England, Canada and the Great War Part 7

I do not consider it necessary to go at any length in relating the vicissitudes of the conflict between the aspirations of the Boer element and the undoubted rights of British suzerainty. As a rule they are sufficiently well known by my English readers.

But I wish to emphasize the two undeniable facts: first, that throughout this protracted contest, England did perseveringly try to favour South Africa with the largest possible measure of political liberty. Second, that the crisis was finally brought about by the persistent determination of the Government of Pretoria to refuse justice to the Uitlanders and to the British capitalists who, at the urgent request of President Kruger, had invested many millions in the development of the very valuable mines recently discovered in the Transvaal territory.

Though England had agreed to the establishment of the two Republics of the Transvaal and Orange, she had maintained her suzerainty on those territories, which suzerainty the Government of Pretoria had again recognized by the Convention of 1884.

The most convincing proof that England did not intend any unfair design against the South African Republics, is the fact that she did not prepare to resist the armed attack of the Government of Pretoria which could be easily foreseen by the intense organization they were evidently making to impose Boer supremacy in South Africa.

In his very unjust appreciation of the policy of Great Britain in South Africa, Mr. Boura.s.sa kept no account whatever of the very important fact that war was declared against England by the South African Republic. How could Great Britain have been guilty of a hideous crime in not bowing to the dictate of President Kruger and his Government, as the "Nationalist" leader said, is beyond comprehension.

England was absolutely within her right in accepting the challenge of the Government of Pretoria, and fighting to maintain her flag and her Sovereignty in South Africa.

Fortunately, the South African War, characterized by deeds of heroism on both sides, has had the most satisfactory conclusion. It is to be hoped that for many long years the future of that great country is settled with all the blessings that political liberty and free inst.i.tutions will surely confer on that important part of the British Empire. The Boers themselves have fully recognized that their own national development cannot be better guaranteed and safeguarded than by the powerful Sovereignty pledged to their protection, on the only condition of their loyal allegiance to the flag waving on the fair land where they can multiply in peace, prosperity and happiness. The enthusiasm and the admirable courage with which they have rallied to the support of Great Britain and her Allies in the present war, is the best evidence how much they appreciate the advantages of their new conditions in the great South African Dominion destined to such a grand future.

I most sincerely deplore the persistent efforts of the "Nationalist"

leader to pervert more and more the mind of my French Canadian countrymen by his so very unfair appreciation of the nature of the South African conflict. It was with the hope of counteracting them that I introduced a special chapter in my French edition explaining, as fully as I could, though in a condensed form, the South African question.

The a.s.sertion that the partic.i.p.ation of Canada in the present European war was the sequence of the precedent of our intervention in the South African struggle, is also most injustifiable and untenable. Had Canada taken no part whatever in the South African War, it would not have made the least difference with regard to the decision of the Canadian people to support Great Britain and the Allies in their gigantic effort to put an end to Prussian terrorism. The a.s.sertion which I most emphatically contradict could have no other object but to prejudice the public mind against Canadian intervention in any of the wars of the Empire--_les guerres de l'empire_.

CHAPTER XIII.

BRITISH AND GERMAN ASPIRATIONS COMPARED.

In the attempt to justify his opposition to the Canadian armed support of the Allies' cause, Mr. Boura.s.sa repeatedly a.s.serted that Great Britain was as much as Germany aspiring to rule the whole world. He pretends that there is no difference between Anglo-Saxonism and Germanism.

How unjust and dangerous is such a doctrine is evident to any fair minded man. It was no doubt calculated to prejudice the French Canadians against Great Britain, by telling them that the sacrifices they were called upon to make were imposed upon them only to favour the British determination to reach the goal of her ambition:--universal domination.

I strongly repudiated such a.s.sertions and vindicated England's course and policy.

To accuse Great Britain to aspire to universal domination is a most unwarranted charge, contradicted by the whole history of the last century during which she was the most determined supporter of peace.

Though one of the great Powers of the world, England never undertook to organize a large standing army. How could she aspire to the world's domination without a complete military organization comprising many millions of men, is what I am unable to understand.

Mr. Boura.s.sa's argument to prove his a.s.sertion is based on the efforts of England to maintain and develop her naval forces so as to guarantee her supremacy on the high seas of the world. How he failed to realize that Great Britain, on account of her insular position, close to the European continent, is by nature itself bound, of sheer necessity, to protect herself by the strength of her military naval power, is beyond comprehension. Supremacy on the seas is for the Mother Country a mere question of national existence,--to be or not to be. But supremacy on the seas cannot, and will never, permit England to attain anything like universal domination. And why? For the obvious reason that Great Britain is not, and never can become, a continental Power, in the exact sense of the word.

