General Gatacre Part 25

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"Just as we were moving off about 400 Boers appeared on the high plateau on our right flank from the Steynsburg direction, but were at once checked by the fire of our guns, and gave the infantry no further trouble."

The advanced troops got back to Molteno at 11 a.m., and all were in by 12.30. The casualties were officially returned as eight officers wounded (one died of wounds) and thirteen missing; in other ranks there were 25 killed, 102 wounded, and 548 missing. The whole force employed amounted to 3,035 of all ranks.

The main facts of this account are taken from the _History of the War in South Africa_ recently published. So little is said in the General's despatch of the part played by the infantry that this omission is a subject of comment in Lord Roberts's covering letter of February 1900.[12] It may therefore be concluded that the Field-Marshal (who was commanding the forces in Ireland at the time that the engagement was fought) was at the time of writing ignorant of many incidents that have since been brought to light.

[12] See _Despatches_ published March 17, 1900.

[Sidenote: With an ace]

In Sir William's letter three days later he speaks of the action as "a most lamentable failure, and yet within an ace of being the success I antic.i.p.ated," and goes on:

"The fault was mine, as I was responsible of course. I went rather against my better judgment in not resting the night at Molteno, but I {236} was tempted by the shortness of the distance and the certainty of success. It was so near being a brilliant success."

Both in the articles published at the time, and in the _Official History_ referred to above, the circ.u.mstances in which Sir William was placed are held to have made some demonstration imperative.

"Sir William Gatacre's decision to advance on Stormberg was fully justified by the strategical situation. General Buller's telegram, although it left him a free hand as to time and opportunity, had suggested that operation. The plan, though bold, was sound in its design, and would have succeeded had not exceptional misfortune attended its execution."[13]

[13] See _Official History_, vol. i. pp. 301, 302.

On the following day, Monday, the battle of Magersfontein was fought on the north-west, and on Friday of the same week Sir Redvers Buller delivered his unsuccessful attack on Colenso. Owing to the proximity of dates, the attempt to retake Stormberg is a.s.sociated in the public mind with the other engagements of that week; but in the numbers employed, in the losses suffered, and in political importance it shrinks into insignificance compared with them. At Magersfontein, on December 11, 14,964 troops of all ranks were engaged, the total killed and wounded was returned as 885, with 63 missing; at Colenso, out of 19,378 men, the losses were 899, with 240 missing; while at Stormberg, out {237} of 3,035 engaged, 135 were killed and wounded, and 571 taken prisoners.[14] From a political point of view, though no ground was gained, still none was lost, and Sir William was actually able, the day after, to establish his headquarters at Sterkstroom, which was five miles farther up the railway than he had been at Putters Kraal.

[14] See _Official History_, vol. i. app. vi. pp. 468, 469, 470.

From the General Commanding-in-Chief Sir William received the following telegram:

"Your telegram respecting your action and dispositions, I think you were quite right to try the night attack and hope better luck next time. I don't think you will find them attack you when in position, but it would be better to retire than run the risk of being surrounded; as to this you must judge for yourself, but military considerations should be held paramount.--BULLER."[15]

[15] See original text. From Frere Camp, 2.17 p.m.; reached Sterkstroom 4.4 p.m., December 11, 1899.

Writing on December 18, Sir William says:

"I have now three regiments--the Derbyshire, Royal Scots, and Royal Irish Rifles. I have been obliged to send the Northumberland Fusiliers to East London to look after the base, as Sir Redvers Buller wished this done. My Howitzer Battery he has been obliged to send to Natal to a.s.sist Clery.

"I have up here (Sterkstroom) a large camp with supplies, stores, etc., and have been ordered by Buller to entrench and endeavour with my mounted troops to harry the district round me, but I have so few trained troops, and these Boers {238} are so mobile (all mounted) that it is a very difficult matter to catch them.

"You must not expect to see much movement from my force: I have no strength--cannot leave my line of communications, which are long. All the districts behind me are ready to rise, and I cannot separate my regiments. I have received orders to entrench my camp, and this I am about to do. This will, of course, free my mounted men a bit, as the post, with provisions, will be safe for them to come back to. As I am writing I hear of a threatened rising in Alice and Seymour, two districts south-west of Stutterheim, right away behind me, which makes it difficult for me to retain my communications with the coast. These may be exaggerated reports, but I have had so many warnings that one cannot afford to disregard them. You may rest a.s.sured we shall fight to the end anyhow, and my thoughts will be with you."

