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The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into the field.

Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and home duties.

Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and 228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the militia, an uncertain quant.i.ty.

The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not known how they are distributed among the various branches of the service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and national militia, which latter is only available for home service and comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be 400,000 strong.

Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods.

In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery 14,000 men with 700 officers.

For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, 7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 trained men available for service.

Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European States may under some circ.u.mstances be of direct importance to us, if they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a European war.

Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under consideration, and then Belgium.

Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men.

The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a total of 141,000 men.

The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 men.

The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Volkerack and Haringvliet there are various outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland).

Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us.

Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: 26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service.

On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising 74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast fortifications.

Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000 men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special arms.

Sweden can command eight cla.s.ses of the First Ban, which comprises units from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as well as four cla.s.ses of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age.

The eight cla.s.ses of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head.

In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm.

Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could at most be put into the field.

As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours.

This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is. .h.i.therto known about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important factor if allied with the English.

Battle- Armoured Armoured Armoured Protected Number N S Nation. ships Coast Gunboats Cruisers Cruisers of u u above Defence and Torpedo m b 5,000 Vessels Armoured Vessels b m Tons. from Ships e a 3000 Tons under r r to 5,000 3,000 i Tons Tons i +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n No Displ. No Displ. No Displ No Displ. No Displ. From f e 200+ 80- s Tons 200 Tons ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- GERMANY: Ready 25 332,410 5 20,600 - --- 10 114,590 33 122,130 117 70 12 Voted or building 12 --- - --- - --- 4 --- 7 --- 14 -- -- ENGLAND: Ready 50 793,260 - --- - --- 38 484,970 66 333,540 223 36 53 Voted or building 12 286,640 - --- - --- 6 145,320 20 101,320 51 -- 19 FRANCE: Ready 22 314,930 - --- - --- 22 214,670 10 50,780 71 191 52 Voted or building 4 93,880 - --- - --- - --- - --- 13 -- 19 ITALY: Ready 8 96,980 - --- - --- 10 79,530 4 10,040 53 39 7 Voted or building 4 84,000 - --- - --- - --- 3 10,200 14 28 13 AUSTRIA- HUNGARY Ready 11 102,620 - --- - --- 3 18,870 4 10,590 18 66 7 Voted or building 5 94,500 - --- - --- - --- 3 --- 6 -- -- RUSSIA: Baltic Fleet Ready 4 62,300 - --- 1 1,760 6 64,950 4 27,270 60 19 13 Voted or building 8 --- - --- - --- - --- - --- 1 -- 1 Black Sea Fleet Ready 6 72,640 - --- - --- - --- 3 13,620 17 10 4 Voted or building 4 --- - --- - --- - --- - --- 14 -- 7 Siberian Fleet -- --- - --- - --- - --- 2 9,180 20 7 13 UNITED STATES: Ready 30 434,890 4 13,120 - --- 14 181,260 16 65,270 40 28 19 Voted or building 7 190,000 - --- - --- - --- - --- 14 -- 20 j.a.pAN: Ready 13 194,690 2 8,540 - --- 13 139,830 12 49,170 59 49 12 Voted or building 3 --- - --- - --- 4 107,120 3 15,000 2 -- 1 ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---

Let us a.s.sume that in event of war England as well as France must leave a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further a.s.sume that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be superior to us.

As regards _materiel_ and training, it may be a.s.sumed that our fleet is distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.

Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under certain circ.u.mstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.

If we consider from the political standpoint the probable att.i.tude of the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, we may a.s.sume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are very different.

If we look at France first, we are ent.i.tled to a.s.sume that single-handed she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely a.s.sume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of extraordinary efforts.

It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be a.s.sumed that the allied Great Powers would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.

[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.]

England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.

English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France.

The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us.

If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according to available information, show the English army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went.

If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with j.a.pan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.

Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably a.s.sume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.

Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast Empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-j.a.panese War. Under the circ.u.mstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the community. Secondly, in the Far East, j.a.pan or China would seize the moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we have already mentioned.

Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the j.a.panese, have seriously shaken Russia's political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier.

Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars against Turkey and j.a.pan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coute_.

If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.

So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-j.a.panese War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.

When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel successfully the attack of our opponents.

In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.

The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a prey to our enemies.

The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland.

England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides.

This circ.u.mstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.

If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will sooner or later be a.s.serted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of Italy at the conference of Algeciras sufficiently demonstrated. It even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria.

Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.

We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own resolution for victory.

Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circ.u.mstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of desperation. A war fought and lost under such circ.u.mstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind.

This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.

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Germany and the Next War Part 11 summary

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