Ghost Wars Part 23

48. Interview with Bhutto, May 5, 2002. Quotations from Talbott meeting are from a State Department cable of February 21, 1996, decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive. Bhutto's comments to Wilson and Brown are from a State Department cable, April 14, 1996.

49. Interview with former senator Hank Brown, February 5, 2003, by telephone (GW). Brown was one of the very few elected politicians in Washington to pay attention to Afghanistan during this period. "I just get a lump in my throat every time I think about it, but Afghanistan really is the straw that broke the camel's back in the Cold War," he recalled. "If there ever was a people in this world that we're indebted to, it would be the people of Afghanistan. And for us to turn our backs on them, it was just criminal. Who's done more to help us? It really is a disgrace what we did."

CHAPTER 17: "DANGLING THE CARROT".

1. Miller's background, outlook, and involvement with the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Pakistan pipeline deal are from the author's interview with Miller, September 23, 2002, Austin, Texas (SC and GW).

2. In Unocal's 1994 10-K, the company explained its losses by saying that "the 1994 operating earnings reflected higher natural gas production, higher foreign crude oil production, stronger earnings from agricultural products, and lower domestic oil and gas operating and depreciation expense. However, these positive factors could not make up for the lower crude oil and natural gas prices, and lower margins in the company's West Coast refining and marketing operations." Two years later, in 1996, the company sold its refining and marketing operations to focus more exclusively on international exploration and development.

3. The company's 1996 annual report was t.i.tled "A New World, A New Unocal," and it detailed a major turnaround in the company's business strategy.

4. For a detailed discussion of the stranded energy reserves of the Caspian region and the dilemma faced by Turkmenistan in particular, see Ahmed Rashid's Taliban: Militant Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, pp. 143-56. pp. 143-56.

5. Ibid., p. 168.

6. Interview with Miller, September 23, 2002.

7. That the control tower was built on the wrong side is from Steve LeVine, The Washington The Washington Post, Post, November 11, 1994. LeVine quotes a Western diplomat as saying, "The builders warned them, but the Turkmen said, 'It looks better this way.' " Other colorful depictions of Niyazov's post-Soviet rule include Alessandra Stanley, November 11, 1994. LeVine quotes a Western diplomat as saying, "The builders warned them, but the Turkmen said, 'It looks better this way.' " Other colorful depictions of Niyazov's post-Soviet rule include Alessandra Stanley, The New York Times, The New York Times, November 23, 1995; Daniel Sneider, November 23, 1995; Daniel Sneider, The The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1996; and Robert G. Kaiser, March 25, 1996; and Robert G. Kaiser, The Washington Post, The Washington Post, July 8, 2002. July 8, 2002.

8. The numbers on trade between the United States and the Central Asian republics are from the testimony of James F. Collins, the State Department's senior coordinator for the new independent states, before the House International Relations Committee, November 14, 1995.

9. "Promote the independence . . ." is from the testimony of Sheila Heslin, former National Security Council staffer, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, September 17, 1997. The a.s.sistance of the U.S. amba.s.sador and others in the government to Unocal is from the interview with Miller, September 23, 2002, and American government officials. For an examination of U.S. energy strategy in the region, see Dan Morgan and David Ottaway, The Washington The Washington Post, Post, September 22, 1997. September 22, 1997.

10. Interview with a senior Saudi official.

11. Author's interview with Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto, May 5, 2002, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (GW). Bhutto would only say that Bulgheroni's Bridas visited her "through one of the Muslim Arab leaders." In a separate interview, however, Turki said that he was the one who made Bulgheroni's introductions with the Pakistani leadership.

12. Platt's Oilgram News, Platt's Oilgram News, October 23, 1995. October 23, 1995.

13. Dan Morgan and David Ottaway, The The Washington Post, Washington Post, October 5, 1998. Kissinger quoted Dr. Samuel Johnson, who was commenting on a man who had wed for a second time immediately after the end of a miserable first marriage. October 5, 1998. Kissinger quoted Dr. Samuel Johnson, who was commenting on a man who had wed for a second time immediately after the end of a miserable first marriage.

