George Brown Part 7

A strong speech against confederation was made by Dorion, an old friend of Brown, a staunch Liberal, and a representative French-Canadian. He declared that he had seen no ground for changing his opinion on two points--the subst.i.tution of an Upper Chamber, nominated by the Crown, for an elective body; and the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, which he, with other Liberals, had always opposed. He had always admitted that representation by population was a just principle; and in 1856 he had suggested, in the legislature, the subst.i.tution of a federal for a legislative union of the Canadas; or failing this, representation by population, with such checks and guarantees as would secure local rights and interests, and preserve to Lower Canada its cherished inst.i.tutions. When the Brown-Dorion government was formed, he had proposed a federation of the Canadas, but with the distinct understanding that he would not attempt to carry such a measure without the consent of a majority of the people of Lower Canada. From the doc.u.ment issued by the Lower Canadian Liberals in 1859, he quoted a pa.s.sage in which it was laid down that the powers given to the central government should be only those that were essential, and that the local powers should be as ample as possible.

"All that belongs to matters of a purely local character, such as education, the administration of justice, the militia, the laws relating to property, police, etc., ought to be referred to the local governments, whose powers ought generally to extend to all subjects which would not be given to the general government." The vesting of residuary powers in the provinces was an important difference between this and the scheme of confederation; but the point most dwelt upon by Dorion was the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces, which he strongly opposed.

Dorion denied that the difficulty about representation was the source of the movement for confederation. He contended that the agitation for representation by population had died out, and that the real authors of confederation were the owners of the Grand Trunk Railway Company, who stood to gain by the construction of the Intercolonial. "The Tache-Macdonald government were defeated because the House condemned them for taking without authority one hundred thousand dollars out of the public chest for the Grand Trunk Railway, at a time when there had not been a party vote on representation by population for one or two sessions." He declared that Macdonald had, in Brown's committee of 1864, voted against confederation, and that he and his colleagues adopted the scheme simply to enable them to remain in office. Dorion also criticized adversely the change in the const.i.tution of the Upper Chamber, from the elective to the nominative system. The Conservative instincts of Macdonald and Cartier, he said, led them to strengthen the power of the Crown at the expense of the people, and this const.i.tution was a specimen of their handiwork. "With a governor-general appointed by the Crown; with local governors also appointed by the Crown; with legislative councils in the general legislature, and in all the provinces, nominated by the Crown, we shall have the most illiberal const.i.tution ever heard of in any government where const.i.tutional government prevails."

He objected to the power vested in the governor-general-in-council to veto the acts of local legislatures. His expectation was that a minority in the local legislature might appeal to their party friends at Ottawa to veto laws which they disliked, and that thus there would be constant interference, agitation and strife between the central and the local authorities. He suspected that the intention was ultimately to change the federal union to a legislative union. The scheme of confederation was being carried without submission to the people. What would prevent the change from a federal to a legislative union from being accomplished in a similar way? To this the people of Lower Canada would not submit. "A million of inhabitants may seem a small affair to the mind of a philosopher who sits down to write out a const.i.tution. He may think it would be better that there should be but one religion, one language and one system of laws; and he goes to work to frame inst.i.tutions that will bring all to that desirable state; but I can tell the honourable gentleman that the history of every country goes to show that not even by the power of the sword can such changes be accomplished."

With some exaggeration Mr. Dorion struck at real faults in the scheme of confederation. The contention that the plan ought to have been submitted to the people is difficult to meet except upon the plea of necessity, or the plea that the end justifies the means. There was a.s.suredly no warrant for depriving the people of the power of electing the second chamber; and the new method, appointment by the government of the day, has been as unsatisfactory in practice as it was unsound in principle. The federal veto on provincial laws has not been used to the extent that Dorion feared. But when we consider how partisan considerations have governed appointments to the senate, we can scarcely say that there was no ground for the fear that the power of disallowance would be similarly abused. Nor can we say that Mr. Dorion was needlessly anxious about provincial rights, when we remember how persistently these have been attacked, and what strength, skill and resolution have been required to defend them.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MISSION TO ENGLAND

A new turn was given to the debate early in March by the defeat of the New Brunswick government in a general election, which meant a defeat for confederation, and by the arrival of news of an important debate in the House of Lords on the defences of Canada. The situation suddenly became critical. That part of the confederation scheme which related to the Maritime Provinces was in grave danger of failure. At the same time the long-standing controversy between the imperial and colonial authorities as to the defence of Canada had come to a head.

