Elements of Morals Part 13

Civility is the _ensemble_ of the forms usage has established to regulate the habitual and daily relations of men with each other. It corresponds in society to the ceremonial of diplomatic life. To avoid the clashes which the rivalries of courts and powers would necessarily carry with them, a code of agreements was established which fix with precision the relations of the diplomatic agents. The same in social life. Civility is composed not of absolute and wholly material rules, but of forms fixed in a general way, yet more or less free in their application, and all the more pleasing as they are the more free. These forms, often laughed at when regarded superficially, have a serious value when we consider that they express the general duty whereby peace is established and maintained among men. (See Nicole, _Essais de morale_,[45] 1671.)

There is, then, in civility a principle which is _essential_ and a form which is _arbitrary_. Usage has everywhere established the form of bowing, for instance; everywhere there are conventional expressions wherewith to greet people according to their age, their s.e.x; but these outward manifestations vary according to times and countries.

A distinction has been made between _personal_ civility and the civility of the _mind_ and _heart_. Civility properly so called is that of the outward manners; but it is worth very little if it is not sustained by the delicacy which says nothing wounding and the true kindliness which seeks to give pleasure: this is what is called civility of the mind and heart.

"The most amiable natural gifts, and the talents made most supple by education, change into defects and vices if they are not inspired by a feeling of kindness. Suppleness, then, is nothing else than perfidy; delicacy nothing else but cunning; this civility lavished upon everybody is nothing else than duplicity.... It is not enough to be a man of the world; one must also be a man of heart.... True civility is that which has its source in justice, in the respect for humanity; it is a form of charity; it is the luxury of virtue."[46]

=62. Modesty.=--One of the most essential parts of kindness is _modesty_.

Modesty is certainly a duty we owe to ourselves; but it is also a duty we owe to others. Nothing more fatiguing than people who bring everything back to themselves, and can speak of nothing but themselves. It is not by appearing satisfied with your own accomplishments, but in having others satisfied with them, that you will please; and they will never find you more charming than when, completely forgetting yourself, you will be only occupied with them. To succeed in making them satisfied with themselves, is the true means of having them satisfied with you.

Among remarkable instances of modesty often cited, are those of Turenne and Catinat. The latter having sent in a report of the battle of Marsaglia, had so totally forgotten to mention himself that some one ingenuously asked: "Was the marshal present?"

=62= (_bis_). =Peace among men.=--"You have but a day to spend on earth,"

says Lamennais; "try to spend it in peace."[47]

Nicole has written an excellent treatise on _the means of preserving peace among men_ (_Essais de morale_, 1671). Let us give a resume of it.

Two causes, according to Nicole, produce disunion among men: "either _in wounding_ their feelings we cause them to withdraw from us, or, in _being wounded_ ourselves, we withdraw from them."

Consequently, "the only means of avoiding such divisions is not to wound the feelings of others, and not to feel one's self wounded by them."

1. If we look into the causes which generally give offense, we shall see that they may be reduced to two, which are: "to contradict people in their opinions, and to oppose their pa.s.sions."

"1. _Opinions._--Men are naturally attached to their opinions, because they desire to rule over others: now we rule through the trust that is placed in us; it is a sort of empire to have one's opinions received by others.

"For this reason, when one seeks to combat the opinions of a man, one does him in some sort injury. It cannot be done without giving him to understand that he is mistaken; and he does not take pleasure in being mistaken. He who contradicts another on some point, pretends to more knowledge than has he whom he wishes to persuade; he thus presents to him two disagreeable ideas at the same time: one, that he is deficient in knowledge, and the other that he who corrects him surpa.s.ses him in intelligence."

One should, therefore, spare people in their opinions; but among these opinions there are some which must be treated with more regard than others:

"They are those advanced by no one particular person of the place where one may live, but which are established by universal approbation: in running against such opinions, one appears wishing to rise above all the rest."

Not that one should always scruple in conversation to show that one does not approve some opinions: that would be destroying society, instead of preserving it....

