Elements of Morals Part 35

But it is not always the greater physical strength and health which determine in man his capacity for work; and it is a notable fact, and a matter upon which it is well to insist, namely, that all differences are compensated for, balance themselves, so to say; that such a one, for example, who, in some respect and from a certain point of view, may be inferior to another, may from another standpoint be superior to him; which, again, is as much as to say that there are no cla.s.ses in society; for if the one who in one respect is inferior to his fellow-man, is in another superior to him, they are equals.

In the cla.s.s called the laboring cla.s.s, for example, we see every day that it is not always the strongest and the healthiest that produce the largest amount of work; and love of work is a notable factor in this scale of physical strength, making the balance pretty even. For some delicate men are industrious, whilst others who are stronger are not; some have a natural liking for their work, whilst others again have not. Hence a difference in the character of their work, and, consequently, in the remuneration of it.

A third difference is that of the _intelligence_. All men have received from nature a special gift which distinguishes them from the animals, and which we call intelligence; but they have not received it all to the same degree. Not all men have the same intellectual faculties, and every one knows how great an element of success intelligence is in all functions, in all departments of human activity, even in those requiring above all physical strength and the use of the hands. It is well known that even the latter find in intelligence their best auxiliary; that it procures them an invaluable advantage, even over those whose physical strength, facility, ardor, tenacity in work, would seem to forestall all rivalry.

There is finally a fourth element which is also inherent in the individual man, and which distinguishes one man from the other, and this is _morality_. We all know that morality, independently of its own merit, its incomparable, intrinsic merit, a merit which cannot be estimated by its fruits, is of itself alone one of the greatest factors in bringing about important results in practical life. We all know that even setting aside the intrinsic worth of morality--honesty, virtue--the work resulting from our physical efforts is greatly enhanced by this precious element. We all know that economy, sobriety, a spirit of peace and concord, devotion to the family--in short, all moral elements--give to him who exercises them a vast superiority over his fellows who do not, despite his intellectual and physical disadvantages.

When I say that morality is an element of inequality, I wish to be understood rightly. There are, it is true, moral inequalities among men; and from these moral inequalities spring others; but morality is not in itself a principle of inequality, for what precisely const.i.tutes morality, is that all men can equally attain to it; that it wholly depends on the individual man to attain to it or not. So that if, on this point, a man finds himself inferior to another, he can blame no one for it but himself.

Here, then, is a point where the law is of no avail; where it is evident that man is the master of his actions, and gains for himself what morality he wishes; if, then, there results from this a certain inequality among men, this inequality is to be attributed to the free-will of the individual man, who did not profit by the admirable gift Providence has endowed him with--namely, moral liberty--and by means of which he can choose between the right and the wrong.

You see, then, that there are many causes differentiating men from each other, and in such a manner that it is impossible to define them strictly.

We cannot say: there are on the one hand the strong, and on the other the weak; on the one the intelligent, on the other the feeble-minded, because all these elements so combine as to compensate for one another. Once more, he who is least favored in one direction, may be better favored in another; he who has an inferior share of intelligence and physical strength, may be the first in will-power. We can thus always fill out natural inequalities, and correct and overcome them by an effort of the will.

Still, however that may be, and despite all effort of individual will-power and moral energy, there unquestionably result from these individual differences a mult.i.tude of different conditions among men.

Besides, and independently of these purely inward causes due to both the physical and moral const.i.tution of the individual man, there are yet outward causes of inequality. These are the circ.u.mstances, the conditions wherein we are born and live.

We are all more or less dependent on the physical and social conditions which surround us. It is quite certain that birth, for example, is a circ.u.mstance wholly independent of the will of man. Some are born in the most favorable, some in the least favorable social conditions--some rich, some poor; facts which depend neither on their const.i.tution nor on their will. There are, moreover, still other outward circ.u.mstances. One may be born in a rich, a civilized, an enlightened, a progressive country, or in a poor, barbarous, benighted country. One may live in a place where there is every means of education, of making a living, of improving one's self, where there may be a thousand favorable openings for a man, and again, on the contrary, in a place far away from all civilization, without opportunities for work, without enlightenment, without means of communication with other men. All such circ.u.mstances are independent of the will of the individual man, and can only be corrected in time and through the progress of civilization, which gradually equalizes all countries.

