England, Canada and the Great War Part 25

With regard to the supposed conflict of "anglo-saxonism" and "pan-germanism" I will merely say that it is only another sample of Mr.

Boura.s.sa's wily dreams.

As I have already said, this last pamphlet of the Nationalist leader is, for a large part of it, but the repet.i.tion of his diatribes so often _hurled_ at England. I will close this chapter by quoting from page 57, the following paragraph which summarizes, in a striking way, the charges Mr. Boura.s.sa is so fond to _hurl_ at the mother-country. It reads thus:--

"_What has allowed England to bring Portugal into va.s.salage? to dominate Spain and keep Gibraltar, Spanish land? to deprive Greece of the Ionians and Cyprus Islands? to steal Malta? to foment Revolution in the Kingdom of Naples and the Papal States? to run, during thirty years, the foreign policy of Italy and to throw her in Austria's execrated arms? to take possession of Suez and to make her own thing of it? to chase France from the Upper Nile, and subsequently from the whole of Egypt, to intervene in the Berlin treaty to deprive Russia of the profits of her victory, to galvanize dying Turkey, to delay for thirty years the revival of the Balkan States and to make of Germany the main spring of continental Europe? In a word, what has permitted England to rule the roost in Europe and to acc.u.mulate the frightful storm let loose in 1914? Who?

What? if it is not the "naval domination" of England ever since the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar._"

It would be most difficult to condense more erroneous historical appreciations and political absurdities in so few lines.

Many will be quite surprised to learn, from Mr. Boura.s.sa's resounding trumpet, that England had been for many years gathering the storm which broke out in 1914. So far all fairminded men were convinced that this rascally work had been done by Germany, in spite of England's exhortations to reduce military armaments.

In all sincerity, I am unable to understand how Mr. Boura.s.sa can expect to successfully give the lie to such incontrovertible truths as the guilt of Germany in preparing the war she finally brought on more than four years ago, and as the unceasing determination of England to maintain peace.

CHAPTER x.x.xIII.

A CASE FOR TRUE STATESMANSHIP.

Whatever the TRUE and the FALSE friends of PEACE may hope and say, it is perfectly useless to close our eyes to the glaring fact that its restoration can only be the result of military effort combined with the highest practical statesmanship. After all what has happened, and the oft-repeated declaration of the Rulers of the belligerent nations, it would be a complete loss of a very valuable time to indulge any longer in the expression of views all acknowledge in principle, but which no one, however well disposed he may be, is actually able to traduce in practical form.

When writing my French book, in the fall of 1916, reviewing the situation as it had so far developed, I said:--

"All are most anxious for peace. However it is infinitely better to look at matters such as they are. It is evident that the military situation does not offer the least hope that the war can be immediately brought to an end. Successes have been achieved on both sides. But nothing decisive has yet happened.

The armies are facing one another in defiant att.i.tude. The belligerent nations, on both sides, have yet, and for a long time, great resources in man-power and money."

"If Germany, which should first give up the fight in acknowledging her crime, is obdurate to final exhaustion, how can it be possibly expected that the Allies who were forced to fight, will submit to the humiliation and shame of soliciting from their cruel enemy a peace the conditions of which, they know, would be utterly unacceptable. Consequently they must with an indomitable courage and an invincible perseverance go on struggling to solve, for a long time, the redoubtable problem to which they are pledged, in honour bound, to give the only settlement which can rea.s.sure the world."

I am still and absolutely of the same opinion. The present military situation has certainly much improved in favour of the Allies since 1916. However, looking at the question, first, from the standpoint of the developing military operations, there is no actual, and there will not be for many months yet--more or less--practical possibility of a satisfactory peace settlement.

Secondly, looking at the question from the standpoint of true statesmanship, it is very easy to draw the inexorable conclusion that, again, there is not actually the least chance of an immediate restoration of peace.

Statesmen, responsible, not only for the future of their respective countries, but, actually, for that of the whole world, are not to be supposed liable to be carried away by a hasty desire to put an end to the war and to their own arduous task in carrying it to the only possible solution:--A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.

A broad and certain fact, staring every one, is that the Berlin Government will not accept the only settlement to which the Allies can possibly agree as long as her armies occupy French and Belgian territories. If Mr. Boura.s.sa and his "pacifists" friends--or dupes--have really entertained a faint hope to the contrary, they were utterly mistaken.

Present military events, however proportionately enlarged by the increased resources, in man-power and money, of the belligerents, are not without many appropriate precedents. History is always repeating itself. Great Powers having risked their all in a drawn battle, do not give in as long as they can stand the strain, considering the importance of the interests they have at stake.

For the same reason above stated, but reversed, the Allies will not negotiate for peace before they have thrown the German armies out of French and Belgian soil, and repulsed them over Teutonic territory. I do not mean to say that peace must necessarily be proclaimed either from Berlin or from Paris. But it will only be signed as the inevitable result of a final triumphant march on the way either to Berlin or to Paris. There is no possible escape from the alternative. In such matters, there is no halfway station.

CHAPTER x.x.xIV.

AFTER-THE-WAR MILITARY PROBLEM.

Two of the most important propositions of His Holiness the Pope more especially deserve earnest consideration. They are indeed supported by the Allies who are purposely fighting for their adoption.

