Formation of the Union, 1750-1829 Part 7

[Sidenote: Malcontents put down.]

The cause of Ma.s.sachusetts was unhesitatingly taken up by all the colonies, from New Hampshire to Georgia. America was united. This unanimity proceeded, however, not from the people, but from suddenly const.i.tuted revolutionary governments. No view of the Revolution could be just which does not recognize the fact that in no colony was there a large majority in favor of resistance, and in some the patriots were undoubtedly in a minority. The movement, started by a few seceders, carried with it a large body of men who were sincerely convinced that the British government was tyrannical. The majorities thus formed, silenced the minority, sometimes by mere intimidation, sometimes by ostracism, often by flagrant violence. One kind of pressure was felt by old George Watson of Plymouth, bending his bald head over his cane, as his neighbors one by one left the church in which he sat, because they would not a.s.sociate with a "mandamus councillor." A different argument was employed on Judge James Smith of New York, in his coat of tar and feathers, the central figure of a shameful procession.

[Sidenote: Early organization.]

Another reason for the sudden strength shown by the Revolutionary movement was that the patriots were organized and the friends of the established government did not know their own strength. The agent of British influence in almost every colony was the governor. In 1775 the governors were all driven out. There was no centre of resistance about which the loyalists could gather. The patriots had seized the reins of government before their opponents fairly understood that they had been dropped.

[Sidenote: Feeling of common interest.]

Another influence which hastened the Revolution was a desire to supplant the men highest in official life. There was no place in the colonial government for a Samuel Adams or a John Adams while the Hutchinsons and the Olivers were preferred. But no personal ambitions can account for the agreement of thirteen colonies having so many points of dissimilarity. The merchants of Boston and New Haven, the townsmen of Concord and Pomfret, the farmers of the Hudson and Delaware valleys, and the aristocratic planters of Virginia and South Carolina, deliberately went to war rather than submit. The causes of the Revolution were general, were wide-spread, and were keenly felt by Americans of every cla.s.s.

[Sidenote: Resistance of taxation.]

The grievance most strenuously put forward was that of "taxation without representation." On this point the colonists were supported by the powerful authority of Pitt and other English statesmen, and by an unbroken line of precedent. They accepted "external taxation;" at the beginning of the struggle they professed a willingness to pay requisitions apportioned in lump sums on the colonies; they were accustomed to heavy taxation for local purposes; in the years immediately preceding the Revolution the people of Ma.s.sachusetts annually raised about ten shillings per head. They sincerely objected to taxation of a new kind, for a purpose which did not interest them, by a power which they could not control. The cry of "Taxation without representation" had great popular effect. It was simple, it was universal, it sounded like tyranny.

[Sidenote: Resistance of garrisons.]

A greater and more keenly felt grievance was the establishment of garrisons. The colonies were willing to run their own risk of enemies.

They a.s.serted that the real purpose of the troops was to overawe their governments. The despatch of the regiments to Boston in 1768 was plainly intended to subdue a turbulent population. The British government made a serious mistake in insisting upon this point, whether with or without taxes.

[Sidenote: Resistance to Acts of Trade.]

By far the most effective cause of the Revolution was the English commercial system. One reason why a tax was felt to be so great a hardship was, that the colonies were already paying a heavy indirect tribute to the British nation, by the limitations on their trade. The fact that French and Spanish colonists suffered more than they did, was no argument to Englishmen accustomed in most ways to regulate themselves. The commercial system might have been enforced; perhaps a tax might have been laid: the two together made a grievance which the colonies would not endure.

[Sidenote: Stand for the charters.]

The coercive acts of 1774 gave a definite object for the general indignation. In altering the government of Ma.s.sachusetts they destroyed the security of all the colonies. The Crown was held unable to withdraw a privilege once granted; Parliament might, however, undo to-morrow what it had done to-day. The instinct of the Americans was for a rigid const.i.tution, unalterable by the ordinary forms of law. They were right in calling the coercive acts unconst.i.tutional. They were contrary to the charters, they were contrary to precedent, and in the minds of the colonists the charters and precedent, taken together, formed an irrepealable body of law.

[Sidenote: Oppression not grievous.]

[Sidenote: Restraints on trade.]

[Sidenote: Resistance to one-man power.]

In looking back over this crisis, it is difficult to see that the colonists had suffered grievous oppression. The taxes had not taken four hundred thousand pounds out of their pockets in ten years. The armies had cost them nothing, and except in Boston had not interfered with the governments. The Acts of Trade were still systematically evaded, and the battle of Lexington came just in time to relieve John Hanc.o.c.k from the necessity of appearing before the court to answer to a charge of smuggling. The real justification of the Revolution is not to be found in the catalogue of grievances drawn up by the colonies. The Revolution was right because it represented two great principles of human progress. In the first place, as the Americans grew in importance, in numbers, and in wealth, they felt more and more indignant that their trade should be hampered for the benefit of men over seas. They represented the principle of the right of an individual to the products of his own industry; and their success has opened to profitable trade a thousand ports the world over. In the second place the Revolution was a resistance to arbitrary power. That arbitrary power was exercised by the Parliament of Great Britain; but, at that moment, by a combination which threatened the existence of popular government in England, the king was the ruling spirit over Parliament. The colonists represented the same general principles as the minority in England. As Sir Edward Thornton said, when minister of Great Britain to the United States, in 1879: "Englishmen now understand that in the American Revolution you were fighting our battles."