There are yet, besides all this, what is generally called the happy and unhappy chances of life. Everybody knows that human events do not always run as one would wish them, that things turn out more or less fortunately, as circ.u.mstances, and not men, order them. One may, for instance, get sick, when he has most need of health; a wife loses her husband, the support of her family, when she has most need of him; one may engage in an enterprise apparently founded on the best conditions of success: this enterprise fails on account of unexpected events, and without its being any one's fault. In commerce, for instance, we see every day the most unfortunate consequences of outward circ.u.mstances, against which one is utterly helpless, because, in commerce especially, there is a large share to be left to chance, to the unknown, which no one can calculate beforehand. Now, all such unexpected events, as they are realized, overthrow all our plans, and are cause that some attain to wealth, and others fall into poverty. Farmers particularly know but too well how dependent they are on outward circ.u.mstances. Cold, heat, rain, are for them elements of fortune or misery, and they are elements over which they have no control whatsoever.

Now these elements, working blindly, as it would seem, are the chief cause of the great diversity of human conditions. Some, it is said, are lucky; others are not; some meet with favorable circ.u.mstances, others with contrary and fatal circ.u.mstances. Everything seems to co-operate toward crushing some, whilst everything again favors the success of others. These causes are innumerable, and could be multiplied _ad infinitum_; they explain the infinite variety of human conditions, how there are none exactly similar, and how there are consequently no two men exactly alike.

They are equals as men, in the sense that they have the same rights to justice, to truth; the same rights of conscience; but they are not equals as to their circ.u.mstances, which circ.u.mstances, as we have seen, vary in every respect. But, it may be asked, why all these inequalities? Why are some happy and others unhappy? Why some rich, fortunate, powerful, intelligent, virtuous even? (for it would almost seem that up to a certain point, virtue also depends on social position, since those who are born in a more elevated condition have greater facilities to exercise virtue); why are others, on the contrary, unfortunate, obliged to work so hard to arrive at such poor results; to be scarcely able to make a living for themselves or their family? Certainly these are indeed most grave and serious questions. But, what I contend for is, that it is not to society we should put these questions, but to Providence, who has made life what it is. Society can do but one thing, namely, not to add to natural inequalities, social ones. It can also, to a certain degree, lessen the natural inequalities; but it is not wholly responsible for man's moral and physical const.i.tution; it is not wholly responsible for the course of events in the world; so that if we would know why things are thus fashioned, we must rise higher; we must not make our fellow-men or society in general answerable for them. I only add that, as legal inequalities disappear, so will the natural inequalities also vanish, and this is the essential point. Natural inequalities cannot be wholly corrected, for the reasons above stated; but as society, in doing away with legal inequalities, strives to lessen the share of responsibility it has heretofore had in these inequalities, the natural inequalities must necessarily grow less, and for the simple reason that avenues being opened to man to enjoy the fruit of his labor, and acquire the rights society holds now out to him, he will be able to fill out these natural inequalities. The inequality of intelligence was largely due to want of culture. As soon as men shall be educated, enlightened, shall themselves endeavor to learn, the differences in human intelligence will gradually disappear; for it has been observed that as civilization progresses, the number of great men diminishes, and what was formerly called genius, is lost in the larger development of society. This may be only an illusion, for genius never changes; only as the existing differences among men become lessened, the inequalities which separated the great men from the rest are less obvious.

Thus, the more you shall put into the hands of men, and if possible of all men, means for educating themselves, the more you will find these differences vanish; the more will they grow like each other, the more will human intelligence become equalized.

On the other hand, as social and legal inequalities disappear, public prosperity, public wealth, public comforts, will increase at the same rate. As the physical strength of men develops, so will the means of combating infirmities, diseases, all that weakened, enervated, depraved the populations, develop also. As the moral differences diminish (not indeed in the sense that every one will reach the same degree of virtue--that is impossible), the rudeness, the brutality, certain odious vices due to ignorance, to barbarous manners, to the insufficient means of communication with each other, will gradually disappear; and thus, in respect to civilization also, will men grow more like each other.