The two subjects were intimately connected. The British government had been led to believe that if confederation were accomplished, the defensive power of Canada would be much increased, and the new union would be ready to a.s.sume larger obligations. From this time the tone of the debate is entirely changed. It ceases to be a philosophic deliberation of the merits of the new scheme. A note of urgency and anxiety is found in the ministerial speeches; the previous question is moved, and the proceedings hurried to a close, amid angry protests from the Opposition.

Mr. Brown wrote on March 5th: "We are going to have a great scene in the House to-day.... The government of New Brunswick appealed to the people on confederation by a general election, and have got beaten.

This puts a serious obstacle in the way of our scheme, and we mean to act promptly and decidedly upon it. At three o'clock we are to announce the necessity of carrying the resolutions at once, sending home a deputation to England, and proroguing parliament without any unnecessary delay--say in a week."

The announcement was made to the House by Attorney-General Macdonald, who laid much stress on the disappointment that would be occasioned in England by the abandonment of a scheme by which Canadian colonies should cease to be a source of embarra.s.sment, and become a source of strength. The question of confederation was intimately connected with the question of defence, and that was a question of the most imminent necessity. The provincial government had been in continued correspondence with the home government as to defence "against every hostile pressure, from whatever source it may come."

A lively debate ensued. John Sandfield Macdonald said that the defeat of the New Brunswick government meant the defeat of the larger scheme of confederation, unless it was intended that the people should be bribed into acquiescence or bullied into submission. "The Hon. Mr.

Tilley and his followers are routed, horse and foot, by the honest people of the province, scouted by those whose interests he had betrayed, and whose behests he had neglected; and I think his fate ought to be a warning to those who adopted this scheme without authority, and who ask the House to ratify it _en bloc_, without seeking to obtain the sanction of the people." Later on he charged the ministers with the intention of manufacturing an entirely new bill, obtaining the sanction of the British government, and forcing it on the Canadian people, as was done in 1840.

This charge was hotly resented by Brown, and it drew from John A.

Macdonald a more explicit statement of the intentions of the government. They would, if the legislature adopted the confederation resolutions, proceed to England, inform the imperial government of what had pa.s.sed in Canada and New Brunswick, and take counsel with that government as to the affairs of Canada, especially in regard to defence and the reciprocity treaty. The legislature would then be called together again forthwith, the report of the conferences in England submitted, and the business relating to confederation completed.

On the following day Macdonald made another announcement, referring to a debate in the House of Lords on February 20th, which he regarded as of the utmost importance. A report made by a Colonel Jervois on the defences of Canada had been published, and the publication, exposing the extreme weakness of Canada, was regarded as an official indiscretion. It a.s.serted that under the arrangements then existing British and Canadian forces together could not defend the colony. Lord Lyveden brought the question up in the House of Lords, and dwelt upon the gravity of the situation created by the defencelessness of Canada and by the hostility of the United States. He held that Great Britain must do one of two things: withdraw her troops and abandon the country altogether, or defend it with the full power of the empire. It was folly to send troops out in driblets, and spend money in the same way.

The Earl de Grey and Ripon, replying for the government, said that Jervois' report contained nothing that was not previously known about the weakness of Canada. He explained the proposed arrangement by which the imperial government was to fortify Quebec at a cost of two hundred thousand pounds, and Canada would undertake the defence of Montreal and the West.[16]

Commenting on a report of this discussion, Mr. Macdonald said there had been negotiations between the two governments, and that he hoped these would result in full provision for the defence of Canada, both east and west. It was of the utmost importance that Canada should be represented in England at this juncture. In order to expedite the debate by shutting out amendments, he moved the previous question.

Macdonald's motion provoked charges of burking free discussion, and counter-charges of obstruction, want of patriotism and inclinations towards annexation. The debate lost its academic calm and became acrimonious. Holton's motion for an adjournment, for the purpose of obtaining further information as to the scheme, was ruled out of order. The same fate befell Dorion's motion for an adjournment of the debate and an appeal to the people, on the ground that it involved fundamental changes in the political inst.i.tutions and political relations of the province; changes not contemplated at the last general election.

On March 12th the main motion adopting the resolutions of the Quebec conference was carried by ninety-one to thirty-three. On the following day an amendment similar to Dorion's, for an appeal to the people, was moved by the Hon. John Hillyard Cameron, of Peel, seconded by Matthew Crooks Cameron, of North Ontario. Undoubtedly the argument for submission to the people was strong, and was hardly met by Brown's vigorous speech in reply. But the overwhelming opinion of the House was against delay, and on March 13th the discussion came to an end.

