Elements of Morals Part 1

Elements of Morals.

by Paul Janet.

PREFACE.

The _Elements de Morale_, by M. Paul Janet, which we here present to the educational world, translated from the latest edition, is, of all the works of that distinguished moralist, the one best adapted to college and school purposes. Its scholarly and methodical arrangement, its clear and direct reasonings, its felicitous examples and ill.u.s.trations, drawn with rare impartiality from the best ancient and modern writers, make of this study of Ethics, generally so unattractive to young students, one singularly inviting. It is a system of morals, practical rather than theoretical, setting forth man's duties and the application thereto of the moral law. Starting with _Preliminary Notions_, M. Janet follows these up with a general division of duties, establishes the general principles of social and individual morality, and chapter by chapter moves from duties to duties, developing each in all its ramifications with unerring clearness, decision, and completeness. Never before, perhaps, was this difficult subject brought to the comprehension of the student with more convincing certainty, and, at the same time, with more vivid and impressive ill.u.s.trations.

The position of M. Paul Janet is that of the _religious_ moralist.

"He supplies," says a writer in the _British Quarterly Review_,[1] in a notice of his _Theory of Morals_, "the very element to which Mr. Sully gives so little place. He cannot conceive morals without religion. Stated shortly, his position is, that moral good is founded upon a natural and essential good, and that the domains of good and of duty are absolutely equivalent. So far he would seem to follow Kant; but he differs from Kant in denying that there are indefinite duties: every duty, he holds, is definite as to its _form_; but it is either definite or indefinite as to its application. As religion is simply belief in the Divine goodness, morality must by necessity lead to religion, and is like a flowerless plant if it fail to do so. He holds with Kant that _practical faith_ in the existence of G.o.d is the postulate of the moral law. The two things exist or fall together."

This, as to M. Janet's position as a moralist; as to his manner of treating his subject, the writer adds:

"... it is beyond our power to set forth, with approach to success, the admirable series of reasonings and ill.u.s.trations by which his positions are established and maintained."

M. Janet's signal merit is the clearness and decision which he gives to the main points of his subject, keeping them ever distinctly in view, and strengthening and supplementing them by substantial and conclusive facts, drawn from the best sources, framing, so to say, his idea in time-honored and irrefutable truths.

The law of duty thus made clear to the comprehension of the student, cannot fail to fix his attention; and between fixing the attention and striking root, the difference is not very great.

C. R. C.

ELEMENTS OF MORALS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY NOTIONS.

SUMMARY.

=Starting point of morals.=--Notions of common sense.

=Object and divisions of morals.=--Practical morality and theoretical morality.

=Utility of morals.=--Morals are useful: 1, in protecting us against the sophisms which combat them; 2, in fixing principles in the mind; 3, in teaching us to reflect upon the motives of our actions; 4, in preparing us for the difficulties which may arise in practice.

=Short resume of theoretical morality.=--Pleasure and the good.--The useful and the honest.--Duty.--Moral conscience and moral sentiment.--Liberty.--Merit and demerit.--Moral responsibility.--Moral sanction.

All sciences have for their starting-point certain elementary notions which are furnished them by the common experience of mankind. There would be no arithmetic if men had not, as their wants increased, begun by counting and calculating, and if they had not already had some ideas of numbers, unity, fractions, etc.; neither would there be any geometry if they had not also had ideas of the round, the square, the straight line.

The same is true of morals. They presuppose a certain number of notions existing among all men, at least to some degree. Good and evil, duty and obligation, conscience, liberty and responsibility, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, sanction, punishment and reward, are notions which the philosopher has not invented, but which he has borrowed from common sense, to return them again cleared and deepened.

Let us begin, then, by rapidly enumerating the elementary and common notions, the a.n.a.lysis and elucidation of which is the object of moral science, and explain the terms employed to express them.

=1. Starting point of morals: common notions.=--All men distinguish the _good_ and the _bad_, _good_ actions and _bad_ actions. For instance, to love one's parents, respect other people's property, to keep one's word, etc., is right; to harm those who have done us no harm, to deceive and lie, to be ungrateful towards our benefactors, and unfaithful to our friends, etc., is wrong.

To do right is _obligatory_ on every one--that is, it _should_ be done; wrong, on the contrary, _should_ be avoided. _Duty_ is that _law_ by which we are held to do the right and avoid the wrong. It is also called the _moral law_. This law, like all laws, _commands_, _forbids_, and _permits_.