"But it is a thing worth pointing out how one may express his sentiments so gently and agreeably that they give no offense.... For very often it is not so much our sentiments that shock others, as the proud, presumptuous, pa.s.sionate, disdainful, insulting manner in which we express them."

There are, then, several mistakes to be avoided:

(_a_) The first is _a.s.sumed superiority_, that is to say an imperious manner in the expression of one's sentiments, and which most persons resent, as much because it shows a proud and haughty soul, as because it indicates a domineering spirit tyrannizing over minds.

(_b_) The second is the decided and dogmatic manner in which an opinion is given; as if it could not be reasonably contradicted.

(_c_) _Vehemence_ does not belong to the mistakes we have just spoken of. It consists in conveying the impression that one is not only attached to one's sentiments from conviction, but also pa.s.sionately, which furnishes many people a reason for suspecting the truth of those sentiments, thus inspiring in them a wholly contrary feeling.

(_d_) The contempt and insults which enter into disputes, are so obviously shocking, that it is not necessary to warn against them; but it may be well to remark that there are certain rudenesses and incivilities nearly akin to contempt, although they spring from another source. Change of opinion is in itself such a hard thing, and so contrary to nature, that we must not add to it other difficulties.

(_e_) Finally, _hardness_, which does not so much consist in the hardness of the terms employed as in the absence of certain softening words, also often shocks those thus addressed, because it implies a sort of indifference and contempt.

2. _Pa.s.sions._--It is not enough to avoid contradicting people's opinions, or to do so cautiously only; one must also spare their _inclinations_ and their _pa.s.sions_, because otherwise, it is impossible to avoid complaints, murmurs, and quarrels.

These inclinations are of three kinds: which may be called _just_, _indifferent_, and _unjust_.

(_a_) One should never really satisfy the unjust ones; but it is not always necessary to oppose them; for it is wounding others to make one's self conspicuous without particular reason.... One must always make amends for good and evil ... especially when there are others who could do it with better results than we.

Besides, "this same rule obliges us to choose the least offensive, the gentlest, the least irritating means."

(_b_) I call indifferent pa.s.sions those the objects of which are not bad in themselves, although they may be sought after with a vicious adhesion. Now, in this sort of things we are at greater liberty to yield to the inclinations of others: 1, because we are not their judges; 2, because we do not know whether these affections are not necessary to them (leading them away from still more dangerous objects); 3, because these sorts of affections must be destroyed with prudence and circ.u.mspection; 4, because there is reason to fear we might do them more harm in indirectly opposing their innocent pa.s.sions, than we should do them good in warning them against them.

(_c_) I call _just_ pa.s.sions, those in which we are obliged to follow others by reason of some duty, although they might perhaps not be justified in requiring of us such deference.

The peace of society resting thus on reciprocal esteem and love, it is just that men should wish to be esteemed and loved, and should demand outward signs of esteem and love. Upon this rest the rules of civility established among men, and of which we have spoken above.

II. It is not enough to avoid wounding men's feelings, one should, moreover, not allow one's self to _feel wounded_ by them, when they themselves fail to treat us as we ought to treat them.

For it is impossible to practice inward peace, if we are so sensitive to all that may be done and said contrary to our inclinations and sentiments; and it is even difficult to prevent the inner dissatisfaction from showing itself outwardly, and inducing us to treat those who have shocked us in a manner calculated to shock them in their turn.

It is, then, necessary to avoid complaining of others, when one has been offended by them. In fact:

... Let us complain of others as much as we please, we shall generally only embitter them the more, without correcting them. We shall be accounted sensitive, proud, haughty ... and if those we complain of have any sort of skill, they will give such an aspect to things that the blame will fall back upon us.

We must then endeavor to establish our peace and quiet on our own reformation and on the moderation of our pa.s.sions. We cannot dispose of the minds or the tongues of others ... we are enjoined to work on ourselves and to correct our own faults.

There is nothing more useful than to suppress one's complaining and resentment. It is the surest way to appease differences at their birth and prevent their increase; it is a charity we practice towards ourselves by procuring to ourselves the good of patience ... it is a charity we do to others in bearing with their foibles, in sparing them the little shame they have deserved, and the new faults they might commit in justifying themselves.

