Elements of Morals Part 33

4. There is a diagnosis[154] of pa.s.sions as there is of diseases. They betray themselves outwardly by external signs which are their symptoms (acts, gestures, physiognomy), and inwardly, by first indications or what was formerly called _prodromes_, which are their forerunners (disturbance, agitation, etc.).

5. Pa.s.sion, like disease, has its history: it has its regular course, its crisis, and termination. The _Imitation of Jesus Christ_ gives in a few words the history of a pa.s.sion: "In the beginning a simple _thought_ presents itself to the mind; this is followed by a vivid _fancy_; then comes _delectation_, a bad _impulse_, and finally the _consent_. Thus does the evil one gradually enter the soul."[155]

6. It is rare that a pa.s.sion arises and develops without obstacles and resistance. Hence that state we have called _fluctuation_ (Vol. I., p.

167), and which has so often been compared to the ebb and flow of the sea.

These general features of the pa.s.sions being stated, let us make a brief sketch of the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions.

It may be said that our pa.s.sions pa.s.s through three distinct states; they are at first natural and unavoidable affections of the mind: _inclinations_, _tendencies_; they become next violent and unruly movements: these are the pa.s.sions properly so-called; they become habits and embodied in the character, and take the name of _qualities_ and _defects_, _virtues_ and _vices_. But it is to be noted that whilst we can always distinguish these three states theoretically, language is, for the most part, inadequate to express them; for men have designated these moral states only according to the necessities of practice, and not according to the rules of theory.

The three states which we have just pointed out, can be very clearly distinguished in the first of the affections of human nature, namely, the _instinct of self-preservation_. This instinct is at first a natural, legitimate, necessary affection of the human heart; but by the force of circ.u.mstances, the influence of age, disease, temperament, it develops out of proportion into a state of pa.s.sion, and becomes what we call _fear_; or else it turns into a habit and becomes the vice we call _cowardice_.

Physical self-preservation is inseparable from two _appet.i.tes_ called hunger and thirst. These two appet.i.tes, too much indulged in, become pa.s.sions, which themselves may become vices. But language fails here to express their various shades: there is only one word to express the pa.s.sion or vice related to eating and drinking: it is on the one hand _gluttony_, and on the other _drunkenness_;[156] both these vices, and in general all undue surrender to sensual pleasures, is called _intemperance_.

The source of all our personal inclinations is the love for ourselves or _self-love_, a legitimate instinct when kept within bounds; but when carried to excess, when exclusive and predominant, it becomes the vice we call _selfishness_.

Self-esteem, developed into a pa.s.sion, becomes, when it turns upon great things, _false pride_; when upon small, _vanity_.

_The love of liberty_ degenerates into a _spirit of revolt_; the legitimate love of power, into _ambition_; _the instinct of property_ becomes _greed_, _cupidity_, _pa.s.sion for gain_, and tends to run into the _pa.s.sion for gambling_ or the desire to gain by means of chance. The desire for gain engenders the _fear of loss_, and this latter pa.s.sion developing into a vice and mania, becomes _avarice_.

Human inclinations are divided into _benevolent_ and _malevolent_ inclinations. The first may develop into a pa.s.sion, but not into a vice; the second alone become vices.

There is not a single benevolent inclination which, carried too far and beyond reason, may not become a more or less blameworthy pa.s.sion. But, in the first place, we have no terms in our language to express the exaggerations of these kinds of pa.s.sions,[157] and in the second, though they be exaggerations, we shall never call the tenderer affections of the human heart, however foolish they may be, vices, if they are sincere.

Yet, may some of these affections become vices when they unite with personal pa.s.sion. For example, good nature or the desire to please may lead to _obsequious servility_, the desire to praise, to _flattery_, and esteem, to _hypocrisy_. But these vices partake more of the nature of self-love than of benevolent inclinations.

_Malevolent pa.s.sions._--Malevolent inclinations give rise to the most terrible pa.s.sions. But are there, indeed, in man naturally malevolent inclinations? Reid, the philosopher, disputes it and justly thinks, as we do, that malevolent pa.s.sions are but the abuse of certain personal inclinations intended to serve as auxiliaries in the development of our activity. There are two princ.i.p.al malevolent pa.s.sions, _emulation_ and _anger_.