The prospects for the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces were now poor. Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island withdrew. A strong feeling against confederation was arising in Nova Scotia, and it was proposed there to return to the original idea of a separate maritime union. It was decided to ask the aid of the British government in overcoming the hesitation of the Maritime Provinces. The British authorities were pressing Canada to a.s.sume increased obligations as to defence. Defence depended on confederation, and England, by exercising some friendly pressure on New Brunswick, might promote both objects.

The committee appointed to confer with the British government was composed of Macdonald, Brown, Cartier and Galt. They met in England a committee of the imperial cabinet, Gladstone, Cardwell, the Duke of Somerset and Earl de Grey and Ripon. An agreement was arrived at as to defence. Canada would undertake works of defence at and west of Montreal, and maintain a certain militia force; Great Britain would complete fortifications at Quebec, provide the whole armament and guarantee a loan for the sum necessary to construct the works undertaken by Canada, and in case of war would defend every portion of Canada with all the resources of the empire. An agreement was made as to the acquisition of the Hudson Bay Territory by Canada, and as to the influence to be brought to bear on the Maritime Provinces. "The idea of coercing the Maritime Provinces into the measure was never for a moment entertained." The end sought was to impress upon them the grave responsibility of thwarting a measure so pregnant with future prosperity to British America.

In spite of the mild language used in regard to New Brunswick, the fact that its consent was a vital part of the whole scheme must have been an incentive to heroic measures, and these were taken.

One of the causes of the defeat of the confederation government of New Brunswick had been the active hostility of the lieutenant-governor, Mr. Arthur Hamilton Gordon, son of the Earl of Aberdeen. He was strongly opposed to the change, and is believed to have gone to the limit of his authority in aiding and encouraging its opponents in the election of 1865. Soon afterwards he visited England, and it is believed that he was sent for by the home authorities and was taken to task for his conduct, and instructed to a.s.sist in carrying out confederation. A despatch from Cardwell, secretary of state for the colonies, to Governor Gordon, expressed the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's government in favour of a union of all the North American colonies.[17]

The governor carried out his instructions with the zeal of a convert, showed the despatch to the head of his government, set about converting him also, and believed he had been partly successful. The substance of the despatch was inserted in the speech from the throne, when the legislature met on March 8th, 1866. The legislative council adopted an address asking for imperial legislation to unite the British North American colonies. The governor, without waiting for the action of the a.s.sembly, made a reply to the council, expressing pleasure at their address, and declaring that he would transmit it to the secretary of state for the colonies. Thereupon the Smith ministry resigned, contending that they ought to have been consulted about the reply, that the council, not having been elected by the people, had no authority to ask the imperial parliament to pa.s.s a measure which the people of New Brunswick had expressly rejected at the polls. A protest in similar terms might have been made in the legislative a.s.sembly, but the opportunity was not given. A government favourable to confederation was formed under Peter Mitch.e.l.l, with Tilley as his chief lieutenant, and the legislature was dissolved.

A threatened Fenian invasion helped to turn the tide of public opinion, and the confederate ministry was returned with a large majority. That result, however desirable, did not sanctify the means taken to bring about a verdict for confederation, which could hardly have been more arbitrary.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] Hansard, House of Lords, February 20th, 1865. See also a long and important debate in the British House of Commons, March 13th, 1865.

[17] Journals Canada, 1865, 2nd Session, pp. 8-15.

CHAPTER XIX

BROWN LEAVES THE COALITION

The series of events which gradually drew Mr. Brown out of the coalition began with the death of Sir Etienne P. Tache on July 30th, 1865. By his age, his long experience, and a certain mild benignity of disposition, Tache was admirably fitted to be the dean of the coalition and the arbiter between its elements. He had served in Reform and Conservative governments, but without incurring the reproach of overweening love of office. With his departure that of Brown became only a matter of time. To work with Macdonald as an equal was a sufficiently disagreeable duty; to work under him, considering the personal relations of the two men, would have been humiliating.

