Ghost Wars Part 19

2. Interview with Ahmed Wali Ma.s.soud, May 7, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

3. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, pp. 83, 218, and 221. pp. 83, 218, and 221.

4. Interview with Zia Mojadedi, May 14, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW). Mojadedi was an agriculture professor during the 1960s and 1970s at Kabul University. In 1969, future Afghan leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was among his students. Mojadedi recalls that his student was "highly volatile." For a detailed discussion of the growing chasm between the Islamists and the communists during the 1960s and 1970s in Afghanistan-and particularly at Kabul University-see Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pp. 81-105. pp. 81-105.

5. Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, Civil War, p. 38. p. 38.

6. This account of the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood and the group's early history is drawn in part from Mary Anne Weaver, A Portrait of Egypt, A Portrait of Egypt, pp. 26-29, and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, pp. 26-29, and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age The Age of Sacred Terror, of Sacred Terror, pp. 57-59. pp. 57-59.

7. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Knights Under the Prophet's Banner. Prophet's Banner. Extracts from this book ma.n.u.script were published by Al-Sharq al-Awsat; FBIS translation, December 2001. Ya.s.ser Arafat was drawn to the Muslim Brotherhood while serving as a young lieutenant in the Egyptian army; he was arrested twice for Brotherhood activities. Later he turned toward secular leftist politics. Extracts from this book ma.n.u.script were published by Al-Sharq al-Awsat; FBIS translation, December 2001. Ya.s.ser Arafat was drawn to the Muslim Brotherhood while serving as a young lieutenant in the Egyptian army; he was arrested twice for Brotherhood activities. Later he turned toward secular leftist politics.

8. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 65. p. 65.

9. Weaver, Portrait of Egypt, Portrait of Egypt, pp. 28-29. pp. 28-29.

10. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 83. p. 83.

11. Interview with Ali Ashgar Payman, May 7, 2002,Kabul, Afghanistan (GW). Payman, a deputy planning minister in the interim government of 2002, was a contemporary of Hekmatyar's at Kabul University.

12. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, Reaping the Whirlwind, pp. 17-18. pp. 17-18.

13. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pp. 103-4. pp. 103-4.

14. There are accounts of Ma.s.soud's 1978 return to Afghanistan in William Branigin's October 18, 1983, dispatch from the Panjshir for The Washington Post The Washington Post and in Jon Lee Anderson's and in Jon Lee Anderson's The Lion's Grave, The Lion's Grave, pp. 218-19. pp. 218-19.

15. That the Soviets didn't initially intend to use their own troops against the mujahedin is from "The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani," Moscow, GPI, "Iskon," 1995, pp. 176-77, translated by Svetlana Savran-skaya, National Security Archive.

16. Edward Girardet, The Christian Science The Christian Science Monitor, Monitor, September 23, 1981. Girardet was the first Western journalist to provide a detailed account of Ma.s.soud's war in the Panjshir. September 23, 1981. Girardet was the first Western journalist to provide a detailed account of Ma.s.soud's war in the Panjshir.

17. Vasiliy Mitrokhin, "The KGB in Afghanistan," p. 134.

18. Sebastian Junger, Fire, Fire, p. 201. p. 201.

19. William Dowell, Time, Time, July 5, 1982. On his way into Afghanistan from Pakistan, Dowell was escorted by a group of Ma.s.soud's men. At one point, the mujahedin pa.s.sed within a few feet of an Afghan army fort. To Dowell's astonishment, instead of opening fire, the soldiers inside the fort waved and smiled. July 5, 1982. On his way into Afghanistan from Pakistan, Dowell was escorted by a group of Ma.s.soud's men. At one point, the mujahedin pa.s.sed within a few feet of an Afghan army fort. To Dowell's astonishment, instead of opening fire, the soldiers inside the fort waved and smiled.

20. Girardet, Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1981. September 24, 1981.

21. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pp. 234-37, describes Ma.s.soud's military and civil organization in the Panjshir, especially as it compared to Hekmatyar's organization in Pakistan. The quotations are from Roy, pp. 234-37, describes Ma.s.soud's military and civil organization in the Panjshir, especially as it compared to Hekmatyar's organization in Pakistan. The quotations are from Roy, Afghanistan, Afghanistan, pp. 63-64. pp. 63-64.

22. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 220. p. 220.

23. United Press International, May 24, 1983.

24. Interview with Brig. Gen. Syed Raza Ali (Ret.), ISI, May 20, 2002, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (SC). Raza worked in ISI's Afghan bureau from the early 1980s through the Soviet withdrawal.

25. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 232. p. 232.

26. Interview with an Arab journalist then in Peshawar.

27. Interview with Graham Fuller, 1992.

28. Interview with a U.S. official.

29. Interview with William Piekney, January 14, 2002, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC).

30. Interview with Abdullah, May 8, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

31. Ibid. The a.s.sa.s.sination attempt is from The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1984, and May 2, 1984, and The Washington Post, The Washington Post, May 2, 1984. May 2, 1984.

32. Patricia I. Sethi, Newsweek, Newsweek, June 11, 1984. June 11, 1984.

33. Edward Girardet, Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 1984. October 2, 1984.

34. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After," Secret, May 1985.

35. This summary of Ma.s.soud's relations with the British and French is based on interviews with U.S. officials, Yahya Ma.s.soud (who handled the liaison with the British), May 2002, and Daoud Mir, who later served as Ma.s.soud's representative in France. See also George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, Charlie Wilson's War, pp. 199-200. Yahya Ma.s.soud reported regarding the British, "We had close contact. I can tell you that more than fourteen times I traveled back and forth to the U.K. seeking a.s.sistance. They a.s.sisted us very well. They gave us very special equipment. They gave us military training-not through Pakistan." The quotations regarding "p.e.n.i.s envy" and "trying to find some liberator character" are from an interview with a former CIA officer. pp. 199-200. Yahya Ma.s.soud reported regarding the British, "We had close contact. I can tell you that more than fourteen times I traveled back and forth to the U.K. seeking a.s.sistance. They a.s.sisted us very well. They gave us very special equipment. They gave us military training-not through Pakistan." The quotations regarding "p.e.n.i.s envy" and "trying to find some liberator character" are from an interview with a former CIA officer.

36. Interview with Afghan amba.s.sador to India Ma.s.soud Khalili, May 28, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

37. "Playing their own game" is from the interview with Syed Raza Ali, May 20, 2002. That the CIA began unilateral supplies to Ma.s.soud in 1984 is from the author's interview with former CIA Near East Division chief Thomas Twetten, March 18, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). Crile, Charlie Wilson's Charlie Wilson's War, War, p. 202, cites Afghan task force chief Avrakatos and also dates the beginning of CIA aid to late 1984. p. 202, cites Afghan task force chief Avrakatos and also dates the beginning of CIA aid to late 1984.

38. "He was never a problem" is from an interview with a U.S. official. "He cannot make a man stronger" is from an interview with Mohammed Yousaf, 1992.

39. Girardet, Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 1984. October 2, 1984.

CHAPTER 7: "THE TERRORISTS WILL OWN THE WORLD".

1. The Anderson quote is from Kirsten Lundberg, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest May, "Politics of a Covert Action," Kennedy School of Government Case Program. The account in this chapter about the internal deliberations surrounding NSDD-166 comes from this excellent case study as well as notes and transcripts from the author's original reporting about the decision directive for The The Washington Post Washington Post in July 1992 and more recent interviews by the author with partic.i.p.ants. in July 1992 and more recent interviews by the author with partic.i.p.ants.

2. Quotations in this and preceding paragraph are from Lundberg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action."

3. NSDD-166 and its annex remain cla.s.sified and have never been published. It remains unclear how specific the original authorizations in the annex were and how many of the new CIA practices evolved under interagency review after the decision directive was signed. In interviews conducted in 1992, Mohammed Yousaf dated the arrival of the first burst communications sets to late 1985. U.S. officials interviewed recently by the author authoritatively date the large-scale expansion of the CIA's unilateral recruitment of paid reporting agents on Afghanistan to 1985. A smaller number of such agents had been on the payroll earlier, according to interviews, but after 1985 the ranks grew to the dozens, and monthly stipends began to swell. It is not clear whether this expansion of unilateral agents was explicitly set in motion by NSDD-166's annex. As to the issue of shooting Soviets, Lundberg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action," reports that the decision directive "endorsed direct attacks on Soviet military officers," p. 25. The author interviewed multiple partic.i.p.ants who remember this issue being discussed at the CIA and by the interagency committee, but those interviews did not make clear whether the decision directive itself endorsed such targeted killings. The interviews underlying the Harvard case study do appear authoritative. George Crile's account of the issue, narrated from the perspective of Avrakatos, does not make clear precisely what legal authorities governed his work.

