Elements of Morals Part 4

DIVISION OF DUTIES--GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL MORALITY.

SUMMARY.

=Division of duties.=--In theory there is but one duty, which is to do right; but this duty is subdivided according to the various relations of man. Hence three cla.s.ses of duties: duties towards ourselves, towards others, towards G.o.d: _individual_, _social_, _religious_ morality. We will begin with social morality, which requires the most expounding.

=General principles of social duties:= to do good; not to do evil.

=Different degrees of this double obligation:= 1, not to return evil for good (_ingrat.i.tude_); 2, not to do evil to those who have not done us any (_injustice and cruelty_); 3, not to return evil for evil (_revenge_); 4, to return good for good (_grat.i.tude_); 5, to do good to those who have not done us any (_charity_); 6, to return good for evil (_clemency_, _generosity_).

=Distinction between the various kinds of social duties:= 1, towards the _lives_ of other men; 2, towards their _property_; 3, towards their _family_; 4, towards their _honor_; 5, towards their _liberty_.

=Distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity.=--Justice is absolute, without restriction, without exception.

Charity, although as obligatory as justice, is more independent in its application. It chooses its time and place; its objects and means; _its beauty is in its liberty_.

We have seen that _practical_ morality or _private_ morality has for its object to acquaint us with the _application_ of theoretical morality. It bears not so much on _duty_ as on _duties_. The first question, then, that presents itself to us is that of the _division of duties_.

=17. Division of duties.=--It has been reasonably a.s.serted that there is in reality but one duty, which is to do good under all circ.u.mstances, the same as it has also been said that there is but one virtue: wisdom, or obedience to the laws of reason. But as these two general divisions teach us in reality nothing touching our various actions, which are very numerous, it is useful and necessary to cla.s.sify the princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstances in which we have to act, in order to specify in a more particular manner wherein the general principle which commands us to do good may be applied in each case.

Human actions may then be divided, either in regard to the different beings they have for their object, or in regard to the various faculties to which they relate.

The ancients divided morality particularly in reference to the divers human _faculties_, and in private morality they considered above all the _virtues_.

The moderns, on the other hand, have divided morality particularly in its relations to the different _objects_ of our actions; and, in private morality, they have considered, above all, the _duties_.

The ancients reduced all virtues to four princ.i.p.al ones: _prudence_, _temperance_, _courage_, and _justice_. This division was transmitted to us, and it is these four virtues which the catechism teaches under the name of _cardinal_ virtues.

The moderns reduced duties to three cla.s.ses: the duties towards _ourselves_, towards _others_, and towards _G.o.d_. Some add a fourth cla.s.s, namely, duties towards _animals_.

That portion of morality which treats of the duties towards ourselves, is called _individual_ morality; that which treats of the duties towards G.o.d, is called _religious morality_; that which treats of the duties towards other men, _social morality_. As to the duties towards animals, they are of so secondary an order, that it is not worth while to cla.s.sify them apart; we shall include them in social morality.

Social morality is by far the most extended in precepts and applications, the various relations of men with each other being extremely numerous. It may be subdivided into three parts: 1, general duties of _social_ life, or morality _properly called social_; 2, duties towards the State, or _civil_ morality; 3, duties towards the family, or _domestic_ morality.

We will begin with the study of social morality, social duties towards men in general, and we will first establish their principles and different varieties.

Let us in a few pages rapidly take a summary review of the general principles of _social_ morality.

=18. General principles of social duties: to do good, not to do evil.=--All human actions, in regard to others, may be reduced to these two precepts: 1, to do good to men; 2, not to do them harm. To this all the virtues of social morality may be reduced. But before exhibiting these virtues and vices more in detail, let us explain what is understood by the expressions _to do good_ and _to do evil_.

In the most general and apparent sense to do any one good would seem to be _to give him pleasure_; to do him harm, would seem to be _to give him pain_. Yet, is it always doing good to a person to procure him pleasure?

and is it always doing him harm, to cause him pain? For example, Kant[6]

says, "Shall we allow the idler soft cushions; the drunkard wines in abundance; the rogue an agreeable face and manners, to deceive more easily; the violent man audacity and a good fist?" Would it really be doing good to these men to grant them the object of their desires, what may satisfy their pa.s.sions? On the other hand, the surgeon who amputates a mortified limb, the dentist who pulls out a bad tooth, the teacher who obliges you to learn, the father who corrects your faults or restrains your pa.s.sions, do they really do you harm because they give you pain? No, certainly not. There are, then, cases where to do some one good is to cause him pain, and to do him harm is to procure him pleasure.

