Famous Sea Fights Part 24

o i {| | | | | | u s {|_Adzumo_ | 9,436| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901.

r e {| | | |{12 6-inch }| | e r {| | | | | | d s {|_Asama_ |} 9,700| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1899.

{|_Tokiwa_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| | {| | | | | | {|_Yak.u.mo_ | 9,850| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 498| " 1901.

{| | | |{12 6-inch }| | ------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------------

[25] The old turret-ship _Chin-yen_--captured from the Chinese (formerly the _Chen-yuen_) (4 12-inch and 4 6-inch guns)--was with the fleet, but is not included in a list of effective armour-clads.

Besides his armoured ships, Admiral Rojdestvensky had a squadron of six protected cruisers under Rear-Admiral Enquist, whose flag flew in the "Oleg," a vessel of 6750 tons launched in 1903, and completed next year.

She had for her princ.i.p.al armament twelve six-inch quick-firers. The other cruisers were the "Aurora," of a little over 6000 tons, the "Svietlana," of nearly 4000, the "Jemschug," and "Izumrud," of 3000 tons (these two armed with 47 quick-firing guns), and the "Almaz," of 3285, a "scout" of good speed, carrying nothing heavier than 12-pounders. There was one auxiliary cruiser, the "Ural,"[26] a flotilla of nine destroyers, four transports, two repairing ships, and two hospital steamers.

[26] A German Atlantic liner purchased at the beginning of the war--formerly known as the "Konigin Maria Theresa"--"roomy and luxurious, but as a warship useless," says the Naval Constructor Politovsky, Chief Engineer of the Baltic Fleet.

Awaiting the battle in sight of his own sh.o.r.es, Togo had concentrated as auxiliary squadrons to his armoured fleet a considerable number of protected cruisers and a whole swarm of torpedo craft. At this stage of her naval development, and on the eve of a life-and-death struggle, j.a.pan had no idea of "sc.r.a.pping" even the older ships. Anything that could carry a few good guns, and brave men to fight them, might be useful, so even the old Chinese ironclad which had carried Ting's flag at the Yalu battle, a ship dating from 1882, was under steam in one of the auxiliary squadrons, with four new 12-inch guns in her barbettes.

There were three of these auxiliary squadrons, commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewa, Rear-Admiral Uriu, and Rear-Admiral Kataoka, the last having as a subordinate commander Rear-Admiral Togo, a relative of the commander-in-chief. Dewa's flag flew in the "Kasagi," a fine cruiser of nearly 5000 tons, built in America, and he had with him her sister ships, the "Chitose" and "Taka-sago." Uriu's flag flew in the "Naniwa," Togo's ship when he was a captain in the Chinese war. Several of the fine cruisers which Ito had then led to victory were present, many of them remodelled, and all provided with new guns. Then there were a number of small protected cruisers, built in j.a.panese dockyards since the Chinese war, the heralds of the later time when the j.a.panese navy would all be home-built. Battleships, armoured cruisers, and protected cruisers were all swifter than the Russian ships. The fleet as a whole could manoeuvre at fully fifty per cent greater speed than the enemy, and this meant that it could choose its own position in battle.

The five torpedo squadrons included two or three torpedo-gunboats, twenty-one fine destroyers, and some eighty torpedo-boats. Togo's plans had the simplicity which is a necessity in the rough game of war, where elaborate schemes are likely to go wrong. Some of the swift protected cruisers were scouting south of the straits. The fleet was anch.o.r.ed in a body in Masampho Bay, and in wireless communication with its scouts. The armoured fleet was to make the main attack on the head of the Russian advance. The protected cruiser squadrons were to sweep round the enemy's flanks, fall upon his rear, and destroy his transports and auxiliaries. The torpedo flotilla was to be ready to dash in and complete the defeat of the enemy when his fleet was crippled by the fight with the heavy ships.

Most of the officers and men of the Russian fleet had the dogged courage that could carry them through even a hopeless fight, but they looked forward to the immediate future with forebodings of disaster. Even among the officers on board the great "Suvaroff" there was a feeling that the most that could be hoped for was that a few ships would struggle through to Vladivostock, if there was a battle, and that the best thing that could happen would be for the thick weather and rough seas to enable them to avoid anything like a close fight with the j.a.panese.

During the last day before the fight Rojdestvensky, who did not want to hurry forward, but was timing his advance so as to pa.s.s the straits in the middle of the next day, spent some time in manoeuvres. Captain s.e.m.e.noff's notes on the proceedings convey a useful lesson.

"Once again" (he says), "and for the last time, we were forcibly reminded of the old truism that a 'fleet' is created by long practice at sea in time of peace (cruising, not remaining in port), and that a collection of ships of various types hastily collected, which have only learned to sail together on the way to the theatre of operations, is no fleet, but a chance concourse of vessels."[27]

[27] "Tsu-shima," p. 10.