14. Robert Baer, See No Evil, See No Evil, pp. xix and 244. pp. xix and 244.

15. Raphel's views on the pipeline and her activities in support of it are from interviews with a senior Clinton administration official. "We were all aware that business advocacy was part of our portfolio," the official said. "We were doing it for that reason, and we could choose Unocal because they were the only American company."

16. Simons's background, his tenure as amba.s.sador, and his perspective on the pipeline are from the author's interview with Tom Simons, August 19, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC).

17. Ibid. More than half a decade after the fact, Bhutto spoke with indignation about those who invoked her husband's name to get her to change sides: "They started saying my husband is interested [in Bridas] and that's why I'm not going to [cancel the MOU with Bridas], which made me really, really upset because I felt that because I am a woman, they're trying to get back at me through my husband. But nonetheless, the fact of the matter was that it had nothing to do with my husband. It had to do with an Arab leader. It had to do with the country he represented. And the fact that [Bridas] had come first. I mean, they're wanting us to break a legal contract . . ."

18. Interview with a Pakistani government official.

19. Interviews with Bhutto, May 5, 2002, and Simons, August 19, 2002. Despite the contentious nature of the meeting, Bhutto and Simons provided similar accounts, with neither one attempting to mask just how poorly it had gone. Simons described it as "a disastrous meeting," and Bhutto called it "a low point in our relations with America."

20. The account of the Unocal-Delta expedition into Afghanistan is based on the author's interview with Miller, September 23, 2002, interviews with Delta's American representative, Charlie Santos, in New York on August 19 and 23, 2002, and again on February 22, 2003 (GW).

21. A copy of the Unocal support agreement was provided to the author. The agreement contained the caveat that "a condition for implementation of the pipeline projects is the establishment of a single, internationally recognized ent.i.ty authorized to act on behalf of all Afghan parties." The word ent.i.ty ent.i.ty was deliberately used instead of was deliberately used instead of government government to give Unocal some wiggle room down the line. to give Unocal some wiggle room down the line.

22. In June, Santos returned to Kandahar without Miller and stayed for more than a week, to try one more time to get the Taliban to sign the support agreement. Finally, Santos got fed up and tore into one of the Taliban negotiators: "We've been sitting here for ten days, and you keep saying, 'Wait another day. Wait another day. Wait another day.' I'm going! This is bulls.h.i.t! Forget this project!" With that he went out to his car and started to drive away. As he did, he saw one of the Taliban in his rearview mirror yelling for him not to go. After several more hours of negotiations, the Taliban at last agreed to sign a handwritten two-sentence statement saying that they supported the concept of the pipeline, but nothing more.

CHAPTER 18: "WE COULDN'T INDICT HIM".

1. Interview with Marty Miller, September 23, 2002, Austin, Texas (SC and GW).

2. Interview with Tom Simons, August 19, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC).

3. Interviews with several U.S. officials familiar with the CIA-ISI liaison during this period. Rana's professional background is from Pakistani journalist Kamran Khan. Rana's outlook is from interviews with U.S. officials and also an interview with his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi (Ret.), May 19, 2002, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (SC). He recalled that ISI had come under "tremendous fire" in Pakistan because of the raid in Quetta in search of Kasi that had been based on faulty information.

4. Interviews with U.S. officials.

5. "All the way down to the bare bones" is from The New York Times, The New York Times, April 27, 1995. The portrait of Deutch here is drawn from multiple published sources and interviews with former colleagues of Deutch at the White House and the CIA. Moynihan's legislation was introduced in January 1995: April 27, 1995. The portrait of Deutch here is drawn from multiple published sources and interviews with former colleagues of Deutch at the White House and the CIA. Moynihan's legislation was introduced in January 1995: Los Angeles Los Angeles Times, Times, October 8, 1995. October 8, 1995.

6. "A technical guy" is from The New York The New York Times Magazine, Times Magazine, December 10, 1995. "From what I know" is from his confirmation hearing, December 10, 1995. "From what I know" is from his confirmation hearing, The New York Times, The New York Times, April 27, 1995. April 27, 1995.