One may reasonably reduce all principles of social morality to these two maxims of the gospel: "Do not do to others what you do not wish them do to you;"--"Do to others as you wish to be done by." These two maxims are admirable, certainly; but they must be interpreted rightly. If, for instance, we have done wrong, do we generally wish to be corrected and punished? When we are yielding to a pa.s.sion, do we wish to be repressed in it, have it repelled? On the contrary, do we not rather wish to be allowed to enjoy it, and have the free range of our vices? Is not this generally what we all wish, when the voice of duty is mute and does not silence our pa.s.sionate feelings? If this is so, should we wish to do to others as we wish in similar circ.u.mstances, namely, in the gratification of pa.s.sions, to be done by? Should we not rather do to them what we should not like them do to us, that is, punish and correct them? It is evidently not in that sense we are to understand the two evangelical maxims; for they would be then no other than maxims of remissness and improper kindness; whilst they, on the contrary, express most admirably a moral truth; only when they speak of what we wish, they mean a _true_ and _good_ wish, not the desires of pa.s.sion; the same when we recommend men to do good, we mean real good and not apparent good; as also in recommending to do no harm, we mean real harm, not the illusory harm of the senses, imagination and pa.s.sions.

Thus, to well understand the duties we have to fulfil towards other men, we must understand the distinction between _true good_ and _false good_.

False good is that which consists exclusively in pleasure, all abstraction being made of usefulness or moral value; as, for example, the pleasures of pa.s.sions. True good is that which independently of pleasure recommends itself either through usefulness or through moral value; as, for instance, health or education. The real evils, of course, are those which injure either the interests of others or their moral dignity, such as misery or corruption. Apparent evils are those which cause us to suffer but a moment and redeem themselves by subsequent advantages: as, for instance, remedies or chastis.e.m.e.nts.

When we speak of good in regard to others, we should not fear to understand by that their interest, as well as their moral welfare; for, though we should not make our own interest the aim of our actions, it is not so in our relation with others. The seeking of our own happiness has no moral value; but the seeking of other people's happiness may have one, provided, we repeat, that we do not deceive ourselves touching the real sense of the word _happiness_, and that we do not understand by it a deceitful and short-lived delight.

"To do to others _as we wish_ to be done by; not to do to them what we do _not wish_ they should do us," should, therefore, be understood in the sense of an _enlightened_ will, which wills for itself nothing but what is truly conformable either to a proper interest or to virtue. Thus understood (and it is their true sense[7]), these two maxims comprehend perfectly the whole of social morality.

=19. Different degrees of this double obligation.=--The sense of these two expressions, to do good and to do harm, being now well-defined, let us examine the various cases which may present themselves, in rising, so to say, from the lowest to the highest round of duty. Let us first suppose a certain good or a certain evil, which will not vary in any of the following cases: this is the scale one may observe starting from the least virtue, to which corresponds evidently the greatest vice (by virtue of the principle set forth above[8]), to rise to the highest virtue, to which the least vice corresponds.

1. _Not to return evil for good._--This is, one may say (all things being equal), the feeblest of the virtues, as to return evil for good const.i.tutes the greatest of wrongs. Say, for example, homicide: is it not evident that the murder of a benefactor is the most abominable of all?

that to rob a benefactor is the most horrible of robberies? that the slander of a benefactor is the most criminal of slanders? On the other hand again, not to kill, not to steal, not to slander, not to deceive a benefactor, is the minimum of moral virtue. To abstain from doing harm to him who has done you good, is a wholly negative virtue, which is simply the absence of a crime. We cannot call that grat.i.tude, for grat.i.tude is a positive virtue, not a negative one; it is all in action, and not in omission; but, before being grateful, the first condition at least, is to be not ungrateful. We shall then say that the greatest of crimes is _ingrat.i.tude._ It is by reason of this principle that the crimes towards parents are the most odious of all; for we have no greater benefactors than our parents, and without mentioning the crimes nature finds repugnant enough, it is evident that the same kind of harm (wounds, blows, insults, negligence, etc.) will always be more blamable when done to parents than to any other benefactors, and to benefactors in general, than to any other men.