I explained, conclusively, I believe, that the case would be very different if Germany succeeded in her efforts to supplant England's supremacy on the seas. When the Berlin Government undertook to build a huge military fleet, Germany was the greatest continental military Power. What were her expectations when she adopted that threatening naval policy? The Berlin authorities were very confident that when they would decide to bring on the great war for which they had been strenuously preparing for half a century, they would in a few months have continental Europe at their feet and under their sway. Triumphant over Europe they would have at once dominated Asia and a great part of Africa. The next surest way for the German Empire to reach universal domination was to break England's power on the seas. What is impossible for England to accomplish, on account of her insular position, Germany, being a continental Empire, could achieve if she became mistress of the seas.

The present war is the proof evident that the mighty power of England on the seas has been the salvation of her national existence and, almost equally, that of France and Italy. It kept the oceans open for the trade of all the Allied and neutral nations. He is willingly blind, intellectually, the man who does not see that deprived of the matchless protection of her naval forces, Great Britain could be starved and subdued in a few months by an enemy ruling the waves against her.

Is it possible to suppose that any man aspiring to help moulding the public opinion of his countrymen, ignores that with the relatively small extent of the territory it can devote to agricultural production, Great Britain can never feed her actual population of over forty-five millions, most likely to reach sixty millions in the not very distant future. Consequently how unjust, how extravagant, is it to accuse England of any aspiration to dominate the world by means of the sacrifices she is absolutely bound to make for the only sake of her self-defence, her self-protection.

If he does not know, I will no doubt cordially oblige the "Nationalist"

leader by informing him that Great Britain, usually importing food products to the amount of seven to eight hundred millions of dollars, for many years past, required as much as a billion dollars worth of them in the war year of 1915. It is so easy to foresee that the continual increase of the population of the United Kingdom, by the new large developments which will surely follow the war in all industrial, commercial and financial pursuits, will cause a relative increase in the importations of food products likely to reach, and even exceed before long, an average total annual value of a billion and a quarter dollars.

None of the European continental Powers has the same imperious reasons as England to take the proper means to guarantee her control of the seas. How is it then that Germany is the only Power to object to England's policy, if it is not for the ultimate object to attain universal domination by the overthrow of Great Britain's ascendency on the wide oceans, which would permit her to realize her long cherished aim by the combined powerful effort of her gigantic military forces both on land and sea.

With regard to England's naval supremacy, the "Nationalist" leader is also committed to other opinions which I strongly contradicted. He entirely forgets that beyond the sea coast limits, well defined by International Law, no Sovereign rights can be claimed on the high seas.

The navigation of the ocean is free to all nations by nature itself. Has any Government ever entertained the foolish idea that the broad Atlantic could, for instance, be divided into so many parts as the European, Asiatic, or American continents, over which several States could exercise Sovereign powers? No Chinese Wall can be built on the seas.

My own view of the case, which I believe to be the correct one, is that England's naval supremacy means nothing more nor less than the police of the seas, and the protection of the flags of all the Nations navigating them, besides being, of course and necessarily, the guarantee of her National existence.

Blind also, intellectually, is the British subject not sufficiently inspired by the true sense of the duties of Loyalty, who does not understand that once Great Britain's maritime power would be crushed and the United Kingdom either conquered or obliged to an humiliating peace which would ruin all her future prospects, the Colonial Empire would equally be at the mercy of the victorious enemy of the Mother Country.

With the most earnest conviction, I have tried, to the best of my ability, to persuade my French-Canadian compatriots of the inevitable dangers ahead if the false views which were so persistingly impressed upon their minds were ever to prevail, and the aim they undoubtedly favour to be realized.

Another argument widely used by our "Nationalist" School to influence the opinion of the French Canadians against Canada's partic.i.p.ation in the war, was that Great Britain herself was not doing what she ought to win the victory. I have personally heard this false objection repeated by many--unconsciously of course--who were influenced in so saying by the "Nationalist" press.

No more unfair charge could have been made against England. I could not help being indignant at reading it, knowing as I did, by daily acquired information what an immense effort the United Kingdom had been making, from the very beginning of the hostilities, to play its powerful part in the great war into which it had n.o.bly decided to enter to avenge its honour, to defend the Empire and the whole world against German barbarous militarism.