Wireless telegraphy had come into use since the last naval war, and a fleet could now try to overhear the aerial messages of an enemy. In the Russian fleet the order had been given that no wireless messages were to be sent.

In other words, the operators were to keep silence, and listen by watching their apparatus. In the morning of the 26th they thought they detected messages pa.s.sing. In the evening these were more frequent--"short messages of a word or two" was the interpretation that the experts in the signal cabins put upon the unintelligible flickerings of the indicator, and they suggested that they were mere negative code-signals from the j.a.panese scouts to their main fleet, repeating an indication that they were on the alert, and had seen nothing. This was mere guesswork, however, and Politovsky's diary of the voyage[28] shows that near the Cape, at Madagascar, and out in the midst of the Indian Ocean, Rojdestvensky's wireless operators had thought that they detected j.a.panese aerial signalling, simply because the receivers gave indications they could not understand. Possibly these were merely the effect of electric storms on the apparatus.

[28] "From Libau to Tsu-shima." By the late Eugene S.

Politovsky. Translated by Major F. R. G.o.dvey, R.M.L.I. 1906.

Once or twice, on 26 May, they thought they could read fragments of sentences, such as--"Last night--nothing--eleven lights--not in line." The short messages in the evening came at fixed times. This showed that prearranged signalling was really going on. It gave the impression that perhaps the fleet was being watched by unseen enemies.

As the sun went down the ships closed up, and half the officers were detailed for duty at the guns during the hours of darkness. The rest lay down fully dressed, ready to turn out at a moment's notice. Many slept on the decks. No lights were shown. s.e.m.e.noff's description of that night of anxious expectation is worth quoting. He was on board the flagship, the "Suvaroff":--

"The night came on dark. The mist seemed to grow denser, and through it but few stars could be seen. On the dark deck there prevailed a strained stillness, broken at times only by the sighs of the sleepers, the steps of an officer, or by an order given in an undertone. Near the guns the motionless figures of their crews seemed like dead, but all were wide awake, gazing keenly into the darkness. Was not that the dark shadow of a torpedo-boat? They listened attentively. Surely the throb of her engines and the noise of steam would betray an invisible foe.

Stepping carefully, so as not to disturb the sleepers, I went round the bridges and decks, and then proceeded to the engine-room. For a moment the bright light blinded me. Here life and movement were visible on all sides. Men were nimbly running up and down the ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and a buzzing of voices. Orders were being transmitted loudly, but on looking more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed."[29]

[29] "Tsu-shima," pp. 27, 28.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA SKETCH MAP TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF THE WATERS IN WHICH THE FIRST PART OF THE FIGHT TOOK PLACE. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE KOREAN (OR TSU-SHIMA) STRAITS ARE MAPPED IN BLACK, & AN OUTLINE MAP OF THE NORTH SEA BETWEEN THE EASTERN COUNTIES OF ENGLAND & THE OPPOSITE COAST OF THE CONTINENT IS SKETCHED OVER THE MAP IN RED ON THE SAME SCALE]

At daybreak the j.a.panese scouts were in touch. As the day came in grey light over the misty broken sea, one of their scouts, the auxiliary cruiser "Siano Maru" (an armed pa.s.senger liner), sweeping round through the haze, almost collided with the hospital ships, and then dashed off and disappeared in the twilight. In former wars she would have had to run back to the fleet with her news. Now from her wireless apparatus the information was sent through the air to the receivers of the "Mikasa" in Masampho Bay, and in a few minutes Togo knew that "the enemy's fleet was in square No.

203 of the chart, apparently steering for the eastern pa.s.sage," i.e. the strait between Tsu-shima Island and j.a.pan.

In the straits and outside Masampho Bay a heavy sea was running, and though the wind blew strongly from the south-west, the weather was still hazy at sunrise, with patches of fog here and there. The main body of the j.a.panese fleet began to get up anchors and slip from its moorings.[30]

[30] English people have so seldom occasion or opportunity of consulting large-scale maps of j.a.pan, that there is an impression that the battle of Tsu-shima was fought in narrow waters, where there was no chance of the Russians eluding Togo and little room for manoeuvring. The strait in which the battle took place is really about as wide as the North Sea between Harwich and the Hook of Holland. (See accompanying sketch map.)

At dawn Rojdestvensky had called in the "Almaz," leaving the "Jemschug" and "Izumrud" steaming in advance of his two divisions. The six auxiliary ships had closed up, so that the leading ship, the transport "Anadir," was abreast of the centre of the two lines. The "Almaz," "Svietlana," and "Ural," steamed at the rear of this central line of transports, to protect them in that direction. The two hospital ships, flying the Red Cross flag and trusting to it for safety, were well astern. About 6 a.m. the huge "Ural" came running up between the lines, and semaph.o.r.ed to the flagship that four ships in line ahead were pa.s.sing across the rear of the fleet, but could not be clearly made out in the mist.