2. _Not to do harm to those who have not done us any._--The violation of this maxim is the second degree of crime and of sin, somewhat less serious than the preceding one, but still odious enough that to abstain from it is, in many cases, a rather feeble virtue. Not to kill, not to steal, not to deceive, not to expose one's self to the punishments of the law, are, indeed, of a very feeble moral value; whilst their contraries const.i.tute the basest and most odious of actions.

The kind of vice which injures others without provocation is what is called _injustice_, and when the pleasure of doing wrong is joined thereto, it is called _cruelty_. Cruelty is an injustice which rejoices in the harm done to others; injustice contents itself with taking advantage of it. There is, therefore, a higher degree of evil in cruelty than in injustice pure and simple.

The virtue opposed to injustice is _justice_, which has two degrees and two forms: the one negative, which consists simply in abstaining from doing _injury to any one_; the second positive, which consists in _rendering to each his due_. This second form of justice is more difficult than the first, for it is active. It is more difficult to restore to others what we hold as our own, or to pay one's debts, than to abstain from stealing; it is more difficult to speak well of one's rivals, than to abstain from slandering them; it is more difficult to give up one's position to another who deserves it, than to abstain from taking his; and yet there are cases where justice requires one should act instead of simply abstaining.

3. _Not to return evil for good._--Here we rise, in some respect, a degree in the moral scale. The two inferior degrees, namely, ingrat.i.tude and cruelty, have always and everywhere been considered as crimes. Nowhere has it ever been considered allowable to do harm to those who have done us good. But in nearly all societies, at a certain degree of civilization, has it been considered allowable, and even praiseworthy, to return evil for evil. "To do good to our friends, and harm to our enemies," is one of the maxims the poets and sages of Greece oftenest repeat. Among the Indians of America, glory consists in ornamenting one's dwelling with the greatest possible number of scalps taken from conquered enemies. We know about the Corsican _vendetta_. In one word, the pa.s.sion of revenge (which consists precisely in returning evil for evil) is one of the most natural and the most profound in the human heart, and it demands a very advanced moral education to comprehend that revenge is contrary to the laws of morality. Now, as the beauty of virtue is in proportion to the difficulty of the pa.s.sions to be overcome, it is evident that the virtues contrary to revenge, namely: _gentleness_, _clemency_, _pardon of injuries_, are amongst the most beautiful and most sublime. Already among the ancients had morality reached this maxim, that one should not do any harm, namely, even to those who had done us some, as may be seen from the dialogue of Plato, ent.i.tled the _Crito_. "_Socrates_: One should then commit no injustice whatsoever?" "_Crito_: No, certainly not." "_Socrates_: Then should one not be unjust even towards those who are unjust towards us."

4. Thus far we have only spoken of the virtues which express themselves negatively, and which consist especially in doing no harm. Let us now consider those which express themselves affirmatively, and which consist in doing good. The first degree is to return _good for good_: which is grat.i.tude, the contrary of which, as we have seen, is ingrat.i.tude; but there are two sorts of ingrat.i.tude, as there are two sorts of grat.i.tude.

There is a negative ingrat.i.tude, as there is a positive ingrat.i.tude. The positive ingrat.i.tude, which is, as we have seen, the most odious of all crimes, consists in returning evil for good; negative ingrat.i.tude consists simply in not returning good for good, namely, in forgetting a kindness.

It is not so reprehensible as the former, but it has still a certain character of baseness. Grat.i.tude is also twofold in its degrees and forms: it is negative, inasmuch as it abstains from injuring a benefactor;[9] it is positive, inasmuch as it returns good for good. In one sense, grat.i.tude is a part of justice, for it consists in returning to a benefactor what is due him; but it is also a notable part, and one which deserves being pointed out, for it seems that there is nothing easier than to return good for good; and experience, on the contrary, teaches us that there is nothing more rare. [This is certainly too strongly put.]

