Gallipoli Diary Volume II Part 8

Hardly had my cable to K. been despatched when Stopford gives us a sample specimen of "dash" by his answer to my reminder. He wires:--

"IXth Corps to G.H.Q. I foresee very great difficulty. The only system possible at first probably will be convoy under escort."

Twelve hours ago, more or less, Stopford had agreed that there was a difficulty which it was up to him to solve and that, at first, (i.e., till blockhouses had been built) the system would be convoy under escort. We ask him what he had done, expecting to get the particulars worked out by his Staff after the conference of Generals, and this is the reply!

Five minutes later, in came another wire giving the general situation at Suvla; saying the 53rd Division had failed to clear ground from which the right of the advance of the 54th Division might be threatened, and that Stopford wished to postpone his night march another four and twenty hours.

So this is the result of our "ginger," and Braithwaite or I must rush over to Suvla at once. Meanwhile, tactics and Kavak Tepe must wait.

Wired back:--

"In the circ.u.mstances the operation for to-morrow is postponed. Chief sending C.G.S. over now to see you."

Braithwaite went: is back now: has seen both Stopford and Reed: has agreed (with a sad heart) on my behalf to the night march being put off another twenty four hours.

Have had, therefore, to cable K. again, shouldering the heavy blame of this further delay:--

"(No. M.F. 545). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. After anxiously weighing the pros and cons, I have decided that it is wiser to wait another 24 hours before carrying out the general attack mentioned in my No. M.F. 543. Braithwaite has just returned from the IXth Corps, and he found that the spirit and general organization were improving rapidly. A small attack by a Brigade, which promised well, was in progress. This morning the Xth Division captured a trench."

The story of the Suvla Council of War:--At first the Generals were for fighting. Inglefield, of the LIVth, who is told off for the attack, was keen. All he asked was, a clean start from Anafarta Ova. If his Division could jump off, intact and fresh, from that well-watered half-way house, Kavak Tepe was his. The LIIIrd Division for their part agreed to make good Anafarta Ova; to clear out the snipers and to hold the place as a base for the LIVth.

So at 10 a.m. Stopford issued orders saying the LIVth must march off at 4 p.m. moving East of Anafarta Ova. Then,--when at last all seemed settled, in came a message from the G.O.C. LIIIrd Division, saying he could not undertake to clear Anafarta Ova of snipers and to hold it as a cover to the advance of the LIVth.

Stopford thereupon cancelled his first order, and, at 1.15 p.m., issued fresh orders directing the LIVth Division _to send in one of their own Brigades_ as an advance guard to clear the ground up to a point East of Anafarta Ova. Braithwaite stayed at Corps Headquarters at Suvla until this Brigade, the 163rd, was moving on Anafarta Ova driving the snipers before them. Mahon, too, after sitting for three days where I left him on the morning of the 9th, has got tired of looking at the gendarmes and has carried their trenches by the forbidden frontal bayonet charge without much trouble or loss although, naturally, these trenches have been strengthened during the interval.

Amidst these tactical miss-fires entered Hankey. He has had a cable from his brother Secretary, Bonham Carter, saying the Prime Minister wishes him to stay on longer and that Lord K. would like to know if he can do anything to give an impetus to the operations. Hankey showed me this cable; also his answer:--

"Reference your 6910. I am glad to stay as desired. The chief thing you could send to help the present operations would be more ammunition. For supplies already sent everyone is most grateful. It is also important that units should be kept up to strength.

"As General Officer Commanding has already apprised you fully of the situation I have nothing to add."

In the Gordons' Mess "a Marine" used to stand as synonym for emptiness.

Asquith's "Marine"[9] is the reverse. Into two sentences totalling 27 words he boils down the drift of hundreds of cables and letters.

_13th August, 1915. Imbros._ Well, I must put it down. Worked till lunch. In the afternoon, left in H.M.S. _Arno_ and sailed over to Suvla to have a last look over the _band-o-bast_ for to-morrow's twice to-morrowed effort. First, saw the Admiral and Commodore who are simply dancing with impatience. No wonder. Whether or no Kavak Tepe summit gives a useful outlook on to the back of Sari Bair and the Dardanelles, at least it will give us the whip hand of the guns on the Anafarta ridge and save our ships from the annoying attentions they are beginning to receive. The sailors think too they have worked out an extra good scheme for ship and sh.o.r.e guns.

Stopford then came aboard; in the mood he was in aboard the _Jonquil_ on the 8th,--only more so! The Divisional Generals are without hope, that is the text of his sermon. Hopeless about to-night, or to-morrow, that is to say; for there are rosy visions and to spare for next week, or the week after, or any other time, so long as it is not too near us. There is something in this beats me. We are alive--we are quite all right--the Brigade of the LIVth sent on to Kuchuk Anafarta Ova made good its point.

True, one battalion got separated from its comrades in the forest and was badly cut up by Turkish snipers just as was Braddock's force by the Redskins, but this, though tragic, is but a tiny incident of a great modern battle and the rest of the 163rd Brigade have not suffered and hold the spot whence, it was settled, the attack on Kavak Tepe should jump off. Nothing practical or tactical seems to have occurred to force us to drop our plan.

But no; Stopford and Reed count the LIIIrd Division as finished: the LIVth incapable of attack; the rest of the IXth Corps immovable.

If I accept; we have lost this battle. We are not beaten now--the men are not--but if I accept, we are held up.

