General Gatacre Part 28

"On Sunday, April 1, I proceeded to Bloemfontein by order to see Lord Roberts, arriving late at night. Early next morning (April 2) I saw the Field-Marshal, and he told me he was placing me in command of the Orange Free State territory held by us, and was giving me ten other battalions, which were to be used as under, _i.e._ six Militia battalions to be distributed along the railway south of Bloemfontein, and in the country east and west of it; the four battalions were, with the four I had already (the 2nd wing of the Berkshire was to be called up from Cape Colony), to make up a Division with which I was to proceed at once to Dewetsdorp and operate along the Basuto border through Ladybrand, Clocolan, Ficksburg country, to clear Lord Roberts's right flank, to enable him to advance northwards. He directed me to draw up for his approval a scheme of distribution for the six Militia battalions through the country. This I did, and submitted it on the spot. The Field-Marshal was anxious to know by what date I considered I could concentrate my troops at Reddersburg, ready to move, after relief by the Militia battalions. I replied that, on the a.s.sumption that I received the Militia battalions on the 6th, I could move on April 17 (reliefs had to be effected, transport collected, supplies, etc., etc.). This date was considered satisfactory by Lord Roberts.

The same evening (April 2) about 9.30 p.m. Lord Roberts again explained to me carefully what he wished, that he was anxious for me to move as soon as possible, and that I was to proceed to Springfontein immediately, and commence {255} preparations. This I did, morning of April 3, by first train."

It would appear that nothing was said during the Monday spent at Bloemfontein about the detachment that was moving that very day from Dewetsdorp through Reddersburg back to the railway at Bethanie. No anxiety seems to have been felt at Headquarters as to what De Wet would do next.

[Sidenote: A relief column]

At about 7 o'clock on Tuesday evening, April 3, information was brought into Edenburg that the Dewetsdorp detachment was surrounded at Mostert's Hoek, a ridge three or four miles east of Reddersburg. This disquieting news was telegraphed to Lord Roberts, who sent an urgent message to Gatacre directing him to prepare to move on Reddersburg, and asking what troops he had available. The reply stated that there were forty scouts and about twenty-five mounted infantry at Springfontein, a Brigade Division Field Artillery at Bethanie, and about two companies mounted infantry at or near Edenburg. A return message informed Gatacre that the Field-Marshal was sending five companies of the Cameron Highlanders by train to Bethanie, and told the General that he was on no account to go without them.

The order to turn out reached the regiment just before midnight; they had three miles to march to the station, and were entrained at 3.30 a.m.

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That same morning, April 4, at about 6 o'clock, the scouts and some mounted infantry started from Bethanie to reconnoitre towards Reddersburg, which was about twelve miles distant, and an hour later they sent in a message that they could hear the firing.

When the five companies of the Camerons and the mounted infantry from Edenburg had joined him at Bethanie, Gatacre started at the head of the column. At 9.30 a.m. another message was sent back by the Officer Commanding the scouts to say that firing had ceased for half an hour.

Gatacre pushed on till he reached a ridge west of the village, but he was still five or six miles from the scene of the fight when he learnt through a loyal colonial that two hours earlier the British had surrendered to a force of Boers between two and three thousand strong.

[Sidenote: Too late]

It was then 11 o'clock, and the relief column was at least five miles from the scene of the misfortune.

The General called a halt, and eventually decided that his troops, being mainly infantry, could do nothing in the way of pursuit of a mounted enemy. After resting for an hour or so, Gatacre came to the conclusion that the safer course would be to retire on the railway, for it must be remembered that he had received the most precise orders "not to move against the Boers until he had satisfied himself that their strength and position warranted his doing so with success."[18]

[18] See _Official History_, vol. ii. p. 311.

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About four miles had been accomplished on the return journey, when a messenger arrived from the Chief Staff Officer ordering the column to return and occupy Reddersburg. Accordingly the men retraced their steps and settled down for the night as best they could; but at midnight a telegram reached the General containing very urgent counter-orders:

"The C.-in-C. directs that you retire to Bethanie during this night so as to reach Bethanie to-morrow morning, as our information leads us to believe that the enemy are moving down in the Reddersburg direction and you are not strong enough to oppose a large force."[19]

[19] From original text.

The column started off again at 2 a.m. April 5.[20]

[20] The movements of the Relief Column are taken from _The 79th News_, special issue ent.i.tled "South African War Record," p. 17. The hours differ slightly from those given in the _Official History_.

