Government in Republican China Part 18

_The Problems of Government in China_

Among the governmental problems confronting China the acquisition of national territorial sovereignty stands out. Ever since the establishment of the Republic the Chinese have grown acutely conscious of the fact that some of their most important economic centers have been lifted out of the national territory. Sun Yat-sen realized in the frustration of his first efforts toward republicanization and social policy that the problems of internal government could not be settled unless the people as a whole were free. Without general freedom there could be no question of democracy, no question of a coordinated plan for the realization of the _min sheng_ principle.[1] Observing the intimate relation between the _tuchuns_ and the foreign interests, which often favored them, Sun and his followers began to stress their nationalist role. With the j.a.panese invasion of the Northeast in 1931, of Shanghai in 1932, of Inner Mongolia and North China in the following years, and of China as a whole in 1937, the issue of territorial sovereignty has become the most important one of all. Until it is settled, all other questions must necessarily be considered in their relation to it.

Second, the question of economic sustenance and development is becoming pressing. Without an adequate economic base, the Chinese population lives under the constant threat of simply starving to death. Military difficulties emphasize this problem; in fact, military effectiveness and strategy will have to depend upon the physical existence of the people in and behind the lines. The Chinese ma.s.ses have lived close to the edge of starvation for a long time. As a consequence, the Chinese cannot wage war but in close proximity to the point of economic paralysis--plain exhaustion of the physical necessities of life. The economic problem cannot wait for spontaneous self-cure.

Third, the Chinese will have to recognize the need for politicalization of public opinion. They must evolve the faculty of transforming group opinion into governmental or organizational action. They must acquire techniques for group collaboration which will allow them to break down traditional groups into more diversified units--a government commission, a factory workshop, an army unit--without reference to family bonds or village and _hui_ connections. This is less a problem of doctrine or education than one of habit and practice.

Fourth, the restoration of national prestige is necessary to the security of the Chinese nation in the international sphere, and to the wholesome development of the Chinese people within their national boundaries as well. They cannot effectively borrow from the West if they do so reluctantly, overcome by the thought of inferiority or by shame.

Unless they conquer their present handicap, the Chinese will continue to lack self-confidence.

Fifth, the army problem must be solved. In the last a.n.a.lysis, the excess of men under arms damages the Chinese military, as the number of well-equipped effectives remains disproportionately small. The hordes of half-armed soldiers const.i.tute a heavy burden upon the society, reduce the general economic level, and--by affording one particular group a disproportionate opportunity for making its preferences felt--brutalize the operation of public opinion and discourage peaceable group pursuit.

Sixth, the Chinese state--if China is to solve political questions through governmental procedures--must be const.i.tuted as a clear and legal ent.i.ty. The old imperial society of China was able to dispense with law through reliance upon social forces expressing themselves in a large number of small but stable units. If these disappear the question arises: How can the individual conceive clearly his relationships within Chinese society? Systematized modern organization requires a legal framework.

_The Question of Chinese Political Survival_

That the Chinese will survive, biologically, as a race--this no one doubts. That the Chinese will survive culturally is more open to question. The Chinese absorbed all their conquerors of the past because the country was large, because the people were extraordinarily h.o.m.ogeneous in ideology and habit, because the Chinese were wealthier than their conquerors and more cultured. Absorption or cultural extinction is not a matter of race; it is a question of ideology, of thought and the habits which arise from ways of thought. What ways of thought are there today that will absorb the conquerors? What ways of thought are there that the conquerors might tear apart from the long past, to change China into a mere geographical expression?

In the past, China has been conquered by invaders who accepted the Chinese estimate of China, and who reciprocated the Chinese self-esteem with a deep admiration for Chinese culture. China's modern invaders bring with them a veritable cult of national self-aggrandizement. Their fondness for the Chinese past is mixed with contempt for modern China.

Will the Chinese preserve their national equanimity and sanity in the face of such an att.i.tude? Much depends upon their military and political fortune and its effect upon their confidence.

Government in the Republican era demonstrates the fertility and inventiveness of the Chinese mind in building political and administrative inst.i.tutions and in finding means of uniting and controlling the Chinese as a people. When the chaos from which they have been emerging is considered, their recent accomplishments are an attestation of political ability. The National Government and the Chinese Soviet Republic were worthy adversaries; each met disastrous odds, not the least of which was the other. Their governmental forms may be destroyed and yet reappear so long as the Chinese remain Chinese in the sense of their long past. Sun Yat-sen expressed his countrymen's elementary social and national consciousness, so different from the feverish nationalism of the West, in very clear language:

Suppose that we, Chinese, were naturalized English or Americans and helped England or America to conquer China on the principle that we accept cosmopolitanism, would our consciences, I ask you, be at rest or not? If our consciences troubled us, that would be a sign that we have nationalism; nationalism would trouble our consciences.[2]

Such nationalism may prove indestructible. With democracy and _min sheng_ as nationalism's corollaries, China promises to contribute a gift of peace and political intelligence to the world, and may yet return to her ancient role as the pacific preceptress of nations.

NOTES

[1] See above, pp. 41 ff.

[2] Paschal M. d'Elia, S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, p. 132, Wuchang, 1931.

CHRONOLOGY OF DYNASTIES

This is the accepted time scheme in China. The dates are the Western equivalents of the most widely current Chinese computation, which is known to be incorrect or haphazard from the eighth century B.C. back.

The periods given for the dynasties are chronological formulas rather than the exact expression of political realities. For a discussion of the materials of Chinese historiography, see Charles S. Gardner, _Chinese Traditional Historiography_, Cambridge, 1938. For an excellent short summary of Chinese history, see the "Historical Sketch" by Lei Hai-tsung in _The Chinese Year Book_, 1936-1937, Shanghai. Chronologies are to be found in the major Chinese-English dictionaries, and--among many others--in Leon Wieger, S. J., _La Chine a travers les ages_, Hsien-hsien, 1920, where they are accompanied by a great deal of the old-style, uncritical, but nevertheless informative, Chinese scholarship.