Dio's Rome Volume I Part 13

WHEN HE REFUSED COMPLIANCE AND ACTUALLY a.s.sAILED THEIR ALLIES, THEY MADE A CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISSA, WHERE HE WAS. And having received advance information that he was lying secretly at anchor somewhere in the vicinity of the landing-places they sent a portion of their ships to the other side of the island to bring on an engagement. When the Illyrians accordingly fell upon the reconnoitering party, thinking them alone, the main body approached at leisure in their ships and after pitching camp in a suitable place repulsed the natives, who, angry at the trick, lost no time in attacking them. Demetrius made his escape to Pharos, another island, but they sailed to that, overcame resistance, and captured the city by betrayal, only to find Demetrius fled. He at this time reached Macedonia with large amounts of money and went to Philip, the king of the country. He was not surrendered by him, but on returning to the Illyrians was arrested by the Romans and was executed.

_(BOOK 13, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] VIII, 21.--In the succeeding year the Romans became openly hostile to the Carthaginians, and the war, though of far shorter duration than the previous one, proved to be both greater and more baneful in its exploits and effects. It was brought on chiefly by Hannibal, general of the Carthaginians. This Hannibal was a child of Hamilcar Barca, and from his earliest boyhood had been trained to fight against the Romans. Hamilcar said he was raising all his sons like so many whelps to fight against them, but as he saw that this one's nature was far superior to that of the rest, he made him take an oath that he would wage war upon them, and for this reason he instructed the boy in warfare above all else when only fifteen years old. On account of this youthfulness Hannibal was not able, when his father died, to succeed to the generalship. But when Hasdrubal was dead, he delayed no longer, being now twenty-six years of age, but at once took possession of the army in Spain and after being acclaimed as leader by the soldiers brought it about that his right to lead was confirmed also by those in authority at home. After effecting this he needed a plausible excuse for his enterprise against the Romans, and this he found in the Saguntines of Spain. These people, dwelling not far from the river Iber and a short distance above the sea, were dependents of the Romans, and the latter held them in honor and in the treaty with the Carthaginians had made an exception of them. For these reasons, then, Hannibal began a war with them, knowing that the Romans would either a.s.sist the Saguntines or avenge them if they suffered injury. Hence for these reasons as well as because he knew that they possessed great wealth, which he particularly needed, and for various other causes that promised him advantages against the Romans he made an attack upon the Saguntines.

Spain, in which the Saguntines dwell, and all the adjoining land is in the western part of Europe. It extends for a considerable distance along the inner sea, beside the Pillars of Hercules, and along the ocean; furthermore it occupies the upper part of the mainland for a very great distance, as far as the Pyrenees. [Sidenote: FRAG. 53] THIS RANGE, BEGINNING AT THE SEA CALLED ANCIENTLY THE SEA OF THE BEBRYCES BUT LATER THE SEA OF THE NARBONENSES, REACHES TO THE GREAT OUTER SEA, AND CONFINES MANY DIVERSE NATIONALITIES; IT ALSO SEPARATES SPAIN FROM THE NEIGHBORING LAND OF GAUL. The tribes did not employ the same language nor carry on a common government. This resulted in their not having a single name. The Romans called them Hispanii, but the Greeks Iberians, from the river Iber.

These Saguntines, then, being besieged sent to those near them and to the Romans asking for aid. But Hannibal checked any local movement, and the Romans sent amba.s.sadors to him bidding him not come near the Saguntines, and threatening in case he should not obey to sail to Carthage at once and lay accusations against him. When the envoys were now close at hand, Hannibal sent some of the natives who were to pretend that they were kindly disposed to them and were instructed to say that the general was not there but had gone some distance away into parts unknown; they advised the enemy, therefore (they were to say), to depart as quickly as possible and before their presence should be reported lest in the disorder prevailing because of the absence of the general they should lose their lives. The envoys accordingly believed them and set off for Carthage. An a.s.sembly being called some of the Carthaginians counseled maintaining peace with the Romans, but the party attached to Hannibal affirmed that the Saguntines were guilty of wrongdoing and the Romans were meddling with what did not concern them. Finally those who urged them to make war won the day.

Meanwhile Hannibal in the course of his siege was conducting vigorous a.s.saults. Many kept falling and many more were being wounded on Hannibal's side. One day the Carthaginians succeeded in shaking down a portion of the outer circuit and had been daring enough to enter through the breach, when the Saguntines made a sortie and scared them away. This gave the besieged strength and the Carthaginians fell back in dejection. They did not leave the spot, however, till they had captured the city, though the siege dragged on to the eighth month.

Many unusual events happened in that time, one of which was Hannibal's being dangerously wounded. The place was taken in this manner. They brought to bear against the wall an engine much higher than the fortification and carrying heavy-armed soldiers, some visible, some concealed. While the Saguntines, therefore, were quite strenuously fighting against the men they saw, thinking them the only ones, those hidden had dug through the wall from below and found their way inside.

The Saguntines overwhelmed by the unexpectedness of the event ran up to the citadel and held a conference to see whether by any reasonable concessions they might be preserved. But as Hannibal held out no moderate terms and no a.s.sistance came to them from the Romans, they begged for a cessation of the a.s.saults until they should deliberate a little about their position. During this respite they gathered together the most highly prized of their treasures and cast them into the fire; then such as were incapable of fighting committed suicide, and those who were in their prime advanced in a body against their opponents and in a desperate struggle were cut down.