But it is not possible for us to observe outwardly such discretion, if we allow our resentment to work inwardly in all its force and violence. The outward complaints come from the inward, and it is very difficult to hold them back, if one's mind is full of them; they always escape and break through some opening or other.... We must, therefore, also quench the complaints which the soul engenders.

Among the subjects of complaint which other men give us, and which should be treated with contempt, Nicole points out particularly:

"False judgments, slander, rudeness, negligence, reserve, or want of confidence, ingrat.i.tude, disagreeable tempers, etc."

Let us merely repeat what he says of the unfavorable judgments of others regarding us:

"There is a ridiculous oddity in this spite which we feel when we hear of the unfavorable judgments and remarks made about us; for one must have very little knowledge of the world to suppose it generally possible that they would not be made. Princes are talked against in their ante-chambers; their servants mimic them. There is nothing so common as to speak of the defects of one's friends and pride one's self in pointing them frankly out to others. There are even occasions when this may be done innocently.... It is, therefore, ridiculous to expect being spared ... for there is no time when we may not be generally sure either that people talk or have talked about us otherwise than we should wish.... We show annoyance at these judgments when they are expressly reported to us ... yet the report itself adds next to nothing to the matter, for before it was made we ought to have been almost sure that we and our faults were unpleasantly commented on.... If this resentment were just, one would then have to be always angry, or never so, because it is unjust. But to keep very quiet, as we do, though we should know that there are people laughing at us, and to be disturbed and upset when we are told what we already knew, is a ridiculous foible."

=63. Social virtues--Kant's advice.=--Kant has also treated the duties of kindness towards men, under the t.i.tle of _Social Virtues_.[48]

"It is a duty to one's self as well as to others to carry the commerce of life to the highest degree of moral perfection; not to _isolate_ one's self; not only to have the happiness of the world in view ideally, but to cultivate the means which indirectly lead to it; urbanity in social relations, gentleness, reciprocal love and respect, affability and propriety, thus adding the graces to virtue, for this also is a duty of virtue.

"These, it is true, are but external and accessory works, presenting a fine appearance of virtue, which, however, deceives no one, because every one knows how much to think of it. It is but a sort of small coin; but the effort we are obliged to make to bring this appearance as near to the truth as possible, helps the sentiment of virtue greatly along. An easy access, an amiable mode of speech, politeness, hospitality, that gentleness in controversy which keeps off all quarrel--all these forms of sociability are external obligations which put also the others under obligation, and which favor the sentiment of virtue in rendering it at least amiable.

"Here arises the question to know whether one can keep up friendly relations with the vicious.[49] One cannot avoid meeting them; for one would have to quit the world, and we are not ourselves competent judges in respect to them. But when vice becomes a scandal--that is to say, a public example of contempt of the strict laws of duty, thus carrying with it opprobrium--then one should stop all relations one may have had heretofore with the guilty person; for the continuation of this relation would deprive virtue of honor, and make of it a merchandise for the use of whoever were rich enough to corrupt parasites through the pleasures of good living."

=64. Duties of friendship.=--Besides the general duties of every kind which link us with all men, for the only reason that they are men, there are particular duties imposed on us toward those of our fellow-beings, to whom we are united by the bonds of friendship.

The duties of friendship have been admirably known and described by the ancients. We could not, therefore, treat this subject better here than by briefly recalling some few pa.s.sages from Aristotle or Cicero.

According to Aristotle, there are three kinds of friendship: the friendship of _pleasure_, the friendship of _interest_, and the friendship of _virtue_. The latter is the only true one.

"There are three kinds of friendship.... The people who love each other from interested motives, for the use they are to each other, love each other, not for their own sakes, but only inasmuch as they get any good or profit from their mutual relations. It is the same with those who only love each other for pleasure's sake. When one loves from motives of pleasure only, one really seeks nothing else but this same pleasure. Such friendships are only indirect and accidental.

They are very easily broken, because these pretended friends do not long remain the same.