7. Twelve case officers in training and eight hundred worldwide is from Bob Woodward, The Washington Post, The Washington Post, November 17, 2001, confirmed by interviews with U.S. officials. That this represented about a 25 percent decline from the Cold War's peak is from interviews with U.S. officials. See also testimony of George Tenet before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. "California hot tub stuff " is from an interview with a Directorate of Operations officer who retired during this period. November 17, 2001, confirmed by interviews with U.S. officials. That this represented about a 25 percent decline from the Cold War's peak is from interviews with U.S. officials. See also testimony of George Tenet before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. "California hot tub stuff " is from an interview with a Directorate of Operations officer who retired during this period.

8. Interview with Fritz Ermath, January 7, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC).

9. Portrait of White House terrorism a.n.a.lysis, Clinton's interest in biological terrorism, and policy review in the first half of 1995 are from interviews with former Clinton administration officials.

10. "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June 21, 1995, redacted version decla.s.sified and publicly released. Context for the decision directive's issuance can be found in Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred The Age of Sacred Terror, Terror, pp. 229-30. Benjamin and Simon arrived in the White House counterterrorism office soon after the new policy took effect. pp. 229-30. Benjamin and Simon arrived in the White House counterterrorism office soon after the new policy took effect.

11. The UBL acronym as the ultimate sign of importance is from an interview with Anthony Lake, May 5, 2003, Washington, D.C. (GW). That the bin Laden unit was formally known as the bin Laden Issue Station is from the testimony of George Tenet, Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. That the Counterterrorist Center's bin Laden unit began with about twelve people is from the National Commission's final report. That it was a "virtual station" and a management prototype is from interviews with U.S. officials. That the NSA had tapped bin Laden's satellite telephone during this period is from James Bamford, The Washington Post, The Washington Post, June 2, 2002. The bin Laden issue station's startup was accompanied by cla.s.sified White House directives that delineated the scope of its mission. Whether this initial doc.u.ment authorized active disruption operations against bin Laden's network is not clear. At least some authorities beyond normal intelligence collection may have been provided to the CIA by President Clinton at this stage, but the precise scope is not known. June 2, 2002. The bin Laden issue station's startup was accompanied by cla.s.sified White House directives that delineated the scope of its mission. Whether this initial doc.u.ment authorized active disruption operations against bin Laden's network is not clear. At least some authorities beyond normal intelligence collection may have been provided to the CIA by President Clinton at this stage, but the precise scope is not known.

12. "One of the most significant" is from "Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," CIA a.s.sessment released publicly in 1996. Clarke quotations from his written testimony to the National Commission, March 24, 2004. See also National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 4. "Let's yank on this bin Laden chain" is from the author's interview with a former Clinton administration official.

13. The account in this chapter of internal U.S. deliberations surrounding bin Laden's expulsion from Sudan is based on interviews with eight senior American officials directly involved as well as Saudi and Sudanese officials. Among those who agreed to be interviewed on the record was former U.S. amba.s.sador to Sudan Timothy Carney, July 31, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). Carney provided the chronology of the Emergency Action Committee's decision-making and cables to Washington. Benjamin and Simon, strongly defending White House decision-making during this episode, provide a detailed account in Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 244-45. "He says that . . . to kill him either" is from an interview with a former Clinton administration official. The plot against Lake probably originated with Hezbollah, not bin Laden, according to former officials. At one stage the plot became so serious that Lake moved out of his suburban home and authorized a countersurveillance effort aimed at detecting his a.s.sa.s.sins. This security effort required Lake to authorize secret wiretaps of all his telephones. In 1970, Lake was subject to a secret FBI wiretap by the Nixon administration after he resigned his job as Henry Kissinger's special a.s.sistant and then went to work for Democratic presidential candidate Edmund Muskie. In 1995, Lake sat at Kissinger's old desk in the Old Executive Office Building as he signed the papers authorizing wiretaps of his own phones. He looked up at the FBI agents, according to one account, and said, "You know, there's a certain irony to all this." The FBI agent reportedly replied in a deadpan tone, "Oh, we know, sir." pp. 244-45. "He says that . . . to kill him either" is from an interview with a former Clinton administration official. The plot against Lake probably originated with Hezbollah, not bin Laden, according to former officials. At one stage the plot became so serious that Lake moved out of his suburban home and authorized a countersurveillance effort aimed at detecting his a.s.sa.s.sins. This security effort required Lake to authorize secret wiretaps of all his telephones. In 1970, Lake was subject to a secret FBI wiretap by the Nixon administration after he resigned his job as Henry Kissinger's special a.s.sistant and then went to work for Democratic presidential candidate Edmund Muskie. In 1995, Lake sat at Kissinger's old desk in the Old Executive Office Building as he signed the papers authorizing wiretaps of his own phones. He looked up at the FBI agents, according to one account, and said, "You know, there's a certain irony to all this." The FBI agent reportedly replied in a deadpan tone, "Oh, we know, sir."