They could only be some of Togo's cruisers "shepherding" the fleet. Just before seven a fine cruiser was seen some five miles away on the starboard beam of the "Suvaroff." She closed up to three miles, and was soon identified as the "Idzumo." The big turret-guns were swung round to bear on her, but the j.a.panese cruiser, having seen what she wanted, increased her distance, but could be seen still keeping the fleet in sight. Togo's report notes that at 7 a.m. the "Idzumo" sent by wireless the second definite report of the enemy, stating that he was twenty-five miles north-west of Ukushima, steering north-east. This would make the Russian position about thirty miles south of the Tsu-shima Islands, heading for the channel to the east of them. An hour later, about 8 a.m., some j.a.panese ships showed themselves the other side of the fleet. s.e.m.e.noff notes how:--

"The 'Chin-yen,' 'Matsushima,' 'Itsukushima,' and 'Hashidate,'

appeared out of the mist, steaming on an almost parallel course.

Ahead of them was a small, light cruiser, apparently the 'Akitsushu,' which hurriedly drew off to the north as soon as we were able to see her well (and equally she us), and the whole squadron began slowly to increase their distance and gradually to disappear from sight."

This was Vice-Admiral Takeomi's division, composed of three of the cruisers that had fought at the Yalu battle, eleven years before, and the "Chin-yen," which had fought against them as the "Ting-yuen." The ship that ran out ahead was the only quick or modern ship in the squadron, the small Clyde-built armoured cruiser "Chiyoda." If Rojdestvensky had had any speedy cruisers available, he might have severely punished this slow squadron of old ships. Takeomi showed he knew his enemy by thus boldly approaching in the mist.

The Russians now realized that they had watchful enemies all round them, and rightly conjectured that they would find the enemy's heavy ships in the straits ready for battle.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. GENERAL MAP]

At 10 a.m. another cruiser squadron appeared on the port beam. This was Dewa's division, made up of the American-built sister ships "Kasagi" and "Chitose," of nearly 5000 tons, and two smaller protected cruisers, the "Niitaka" and "Otowa," lately turned out by j.a.panese yards. They seemed to invite attack. At a signal from the admiral, the eight armour-clads of the starboard line steamed ahead of the port line, turned together to port, and then, turning again, formed line ahead, leading the whole fleet. At the same time the transports moved out to Starboard, guarded by the "Vladimir Monomach" (detached from the port division), the "Svietlana," "Almaz," and "Ural."

Dewa's cruisers held a parallel course with the Russian battleships for more than an hour, still apparently unsupported. The range was about five miles. At 11.20 the Russians opened fire on them. s.e.m.e.noff says that it was the result of a mistake. "The 'Orel' fired an accidental shot (which she immediately reported by semaph.o.r.e). Unable, with smokeless powder, to tell by which of the leading ships it had been fired, the fleet took it as a signal from the 'Suvaroff' and opened fire. Of the whole fleet the fire of the 3rd Squadron was the heaviest."

This squadron was made up of Nebogatoff's "old tubs." Their heavy fire was probably the result of undisciplined excitement. The j.a.panese fired a few shots in reply, but no harm was done on either side. Rojdestvensky, who had kept the guns of his flagship silent, signalled "Ammunition not to be wasted," and the firing ceased in five minutes, just as the j.a.panese turned slowly and increased their distance.

Orders were now signalled for the men of the Russian fleet to have their dinners, and the officers lunched in turn. The harmless skirmish encouraged some of the Russian crews with the idea that they had been in action and were none the worse, and had driven the j.a.panese away. At noon the fleet was due south of Tsu-shima, which towered like a mountain out of the sea a few miles ahead. The signal was hoisted, "Change course N.23E. for Vladivostock." It was the anniversary of the Tsar's coronation. Round the wardroom tables in his doomed fleet the officers stood up and drank with enthusiasm to the Emperor, the Empress, and "victory for Russia!"

The cheering had hardly died down when the bugles sounded the alarm. Every one hurried to his post. The enemy's cruisers had again shown themselves, this time accompanied by a flotilla of destroyers, that came rolling through the rough sea with the waves foaming over their bows. On a signal from the admiral the four leading battleships turned to starboard and stood towards the enemy, then re-formed line ahead on a course parallel to the rest of the fleet, and slightly in advance of it. The j.a.panese on the threat of attack had turned also and went off at high speed to the northwards.

At 1.20 p.m. the admiral signalled to the four next ships of the fleet to join the line of battleships, forming astern of them. The Russian armada was now well into the wide eastern strait of Tsu-shima, and far ahead through the mist a crowd of ships could be dimly seen. The crisis was near at hand.