4. Lundberg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action," p. 52.

5. Interviews with U.S. officials.

6. Humphrey's recommendation is from the author's interviews in 1992 with multiple U.S. officials involved in the debate over supplying sniper rifles to the mujahedin.

7. Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, the CIA, pp. 428-29. pp. 428-29.

8. The Pillsbury quote is from Lundberg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action," p. 32. Other details are from the case study and author's interviews with U.S. officials.

9. That the CIA recruited and paid European journalists and travelers to report on Afghanistan is from multiple interviews with U.S. officials, including an interview with Warren Marik, March 11, 2002, Washington, D.C. (SC). That Haq's relationship with Hart was pa.s.sed to Piekney is from the author's interviews with U.S. officials. Haq was by now a celebrated and famous commander. President Reagan praised him at a black-tie dinner in Washington, and Haq later met British prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Although he was an increasingly outspoken critic of Pakistani intelligence and Hekmatyar, Haq did not openly break with the CIA until 1987.

10. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 348. p. 348.

11. "Death by a thousand cuts" is from Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The The Bear Trap, Bear Trap, p. 1. p. 1.

12. Interviews with Mohammed Yousaf in 1992.

13. Artyom Borovik, The Hidden War, The Hidden War, p. 76. The b.o.o.by trap examples from plastic explosives and "Hidden death" are on pp. 35-36. p. 76. The b.o.o.by trap examples from plastic explosives and "Hidden death" are on pp. 35-36.

14. Quotations in this and the preceding paragraph are from the author's interviews with Yousaf, 1992.

15. Najibullah's elevation to the Politburo is from Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, p. 128. The size of Afghan intelligence service, ibid., p. 133. The location of foreign residencies and penetration of mujahedin headquarters is from Vasiliy Mitrokhin, "The KGB in Afghanistan," pp. 151-56. p. 128. The size of Afghan intelligence service, ibid., p. 133. The location of foreign residencies and penetration of mujahedin headquarters is from Vasiliy Mitrokhin, "The KGB in Afghanistan," pp. 151-56.

16. The use of Spetsnaz tactics and "Omsk vans" is from interviews with U.S. officials in 1992. It is also described in detail in Lund-berg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action." Helicopter tactics along Pakistani border and that Spetsnaz troops commandeered pickup trucks and operated in disguise are from Timothy Gusinov, a former Soviet military adviser in Afghanistan, writing in The Washington Times, The Washington Times, November 3, 2001. The KGB's use of false bands is from Mitrokhin, "The KGB in Afghanistan." November 3, 2001. The KGB's use of false bands is from Mitrokhin, "The KGB in Afghanistan."

17. Interviews with U.S. officials.

18. That Afghan fighters rejected suicide missions uniformly is from interviews with Yousaf and with Howard Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, in Virginia (SC), and other U.S. officials.

19. "Most likely use" is from an interview with a U.S. official in 1992, addressing the specific question of sniper rifles, detonator packages, and other "dual use" covert supplies. "These aren't terrorist . . . ever again" is from George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 166. "Do I want . . . spreads fear," ibid., p. 318. Endorsed reward for belt buckles, ibid., p. 350. p. 166. "Do I want . . . spreads fear," ibid., p. 318. Endorsed reward for belt buckles, ibid., p. 350.

20. The Vaughan Forrest quotation is from a telephone interview with Forrest, 1992. "Shooting ducks" and "off Russian generals" are from an interview with a partic.i.p.ant in the debates, 1992.

21. Interviews with multiple U.S. officials involved with the sniper rifle debate, 1992, as well as interviews with Yousaf, 1992, who received the guns and implemented the training.

22. Statistics about Americans abroad in 1985 are from Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Inside Terrorism, p. 150. Habash's quotation from 1970 is also cited in Hoffman, pp. 70-71. He dates Jenkins's seminal formulations to his article "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., p. 150. Habash's quotation from 1970 is also cited in Hoffman, pp. 70-71. He dates Jenkins's seminal formulations to his article "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World International Terrorism and World Security Security . .

