Frenzied Finance Part 42

"Third, the absolute control of the three great companies, and through them of their subsidiary financial inst.i.tutions, while supposed to be in the hands of the policy-holders, is entirely beyond their regulation, as all policy-holders of the three companies give over complete control of their companies to the 'System' through the following machinery: The control of the New York Life rests absolutely in President McCall, that of the Mutual Life with President McCurdy. Originally these men were elected to office by policy-holders' proxies, voted by the great general agents; but so immeasurable has been the growth of these corporations that only rebellion among policy-holders on an international scale could oust from power the McCalls and the McCurdys. The control of the Equitable Life rests in the $100,000 of capital stock which is almost entirely owned by the men who elect themselves to manage the company.

"Therefore you will see that I fully comprehend that this power, which you claim to be, and which undoubtedly is, the greatest on earth, is absolutely, for all practical purposes, in the hands of three men, and that any one who attempts to do anything contrary to what this power allows will find himself opposed by practically unlimited money, which can be used first to corrupt all sources of help, including State insurance-law enforcers, and then to keep such corruptions from the policy-holders by subsidizing the press. In other words, you see that I fully comprehend that I, or any man or any body of men, would be absolutely helpless in an attempt to correct present evils unless we could do two things: First, show to the policy-holders of the great insurance companies that they are absolutely in the hands and at the mercy of 'one man,' and next, that this 'one man' is unscrupulous."

In other and different ways I had it forcibly impressed upon me that I must go no further in connecting the life-insurance companies with "frenzied financiering"; that while the "Standard Oil"-Amalgamated-City Bank crowd might bide their time for reprisal and vengeance, the great insurance companies must at any cost instantly squelch those rash souls who dared to cross their paths. To all such warnings I replied that a life-insurance company, especially great inst.i.tutions with hundreds of thousands of policy-holders, must be as far above suspicion as Caesar's wife; that the security of the immense funds in their possession must be as una.s.sailable as the United States Const.i.tution; but that immunity from criticism could be secured only by honesty of purpose, honesty of method, and honesty of results; and that I would follow "frenzied finance" wherever it might lead, even if the exposure brought every life-insurance concern in the country down to the ring-bolt of making public confession of complicity. But with all my knowledge of the "System's" weakness, I never dreamed of the condition of fatuity into which the past few years of unbridled "frenzied finance" have plunged its votaries. If the correspondence that follows here correctly represents the purposes and the methods of great American life-insurance companies, I ask my readers what quick, sharp, effective means should be taken to call a halt and rescue the billions of the people's savings before it is too late. And I ask all policy-holders in the great insurance companies to weigh carefully what follows, that from it they may decide the question.

As soon as it became fixed in the minds of the different interested parties who had communicated with me that my purpose was unalterable, queer things happened:

First, there appeared in the press of the country, under large, black headlines, the startling confession of the editor of a New York financial paper, who, conscience-stricken, admitted that he had been engaged in the systematic blackmail of insurance companies and officials and Wall Street inst.i.tutions such as banks and trust companies. It was a curious doc.u.ment, and even the casual reader must have wondered at the mysterious lack of detail. The paper, I found out later, was one of the innumerable swarm of journalistic insects generated, like mosquitoes, in the financial swamps of Wall Street, destined to live a day and die as they deliver their sting, and the attention given it was curiously out of proportion to its importance. Among other queer things, the editor announced that after printing his confession he would disappear; no names were mentioned nor a fact printed which identified any one or anything. All this could not happen without a motive, and I said to myself, "The 'System' is planting a mine for some one." Not another word appeared. I awaited developments. On October 8th I received the following letters, which tell their own story:

FREMONT, OHIO, October 6, 1904.

MR. THOMAS W. LAWSON, Boston, Ma.s.s.