Putting aside the question of where the blame for the long-standing feud lay, it was inevitable that the a.s.sociation should be temporary and brief. On August 3rd the governer-general asked Mr. Macdonald to form an administration. Mr. Macdonald consented, obtained the a.s.sent of Mr. Cartier and consulted Mr. Brown. I quote from an authorized memorandum of the conversation. "Mr. Brown replied that he was quite prepared to enter into arrangements for the continuance of the government in the same position as it occupied previous to the death of Sir Etienne P. Tache; but that the proposal now made involved a grave departure from that position. The government, heretofore, had been a coalition of three political parties, each represented by an active party leader, but all acting under one chief, who had ceased to be actuated by strong party feelings or personal ambitions, and who was well fitted to give confidence to all the three sections of the coalition that the conditions which united them would be carried out in good faith to the very letter. Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Cartier and himself [Mr. Brown] were, on the contrary, regarded as party leaders, with party feelings and aspirations, and to place any one of them in an att.i.tude of superiority to the others, with the vast advantage of the premiership, would, in the public mind, lessen the security of good faith, and seriously endanger the existence of the coalition. It would be an entire change of the situation. Whichever of the three was so preferred, the act would amount to an abandonment of the coalition basis, and a reconstruction of the government on party lines under a party leader." When the coalition was formed, the Liberals were in a majority in the legislature; for reasons of State they had relinquished their party advantage, and a government was formed in which the Conservatives had nine members and the Liberals three. In what light would the Liberal party regard this new proposition? Mr.

Brown suggested that an invitation be extended to some gentleman of good position in the legislative council, under whom all parties could act with confidence, as successor to Colonel Tache. So far as to the party. Speaking, however, for himself alone, Mr. Brown said he occupied the same position as in 1864. He stood prepared to give outside the ministry a frank and earnest support to any ministry that might be formed for the purpose of carrying out confederation.

Mr. Macdonald replied that he had no personal feeling as to the premiership, and would readily stand aside; and he suggested the name of Mr. Cartier, as leader of the French-Canadians. Mr. Brown said that it would be necessary for him to consult with his political friends.

Sir Narcisse F. Belleau, a member of the executive council, was then proposed by Mr. Macdonald, and accepted by Mr. Brown, on condition that the policy of confederation should be stated in precise terms.

Sir Narcisse Belleau became nominal prime minister of Canada, and the difficulty was tided over for a few months.

The arrangement, however, was a mere makeshift. The objections set forth by Brown to Macdonald's a.s.suming the t.i.tle of leader applied with equal force to his a.s.suming the leadership in fact, as he necessarily did under Sir Narcisse Belleau; the discussion over this point, though couched in language of diplomatic courtesy, must have irritated both parties, and their relations grew steadily worse. The immediate and a.s.signed cause of the rupture was a disagreement in regard to negotiations for the renewal of the reciprocity treaty. It is admitted that it was only in part the real cause, and would not have severed the relations between men who were personally and politically in sympathy.

Mr. Brown had taken a deep interest in the subject of reciprocity. In 1863 he was in communication with John Sandfield Macdonald, then premier of Canada, and Luther Holton, minister of finance. He dwelt on the importance of opening communication with the American government during the administration of Lincoln, whom he regarded as favourable to the renewal of the treaty. Seward, Lincoln's secretary of state, suggested that Canada should have an agent at Washington, with whom he and Lord Lyons, the British amba.s.sador, could confer on Canadian matters. The premier asked Brown to go, saying that all his colleagues were agreed upon his eminent fitness for the mission. Brown declined the mission, contending that Mr. Holton, besides being fully qualified, was, by virtue of his official position as minister of finance, the proper person to represent Canada. He kept urging the importance of taking action early, before the American movement against the renewal of the treaty could gather headway. But neither the Macdonald-Sicotte government nor its successor lived long enough to take action, and the opportunity was lost. The coalition government was fully employed with other matters during 1864, and it was not until the spring of 1863 that the matter of reciprocity was taken up.

In the summer of that year the imperial government authorized the formation of a confederate council on reciprocity, consisting of representation from Canada and the other North American colonies, and presided over by the governor-general. Brown and Galt were the representatives of Canada on the council.

Mr. Brown was in the Maritime Provinces in November, 1865, on government business. On his return to Toronto he was surprised to read in American papers a statement that Mr. Galt and Mr. Howland were negotiating with the Committee of Ways and Means at Washington.

Explanations were given by Galt at a meeting of the cabinet at Ottawa on December 17th. Seward had told him that the treaty could not be renewed, but that something might be done by reciprocal legislation.