There is no way out. Whether there is any good looking back even for one moment, G.o.d knows; I doubt it! But I feel so acutely, I seem to see so clearly, where our push for Constantinople first began to quit the rails, that I must put it down right here. The moment was when I asked for Rawlinson or Byng, and when, in reply, the keen, the young, the fit, the up-to-date Commanders were all barred, simply and solely that Mahon should not be disturbed in his Divisional Command. I resisted it very strongly: I went so far as to remind K. in my cable of his own sad disappointment at Bloemfontein when he (K.) had offered him a Cavalry Brigade and he returned instead to his appointment in the Sudan. The question that keeps troubling me is, ought I to have fought it further; ought I to have resigned sooner than allow generals old and yet inexperienced to be foisted on to me?

These stories about the troops? I do not accept them. The troops have lost heavily but they are right if there were leaders.

I know quite well both Territorial Divisions. I knew them in England that is to say. Since then, they have had their eyes picked out. They have been through the strainer and the best officers and men and the best battalions have been serving for months past in France. The three show battalions in the 54th (Ess.e.x) Division are in France and their places have been taken by the 10th and 11th London and by the 8th Hants.

Ess.e.x is good; London is good and Hants is good; but the trinity is not Territorial. The same with the Welshmen.

Yet even so; taking these Territorials as they are; a scratch lot; half strength; no artillery; not a patch upon the original Divisions as I inspected them in England six months ago; even so, they'd fight right enough and keen enough if they were set fair and square at their fence.

In the fight of the 10th the Welshmen were not given a chance. Sent in on a narrow front--jammed into a pocket;--as they began to climb the spur they caught it from the guns, rifles and machine guns on both flanks.

We might still do something with a change of commanders. But I have been long enough Military Secretary both in India and at home to realize that ruthlessness here is apt to be a two-edged sword. You can't clap a new head on to old shoulders without upsetting circulation and equilibrium.

Still, I would harden my heart to it now--to-night--were not my hands tied by Mahon's seniority. Mahon is the next senior--in the whole force he stands next to myself. Had not Bruce Hamilton been barred by the P.M.

when I wanted to put him in vice Hunter-Weston at h.e.l.les, the problem would be simple enough. Even if I had not, at the outset, given that well-tried, thrusting old fighter the conduct of the Suvla enterprise, at least I would have brought him in on the morning of the 9th instant quite easily and without causing any upset to anyone or anything. He ranks both Stopford and Mahon and nothing would have been simpler than to let him bring up a contingent of troops from h.e.l.les, when, automatically, he would have taken command in the Suvla area. What it would have meant to have had a man imbued with the attack spirit at the head of this IXth Corps would have been just--victory!

Anch.o.r.ed at 9 p.m. and, before going to bed, sent following cable:--

"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for War.

"The result of my visit to the IXth Corps, from which I am just back, has bitterly disappointed me. There is nothing for it but to allow them time to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional Generals to undertake a general action for which, in their present frame of mind, they have no heart. In fact, these generals are unfit for it.

With exceeding reluctance I am obliged to give them time to rest and reorganize their troops.

"Though we were to repeat our landing operations a hundred times, we would never dare hope to reproduce conditions so favourable as to put one division ash.o.r.e under cover of dark and, as the day broke, have the next division sailing in to its support. No advantage was taken of these favourable conditions and, for reasons which I can only explain by letter, the swift advance was not delivered,--therefore, the mischief is done. Until we are ready to advance again, reorganized and complete, we must go slow."

_14th August, 1915. Imbros._ Before breakfast, Braithwaite brought me a statement of our interview of last night with Stopford. He dictated it, directly he got back last night; i.e., about three hours after the event. I agree with every word:--

"Notes of an interview which took place on board H.M.S. _Triad_ between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 13th August, 1915, between the General Commanding and Sir Frederick Stopford, commanding 9th Corps.

_Present_:--

General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, K.C.M.G., etc., Major-General Braithwaite, C.B.

"Sir Frederick represented that the 9th Corps were not fit to undertake an advance at the present moment. Questioned why, he replied that the losses had been considerable, that the disorganization of units was very great, and that the length of the line he had to hold was all too thinly held as it was. He stated that his Divisional Generals were entirely of the same opinion as himself; in fact, he gave us completely the impression that they were 'not for it,' but he only specifically mentioned Hammersley and Lindley. He said water was no difficulty. He implied that the troops were getting better every day, and given time to rest and reorganize, he thought they would be able in time to make an advance. But he was very emphatic on the point that at present such a thing as an attack had practically no chance of success. He told us that the opposition in the centre about Anafarta Ova could no longer be cla.s.sed as sniping, but that it was regular opposition. But as he also told us that his landing was an opposed landing, I think perhaps that during the short time he has been on active service in this country he has not quite realized what opposition really means. But the salient fact remains that none of his Divisional Generals who would be employed in the attack thought that that attack would have any chance of success whatever. Indeed, he saw every difficulty, and though he kept saying that he was an optimist, he foresaw every bad thing that could possibly happen and none of the bright spots. It was a most depressing interview, but it left no doubt in the minds of the hearers that it would be quite useless to order an attack to be undertaken by a Commander and Divisional Generals whose hearts were confessedly not in it, who saw a Turk behind every bush, a battalion behind every hill, and a Brigade behind every mountain."

At lunch time Lord K. answered my last night's cable:--

"If you should deem it necessary to replace Stopford, Mahon and Hammersley, have you any competent Generals to take their place? From your report I think Stopford should come home.

"This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers that will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom. If, therefore, any Generals fail, do not hesitate to act promptly.