_My Dear Sir_: I have followed with intensest interest your discussion of "Frenzied Finance." The _expose_ of the "System," and its Machiavellian performances, was highly interesting to me. I was a.s.sociated with Attorney-General Monnett in his effort to get testimony and the inside facts concerning the trust and its operations in his prosecution against that corporation for violating the Ohio anti-trust law. At that time the books of the company were burned in Cleveland, and, as stated in your article, the company now relies upon the superior memory of Standard Oil.

I was well aware of the connection of certain life-insurance companies with Morgan and the Rockefellers, but until your public charge, was not familiar with the details. As I had considerable money invested myself in New York Life Insurance I wrote John A. McCall a bitter letter. In this age of commercialism sentimental benevolence gets little place. The common sentiments of humanity and appreciation of responsibility admonish one in moderate circ.u.mstances or even in affluence to invite the co-operation of others in providing for those dependent upon the individual hazard of life and fortune. Life insurance has come to be a sacred thing. It is the substantial token and expression of responsibility which a reasonable man dying leaves to those dependent upon him. I so wrote Mr. McCall, and told him that if the head of a great inst.i.tution like the New York Life Insurance Company would be guilty of such perfidy as charged by you, the organization which would retain him in a position of responsibility was undeserving of confidence or patronage.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PHOTOGRAPH OF JOHN A. MCCALL'S REPLY TO H. C. DERAN, THE POLICYHOLDER WHO HAD ASKED FOR A DENIAL OF MR. LAWSON'S CHARGES.]

I enclose for your inspection Mr. McCall's reply. This is doubtless a sample of the sort of campaign waged throughout the country by the "System."

I enclose stamped envelope for the return of the McCall letter, as I purpose continuing the correspondence until I force him to an issue.

You will observe the very palpable evasion of the issue. I asked him if the details of the transaction described in _Everybody's_, in which the New York Life Insurance figured conspicuously, were true. He answered by saying that he made money out of the trust company venture and retired. The fact that New York Life money is so deposited as to suit the convenience of the "System" in its heads--I win, tails--you lose, operation, is a matter which has escaped the attention of the astute financier. I have written him further, calling his attention to the fact that his letter conveys no information not heretofore made public in circular but that my inquiry was directed to the particular transaction alluded to in _Everybody's_, and requesting a flat affirmation or denial.

Trusting that these facts may be of a.s.sistance to you, I am,

Yours very truly, (Signed) H. C. DERAN.

I shall spare my readers the enclosures. They were newspaper slips, printed on fairly thick paper, reproduced from unknown publications, and obviously put forth to discredit me by implication. One, headed "A Frenzied Financial Blackmailer," from the _Vigilant_, New York City, September 30, 1904, presented the confession, previously referred to, made by the editor of the _United States Investors' Guardian_, and an editorial denouncing the blackmail of financial corporations. Another slip was "Stamp out the Fake Financial Newspaper Publisher" from the _Fourth Estate_, New York City, October 1, 1904, in which the wickedness of the aforesaid editor came in for further moral castigation.

At once, as I read these letters and ran over the printed slips pinned to Mr. McCall's, I realized the purpose of the blackmail editor's confession and just how so much s.p.a.ce came to be given it in the daily papers. Insurance corporations are large advertisers[20] and enjoy great popularity in the business offices of great newspapers. It is not said in these clippings that either Mr. Lawson or _Everybody's Magazine_ belongs to that lowest order of criminal, the self-confessed black-mailer, but the suggestion is obvious. Every policy-holder throughout the world who received these enclosures attached to letters from the greatest insurance president in America would instantly supply the connection--"'Frenzied finance black-mailer'--that's intended for Lawson, surely; 'Frenzied financial journal'--_Everybody's Magazine_, beyond question."

Will my readers weigh carefully this awful charge:

"Thomas W. Lawson, in addition to being a frenzied financial black-mailer, is attacking the New York Life Insurance Company because he tried to secure insurance from that company, and that company would not give it to him. His attack is made in the interest of some competing company."