14. Interview with Carney, July 31, 2002.

15. Ibid.

16. Interviews with former Clinton administration officials directly involved in the discussions.

17. "An emba.s.sy is a tool" is from the interview with Carney, July 31, 2002.

18. That the dinner was on February 6, 1996, is from Barton Gellman, The Washington The Washington Post, Post, October 3, 2001. Carney, writing with Mansoor Ijaz, has also published a brief account of his partic.i.p.ation, in October 3, 2001. Carney, writing with Mansoor Ijaz, has also published a brief account of his partic.i.p.ation, in The Washington The Washington Post, Post, June 30, 2002. June 30, 2002.

19. Gellman, The Washington Post, The Washington Post, October 3, 2001, and Carney, October 3, 2001, and Carney, The Washington Post, The Washington Post, June 30, 2002; also Benjamin and Simon, June 30, 2002; also Benjamin and Simon, Age Age of Sacred Terror, of Sacred Terror, pp. 246-47. The original doc.u.ment was published by pp. 246-47. The original doc.u.ment was published by The Washington Post The Washington Post in October 2001. Clinton administration officials confirmed its authenticity in interviews and described the doc.u.ment's origins in a series of working group meetings led by the National Security Council. in October 2001. Clinton administration officials confirmed its authenticity in interviews and described the doc.u.ment's origins in a series of working group meetings led by the National Security Council.

20. Time, Time, May 6, 1996. May 6, 1996.

21. "We told the Americans" is from an interview with a Sudanese official. No "reliable evidence" is from the National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 3.

22. Interviews with U.S. officials involved. See also, National Commission staff statement no. 5, p. 4.

23. Ibid.

24. The contact with Egypt and Jordan is from an interview with a U.S. official. "To keep him moving" is from the interview with Lake, May 5, 2003. "[W]ere afraid it was . . . done anything to us" is from a speech by Clinton in October 2001 to the Washington Society of a.s.sociation Executives, quoted in USA Today, USA Today, November 12, 2001. November 12, 2001.

25. Interview with Prince Turki, August 2, 2002, Cancun, Mexico (SC).

26. "Never mentioned . . . send him away" is from "Hunting bin Laden," Frontline, Frontline, March 21, 2000. The Sudanese official's account from an interview with the author. March 21, 2000. The Sudanese official's account from an interview with the author.

27. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, excerpts from Al-Sharaq al-Awsat, Al-Sharaq al-Awsat, June 18, 1996. BBC translation. June 18, 1996. BBC translation.

28. Badeeb Orbit interview, early 2002. Original Arabic language tape supplied to the author by Badeeb. See notes to chapter 4.

29. Interviews with former Clinton administration officials. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Age of Sacred Terror, Sacred Terror, pp. 463-64. In June 1996, Carney visited Deutch and Tenet at CIA headquarters to discuss reopening the Khartoum emba.s.sy. By this time Carney was based in Nairobi and traveling occasionally to the Sudanese capital. Carney recalls that Deutch and Tenet were now ready to support reopening the emba.s.sy. Tenet said, by Carney's account, that "it was time to get the U.S. government back in, and we need to do it now." Carney said that in an election year, "I can't imagine the administration would want to take a chance that Sudan would somehow become a campaign issue" by taking the risk to reopen the emba.s.sy. Carney said, "Let's hold off until after the election and then do it." But Tenet, by Carney's account, replied, "No, we need to do it now." The emba.s.sy, however, remained closed. pp. 463-64. In June 1996, Carney visited Deutch and Tenet at CIA headquarters to discuss reopening the Khartoum emba.s.sy. By this time Carney was based in Nairobi and traveling occasionally to the Sudanese capital. Carney recalls that Deutch and Tenet were now ready to support reopening the emba.s.sy. Tenet said, by Carney's account, that "it was time to get the U.S. government back in, and we need to do it now." Carney said that in an election year, "I can't imagine the administration would want to take a chance that Sudan would somehow become a campaign issue" by taking the risk to reopen the emba.s.sy. Carney said, "Let's hold off until after the election and then do it." But Tenet, by Carney's account, replied, "No, we need to do it now." The emba.s.sy, however, remained closed.