23. "The incidents would become" is from Duane R. Clarridge, with Digby Diehl, A Spy A Spy for All Seasons, for All Seasons, p. 320. The account of the Counterterrorist Center's birth, the memo, and the quotations in the following five paragraphs are from Clarridge, ibid., pp. 320-29, and from an interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001, San Diego, California (SC). p. 320. The account of the Counterterrorist Center's birth, the memo, and the quotations in the following five paragraphs are from Clarridge, ibid., pp. 320-29, and from an interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001, San Diego, California (SC).

24. A partially decla.s.sified version of NSDD-207 has been obtained and published by the National Security Archive.

25. "Pretty much anything he wanted" is from Robert Baer, See No Evil, See No Evil, pp. 84-85. "Hit teams" is from the author's interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001. pp. 84-85. "Hit teams" is from the author's interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001.

26. Interview with Robert Gates, March 12, 2002, Cleveland, Ohio (SC).

27. The Baer quotation is from Baer, See No See No Evil, Evil, pp. 84-85. The Cannistraro quotation is from the author's interview with Vincent Cannistraro, January 8, 2002, Rosslyn, Virginia (SC). pp. 84-85. The Cannistraro quotation is from the author's interview with Vincent Cannistraro, January 8, 2002, Rosslyn, Virginia (SC).

28. The use of beacons in planted weapons is from an interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001.

29. That the CIA had no sources in Hezbollah and "absolutely no idea" where the hostages were is from Baer, See No Evil, See No Evil,pp. 86-92. That the Counterterrorist Center was inundated with hoaxes, some mounted by Hezbollah, is from the interview with Cannistraro, January 8, 2002.

30. The trucks and the development of the operation with Delta Force are from the interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001.

31. The account of the Eagle Program, the prototypes, the effort to equip them with cameras, explosives, and rockets is from the interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001.

32. Clarridge, with Diehl, Spy for All Seasons, Spy for All Seasons, p. 339. p. 339.

33. Interview with Yousaf, 1992.

34. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Inside Terrorism, p. 41. p. 41.

35. Counterterrorist branches and priorities are from interviews with Clarridge, December 28, 2001; Cannistraro, January 8, 2002; and Stanley Bedington, a senior a.n.a.lyst at the center from its founding, November 19, 2001, Rosslyn, Virginia (SC).

36. Interview with Clarridge, December 28, 2001.

37. Bedington's recollection that bin Laden's activities were first reported in CIA cables around 1985 is supported by an uncla.s.sified profile of bin Laden released by the agency in 1996. Drawing on agency reporting, the profile says, "By 1985, Bin Laden had drawn on his family's wealth, plus donations received from sympathetic merchant families in the Gulf region, to organize the Islamic Salvation Front. . . ."

38. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 349. p. 349.

CHAPTER 8: "INSHALLAH, YOU WILL KNOW MY PLANS".

1. Interview with Milton Bearden, November 15, 2001, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC). "I want you to go out there and win" is from Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, p. 214. p. 214.

2. "Uncle Milty" is from Robert Baer, See See No Evil, No Evil, p. 142. Other quotations and anecdotes are from interviews with U.S. officials. p. 142. Other quotations and anecdotes are from interviews with U.S. officials.

3. Interview with Milton Bearden, March 25, 2002, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC).

4. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 429. p. 429.

5. Published accounts of the first Stinger shot include Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, The Bear Trap, pp. 175-76, and Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," pp. 175-76, and Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, pp. 21-22. Also Milt Bearden and James Risen, pp. 21-22. Also Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, pp. 248-52. The incoming cable quoted is from Bearden and Risen. That the attack was recorded by a KH-11 is from interviews with U.S. officials. The Bearden quote describing the video is from the interview, November 15, 2001, and Bearden and Risen, pp. 248-52. The incoming cable quoted is from Bearden and Risen. That the attack was recorded by a KH-11 is from interviews with U.S. officials. The Bearden quote describing the video is from the interview, November 15, 2001, and Bearden and Risen, Main Main Enemy, Enemy, p. 252. That Reagan screened biopics of foreign visitors is from Bob Woodward, p. 252. That Reagan screened biopics of foreign visitors is from Bob Woodward, Veil, Veil, p. 249. George Crile, in p. 249. George Crile, in Charlie Charlie Wilson's War, Wilson's War, argues that the crucial groundwork for the introduction of the Stinger was laid by Wilson and his supporters. argues that the crucial groundwork for the introduction of the Stinger was laid by Wilson and his supporters.