Emulation is but a special desire for success and superiority. This desire, induced by the thought that other men around us have attained to such or such degree of public esteem or power, is not in itself a malevolent inclination. We may wish to equal and surpa.s.s others without, at the same time, wishing them any harm. We can experience pleasure in excelling them, without exactly rejoicing in their defeat; we can bear being excelled by them without begrudging them their success.

Emulation then is a personal but not a malevolent sentiment; it becomes malevolent and vicious when our feelings toward others become inverted: when, for example, we regret, not the check we have been made to suffer, but the advantage our rivals have gained over us, and when we are unable to bear the idea of the good fortune of others; or again when, conversely, we experience more pleasure at their defeat than joy at our own victory.

This sentiment, thus perverted, becomes what is called _envy_: and envy is generally the pain we feel at the good fortune of others; it is then a sentiment implying the wish to see others unhappy; and is therefore an actual vice, as low as it is odious.

_Envy_ which has some a.n.a.logy with _jealousy_ must be distinguished from the latter. Jealousy is a kind of envy which bears especially upon affections it is not allowed to share; envy, upon material goods, or goods in the abstract (fortune, honors, power). The envious man wants goods he does not possess; the jealous man refuses to share those which he has.

Jealousy is then a sort of selfishness, not as base as envy, since higher goods are in question, but which for its consequences is nevertheless one of the most terrible of pa.s.sions.

Anger is a natural pa.s.sion, which seems to have been bestowed on us to furnish us an arm against peril; it is an effort the soul makes to resist an evil it stands in danger of. But this inclination is one of those which cause us the quickest to lose our self-possession, and throws us into a sort of momentary insanity. Yet, although it is a pa.s.sion of which the consequences may be fatal, it is not necessarily accompanied by hatred (as may be seen by the soldier who will fight furiously and who, immediately after the battle or during a truce, will shake hands with his enemy).

Anger then is an effort of nature in the act of self-defense; it is a fever, and as such it is a fatal and culpable pa.s.sion, but it is not a vice.

Anger becomes _hatred_ when, thinking of the harm we have done or could do to our enemy, we rejoice over the thought of this harm; it is called _resentment_ or _rancor_ when it is the spiteful recollection of an injury received; finally, it becomes the _pa.s.sion of vengeance_ (the most criminal of all) when it is the desire and hope to return evil for evil.

Pleasure at the misfortune of others, when it reaches a certain refinement, even though free from hatred, becomes _cruelty_.

Hatred changes into _contempt_ when there is joined to it the idea of the baseness and inferiority of the person who is hated. Contempt is a legitimate sentiment when it has for its object base and culpable actions; it is a bad and blameworthy pa.s.sion when it bears upon a pretended inferiority, either of birth, or fortune, or talent, and then belongs to false pride. False pride, however, is not always accompanied by contempt.

We see men full of self-satisfaction, who yet know how to be polite and courteous toward those they regard their inferiors; others, on the contrary, who look down upon their inferiors and treat them like brutes.

Contempt, with such, is added to false pride. A gentler form of contempt is _disdain_, a sort of delicate and covered contempt. Contempt when it applies itself to set off, not the vices, but the peculiarities of men, trying to make them appear ridiculous, becomes _raillery_ or _irony_.

Such are the princ.i.p.al affections of the soul viewed as diseases, that is to say, inasmuch as they have need of remedies.

Let us now, to continue Bacon's comparison, pa.s.s to their _treatment_.

=176. Culture of the soul.=--After having studied characters and pa.s.sions, we have to ask ourselves by what means pa.s.sions may be governed and characters modified or corrected.

=177. Bossuet's rule.=--As to the first point, namely, the government of the pa.s.sions, Bossuet gives us in his _Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme_,[158] excellent practical advice: it is obviously based on his study of consciences.

He justly observes that we cannot directly control our pa.s.sions: "We cannot," he says, "start or appease our anger as we can move an aim or keep it still." But, on the other hand, the power we exercise over our external members gives us also a very great one over our pa.s.sions. It is, of course, but an indirect power, but it is no less efficacious: "Thus can I put away from me a disagreeable and irritating object, and when my anger is excited, I can refuse it the arm it needs to satisfy itself."