On receiving the first wireless message from the "Shinano Maru" at daybreak, Togo had weighed anchor and come out of Masampho Bay, with his main fleet steering east, so as to pa.s.s just to the north of Tsu-shima. He had with him his twelve armoured ships, and Rear-Admiral Uriu's division of protected cruisers ("Naniwa," "Takachico," "Tsushima," and "Akashi"), and a strong flotilla of destroyers. The smaller torpedo-boats, more than sixty in number, had been already sent to shelter in Miura Bay in the island of Tsu-shima, on account of the heavy seas.

During the morning Togo received a succession of wireless messages from his cruisers, and every mile of the enemy's progress, every change in his formation was quickly signalled to him. Shortly after noon he was able to note that the Russians were entering the straits, steaming at about 12 knots on a north-easterly course; that they were formed in two columns in line ahead, the starboard column being the stronger, and that they had their transports astern between the columns. He decided to attack them on the weaker side at 2 p.m., when he calculated that they would be near Okinoshima, a small island in the middle of the eastern strait, about half-way between Tsu-shima and the south-western headlands of Nippon.

At half-past one he was joined by Dewa's division of cruisers, and a few minutes later the divisions of Kataoka and the younger Togo rejoined. They had till now hung on the flanks of the Russian advance. At a quarter to two the enemy's fleet came in sight away to the south-westward of Okinoshima.

Flags fluttered up to the signal yards of the "Mikasa," and the fleet read with enthusiasm Togo's inspiring message:--

"_The rise or fall of the Empire depends upon to-day's battle.

Let every man do his utmost._"

He had been about ten miles north of Okinoshima at noon (by which time he had steamed some 90 miles from Douglas Bay since 5 a.m.), thence he turned back slowly, going west and a little south, till he sighted the Russians.

He crossed their line of advance diagonally at about 9500 yards distance.

His light cruiser divisions had received orders to steam southwards and attack the Russian rear, and were already well on their way.

The heavy j.a.panese ships, circling on the left front of the enemy's advance, put on speed, and were evidently intending to recross the bows of the battleship division, bringing a converging fire to bear on the leading ships--the manoeuvre known as "crossing the T." As the "Mikasa" led the j.a.panese line on its turning movement Rojdestvensky swung round to starboard and opened fire at 8500 yards. Togo waited till the distance had shortened to 6500, and then the guns of the "Mikasa" flashed out. At that moment only three other of his ships had made the turn. They also opened fire, and ship after ship as she came round into line joined in the cannonade. The Russians turned more slowly, and it was some time before the whole of their line was in action. Meanwhile a storm of fire had burst upon the leading ships of Rojdestvensky's lines, the "Suvaroff" and the "Ossliabya" at the head of the starboard and port divisions being each made a target by several of the enemy.

The j.a.panese gunners were firing with a rapidity that surprised even those who had been in the action of 10 August, and with much more terrible effect. In Captain s.e.m.e.noff's narrative of the fate of the "Suvaroff" we have a remarkably detailed description of the execution done by the j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls in this first stage of the battle. The opening shots went high. They flew over the "Suvaroff," some of the big 12-inch projectiles turning over and over longitudinally in their flight. But at once s.e.m.e.noff remarked that the enemy were using a more sensitive fuse than on 10 August.

Every sh.e.l.l as it touched the water exploded in a geyser of smoke and spray. As the j.a.panese corrected the range sh.e.l.ls began to explode on board or immediately over the deck, and again there was proof of the improved fusing. The slightest obstacle--the guy of a funnel, the lift of a boat derrick--was enough to burst the sh.e.l.l.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA DIAGRAMS OF MOVEMENTS DURING THE FIGHTING OF MAY 27TH]

The first fair hit was on the side, abreast of the forward funnel. It sent up a "gigantic column of smoke, water, and flame." Then several men were killed and wounded near the fore-bridge, and then there was a crash beside one of the quick-firers, and, the sh.e.l.l bursting as it penetrated the deck, set the ship on fire. In the battle of 10 August the flagship "Tsarevitch,"

which had borne the brunt of the j.a.panese fire, had been hit just nineteen times, but now that the "Mikasa" and her consorts had got the range hit followed hit on the leading Russian ships. "It seemed impossible," says s.e.m.e.noff, "even to count the number of projectiles striking us. I had not only never witnessed such a fire before, but I had never imagined anything like it. Sh.e.l.ls seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another.... The steel plates and superstructure on the upper deck were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their mountings. Such havoc would never be caused by the simple impact of a sh.e.l.l, still less by that of its splinters. It could only be caused by the force of the explosion.... In addition to this there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Of course, the steel did not burn, but the paint on it did. Such almost incombustible materials as hammocks and rows of boxes, drenched with water, flared up in a moment. At times it was almost impossible to see anything with gla.s.ses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering, heated air. No! It was different to the 10th of August!"