He who acts and is capable of doing the right and the wrong, and who consequently is held to obey the moral law, is called a moral agent. In order that an agent may be held to obey a law, he must _know it and understand it_. In morals, as in legislation, _no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law_. There is, then, in every man a certain knowledge of the law, that is to say, a natural discernment of the right and the wrong.

This discernment is what is called conscience, or sometimes the _moral sense_.

Conscience is an act of the mind, a _judgment_. But it is not only the mind that is made aware of the right and the wrong: it is the heart. Good and evil, done either by others or by ourselves, awaken in us emotions, affections of diverse nature. These emotions or affections are what collectively const.i.tute the _moral sentiment_.

It does not suffice that a man know and distinguish the good and the evil, and experience for the one and for the other different sentiments; it is also necessary, in order to be a _moral agent_, that he be capable of _choosing_ between them; he cannot be commanded to do what he cannot do, nor can he be forbidden to do what he cannot help doing. This power of choosing is called _liberty_, or _free will_.

A free agent--one, namely, who can discern between the right and the wrong--is said to be responsible for his actions; that is to say, he can answer for them, give an account of them, suffer their consequences; he is then their _real cause_. His actions may consequently be attributed to him, put to his account; in other words _imputed_ to him. The agent is responsible, the actions are _imputable_.

Human actions, we have said, are sometimes good, sometimes bad. These two qualifications have degrees in proportion to the importance or the difficulty of the action. It is thus we call an action _suitable_, _estimable_, _beautiful_, _admirable_, _sublime_, etc. On the other hand, a bad action is sometimes but a simple mistake, and sometimes a _crime_.

It is _culpable_, _base_, _abominable_, _execrable_, etc.

If we observe in an agent the _habit_ of good actions, a _constant tendency_ to conform to the law of duty, this habit or constant tendency is called _virtue_, and the contrary tendency is called _vice_.

Whilst man feels himself bound by his conscience to seek the _right_, he is impelled by his nature to seek _pleasure_. When he enjoys pleasure without any admixture of pain, he is _happy_; and the highest degree of possible pleasure with the least degree of possible pain is _happiness_.

Now, experience shows that happiness is not always in harmony with virtue, and that pleasure does not necessarily accompany right doing.

And yet we find such a separation unjust; and we believe in a natural and legitimate connection between pleasure and right, pain and wrong.

Pleasure, considered as the consequence of well-doing, is called _recompense_; and pain, considered as the legitimate consequence of evil, is called _punishment_.

When a man has done well he thinks, and all other men think, that he has a right to a recompense. When he has done ill they think the contrary, and he himself thinks also that he must atone for his wrong-doing by a chastis.e.m.e.nt. This principle, by virtue of which we declare a moral agent deserving of happiness or unhappiness according to his good or bad actions, is called the principle of merit and demerit.

The sum total of the rewards and punishments attached to the execution or violation of a law is called sanction; the sanction of the moral law will then be called _moral sanction_.

All law presupposes a legislator. The moral law will presuppose, then, a _moral_ legislator, and morality consequently raises us to G.o.d. All human or earthly sanction being shown by observation to be insufficient, the moral law calls for a religious sanction. It is thus that morality conducts us to the _immortality of the soul_.

If we go back upon the whole of the ideas we have just briefly expressed, we shall see that at each of the steps we have taken there are always two contraries opposed the one to the other: _good_ and _evil_, _command_ and _prohibition_, _virtue_ and _vice_, _merit_ and _demerit_, _pleasure_ and _pain_, _reward_ and _punishment_.

Human life presents itself, then, under two aspects. Man can choose between the two. This power is liberty. This choice is difficult and laborious; it exacts from us incessant efforts. It is for this reason that life is said to be a _trial_, and is often represented as a _combat_. It should therefore not be represented as a play, but rather as a manly and valiant effort. Struggle is its condition, peace its prize.

Such are the fundamental ideas _morality_ has for its object, and of which it seeks, at the same time, both the principles and the applications.

=2. What is morality? the object of morality.=--Morality may be considered as a _science_ or as an _art_.

By science we understand a totality of truths connected with each other concerning one and the same object. Science has for its object proper, _knowledge_.

By art we understand a totality of rules or precepts for directing activity towards a definite end; art has for its object proper, _action_.

Science is _theoretical_ or _speculative_; art is _practical_.

Morality is a science inasmuch as it seeks to know and demonstrate the principles and conditions of morality; it is an art inasmuch as it shows and prescribes to us its applications.

As science, morality may be defined: science of _good_ or science of _duty_.