You see, then, that by culture, by the progress of civilization, all these inequalities due to outward circ.u.mstances, may be combated. Society at the present time, being more ingenious, more enlightened, more clever than in past days, has at its command a mult.i.tude of means wherewith, if not to destroy, at least to reduce the ill effects of outward chances. That, for example, which we call _life-insurance_, is very effective indeed in combating misfortune. By means of a small sacrifice, every man may in some respect protect himself against chances which formerly reduced a large part of the population to misery. It is the same with other similar societies of mutual a.s.sistance and benefit; they will increase in proportion to general progress, and will largely counteract the unhappy results of such inequalities as may be combated by human industry.

I go still further; I maintain that the inequalities above noted not only should not be imputed to society, but not even to Providence. They are legitimate and useful; they are the necessary stimulant to work. It is because of that very great variety of conditions that men make the proper efforts to better them, and that by these efforts, by this common labor, society progresses.

Why does every one work? Is it not that each sees above him a position he covets, and which he seeks to secure? It is not the first of positions, nor the highest, for man does not think of those too far above him, nor should he; but the next best, such as others like him occupy, he can attain. If he earns a little money only, he tries to earn more; if he is only a workman, he may become a foreman; if only a foreman, a master; if only a master, a capitalist. He who is but a third clerk will want to be second clerk; he who is second will want to be first; and thus through the whole series of degrees. Now, it is just the possibility of securing a better situation than the one we are in that stimulates us to work and make the necessary efforts. Suppose (a thing, of course, impossible) that all men could be a.s.sured of a sufficient quant.i.ty of daily bread equally distributed among them, human activity would at once come to a stop, human work would cease; society would consequently become impoverished, and, becoming impoverished, even the small portion each one is satisfied with could no longer be possible, and they would have to fall back upon work again. Work requires a stimulant, and it is the inequality of human conditions which furnishes this stimulant.

Societies are like individuals. Every society has always before its eyes a condition better than the one it is in, a state of greater material prosperity, of greater intellectual development; and it is because we long to reach that superior state that society strives after improvement. There are, indeed, societies that are indifferent to this; that do not experience such a want; but such peoples remain stagnant in their barbarous ignorance; they never advance. It is the civilized nations who are not satisfied with their condition, and where every one endeavors to better his own. We should, therefore, look upon the inequalities which favor individual development, which a.s.sist the progress of the race, which excite every man to make an effort to better his condition, as truly desirable.

I have demonstrated how the great legal inequalities which, before the French Revolution, authorized the division of society into cla.s.ses, have now disappeared, and that what remains, and must of necessity remain, are the natural inequalities resting, on the one hand, on individual faculties, and on the other, on the diversity and the inequality of the conditions wherein we are placed. Let us now see whether in these conditions there is something requiring society to be divided into parts:--some people above, some below, some in the middle, and whether each of these parts should be called a cla.s.s. I look in vain for anything whereon such distinctions could be based. Let us take the most natural fact which could serve as a basis for such distinctions--namely, fortune, wealth.

It is said: there are the rich and the poor. But what more vague than such terms? Where does poverty stop? Undoubtedly, there are wretched people in all societies. There is no society wholly free of poor unfortunates, so unfortunate as to require the a.s.sistance of others. It is what we call beggary, and it exists in all societies. But this is not an element which may be said to const.i.tute a cla.s.s. It is not any more correct to say the cla.s.s of beggars than the cla.s.s of invalids. There are invalids in all societies, and we are all subject to becoming invalids, but we cannot say that there is a cla.s.s of invalids. Those who are ill are to be pitied, but they do not, I repeat, const.i.tute a cla.s.s, which would allow us to divide society into two parts: a cla.s.s of people that are well and people that are sick. The same with beggary; it is an anomaly, an unfortunate exception to the rule, and very sad for those who are its victims, but it does not const.i.tute a cla.s.s. Yet it is not this we generally understand by the poor and the rich cla.s.ses. We understand by rich those who have a certain appearance of well-being; and by poor those who work more or less with their hands. Now, there is nothing more false than such a distinction, for, among those called rich, there are many that are poor, and wealth and poverty are not generally absolutely different. It depends on the relations between the wants and the means of satisfying them.