CHAPTER IV.

UNION AND INDEPENDENCE (1775-1783).

34. REFERENCES.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES.--Justin Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_, VI.

_pa.s.sim_, VII. 1-214, VIII. App.; and _Readers' Handbook of the Revolution_; W. F. Allen, _History Topics_, 107, 108; W. E. Foster, _References to the Const.i.tution of the United States_, 11-14; Channing and Hart, _Guide_, ---- 136-141.

HISTORICAL MAPS.--Nos. 2 and 3 this volume (_Epoch Maps_, Nos. 4 and 5); H. C Lodge, _Colonies_, frontispiece; Scribner, _Statistical Atlas_, Pl. 12; Rhode, _Atlas_, No. xxviii.; Geo. Bancroft, _United States_ (original edition), V. 241; Labberton, _Atlas_, lxiv.; B. A. Hinsdale, _Old Northwest_, I. 176, 180 (republished from T. MacCoun, _Historical Geography_); List of contemporary maps in Winsor, _Handbook_, 302, school histories of Channing, Johnston, Scudder, Thomas.

GENERAL ACCOUNTS.--G T. Curtis, _Const.i.tutional History_, I. chs. i.- iv. (History of the Const.i.tution, I 28-123); W. E. H. Lecky, _England in the Eighteenth Century_, IV. ch iv.; Geo. Bancroft, _United States_, VII.

chap. xxvii. (last revision, IV. Chs. ix.-xxvii, V.); R. Hildreth, _United States_, IV. 57-373, 411-425, 440-444; Edward Channing, _United States_, 1765-1865, ch iii.; W. M. Sloane, _French War and Revolution_ chs. xviii.- xxiv.; H. C. Lodge, _George Washington_, I. chs. v.-xi.; Abiel Holmes, _Annals of America_, II. 199-353; Bryant and Gay, _United States_, III.

377-623, IV. 1-74; Justin Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_, VI chs ii.-ix., VII. chs. i., ii.; J. R. Green, _English People_, IV. 254-271; Adolphus, _England_, II. 333-433, _pa.s.sim_; Story, _Commentaries_, ---- 198-217; T. Pitkin, United States, I. 282-422, II. 37-153.

SPECIAL HISTORIES.--G. W. Greene, _Historical View_; R. Frothingham, _Rise of the Republic_, 403-568; John Fiske, _American Revolution_; J. M.

Ludlow, _War of American Independence_, chs. v.-viii.; Geo. Pellew, _John Jay_, 59-228; E. J. Lowell, _Hessians_; Charles Borgeaud, _Rise of Modern Democracy_; M. C. Tyler, _Literature of the Revolution_, II.; L. Sabine, _American Loyalists_; H. B. Carrington, _Battles of the Revolution_; W. B.

Weeden, _New England_, II. chs. xx, xxi.; W. G. Sumner, _Financier and Finances of the American Revolution_.

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS.--_Journals of Congress, Secret Journals of Congress_, works and full biographies of the Revolutionary Statesmen; Peter Force, _American Archives_; Jared Sparks, _Correspondence of the Revolution_; F. Wharton, _Diplomatic Correspondence_; John Adams and Abigail Adams, _Familiar Letters_; Tom Paine, _Common Sense_; Crevecoeur, _Letters from an American Farmer_ [1770-1781]; J. Anbury, _Travels_ [1776- 1781]; Chastellux, _Voyage de Newport_ [also in translation, 1780-1781]; W. B. Donne, _Correspondence of George III. with Lord North_ [1768-1783]; Francis Hopkins, _Essays and Writings_; Philip Freneau, _Poems_; Baroness Riedesel, _Letters and Memoirs_.--Reprints in Niles, _Principles and Acts of the Revolution_; D. R. Goodloe, _Birth of the Republic_, 205-353; Mathew Carey, _Remembrancer_; Frank Moore, _Diary of the American Revolution_, _Old South Leaflets_, _American History told by Contemporaries_, II.

35. THE STRENGTH OF THE COMBATANTS (1775).

[Sidenote: Power of Great Britain.]

When we compare the population and resources of the two countries, the defiance of the colonists seems almost foolhardy. In 1775 England, Ireland, and Scotland together had from eight to ten million souls; while the colonies numbered but three millions. Great Britain had a considerable system of manufactures, and the greatest foreign commerce in the world, and rich colonies in every quarter of the globe poured wealth into her lap. What she lacked she could buy. In the year 1775 the home government raised ten million pounds in taxes, and when the time came she was able to borrow hundreds of millions in all the colonies together, two million pounds in money was the utmost that could be raised in a single year by any system of taxes or loans. In 1776 one hundred and thirty cruisers and transports brought the British army to New York: the whole American navy had not more than seventeen vessels. In moral resources Great Britain was decidedly stronger than America. Parliament was divided, but the king was determined. On Oct 15, 1775, he wrote: "Every means of distressing America must meet with my concurrence." Down to 1778 the war was popular in England, and interfered little with her prosperity.