To do this it is necessary to will it; but there is nothing so difficult as to will when the soul is possessed by a pa.s.sion. The question is then to know how one may escape a ruling pa.s.sion. To succeed in it one should not attack it in front, but as much as possible turn the mind upon other objects: it is with pa.s.sion "as with a river which is more easily turned off from its course than stopped short." A pa.s.sion is often conquered by means of another pa.s.sion, "as in a State," says Bacon, "where a prince restrains one faction by means of another." Bossuet says even that it may be well, in order to avoid criminal pa.s.sions, to abandon one's self to innocent ones.[159] One should also be careful in the choice of the persons he a.s.sociates with: "for nothing more arouses the pa.s.sions than the talk and actions of pa.s.sionate men; whilst a quiet mind, provided its repose be not feelingless and insipid, seems, on the contrary, to communicate to us its own peace. We need something lively that may accord with our own feelings.

In a word, to conclude with Bossuet, "we should try to calm excited minds by diverting them from the main object of their excitement; approach them obliquely rather than directly in front; that is to say, that when a pa.s.sion is already excited, there is no time then to attack it by reasoning, for one drives it all the stronger in. Where wise reflections are of greatest effect is in the forestalling of pa.s.sions. One should therefore fill his mind with sensible thoughts, and accustom it early to proper inclinations, so that there be no room for the objects of pa.s.sions."

=178. Improvement of character.=--Bossuet has just informed us how we are to conduct ourselves in regard to the pa.s.sions, as diseases of the soul.

Let us now see how character, namely, temperament, may be modified.

The character is a collection of habits, a great part of which belong, unquestionably, to our natural inclinations, but which, nevertheless, are also largely formed under the influence of education, circ.u.mstances, indulgence of pa.s.sions, etc. It is thus character, "this second nature,"

as it has often been called, gradually develops.

Character being, as we have seen above, a habit, and virtue, on the other hand, being also a habit, the problem which presents itself to him who wishes to improve his character and exchange his vices for virtues, is to know how one habit may be subst.i.tuted for another, and how even a painful habit may be subst.i.tuted for an agreeable habit, sometimes for a habit which has lost its charm, but not yet its empire over one.

This problem may be found a.n.a.lyzed and most pathetically described in the _Confessions_ of St. Augustine:

"I was," he tells us, "like those who wish to get awake, but who, overcome by sleep, fall back into slumber. There is certainly no one who would wish to sleep always, and who would not rather, if he is healthy of mind, prefer the waking to the sleeping state; and yet there is nothing more difficult than to shake off the languor which weighs our limbs down; and often, though the hour for waking has come, we are against our will made captives by the sweetness of sleep.... I was held back by the frivolous pleasures and foolish vanities which I had found in the company of my former friends: they hung on the vestures of my flesh, whispering, 'Art thou going to abandon us?'...

If, on the one hand, virtue attracted and persuaded me, pleasure on the other captivated and enslaved me.... I had no other answer for the former, than: 'Presently, presently, wait a little.' But this 'presently' had no end and this 'wait a little' was indefinitely prolonged, Wretch that I am! who will deliver me from the body of this death?"[160]

At so painful a juncture, the Christian religion offers its children an all-powerful and efficacious remedy: this is what it calls _grace_. But of this means moral philosophy cannot dispose; all it can do is to find in the study of human nature the exclusively natural means G.o.d has endowed it with, to elevate man to virtue. Now, these means, limited though they be, should not be considered inefficient, since for many centuries they sufficed the greatest men and sages of antiquity.[161]

=179. Rules of Malebranche and Aristotle.=--We may take for a starting point this maxim of Malebranche, which he borrowed from Aristotle: _Acts produce habits, and habits produce acts_.[162] A habit, in fact, is induced by a certain number of often repeated actions; and once generated, it produces in its turn acts, so to say, spontaneous and without any effort of the will. Thence spring vices and virtues; and the problem is to know how the first may be corrected, and the second retained: for the question is not only to pa.s.s from evil to good, but we should also take care not to slide from good into evil.