In his note of the first of August, 1917, addressed to the Rulers of the belligerent nations, the Pope says in part:--

"AT FIRST, THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT MUST BE TO SUBSt.i.tUTE THE MORAL FORCE OF RIGHT TO THE MATERIAL FORCE OF ARMS."

No truer proposition could be enounced. If Germany had put this principle into practice, she never would have violated Belgian territory.

When England protested against the proposed invasion of Belgium, she did so in obedience to the sacred principle enunciated by the Sovereign Pontiff. She strongly insisted to the last minute that _the moral force_ of solemn treaties should prevail upon _the material force of arms_.

In a letter dated October 7, 1917, His Eminence Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State to His Holiness, addressing the Archbishop of Lens, wrote as follows respecting conscription:--

"The Holy See, in his Appeal of the first of August, did not consider, out of deference for the leaders of the belligerent peoples, that he should mention it, preferring to leave to themselves the care of determining it, but for him, the only practical system and, moreover, easy to apply with some good will on both sides, would be the following: to suppress, with one accord between civilized nations, military obligatory service; to const.i.tute an arbitration tribunal, as already said in the Pontifical Appeal, to settle international questions; finally, to prevent infractions, to establish universal "boycottage" against any nation attempting to reestablish military obligatory service, on refusing either to lay an international question before the arbitration tribunal, or to abide by its decision."

Cardinal Gasparri then points to the ante-war British and American systems of military "voluntarism", in the following terms:--

"As a matter of fact, omitting other considerations, the recent example of England and America testifies in favour of the adoption of this system. England and America had, in effect, voluntary service, and, to take an efficient part in the present war, they were obliged to adopt conscription. It proves that voluntary service well supplies the necessary contingent to maintain public order (and is public order not maintained in England and America just as well, if not better, than in the other nations?) but it does not supply the enormous armies required for modern warfare. Consequently in suppressing, with one accord between civilized nations, obligatory service to replace it by voluntary service, disarmament with all the happy consequences above indicated would be automatically obtained without any perturbation of public order."

"For the last century, conscription has been the true cause of calamities which have afflicted society: to reach a simultaneous and reciprocal suppression will be the true remedy. In fact, once suppressed, conscription could be reestablished only by a law; and for such a law, even with the present const.i.tution of the Central Empires, Parliamentary approbation would be required (which approbation would be most improbable for many reasons and above all on account of the sad experience of the present war); in this way, what is so much desired, for the maintenance of agreements, would be obtained: the peoples' guarantee. If, on the other hand, the right to make peace or war was given to the people by way of =referendum=, or at least to Parliament, peace between nations would be a.s.sured, as much at least as it is possible in this world."

It should be very gratifying indeed to all the loyal subjects of the British Empire to ascertain, from the declarations of Cardinal Gasparri, that the Pope is in so complete accord with England on this the most important question to be settled by the future peace treaty.

As proved in one of the first chapters of this work, the Government of Great Britain, supported in this course by almost the unanimous opinion of the peoples of the United Kingdom, was the first to suggest the holding of the Hague conferences to consider the best means to adopt to favour the world with the blessings of permanent peace. Their own view, which they forcibly expressed, was that the surest way to reach that much desired result was to limit the military armaments, both on land and sea. For more than twenty years previous to the war, they pressed, and even implored, for the adoption of their program.

I have also proved how obdurate Germany was in resisting England's propositions, and her successful intrigues to thwart Great Britain's efforts to have them adopted and put into practice.

England's policy has not changed. On the contrary, it is more than ever favourable to the limitation, and even to the complete abolition, of armaments, if one or the other can be achieved. It is the princ.i.p.al war aim of Great Britain, only coming next after her determination to avenge Belgium.

The future peace of the world could no doubt be well guaranteed by a large measure of disarmament. But it would certainly be much more so, if complete abolition could be obtained by an international agreement binding on all nations, with, of course, the allowance of the necessary forces required for the maintenance of interior public order.

The whole world can safely depend on the strenuous support of England for either the limitation or the abolition of armaments whenever the question is seriously taken up for consideration.

Evidently the problem will be difficult to solve. However, it should not be beyond the resources of statesmanship which, a.s.suredly, ought to rise superior to all prejudiced aspirations after the terrible ordeal Humanity will have experienced during the present war.

The maintenance of internal public order, and permanent preparedness for foreign wars, are two very different questions to examine. The first can safely be left to the care of every nation sure to attend to it if willing to maintain her authority. The second has a much wider scope and will tax the ability of statesmanship to the utmost limit.

Will the great civilized nations decide, when the war is over, to completely abolish conscription to return to voluntary military service within a very limited organization, thus doing away by a bold and single stroke with a system which, for more than a hundred years, has been the curse of continental Europe?

Or will they, at least as an initial attempt, come to the conclusion to only limit armaments, maintaining compulsory service for the reduced strength of the armies?

If armaments are either abolished, or merely reduced, will they be so on sea as well as on land? I would answer at once:--of course, they should.

Looking at the question from the British stand-point--and I can also say from that of the United States--it should be easily solved.

Public opinion in Great Britain and all over the British Empire, as well as in the United States, has always been against conscription in peace times, until the present war.

Not exactly foreseeing the full extent of the effort she would be called upon to make, England entered into the conflict determined to meet the requirements of her military situation out of the resources of voluntary enlistment. Canada, joining in the struggle, did the same. Both have done wonderfully well during the three first years of the prolonged war.