[Sidenote: Weakness of America.]

How was it in America? Canada, the Floridas, the West Indies, and Nova Scotia held off. Of the three millions of population, five hundred thousand were negro slaves, carried no muskets, and caused constant fear of revolt. John Adams has said that more than a third part of the princ.i.p.al men in America were throughout opposed to the Revolution; and of those who agreed with the principles of the Revolution, thousands thought them not worth fighting for. There were rivalries and jealousies between American public men and between the sections. The troops of one New England State refused to serve under officers from another State. The whole power of England could be concentrated upon the struggle, and the Revolution would have been crushed in a single year if the eyes of the English had not been so blinded to the real seriousness of the crisis that they sent small forces and inefficient commanders. England was at peace with all the world, and might naturally expect to prevent the active a.s.sistance of the colonies by any other power.

[Sidenote: The two armies.]

[Sidenote: Hessians.]

[Sidenote: Indians.]

[Sidenote: Discipline.]

When the armies are compared, the number and enthusiasm of the Americans by no means made up for the difference of population. On the average, 33,000 men were under the American colors each year; but the army sometimes fell, as at the battle of Princeton, Jan. 2, 1777, to but 5,000.

The English had an average of 40,000 troops in the colonies, of whom from 20,000 to 25,000 might have been utilized in a single military operation; and in the crisis of the general European war, about 1780, Great Britain placed 314,000 troops under arms in different parts of the world. The efficiency of the American army was very much diminished by the fact that two kinds of troops were in service,--the Continentals, enlisted by Congress; and the militia, raised by each colony separately. Of these militia, New England, with one fourth of the population of the country, furnished as many as the other colonies put together. The British were able to draw garrisons from other parts of the world, and to fill up gaps with Germans hired like horses; yet, although sold by their sovereign at the contract price of thirty-six dollars per head, and often abused in service, these Hessians made good soldiers, and sometimes saved British armies in critical moments. Another sort of aliens were brought into the contest, first by the Americans, later by the English. These were the Indians. They were intractable in the service of both sides, and determined no important contest; but since the British were the invaders, their use of the Indians combined with that of the Hessians to exasperate the Americans, although they had the same kind of savage allies, and eventually called in foreigners also. In discipline the Americans were far inferior to the English. General Montgomery wrote: "The privates are all generals, but not soldiers;" and Baron Steuben wrote to a Prussian officer a little later: "You say to your soldier, 'Do this,' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say to mine, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it." The British officers were often incapable, but they had a military training, and were accustomed to require and to observe discipline. The American officers came in most cases from civil life, had no social superiority over their men, and were so unruly that John Adams wrote in 1777: "They quarrel like cats and dogs. They worry one another like mastiffs, scrambling for rank and pay like apes for nuts."

[Sidenote: Commanders.]

The success of the Revolution was, nevertheless, due to the personal qualities of these officers and their troops, when directed by able commanders. In the early stages of the war the British generals were slow, timid, unready, and inefficient. Putnam, Wayne, Greene, and other American generals were natural soldiers; and in Washington we have the one man who never made a serious blunder, who was never frightened, who never despaired, and whose unflinching confidence was the rallying point of the military forces of the nation.

[Sidenote: Plans of campaign.]

The theatre of the war was more favorable to the British than to the Americans. There were no fortresses, and the coast was everywhere open to the landing of expeditions. The simplest military principle demanded the isolation of New England, the source and centre of the Revolution, from the rest of the colonies. From 1776 the British occupied the town of New York, and they held Canada. A combined military operation from both South and North would give them the valley of the Hudson. The failure of Burgoyne's expedition in 1777 prevented the success of this manoeuvre. The war was then transferred to the Southern colonies, with the intention to roll up the line of defence, as the French line had been rolled up in 1758; but whenever the British attempted to penetrate far into the country from the sea-coast, they were eventually worsted and driven back.

36. THE SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1775).

[Sidenote: Conception of a "Congress."]

Before the war could be fought, some kind of civil organization had to be formed. On May 10, 1775, three weeks after the battle of Lexington, the second Continental Congress a.s.sembled in Philadelphia, and continued, with occasional adjournments, till May 1, 1781. To the minds of the men of that day a congress was not a legislature, but a diplomatic a.s.sembly, a meeting of delegates for conference, and for suggestions to their princ.i.p.als. To be sure, this Congress represented the people, acting through popular conventions, and not the old colonial a.s.semblies; yet those conventions a.s.sumed to exercise the powers of government in the colonies, and expected the delegates to report back to them, and to ask for instructions.

Nevertheless, the delegates at once began to pa.s.s resolutions which were to have effect without any ratification by the legislatures. Of the nine colonies which gave formal instructions to their representatives, all but one directed them to "order" something, or to "determine" something, or to pa.s.s "binding" Acts.

[Sidenote: Advisory action.]