Germany and the Next War Part 6

Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines:

"German majesty and honour Fall not with the princes' crown; When amid the flames of war German Empire crashes down, German greatness stands unscathed." [C]

[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 by Bernhard Suphan.]

The n.o.bler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old importance of our cla.s.sical literature. Again, we have learnt from the vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties towards the human race.

Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be s.n.a.t.c.hed again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions which were once under German influence are now once more subject to Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia.

Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs.

The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America.

The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and thus united, const.i.tute a power in the State, with which the Government must reckon.

Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of universal culture.

Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great compet.i.tion with the other Powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both ent.i.tle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.

Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Inst.i.tute on March 1, 1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D]

[Footnote D: This pa.s.sage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]

That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed.

If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language.

England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the interest of English industries and English capital. The work of civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence.

The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of Heaven." [E]

[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]

The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes under which the part.i.tion of Africa and the last phase of French colonial policy were ended. We may a.s.sume that at first the adherents to Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have obtained the best shares."

This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany.

The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully ent.i.tled not only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Bulow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them.

Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity.

The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more brilliantly a.s.serted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative industrial occupation.

There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the a.s.sured markets which England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of other countries. The livelihood of our working cla.s.ses directly depends on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland.

There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the unfortunate course of our history has. .h.i.therto prevented us from building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, may keep our sea communications open.

We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be."

[F]

[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.]

We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our growing working population, but would supply raw materials and foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German Empire?

These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to political paralysis at the time when the great European States built themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in politics, until late, when the part.i.tion of the globe was long concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers.

It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the straight road of our intended development.

The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword.

CHAPTER V

WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL

In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development.

The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us.

"The man of sense will by the forelock clutch Whatever lies within his power, Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, Nor from his enterprise be thrust, But, having once begun to work, Go working on because he must."

_Faust_ (translated by Sir Theodore Martin).

The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circ.u.mscribed by the hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circ.u.mstances which turn the scale when the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other.

These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion.

We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions.

We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps.

On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories.

There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be a.s.sumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible.

The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire.

Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power.

That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.

The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events.

Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance.

The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions.

The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we calculate on finding in our allies a.s.sistance towards realizing our own political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.

Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of va.s.sal state of France. Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.

England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy a.s.sistance to her policy of development. It is our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can.