We are not concerned here with the fatigues of the march from Dewetsdorp, nor with the particular stress which led to capitulation.

It is enough to know that although a messenger had succeeded in getting through the enemy's lines, and although the casualties numbered only ten killed and thirty-five wounded out of 591 men of the regular army, some one betrayed his comrades' honour, and the whole party was captured.[21] If this column had been able to hold on an hour or so longer, there would have been no Reddersburg incident. In the same way, {258} if more prompt and more energetic measures had been taken from Headquarters to rescue the column from the perilous situation created by the defeat at Sannah's Post, the little force could easily have been brought into Bloemfontein with the help of cavalry. As a matter of fact there were on April 2 three cavalry brigades camped at Springfield, Rustfontein, and Bloemspruit respectively, all of which lie just outside the capital to the south and east.

[21] NOTE.--The Officer Commanding was exonerated from all blame in this matter.

In the meantime, what had become of the other detachments? At Wepener, four days later, a force of 1,898 men, composed almost entirely of Colonial Corps, under the command of Colonel Dalgety of the Cape Mounted Rifles, was attacked by De Wet and blockaded for fourteen days; but so skilfully, under the guidance of Major Ronald Maxwell, R.E., did the men entrench themselves, that the total casualties at the end of the siege were only 169.

The other columns, at Smithfield, Helvetia, and Rouxville, were only saved by the skilful handling of Major Allen of the Royal Irish Rifles, who collected them all and withdrew on Aliwal North, and by the heroic spirit of the men themselves. The detachment from Helvetia marched seventy-three miles in fifty-two hours, and that from Smithfield forty-five miles in thirty-six hours. General Brabant sent out some empty waggons to meet the exhausted infantry, but, though almost barefoot and reeling with fatigue, they refused to accept the lift, saying that if they did so the good name of the regiment would suffer.

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The story of all these detachments must be looked at as a whole, as a policy. It was the defeat at Sannah's Post which, coming "like a bolt from the blue," changed the whole situation; "the dispositions of the troops, designed to restore peace, were (now) not merely inadequate, they were wholly inappropriate."[22] It is difficult to see how the position of the Dewetsdorp detachment differs from that of the others, all of which were but the execution of the policy sketched in the telegram from the Field-Marshal to the War Office of March 21, given on page 243.

[22] See _Official History_, vol. ii. p. 305.

On April 9 Sir Herbert Chermside arrived at Springfontein to take over the command of the Third Division, and the next day the following letter reached Sir William Gatacre:

"_From Chief of the Staff, S.A.F.F._

"SIR,

"I am directed by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa to inform you that his lordship has decided, though with much regret, to relieve you of your present command. You will therefore be good enough to make over the command of the 3rd Division to Major-General Sir Herbert Chermside, G.C.M.G., C.B., and proceed to England at an early date.

"I have the honour to be, Sir, "Your obedient servant, "B. DUFF, _Colonel, for Major-General,_ "_Chief of the Staff, S.A.F. Force._"

When the camp woke up on the morning of the 11th their ex-commander was gone. The {260} following letter reflects the spirit in which his staff officers looked at the matter.

"REDDERSBURG, _April_ 12, 1900.

"It is with a heavy heart indeed that I write this. Why, oh why did they treat our General so hardly, so unfairly? We know nothing except the bare facts. All are sorry and grieved, and many question the fairness, the justice of the action taken. No one worked harder than he did. I may say it would have been impossible to do so. He never spared himself. Luck, cursed luck, has been all against him. I heard two days ago from England that they believed that he had attacked at Stormberg with two battalions when he had eight at his command,--such a gross mistake! Now the luck having turned, as it appeared, the unfortunate Royal Irish Rifles get caught again, although no possible blame could be attached to him by reasonable men. I worked out the orders and telegrams he had given and received myself, and I know what was done. They seem to have attributed the blame of it to him--most unfairly. He was so good about it and so plucky, blaming no one and taking the blow so courageously,--man could not be braver under any circ.u.mstances. All the interest of the campaign has gone for me, and ---- feels for him as much as I do.

"We shall never have a chief whom we can serve more loyally, who was always considerate and even-tempered, and spared himself so little.

His faults, if I may use the expression, are his virtues, devotion and loyalty and energy--to use all in the service of his country. It has been a great blow to us all.

"Believe me, we feel it as the loss of a personal and dear friend."

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CHAPTER XVII

1900-1903

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