Again, I ask that it be kept in mind that all this is not said by an insignificant and irresponsible trickster, but is deliberately put forth by the greatest insurance president in America, over his signature, to his policy-holder No. 826,152 and 957,006.

Soon afterward, in its issue of October 20th, a well-known organ of the insurance companies, _The Spectator_, published in New York, had a long article dealing with malicious attacks on our great insurance corporations, specifically mentioning my accusation against the New York Life. "Mr. Lawson was actuated by the meanest motives," says _The Spectator_.

Extract from _The Spectator_, October 20, 1904:

Mr. Lawson, in the hypocritical role of a would-be-reformed-speculator, is a figure calculated to stir the risibilities of all who have watched his antics and read his articles, _especially when each one of the companies he mentions has repeatedly rejected him for insurance_.

Letters to policy-holders from the New York Life Insurance officers poured in on me from different parts of the country, all containing the same defence and the same accusations as the one above, and signed by vice-presidents of the company as well as President McCall, showing conclusively that this great corporation as a corporation had deliberately adopted this method of meeting my serious yet conservatively put business accusations.

President McCall's defence of the New York Life Insurance Company and his reply to my accusations are now completely before my readers. Let us see if there is not a chance here to determine the grave question, "Is '_the one man_' who runs each of our great insurance companies honest?"

The facts are: During the past twenty years I have been importuned, begged, and hounded by the several great insurance companies of the United States to take out policies with them almost upon any terms I might name. Of this statement I could present more photographic proof than would fit in any one issue of this magazine, but most of it would have no bearing on the point at issue.

In the present year (1904)--to go no further back--John A. McCall has repeatedly urged me to come into the New York Life Insurance Company.

Absolute evidence of the truth of this a.s.sertion is presented below. Mr.

McCall's letter reproduced here would be accepted as complete proof in any court of justice. In the correspondence that follows this first letter it will be seen that Mr. McCall left no stone unturned in his effort to get me into the New York Life Insurance Company. A duplicate of the communication sent to my residence went on the same date to my office. To quote his own words, "I hope you may" and "I may have the pleasure of welcoming you either to new or increased membership in this great mutual insurance investment." Then, his anxiety being so great, after waiting four days for a reply he sent his special agent to argue with me, and, on the following day, his Boston manager to urge me further.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PHOTOGRAPH OF LETTER FROM JOHN A. MCCALL SOLICITING INSURANCE, SENT TO MR. LAWSON'S HOUSE.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: PHOTOGRAPH OF HEADING AND SIGNATURE OF JOHN A. MCCALL'S LETTER OF JANUARY 22D, SENT IN DUPLICATE TO MR. LAWSON'S OFFICE; OF SPECIAL AGENT GILLESPIE'S LETTER OF JANUARY 27TH; OF MANAGER HAYES'S LETTER OF JANUARY 28TH. THESE THREE LETTERS SOLICITING INSURANCE, FOLLOWED EACH OTHER WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX DAYS.]

Is it any wonder that I called the history I am writing "Frenzied Finance"? The man who wrote the letter practically saying that I was a black-mailer and that my reason for attacking the New York Life was my anger because he would not take me into his company, and the man who wrote the ones begging me to come in, are one and the same; and he absolutely controls directly $400,000,000 of the people's savings in the New York Life, and indirectly unnumbered millions in affiliated inst.i.tutions!

I think the case is complete. The policy-holders of the New York Life have an opportunity to decide whether the "one man" who runs the great inst.i.tution in which their savings are invested is honest. In making up their minds, I implore them not at the present time, or at least until the question has been more fully ventilated, to allow their policies to lapse. Under any and all circ.u.mstances they should keep up the payment of their premiums, for the one thing especially desired and schemed for by some of the "frenzied finance" insurance companies is a wholesale lapse of policies.