After some demur, Mr. Galt went on to discuss the matter on that basis. He suggested the free exchange of natural products, and a designated list of manufactures. The customs duties on foreign goods were to be a.s.similated as far as possible. Inland waters and ca.n.a.ls might be used in common, and maintained at the joint expense of the two countries. Mr. Galt followed up his narrative by proposing that a minute of council be adopted, ratifying what he had done, and authorizing him to proceed to Washington and continue the negotiations.

The discussion that followed lasted several days. Mr. Brown objected strongly to the proceeding. He declared that "Mr. Galt had flung at the heads of the Americans every concession that we had in our power to make, and some that we certainly could not make, so that our case was foreclosed before the commission was opened." He objected still more strongly to the plan of reciprocal legislation, which would keep the people of Canada "dangling from year to year on the legislation of the American congress, looking to Washington instead of to Ottawa as the controller of their commerce and prosperity." The scheme was admirably designed by the Americans to promote annexation. Before each congress the United States press would contain articles threatening ruin to Canadian trade. The Maritime Provinces would take offence at being ignored, and confederation as well as reciprocity might be lost.

His own proposal was to treat Mr. Galt's proceedings at Washington as unofficial, call the confederate council, and begin anew to "make a dead set to have this reciprocal legislation idea upset before proceeding with the discussion."

Galt at length suggested a compromise. His proceedings at Washington were to be treated as unofficial, and no order-in-council pa.s.sed. Galt and Howland were to be sent to Washington to obtain a treaty if possible, and if not to learn what terms could be arranged, and report to the government.

Brown regarded this motion as intended to remove him from the confederate council, and subst.i.tute Mr. Howland, and said so; but he declared that he would accept the compromise nevertheless. It appeared, however, that there had been a misunderstanding as to the recording of a minute of the proceedings. The first minute was withdrawn; but as Mr. Brown considered that the second minute still sanctioned the idea of reciprocal legislation, he refused to sign it, and decided to place his resignation in the hands of the premier, and to wait upon the governor-general. After hearing the explanation, His Excellency said: "Then, Mr. Brown, I am called upon to decide between your policy and that of the other members of the government?" Mr.

Brown replied, "Yes, sir, and if I am allowed to give advice in the matter, I should say that the government ought to be sustained, though the decision is against myself. I consider the great question of confederation as of far greater consequence to the country than reciprocity negotiations. My resignation may aid in preventing their policy on the reciprocity question from being carried out, or at least call forth a full expression of opinion on the subject, and the government should be sustained, if wrong in this, for the sake of confederation."

The debate in council had occupied several days, and had evidently aroused strong feelings. Undoubtedly Mr. Brown's decision was affected by the affront that he considered had been put upon him by virtually removing him from the confederate council and sending Mr. Howland instead of himself to Washington as the colleague of Mr. Galt. He disapproved on public grounds of the policy of the government, and he resented the manner in which he had been ignored throughout the transaction. On the day after the rupture Mr. Cartier wrote Mr. Brown asking him whether he could reconsider his resignation. Mr. Brown replied, "I have received your kind note, and think it right to state frankly at once that the step I have taken cannot be revoked. The interests involved are too great. I think a very great blunder has been committed in a matter involving the most important interests of the country, and that the order-in-council you have pa.s.sed endorses that blunder and authorizes persistence in it.... I confess I was much annoyed at the personal affront offered me, but that feeling has pa.s.sed away in view of the serious character of the matter at issue, which casts all personal feeling aside."

If it were necessary to seek for justification of Mr. Brown's action in leaving the ministry at this time, it might be found either in his disagreement with the government on the question of policy, or in the treatment accorded to him by his colleagues. Sandfield Macdonald and his colleagues had on a former occasion recognized Mr. Brown's eminent fitness to represent Canada in the negotiations at Washington, not only because of his thorough acquaintance with the subject, but because of his steadily maintained att.i.tude of friendship for the North. He was a member of the confederate council on reciprocity. His position in the ministry was not that of a subordinate, but of the representative of a powerful party. In resenting the manner in which his position was ignored, he does not seem to have exceeded the bounds of proper self-a.s.sertion. However, this controversy a.s.sumes less importance if it is recognized that the rupture was inevitable. The precise time or occasion is of less importance than the force which was always and under all circ.u.mstances operating to draw Mr. Brown away from an a.s.sociation injurious to himself and to Liberalism, in its broad sense as well as in its party sense, and to his influence as a public man. This had better be considered in another place.

CHAPTER XX