How many among physicians, lawyers, artists, for example--among men who belong to what we call the middle cla.s.s--are, I ask, not only poor, but wretched? How are we to know them? What is it marks in society the rich and the poor? Here we have, for instance, country people, good folks, who have never opened a book, who do not know A from B, and who are rich; and again others of the middle cla.s.s who are poor. The conditions in society so intertwine that it is impossible to cut it in two and say: these are the rich cla.s.ses, these the poor. There is an infinite variety of degrees, each having some sort of property, the one more, the other less. In such a number of degrees it is impossible to distinguish precisely the beginning or the end. We admit these individual inequalities, and as many different conditions as there are individuals; but there are no cla.s.ses, and no one could tell their beginnings and ends. How could you determine the amount of property requisite to belong to either of these categories--the rich or the poor? Shall you say that the rich man is he who has any capital, and the poor, he who has not any? There are many people with capital that are poor, and many without who are very well off. These are but arbitrary distinctions.

Upon what, then, shall we base cla.s.s differences? On the professions? On those who exercise public functions and those who do not? But this would, in the first place, be a very unequal division; for the number of public functionaries is very small in comparison with the immense ma.s.s of people who have no public profession. And again, wherein is the public functionary superior to this or that merchant, this or that big farmer, this or that great builder or contractor? It is impossible to say; for in the hierarchy of functionaries there is also a top, a middle, a bottom, with an infinite variety of degrees in each.

Take the n.o.bility. But who in these days troubles himself about aristocratic names? They are, unquestionably, valuable _souvenirs_ for those who can boast of them--of great historical names, for instance; names which have played a part in history; they are grand recollections to cherish and respect, but they give him who possesses them but very feeble advantages. It is not very long since there might have been found some legitimate ground for the cla.s.s distinctions we are examining, namely, in political rights, at a time when some few enjoyed political rights and a great many had none; but this time has gone by, this inequality is also wiped out; there are no more political cla.s.ses than there are social cla.s.ses.

Shall we take material work--work of hand, as a cla.s.s distinction among men? We hear often the term _laboring cla.s.ses_--men, namely, who live by work of hand; but are not those who work with their brains, workers also?

There are a thousand kinds of work, and it is not absolutely necessary one should work with his hands to be a worker. Besides, there are many people working with their hands, who do not belong to what is usually understood by the laboring cla.s.s: the painters, sculptors, chemists, surgeons; all these people work with their hands. You see, then, that, look at it as you will, it will be very difficult to find distinctive signs whereby society could be divided into cla.s.ses.

There are groups of workers; groups formed by the variety of work which has to be done. Everybody cannot do the same thing in society. Political economy teaches a very true and necessary law, called division of labor.

In order that a certain piece of work be well done, its different parts must be distributed among those who are capable of executing them; and the more each one will exclusively attend to the portion allotted to him, the better will the work be done.

It is the same with society. Society is a great work-shop, a vast factory, where there are a great many different kinds of work to be done. Each must do his share. Hence various groups of workers. Some cultivate the land, because men must be fed; some engage in industrial pursuits, for men must be clothed, must be housed against the inclemencies of the weather; then there is justice to be rendered; there are some needed to protect the laborers; men must also be educated and need educators. There are roads to be made, railroads to be laid, laws to be enforced, and all this gives rise to a mult.i.tude of functions, a large number of groups of workers, each working in the line which has been determined, more or less, by birth, circ.u.mstances, or natural ability. Shall we still say that each of these groups forms a cla.s.s? Shall it be the military cla.s.s, because it is composed of soldiers; the cla.s.s of ecclesiastics, because composed of priests; the teaching cla.s.s, because composed of teachers? In no wise.

Then should we neither speak of the laboring cla.s.ses--of the middle cla.s.ses.

There is, I repeat, but one society, and that society composed of an infinite number of individuals; all differing from each other by reason of their various natural endowments and the outward conditions in which they are placed. They are subdivided into groups which more or less blend with each other, are more or less dependent on each other.