5. _To do good to those who have done us neither good nor harm._ This is what is called charity, which is a degree above the preceding, for in the preceding case we scarcely do more than give back what we have received; in this case we put in something of our own. But to characterize this new degree of virtue, it is necessary to well explain that the question relates to a good _that is not due_. For justice, we have seen, does not always mean to abstain from evil; it even does good sometimes. To restore a trust to one not expecting it; to do good to him who deserves it; to elect to a position one worthy of it; or, what is still more heroic, to give one's own position up to him, this evidently is doing good to others, and to those who have not done us any; but these are goods _due_, which already belong in some respects to those upon whom we confer them. It is not so with the goods which charity distributes. The gifts I make to the poor, the consolations I give to the afflicted, the care I bestow upon the sick, all of which take from my time, my interests, and my life which I endanger to save a fellow-being, are also goods which are my own and not his. I do not return to him what he would otherwise legitimately possess, whether he knows it or not. I give him something of my own; it is a pure _gift_. This gift is suggested to me by love, not by justice. The contrary of charity or devotion to others is _selfishness_.

Finally, there is a last degree above all other preceding degrees, namely, _to return good for evil_. This kind of virtue, the highest of all, has no particular name in the language. Charity, in fact, consists in doing good generally, and comprises the two degrees: to do good to the unfortunate, and return good for evil. Clemency may consist in simply pardoning; it does not necessarily go so far as to return good for evil.

Corneille might as well have called his tragedy of Cinna, the Clemency of Augustus, even if Augustus had merely pardoned Cinna, and not added: "Let us be friends!" Thus has this great and magnificent virtue no name, and as science is powerless in creating words suitable for every-day language, it must rest satisfied with periphrases. Nevertheless, this sublime virtue finds nowhere a grander expression than in those maxims of the Gospel: "You have been told that it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy: But I say to you: Love your enemies; do good to those that hate you, and pray for those that despitefully use you and persecute you."

=20. Different kinds of social duties.=--After the preceding division, which answers to the different degrees of obligation which may exist among men, there is another cla.s.sification which rests on the various _species_ or _kinds_ of duties which we may have to perform towards our fellow-beings. Let us first briefly state what will be developed at greater length in the following chapters.

1. _Duties relating to the life of others._--According to the two maxims cited above, these duties are of two kinds: 1, not to attempt the life of others; 2, to make efforts to save the life of others. All attempt at the life of others is called _homicide_. When accompanied by perfidy or treason, it is _a.s.sa.s.sination_. The murder of parents by children is called _parricide_; of children by parents (especially at the tenderest age), _infanticide_; of brothers by brothers, _fratricide_. All these crimes are most odious, and most repugnant to the human heart. Murder is never permitted, even when the highest interest and the greatest good is at stake. Thus did the ancients err in believing that the murder of a tyrant, or _tyrannicide_, was not only legitimate, but also honorable and beautiful. However, there is to be excepted the case of _legitimate self-defense_; for we cannot be forbidden to defend ourselves against him who wishes to deprive us of life. But the _duel_ should not be considered an act of legitimate self-defense: that is evident in the case of the aggressor; and, on the other side, there is only the defense that there has been the consent to be put in peril. As to the question whether an attack on honor is not equivalent to an attack on life, it cannot be said that it is false in all cases; but the abuse of the thing is here so near the principle, that it is wiser to condemn altogether a barbarous practice, of which so deplorable an abuse has been made. Finally, homicide in war, within the conditions authorized by international law, is considered a case of legitimate self-defense.[10]

If murder is the most criminal of actions, and the most revolting to our sensibilities, the action, on the contrary, which consists in _saving the life_ of others is the most beautiful of all. "The good shepherd gives his life for the sheep."

With the fundamental duty not to attempt the life of other men, is connected, as corollary, the duty not to injure them bodily by blows or wounds, or by dangerous violence done to their health, and, conversely, to a.s.sist them in illness.