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CHAPTER XVI

1900

ORANGE FREE STATE

The anxiety felt by the commanders of the three detached forces in South Africa was shared by the nation at home. The telegrams sent to England by Sir Redvers Buller showed that the state of affairs in Natal after the battle of Colenso was very critical, and that only prompt and ample reinforcements would be of any avail. Troops of all arms were despatched to Capetown as fast as ships could be got ready to carry them, and Field-Marshal Lord Roberts was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with Lord Kitchener as his chief staff officer.

The Field-Marshal reached Capetown on January 10. Four weeks were necessary for the organisation of his new army, which amounted to 35,000 men when concentrated at Modder River on February 8. A week later General French at the head of a Cavalry Division rode into Kimberley, and on the same day the Sixth Division got in touch with General Cronje, and commenced the series of operations which led to his surrender with all his army. There {240} were yet, however, two serious engagements to be fought, at Poplar Grove and Driefontein, before the Commander-in-Chief entered Bloemfontein on Thursday, March 15, 1900. By that time this advance in force into the enemy's country had had its effect in the east and south. The pressure in Natal was relaxed, and on March 1 Sir Redvers Buller rode into Ladysmith and greeted Sir George White and his gallant garrison. In the meantime Gatacre and Clements had been holding on to the railways, impatient to move forward as soon as it was safe to do so. Both these columns, which had been marking time in the face of the enemy, had had occasional conflicts, but these were, for the most part, outpost affairs, or the result of reconnaissance.

Writing from Sterkstroom on February 24, Sir William says:

"Yesterday we had a fight just north of Molteno, and unfortunately lost about seventy men, but we gained the information we required.

Montmorency is missing, and I fear he has been wounded or shot. His party got too far ahead of us, and it was with difficulty I extricated them. I was very nearly shot twice, once by a rifleman (Boer), once by a sh.e.l.l--very near. I have had marvellous luck on more than one occasion. The men all behaved very well. I do not think that people realise quite the extent of the country I am covering. From Karn Nek to Bird's River is thirty-five miles, and I have three and a half regiments only to do it with. I think I told you that Brabant, a Colonial, {241} had been given a command under me of mounted troops.

He has a very mixed lot, and their procedure is sketchy, but Lord Roberts wishes him to have a free hand. He is to start to-day towards Dordrecht, and I have told him what I want him to do, _i.e._ to cut in between Dordrecht and Jamestown, which I think should have the effect of making them fall back from Stormberg, in which case I could occupy it, but, as you see, I cannot occupy it without evacuating some place behind me."

[Sidenote: Across the river]

On March 5 the Third Division reoccupied Stormberg; on the 6th they reached Burghersdorp; on the 9th the scouts chased the Boers to the bridge over the Orange River at Bethulie, and entrenched themselves on the southern bank. The little band arrived just in time to see the railway bridge blown up, but their advance saved the roadway.

Lieutenant Popham, of the Derbyshire Regiment, promptly cut the electric wire that would have fused the dynamite, and at night Sir William, accompanied by Lieutenant Grant, R.E., crept along the parapet, and dropped the parcels of explosives into the river. The scouts of the Third Division were rather proud of having saved this bridge, as at Norvals Pont both were destroyed. The next day the column occupied Bethulie in the enemy's country, and on the 15th took possession of the railway junction at Springfontein. Colonel Clements had also crossed the Orange River, and made his way on to the junction shortly after the Third Division had captured the place.

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"The deliberation of Gatacre's movements surprised his younger officers, who did not know that the Divisional General had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief not to commit himself seriously until reinforcements had reached him, and, if possible, to repair the railway which connects Stormberg with Naauwpoort Junction."[1]

[1] See _Official History_, vol. ii. p. 247.

Colonel Clements had received orders in the same strain:

"Do not attempt to force pa.s.sage of river until you hear from me, or are certain that the enemy have considerably loosened their hold over the heights on the north bank. This they are sure to do when we reach Bloemfontein, and it is better that the repair of the bridge be delayed a few days than that lives be lost unnecessarily."[2]

[2] _Ibid._, vol. ii. p. 256.