There is, however, a sign whereby men may be distinguished from each other, and that is education: difference in instruction and culture; and this is in these days the only kind of difference that can still exist among them.

How is this to be remedied? In two ways: in observing the duties of society and the duties of individuals. Society at this present moment is doing all in its power to bring education within the reach of all, and according to the particular need of each. Of course all are not obliged to learn the same things. Even among the most enlightened, there are some who, relatively to others, are quite ignorant. So that there are degrees here also. But still there is a certain common ground of customary, useful, necessary knowledge, which brings all together:--the education common to all, and which is as a bond between them. Society is doing its best in extending this education, propagating it, developing it; and men should do their best toward it. It depends, therefore, on the individual man to do away with this last inequality. It behooves us, then, to disseminate education and instruction, as far as it lies in our power; and it behooves those who have not yet enjoyed it to make every effort to improve themselves.

Finally, connected with education, there is a feature which also establishes a certain difference between men: good manners; good habits; good morals; all of which are distinguishing, differentiating, traits. On whom is it inc.u.mbent to do away with such inequalities? On us all. Each of us, in his own individual sphere of life, must break down the barrier that separates him from the one above him; he must rise up to him, not so much through morality, for morality is the same below as above, but through his manners, his habits, his dignity, sobriety, politeness, he must win his esteem.

This is accomplished rather through education than instruction, for it is education that makes men good-natured, so that it will be through education that the last inequality between men will be effaced.

I say, then, that we should as much as possible work toward this end, and above all avoid using expressions which tend to separate men from each other. These expressions belong to a past age; they were perpetuated by usage, and still uphold certain imaginary rights, and modes of thinking--certain prejudices and sentiments which divide society into two parts, and cause it to believe that it is so divided from necessity. In indulging in such prejudices, what in fact is but an imaginary division becomes a real one.

It is, therefore, this imaginary division of cla.s.ses which must be done away with; for it is from the imagination that all these feelings of distrust, and jealousy, and ill-will generally spring; and they should be combated resolutely, for they carry with them very lamentable consequences. The remedy is where the evil is. These old prejudices residing in the imagination, it is the imagination we should correct. We must accustom ourselves to think differently; we must look upon ourselves not as belonging to a particular cla.s.s, but to one and the same society, a society of men, men all equals and in different social conditions, all ent.i.tled to the same rights.

It is, therefore, in reciprocal good feeling, in the heart of men rather than in any legal reform, that the true safety of society resides. We must give up those old notions which cause some to imagine that they are oppressed, or threatened, or prevented to rise in the social scale, and others, that they run the danger of being dispossessed of their privileges. There is in such antagonism far greater danger than in the actual evils both sides complain of.

To do away with it only requires reciprocal good-will, kindness, readiness to understand each other. The reform which has taken place in our laws, must take place in our minds also. Cla.s.s feeling must be suppressed, and there will then appear a truly human society, all being united by brotherly love.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] No. CLIX.--July 1, 1884, pp. 246, 247.

[2] The fifth collegiate year will be devoted to theoretical morality.

[3] The word enthusiasm comes from a Greek word signifying, to be filled with a G.o.d.

[4] Drive away nature, and it gallops back again. Lafontaine has said the same thing: "Shut the door against its nose, and it will return by the window."

[5] J. J. Rousseau, _Emile_.

[6] Kant, _Doctrine de la vertu_. French translation of J. Barni, p. 171.

[7] Kant is wrong in rejecting these two maxims, interpreting them in the sense we have just refuted.

[8] Chapter I., page 22.

[9] It would seem here that negative grat.i.tude becomes confounded with negative ingrat.i.tude; the one doing no harm, the other doing no good; it would seem as one and the same condition, wherein neither harm nor good is done; but the distinction exists nevertheless; for the question, on the one hand, is to do no harm when tempted to do some, and on the other, not to do any good when there is an occasion for it. For example, he who despoils others, but abstains before his benefactor, experiences a certain degree of grat.i.tude, and he who does good to his friends and flatterers around him, and does not do any to his benefactor, is already ungrateful.

[10] These questions will be examined more in detail in the next chapter.