Ethics Part 24

Proof.--In proportion as an image is a.s.sociated with a greater number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of G.o.d.

Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of G.o.d (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves G.o.d, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of G.o.d; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves G.o.d, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. This love towards G.o.d must hold the chief place in the mind.

Proof.--For this love is a.s.sociated with all the modifications of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. G.o.d is without pa.s.sions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to G.o.d, are true (II. x.x.xii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) G.o.d is without pa.s.sions. Again, G.o.d cannot pa.s.s either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary.--Strictly speaking, G.o.d does not love or hate anyone. For G.o.d (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate G.o.d.

Proof.--The idea of G.o.d which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate G.o.d, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of G.o.d, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate G.o.d. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Love towards G.o.d cannot be turned into hate.

Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand G.o.d as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard G.o.d as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a pa.s.sion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand G.o.d to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves G.o.d, cannot endeavour that G.o.d should love him in return.

Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.

xvii. Coroll.) that G.o.d, whom he loves, should not be G.o.d, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves G.o.d, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards G.o.d cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to G.o.d by the same bond of love.

Proof.--This love towards G.o.d is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. x.x.xvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. x.x.xvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. x.x.xv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.

Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards G.o.d is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:----

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.

ii. and V. iv. note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpa.s.s those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]

are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to G.o.d (V. ix. xi.).

[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and a.s.sociate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.

Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or pa.s.sion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most pa.s.sive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its pa.s.sive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of G.o.d, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are pa.s.sions (V. iii. and iv. note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time to pa.s.s on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of the mind, without relation to the body.

PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.

Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and, consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.

Thus it cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.

xvii. note), or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in G.o.d there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Proof.--G.o.d is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of G.o.d (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must necessarily exist in G.o.d (II. iii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Proof.--There is necessarily in G.o.d a concept or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not a.s.signed to the human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.

Coroll.), we do not a.s.sign to it duration, except while the body endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of G.o.d (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand G.o.d.

Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of G.o.d to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and, in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand G.o.d (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.

Proof--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable thereof. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know G.o.d (IV.

xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge pa.s.ses to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.

of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.