I have already commented on the immense service guaranteed to the Allied nations by the British fleet. To ill.u.s.trate the wonderful and admirable military effort of Great Britain, I will quote some very important figures from the most interesting Report of the British War Cabinet, for the year 1917, presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

Under the t.i.tle "_Construction and Supply_" the Report says:--

During the past year the Naval Service has undergone continual expansion in order to enable it to meet every demand made upon it, not only in the seas surrounding these islands, but in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arctic Ocean, the Pacific, and the Atlantic, where it has co-operated with the Naval forces of the Allies. The displacement tonnage of the Royal Navy in 1914 was 2,400,000 tons. To-day it has increased by 75 per cent.--=(making a total of 4,200,000 tons--)=. The ships and vessels of all kinds employed in the Naval Service in September, 1914, after the whole of the mobilisation had been completed, had a tonnage of just over 4 million; now the figure is well over 6 million. Transports, fleet attendants and overseas oilers and similar auxiliary vessels at the outbreak of war numbered 23; the Admiralty to-day control nearly 700 such craft. The strength of the personnel, which was 145,000, has been increased to 420,000.

From these brief particulars regarding the ships and their manning, an estimate can be formed of the expansions that have been made in the auxiliary services, such as guns, torpedoes, munitions, and stores of all kinds, anti-submarine apparatus, mines, &c., and some idea is gained of the demands that have been made upon the great army of workers on sh.o.r.e, the men in the Royal dockyards and a.r.s.enals, in the shipyards, the engine shops, and the factories, without whose help the Fleet could not be maintained as a fighting force.

As regards warship and auxiliary ship construction, the output during the last 12 months has been between three and four times the average annual output for the few years preceding the war.

The Admiralty now control all the dry docks in the country,...--250 merchant ships are being repaired each week, either in dry dock or afloat.

Since the beginning of the war, 31,470 British war vessels have been placed in dock or on the slips =(--as many as 225 being repaired in one week--)=.... These figures do not include repair work carried out to the vessels of our Allies....

The Transport Service is of the highest importance in carrying on the war. What has been the achievement of England on that score? Under the t.i.tle:--"_Transportation_" the War Cabinet Report proves its immensity as follows:--

The record of what has been done by the transport services for the Armies of the Allies shows a stupendous amount of work accomplished, which const.i.tutes one of the brilliant achievements of the war. There had been transported overseas up till the end of August, 1917, the last date for which complete statistics are available--some:--13 million human beings--combatants, wounded, medical personnel, refugees, prisoners, &c.; 2 million horses and mules; million vehicles; 25 million tons of explosive and supplies for the armies; ... 51 million tons of coal and oil fuel for the use of our Fleets, our Armies, and to meet the needs of our Allies.

The operations of the seas are on such a large scale that it is difficult to realize all that is involved in sea transportation; for example, over 7,000 personnel are transported, and more than 30,000 tons of stores and supplies have to be imported daily into France for the maintenance of our own army. About 567 steamers, of approximately 1 million tons, are continually employed in the service of carrying troops and stores to the Armies in France and to the forces in various theatres of war in the East.

We all know that the Berlin Government expected that the submarine campaign would result in an early final victory for the Central Empires.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then the Imperial Chancellor, said:--"_The Blockade must succeed within a limited number of weeks, within which America cannot effectively partic.i.p.ate in the operations_."

How he was mistaken, and extravagant were his expectations, events have proved. This sentence is also proof evident that he realized how effective the United States effort would become, if the submarine campaign did not succeed within a few weeks.

The iniquitous submarine campaign, re-opened early in the year 1917, "_added materially to the responsibilities of the Navy. To meet this new and serious menace drastic steps had to be taken to supplement those adopted in the previous December and January_."

The Report adds:--

A large number of new destroyers have been built and at the same time auxiliary patrol services have been expanded enormously so as to deal with the nefarious submarine and minelaying methods of the enemy. Before the outbreak of the war there were under 20 vessels employed as minesweepers and on auxiliary patrol duties.

To-day the number of craft used for these purposes at home and abroad is about 3,400, and is constantly increasing.

A new feature of the means adopted for the protection of trade against submarines has been a return to the convoy system as practised in bygone wars. It has been markedly effective in reducing the losses. During the last few months over 90 per cent. of all vessels sailing in all the Atlantic trades were convoyed....

The Royal Naval Air Service at the outbreak of war possessed a personnel of under 800; at the present moment the numbers approach 46,000 and are continually increasing.... Mention must also be made of the great value of the air services in combating the submarine menace round our coasts.... Ill.u.s.trating their extent it may be stated that in one week the aircraft patrol round the British coasts alone flies 30,000 miles.