Some few years ago the financial world learned with great interest of a new and very useful invention in finance. A group of individuals who had been buying large quant.i.ties of a certain stock at a low price, found they could not, on account of the fact of its overcapitalization having become known to the public, resell it; and they were, to use the stock-gambling term, "hung up" with it because it was too water-logged to float. It became necessary to disguise its ident.i.ty. Here's how they did it: They formed a "syndicate," to which they "turned over" their stock at a good profit; the "syndicate" in its turn put it "in trust" by simply depositing the stock certificate with a trust company, which in its turn issued against the stocks thus held a new security, which it called a "bond." For these a ready market was found, for the word "bond"

is still a term to conjure with in the world of finance.

This seemed such a serviceable arrangement that the originators soon had many imitators. Many "syndicates" were formed, and many so-called "bonds" were put on the market. In most cases the stocks were purchased at a low price, turned into "trusts" at double their cost, and then paid for by means of these certificates, dubbed "bonds." As one stock after another was converted into syndicate certificates--"bonds"--the familiarity of the procedure robbed it of its novelty and these "bonds"

were quoted and dealt in much as other and more tangible securities bearing the same name. Perhaps this is why the startling announcement of the New York Life Insurance Company made about this time, that it proposed to sell all its stocks and thereafter hold nothing but bonds, created so much less of a sensation than was antic.i.p.ated. The term "bond" had become vulgarized.

This excellent example would undoubtedly have had many followers but for the humor of the Tobacco Trust. This robust inst.i.tution, with an immense amount of watered stock, audaciously poured it all but a small amount into bonds, $157,000,000 of them, and with a fine trumpet-blast proclaimed these "bonds" safe investments for widows, orphans, and insurance companies. Even Wall Street, with its frenzied votaries and its frenzied environment, was staggered. The culmination of these conversion performances was the brilliant plan evolved by George W.

Perkins, the junior partner in the firm of J. Pierpont Morgan & Co., vice-president of the New York Life Insurance Company and expert investor of its vast surplus, to have the United States Steel Trust purchase some $200,000,000 worth of its own water-logged stock and convert the same into more "absolutely safe bonds"; for its most valuable services in the turning-over process the Morgan firm was to have a commission of some forty millions of dollars. At this juncture "frenzied finance" became gagged with its own froth, and I have not s.p.a.ce here to go further into the subject.

The New York Life Insurance Company declares to its agents, policy-holders, and prospective policy-holders that it no longer holds stock securities. In its last report to the Insurance Commissioners there are set forth stock securities of the kind I have described above, to the amount of fifty millions of dollars. I will give one ill.u.s.tration:

"Northern Pacific--Great Northern--C., B. & Q. collateral 4s, book value--$12,057,132.59, market value--$11,375,000."--(From the official report to Insurance Commissioners.)

Now, these bonds are nothing more nor less than Chicago, Burlington and Quincy stock of a par value of $100 per share, which shares were purchased by individuals, and had "bonds" issued against them at $200 per share. (Northern Pacific and Great Northern stock in about the same proportion.) In the sense in which the public look upon the old bonds of railroads this "bond" is no more a bond than it is a Government bond. It is nothing more nor less than a stock security, _and yet President McCall says in his letter printed above and sent by him to policy-holder DeRan that the New York Life does not and cannot invest its surplus in stock securities_.

THE TRUE STORY OF HOW I WAS "BLACK-LISTED"

The publication of President McCall's letter and the charges which accompanied it attracted so much attention that the "Big Three" were flooded with letters from policy-holders demanding information. In the January, 1904, issue of _Everybody's Magazine_, I continued the controversy. After reviewing the conditions of the previous month's argument, I went on:

In entering upon the exposure of the most powerful body of men in the world, I knew quite well what I was "up against," and deliberately decided that in the conduct of my fight I would use such strategy as I believed proper to outwit so strong and so unscrupulous an adversary.

One can hang a dog as well with a cord as with a hawser, and in proving my a.s.sertions I am quite willing that the insurance companies should believe each play is my best card. I decline, however, to show my hand.