30. Interview with a Sudanese official.

31. "Sudan is not a good . . ." is from "Hunting bin Laden," Frontline, Frontline, March 21, 2000. The information from the Sudanese official is from the author's interview. This account tracks with multiple published accounts, including some drawing on Afghan sources in Jalalabad where the flights landed. March 21, 2000. The information from the Sudanese official is from the author's interview. This account tracks with multiple published accounts, including some drawing on Afghan sources in Jalalabad where the flights landed.

32. Badeeb Orbit interview, early 2002. Turki confirmed Badeeb's account of the Qatar stopover in an interview with the author, August 2, 2002. Turki blamed Qatar's decision on the tiny emirate's history of nipping at the heels of its larger Saudi neighbor. For the conclusion of American investigators, see National Commission staff statement no. 5, p. 4, and the final report, p.63.

33. Interviews with U.S. officials involved.

34. Robert Fisk, The Independent, The Independent, July 10, 1996. July 10, 1996.

35. This account of the failed attempt to arrest Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Qatar is drawn mainly from the interviews with U.S. officials. See also the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, pp. 310-13 and the National Commission's staff statement no. 5, pp. 2-3. For how Mohammed was a.s.signed within CTC, see the commission's final report, p. 276. James Risen and David Johnston published an excellent account of the episode in The New York Times, The New York Times, March 8, 2003. The quotations from Freeh's letter are from their account. March 8, 2003. The quotations from Freeh's letter are from their account.

36. Kathy Gannon, a.s.sociated Press, July 11, 1996. Sudan's government formally reported to the United Nations on June 3, 1996, that bin Laden had left that country for Afghanistan. Initial press reports from Pakistan quoted Pakistani intelligence and religious party leaders as saying that bin Laden's arrival in Afghanistan had been facilitated in part by his former allies from the anti-Soviet jihad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami.

37. Interview with Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service terrorism a.n.a.lyst, August 27, 2002,Washington,D.C. (GW).

38. United Press International, June 7, 1996.

39. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, pp. 41-42; Barnett R. Rubin, pp. 41-42; Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, of Afghanistan, p. xv; Michael Griffin, p. xv; Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, Reaping the Whirlwind, p. 65. p. 65.

40. Quotations from Raphel's meetings and Simons's cables from "A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan," decla.s.sified cable, April 22, 1996, released by the National Security Archive. Ma.s.soud's perspective is from interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud.

41. "Has become a conduit for drugs" is from Robin Raphel's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, June 6, 1996. "Concerned that economic opportunities" and "will be very good" are from Rashid, Taliban, Taliban, pp. 45 and 166. Raphel's comment to a Russian counterpart from State Department cable of May 13, 1996, decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive. pp. 45 and 166. Raphel's comment to a Russian counterpart from State Department cable of May 13, 1996, decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive.

42. Life expectancy is from Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 135. That Afghanistan was 173 is from Raphel, Senate Subcommittee testimony, June 6, 1996. p. 135. That Afghanistan was 173 is from Raphel, Senate Subcommittee testimony, June 6, 1996.

43. Interview with Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto, May 5, 2002, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (GW). That all the while Bhutto continued to lie: In meetings in Islamabad in the spring of 1996 with one of their strongest supporters in the U.S. Congress, Senator Hank Brown, Bhutto and her aides denied providing any aid to the Taliban. On June 26, 1996, Bhutto's amba.s.sador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, testified at a congressional hearing: "Pakistan, let me state emphatically, does not provide arms or ammunition to any faction."