2. _Duties relating to property._--It is evident[11] that man cannot preserve his life and render it happy and comfortable without a certain number of material objects which are his. The legitimate possession of these goods is what is called _property_.[12] The right of property rests in one respect on social utility, and in the other on human labor. On the one hand, society cannot subsist without a certain order that settles for each what is _his own_; on the other, it is but right that each should be the proprietor of what he has earned by his work; the right of possession carries with it the right of economizing, and, consequently, the right of forming a _capital_, and, moreover, the right of using this capital in making it bear _interest_. Again, the right of preserving implies also the right of _transmission_; hence the legitimacy of _inheritance_.

Property once founded upon law, it becomes our duty not to transgress the law. The act of taking what belongs to another is called _theft_. Theft is absolutely forbidden by the moral law, whatever name it may a.s.sume, or under whatever prestige it may present itself. "Thou shalt not steal."

Theft does not consist merely in putting one's hand into a neighbor's pocket; it includes all possible ways whereby the property of others may be appropriated. For example, to _defraud_ in regard to the quality of the thing sold; to practice illegal _stock-jobbing_; to convert to one's own use a _deposit_ entrusted to one's care; to borrow without knowing whether one can pay, and after having borrowed, to disown the debt, or refuse to pay it; there are as many forms of theft as there are ways of appropriating the property of others.

Regarding the property of others, the negative duty then consists in not taking what belongs to others. The positive duty consists in a.s.sisting others with one's own property, in relieving their misery. This is called _benevolence_, which benevolence may be exercised in various ways, either by _gift_, or by _loan_. It may also be exercised in _kind,_ that is in giving to others the objects necessary to their maintenance or support, or in money, that is, in furnishing them the means of procuring them; or in _work_, which is the best of all gifts; for in thus relieving others we procure them the means of helping themselves.

With the duty relating to the property of others, are connected as corollaries, the duties relating to the observance of agreements or contracts; the transmission of property in society being not always done from hand to hand, but by means of promises and writings. To fail in keeping one's promise, to pervert the sense of solemn contracts, is, on the one side, to appropriate other people's property, and on the other, to lie and deceive, and thus to fail in a double duty.

3. _Duties relating to the families of others._--We have seen above what are the duties of man in his family; there remains to be said a few words touching the duties towards the families of others. One may fail in these duties either by violating the conjugal bond, which is _adultery_; or by carrying off other people's children, which is _abduction_, or by depraving them through bad advice or bad examples, which is _corruption_.

4. _Duties relating to the honor of others._--One may fail in these duties, either by saying to a man (who does not deserve it), wounding and rude things to his face, which are _insults_, or in speaking ill of others; and here we distinguish two degrees: if what is said is true, it is _backbiting_; if what is said is false and an invention, it is _slander_. In general one must not too easily ascribe evil to other men; this kind of defect is what is called _rash judgments_.

The _positive_ duty respecting other people's reputation is to be just towards every one, even towards one's enemies; to speak well of them if they deserve it, and even of those who speak ill of us. It is a duty to entertain a kindly disposition towards men in general, provided this does not go so far as to wink at wrong. In our relations with our neighbors, usage of the world has, in order to avoid quarrels and insults, introduced what is called _politeness_, which, for being a worldly virtue, is not the less a necessary virtue in the order of society.

5. _Duties towards the liberty of others._--These are rather the duties of the State than of the individual. They consist in respecting in others the liberty of conscience, the liberty of labor, individual liberty, personal responsibility, all of which are the _natural rights_ of man. However, private individuals may themselves also fail in this kind of duties. The violation of the liberty of conscience is called _intolerance_; it consists either in employing force to constrain the consciences, or in imputing bad morals or bad motives to those who do not think as we do. The virtue opposed to intolerance is _tolerance_, a disposition of the soul which consists, not in approving what we think false, but in respecting in others what we wish they should respect in us, namely, conscience. One may also violate individual liberty, the liberty of labor, in keeping one's fellow-beings in _slavery_; but slavery is rather a social inst.i.tution than an individual act. However, there may be cases where one may seek to injure other people's work, in restraining others by threats from work; which, for example, takes sometimes place in workmen's strikes. There is also a certain way of domineering over the freedom of others without restraining it materially, which const.i.tutes real _tyranny_; it is the dominion which a strong will exercises over a feeble will, and of which it too often is tempted to take advantage. On the contrary, it is a duty, not only to respect the liberty of others, but also to encourage it, to develop it, to enlighten it through education.