In reply to the charge that I was attacking the New York Life because I had been refused insurance by that company, as positively stated in Mr.

McCall's letter, I reproduced a letter written and signed by President John A. McCall, dated 1904, soliciting me to take out insurance in his company. I printed parts of three other letters, one directed to my office, also signed by Mr. McCall, another from the special agent, and a third from the Boston agent of the New York Life, supplementing Mr.

McCall's letter and requesting the privilege of an interview.

This correspondence was put forth with a thorough understanding of its nature. The publishers of _Everybody's Magazine_ and my own lawyers, to whom I submitted it, both pointed out that the insurance companies would undoubtedly take the ground that the McCall letter was no more than a circular that had been sent out to a number of capitalists and had gone to me by mistake. I replied that such a rejoinder would practically amount to an admission that the statement and signature of the highest officials of the New York Life were valueless and without significance, which would place President McCall in an untenable position. If his signature were valueless and without significance when appended to a letter addressed to me, why not in other instances if the interests of his corporation seemed to require such a disclaimer? Considering my argument, would not such a confession have a pregnant bearing on the proposition--is the "one man" honest, especially as I was equipped with additional doc.u.ments to offset further attempts on the part of the insurance companies to show me up as a disappointed seeker after their policies?

Here, specifically, are the details of my encounter with the life-insurance inst.i.tutions, and I pledge my word to my readers that they const.i.tute all the facts in this connection. They are well known to the prominent men a.s.sociated with the great companies whose duty it is to keep track of just such transactions. Whoever knows by experience of the incessant pursuit of business by the important insurance corporations need not be told that a man in my position has had his share of importuning by agents great and small. I have never sought life insurance, for it has not appealed to me as an investment, but on three separate occasions I have yielded to the persuasions of a friend connected with one of the big inst.i.tutions and have considered the subject. The first time was in 1887, following a breakdown from overwork. This illness my friend used as an argument to induce me to take out insurance, and I went so far as to agree to submit to a private medical examination by the leading physicians of his company for the purpose of ascertaining if my breakdown, which for a brief time had left a trace of paralysis in my left side, would bar me. This examination was at my own expense, and it was expressly understood that, being private, it should not const.i.tute a record. The physician p.r.o.nounced me a perfect risk, but advised against going further inasmuch as a rigid rule of the company precluded them from granting insurance to any one who had suffered from this form of illness until seven years after the attack.

I was not disappointed except on account of my friend.

Five years later his solicitation was renewed and I was a.s.sured that the officials of his company were so eager to have me that they would waive the seven-year rule, which still had two years to run. This time I went up before another medical examiner, and after the usual tests, was asked the stereotyped question if I had ever previously been rejected for life insurance. My friend replied for me--no. I, however, in spite of his protests stated fully the conditions of my previous examination, which the doctor a.s.sured me did not const.i.tute an official rejection, and the application was filled out. In the conversation that ensued, the doctor said that it was safer to await the expiration of the seven years, and I being still indifferent, except to my friend's interest, accepted the apologies of the several people concerned for the trouble I had taken and let it go at that.

Four years later, in 1896, after the attack of appendicitis which I described in the December, 1904, instalment of "Frenzied Finance," again my good friend the agent came to me and used the incident of my narrow escape from death to impress upon me once more the desirability of having a large policy of life insurance. Those who have read the "System's" disclaimer, will remember that I had been blacklisted since 1892. There were the usual consultations with high officials of the corporation, and when all preliminary bargains had been arranged, I underwent a thorough examination in New York. This time, the seven-year term having expired, I was p.r.o.nounced a perfect risk. But my latest illness had brought me up against another waiting rule, and once more the subject was abandoned after the usual expressions of regret and good-will. Since 1896 my connection with life-insurance companies has been about the same as that of a mola.s.ses barrel with the industrious flies in summer.