44. Interview with Simons, August 19, 2002.

45. Interviews with U.S. officials. Steve Le- Vine of Newsweek Newsweek first reported publicly on bin Laden's large payments to the Taliban, on October 13, 1997. National Commission investigators describe bin Laden's 1996 financial problems in staff statement no. 15, although they provide no a.s.sessment of any payments to the Taliban. Given his $1 million allowance for more than ten years, $3 million would not be an exorbitant sum for bin Laden even in tight times. But it is not clear what contributions he made, if any, or where they came from. first reported publicly on bin Laden's large payments to the Taliban, on October 13, 1997. National Commission investigators describe bin Laden's 1996 financial problems in staff statement no. 15, although they provide no a.s.sessment of any payments to the Taliban. Given his $1 million allowance for more than ten years, $3 million would not be an exorbitant sum for bin Laden even in tight times. But it is not clear what contributions he made, if any, or where they came from.

46. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Holy War, Inc., p. 28. Benjamin and Simon, p. 28. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 134. p. 134.

47. The Ma.s.soud quotes and tactical details are from Davis, "How the Taliban Became a Military Force," in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Fundamentalism Reborn, Reborn, pp. 65-67. Ahmed Rashid writes in the same volume, p. 87, on the role of Pakistani intelligence during this period: "The ISI played a leading role in helping the Taliban's capture of Jalalabad and Kabul, first by helping subvert the Jalalabad pp. 65-67. Ahmed Rashid writes in the same volume, p. 87, on the role of Pakistani intelligence during this period: "The ISI played a leading role in helping the Taliban's capture of Jalalabad and Kabul, first by helping subvert the Jalalabad Shura Shura and offering its members sanctuary in Pakistan, and then allowing the Taliban to reinforce their a.s.sault on Kabul by fresh troops drawn from Afghan refugee camps on the border." and offering its members sanctuary in Pakistan, and then allowing the Taliban to reinforce their a.s.sault on Kabul by fresh troops drawn from Afghan refugee camps on the border."

48. Ibid.

49. Najibullah's translation and comment are from The Guardian, The Guardian, October 12, 1996, and from an interview with a U.N. official who visited Najibullah. October 12, 1996, and from an interview with a U.N. official who visited Najibullah.

50. Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, Reaping the Whirlwind, p. 3. p. 3.

51. Quotations ibid., pp. 6-7.

52. Nancy Hatch Dupree, "Afghan Women Under the Taliban," in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Fundamentalism Reborn, Reborn, p. 156, citing United Nations human rights reporting. p. 156, citing United Nations human rights reporting.

53. All quotations are from "Dealing with the Taliban in Kabul," a State Department cable from Washington to Islamabad and other emba.s.sies, September 28, 1996, decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive.

54. Simons's remarks from "Amba.s.sador Meets the Taliban," State Department cable of November 12, 1996, decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive. Simons also discussed the meeting in an interview. Christopher's letter and Raphel-Karzai from "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Osama bin Laden," State Department memo decla.s.sified and released by the National Security Archive.

55. Rashid, Taliban, Taliban, p. 178, and Richard MacKenzie, "The United States and the Taliban," in Maley, ed., p. 178, and Richard MacKenzie, "The United States and the Taliban," in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn, Fundamentalism Reborn, p. 91. p. 91.

CHAPTER 19: "WE'RE KEEPING THESE STINGERS".

1. Schroen's trip to Kabul and his discussions with Ma.s.soud are described in detail in the Prologue.

2. Interviews with U.S. officials.

3. Interviews with U.S., Pakistani, Saudi, and Afghan intelligence officials involved with the Stinger program.

4. Interviews with U.S. officials.

5. "The U.S. does not support," Agence Agence France Presse, France Presse, October 24, 1996. "Impossible to justify" is from Dupree, in William Maley, ed., October 24, 1996. "Impossible to justify" is from Dupree, in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn, Fundamentalism Reborn, p. 149. p. 149.

6. "Fanatically neutral" is from The New The New York Times, York Times, October 23, 1996. October 23, 1996.

7. The Washington Post, The Washington Post, October 7, 1996. October 7, 1996.

8. This account of Schroen's visit to Kandahar is from interviews with U.S. officials.

9. "We're keeping these Stingers" is from an interview with Gary Schroen, May 7, 2002, Washington D.C. (SC).