If the first maxim of Malebranche were absolute, it would follow that the soul could not change its habits, nor the bad man improve, nor the good become corrupt; it would follow that hope would be interdicted to the one, and that the other would have nothing more to fear; consequences which experience shows to be entirely false. Some fanatical sects may have believed that virtue or holiness once attained could never again be lost,[163] and this belief served as a shield to the most shameful disorders. Facts, on the contrary, teach us that there is no virtue so infallible as to be secure against a fall, and no vice ever so deeply rooted that may not be lessened or destroyed. In fact, and this is Malebranche's second maxim: _One can always act against a ruling habit._ If one can act contrary to a positive habit, such acts often repeated may, according to the first maxim, produce, by the effort of the will, a new habit which will take the place of the preceding one. One can thus either corrupt or correct one's self. Only, as the virtuous habits are the more painful to acquire, and the vicious habits the more agreeable, it will always be more easy to pa.s.s from good to evil than from evil to good.

How shall we proceed to subst.i.tute a good habit for a bad one? Aristotle says that when we have a defect to get rid of, we should throw ourselves into the opposite extreme, so that after having removed ourselves with all our might from the dreaded fault we may in some respects, and through natural elasticity, return to the just medium indicated by reason, just as a bent wand straightens itself again when let go. This maxim may do in certain cases and with certain characters, but it would have to be applied cautiously. One may, under the influence of enthusiasm, throw himself into a violent extreme, and remain there for some time; but at the moment of reaction it is not impossible that, instead of stopping at the desired medium, he may fall back into the first extreme again.

=180. Rules of Bacon and Leibnitz.=--Bacon,[164] who did not find Aristotle's maxim sufficient, tries to complete it by a few additional ones:

1. One should beware of beginning with too difficult tasks, and should proportion them to his strength--in a word, _proceed by degrees_. For example, he who wishes to correct himself of his laziness, should not at once impose too great a work upon himself, but he should every day work a little longer than the day before, until the habit is formed.

In order to render these exercises less painful, it is permitted to employ some auxiliary means, like some one learning to swim will use bladders or willow supports. After a little while the difficulties will be purposely increased, like dancers who, to acquire agility, practice at first with very heavy shoes.

"There is to be observed," adds Bacon, "that there are certain vices (and drunkenness is one of them) where it is dangerous to proceed by degrees only, and where it is better to cut short at once and in an absolute manner.

2. The second maxim, where the question is of acquiring a new virtue, is to choose for it two different opportunities: the first when one feels best disposed toward the kind of actions he may have in view; the second, when as ill disposed as possible, so as to take advantage of the first opportunity to make considerable headway, and of the second, to exercise the energy of the will. This second rule is an excellent one, and truly efficacious.

3. A third rule is, when one has conquered, or thinks he has conquered, his temperament, not to trust it too much. It were well to remember here the old maxim: "_Drive away temperament_," etc., and remember aesop's cat, which, metamorphosed into a woman, behaved very well at table until it espied a mouse.

Leibnitz also gives us some good advice as to practical prudence, to teach us to triumph over ourselves, and expounds in his own way the same ideas as Bossuet and Bacon:

"When a man is in a good state of mind he should lay down for himself laws and rules for the future, and strictly adhere to them; he should, according to the nature of the thing, either suddenly or gradually turn his back upon all occasions liable to degrade him. A journey undertaken on purpose by a lover will cure him of his love; a sudden retreat will relieve us of bad company. Francis Borgia, general of the Jesuits, who was finally canonized, being accustomed to drink freely whilst yet a man of the world, when he began to withdraw from it gradually reduced his allowance to the smallest amount by dropping every day a piece of wax into the bowl he was in the habit of emptying. _To dangerous likings_ one must oppose more innocent likings, such as agriculture, gardening, etc.; one must shun idleness; make collections of natural history or art objects; engage in scientific experiments and investigations; one must make himself some indispensable occupation, or, in default of such, engage in useful or agreeable conversation or reading. In a word, one should take advantage of all good impulses toward forming strong resolutions, as if they were the voice of G.o.d calling us.[165]

=181. Franklin's Almanac.=--To these maxims concerning the formation and perfecting of character, may fittingly be added the moral method which Benjamin Franklin adopted for his own improvement in virtue. He had made a list of the qualities which he wished to acquire and develop within himself, and had reduced them to thirteen princ.i.p.al ones. This cla.s.sification, which has no scientific value, appeared to him entirely sufficient for the end he had in view. These thirteen virtues are the following: temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquillity, chast.i.ty, humility.