6. Cable quoted by Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 430. p. 430.

7. This account of the CIA's agent network is from the author's interviews with three former and current U.S. officials. Interviews conducted by the author with British officials in 1992 also described their liaison with Ma.s.soud but provided no dates. The British liaison appears to have begun very early in the war. According to still-cla.s.sified records of the Afghan covert action program, the CIA received authority to expand its unilateral agent network after NSDD-166 was signed in March 1985, but the Islamabad station would have had standing authority to recruit some agents earlier for routine espionage purposes. That CIA a.s.sistance to Ma.s.soud began in 1984, see note 37 of chapter 6.

8. Interviews with U.S. officials.

9. Ibid.

10. Interview with Bearden, November 15, 2001.

11. That bin Laden's house was in the University Town section of Peshawar is from Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Holy War, Inc., p. 56. The description of the neighborhood is from the author's visits. p. 56. The description of the neighborhood is from the author's visits.

12. Quotations and dates are from al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner Knights Under the Prophet's Banner . . The English version is from the FBIS translation. The ma.n.u.script appeared to represent an effort by al-Zawahiri to publish a personal memoir and political manifes...o...b..fore he was captured or killed by U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some of the recollections in the ma.n.u.script may be constructed to promote al-Zawahiri's contemporary political agenda, but many of the dates and details of the political and theological arguments he writes about are consistent with other accounts. The English version is from the FBIS translation. The ma.n.u.script appeared to represent an effort by al-Zawahiri to publish a personal memoir and political manifes...o...b..fore he was captured or killed by U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some of the recollections in the ma.n.u.script may be constructed to promote al-Zawahiri's contemporary political agenda, but many of the dates and details of the political and theological arguments he writes about are consistent with other accounts.

13. Azzam's biography details are from Nida'ul Islam, Nida'ul Islam, July-September 1996, and interviews with Arab journalists and activists who asked not to be further identified. See also Bergen, July-September 1996, and interviews with Arab journalists and activists who asked not to be further identified. See also Bergen, Holy War, Holy War, pp. 51-54; Roy, pp. 51-54; Roy, Afghanistan: Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, From Holy War to Civil War, p. 85; Mary Anne Weaver, p. 85; Mary Anne Weaver, The New Yorker, The New Yorker, January 24, 2000. That the Tucson office opened in 1986 is from Judith Miller and Dale Van Natta, January 24, 2000. That the Tucson office opened in 1986 is from Judith Miller and Dale Van Natta, The The New York Times, New York Times, June 9, 2002. June 9, 2002.

14. The Gates quotation is from Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 349. "We should try . . . see them as the enemy" is from an interview with a U.S. official. "Actually did some very good things . . . anti-American" is from Bearden's interview with p. 349. "We should try . . . see them as the enemy" is from an interview with a U.S. official. "Actually did some very good things . . . anti-American" is from Bearden's interview with Frontline, Frontline, "Hunting Bin Laden," March 21, 2000. The description of how the issue was viewed and debated within the U.S. intelligence community is from interviews with former U.S. officials. "Hunting Bin Laden," March 21, 2000. The description of how the issue was viewed and debated within the U.S. intelligence community is from interviews with former U.S. officials.

15. The account here and following of debates between bin Laden, Azzam, and other Arabs in Peshawar is drawn primarily from interviews with Arab journalists and activists who were in Peshawar at the time. Prince Turki described bin Laden's relationship with Azzam and al-Zawahiri in similar terms in an interview on August 2, 2002, Cancun, Mexico: "Bin Laden, I think, liked very much Abdullah Azzam . . . and was taken by the man's eloquence and personality." Published accounts of the debates among Peshawar Arab activists during this period include The New The New York Times, York Times, January 14, 2001. January 14, 2001.

16. "A place steeped in cussedness" is from an interview with Peter Tomsen, former special envoy to the Afghan resistance, May 8, 2003, Washington, D.C. (SC). "Know my plans" is from an interview with an Arab activist who was in Peshawar at the time.