VIII, 22.--For their sakes the Romans and the Carthaginians embarked upon war. Hannibal after gaining numerous allies was hastening toward Italy. The Romans on ascertaining this a.s.sembled in their senate-hall, and many speeches were delivered. Lucius Cornelius Lentulus addressed the people and said they must not delay but vote for war against the Carthaginians and separate consuls and armies into two detachments, and send the one to Spain and the other to Libya, in order that at one and the same time the land of the enemy might be desolated and his allies injured; thus neither would he be able to a.s.sist Spain nor could he himself receive a.s.sistance from there. To this Quintus Fabius Maximus rejoined that it was not so absolutely and inevitably necessary to vote for war, but they could first employ an emba.s.sy, and then if the Carthaginians persuaded them that they were guilty of no wrong, they should remain quiet, but if the same people were convicted of wrongdoing, they might thereupon wage war against them, "in order,"

he said, "that we may cast the responsibility for the war upon them."

[Sidenote: FRAG. 54^9] THE OPINIONS OF THE TWO MEN WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THESE. THE SENATE DECIDED TO MAKE PREPARATIONS, TO BE SURE, FOR CONFLICT, BUT TO DESPATCH ENVOYS TO CARTHAGE AND DENOUNCE HANNIBAL; AND IF THE CARTHAGINIANS REFRAINED FROM APPROVING THE EXPLOITS, THEY WOULD ARBITRATE THE MATTER, OR IF ALL RESPONSIBILITY WERE LAID UPON HIS SHOULDERS, THEY WOULD DEMAND HIS EXTRADITION, AND IF HE WERE NOT GIVEN UP, THEY WOULD DECLARE WAR UPON THE NATION.

The envoys set out and the Carthaginians considered what must be done.

And a certain Hasdrubal, one of those who had been primed by Hannibal, counseled them that they ought to get back their ancient freedom and shake off by means of money and troops and allies, all welded together, the slavery imposed by peace, adding: "If you only permit Hannibal to act as he wishes, the proper thing will be done and you will have no trouble." After such words on his part the great Hanno, opposing Hasdrubal's argument, gave it as his opinion that they ought not to draw war upon themselves lightly nor for small complaints concerning foreigners, when it was in their power to settle a part of the difficulty and divert the rest of it upon the heads of those who had been active in the matter. With these remarks he ceased, and the elder Carthaginians who remembered the former war sided with him, but those in robust manhood and especially all the partisans of Hannibal violently gainsaid him. [Sidenote: FRAG. 54^10] INASMUCH, THEN, AS THEY MADE NO DEFINITE ANSWER AND SHOWED CONTEMPT FOR THE ENVOYS, MARCUS FABIUS THRUSTING HIS HANDS BENEATH HIS TOGA AND HOLDING THEM WITH PALMS UPWARD SAID: "HERE I BRING TO YOU, CARTHAGINIANS, BOTH WAR AND PEACE: DO YOU CHOOSE WHICHEVER OF THEM YOU WISH." UPON THEIR REPLYING THAT THEY CHOSE NEITHER, BUT WOULD READILY ACCEPT EITHER THAT THE ROMANS SHOULD LEAVE, HE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED WAR UPON THEM.

In this way, then, and for these reasons the Romans and the Carthaginians became involved in war for the second time. And the Divinity beforehand indicated what was to come to pa.s.s. For in Rome an ox talked with a human voice, and another at the Ludi Romani threw himself out of a house into the Tiber and was lost, many thunderbolts fell, and blood in one case was seen coming from sacred statues whereas in another it dripped from the shield of a soldier, and the sword of another soldier was s.n.a.t.c.hed by a wolf from the very midst of the camp. Many unknown wild beasts went before Hannibal leading the way, as he was crossing the Iber, and a vision appeared to him in a dream. He thought that the G.o.ds once, sitting in a.s.sembly, sent for him and bade him march with all speed into Italy and receive from them a guide for the way, and that by this guide he was commanded to follow without turning around. He did turn around, however, and saw a great tempest moving and an immense serpent accompanying it. In surprise he asked his conductor what these creatures were; and the guide said: "Hannibal, they are on their way to help you in the sack of Italy."

_(BOOK 14, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VIII, 23.--These things inspired Hannibal with a firm hope, but threw the Romans into a state of profound terror. The Romans divided their forces into two parts and sent out the consuls,--Semp.r.o.nius Longus to Sicily and Publius Scipio to Spain. Hannibal, desiring to invade Italy with all possible speed, marched on hurriedly and traversed without fighting the whole of Gaul lying between the Pyrenees and the Rhone.

As far as the Rhone river no one came to oppose him, but at that point Scipio showed himself although he had no troops with him. Nevertheless with the help of the natives and their nearest neighbors he had already destroyed the boats in the river and had posted guards over the stream. Hannibal therefore used up some time in building rafts and skiffs, some of them out of a single log of wood, but still with the help of a large corps of workers had everything in readiness that was needful for crossing before Scipio's own army could arrive. He sent his brother Mago accompanied by the hors.e.m.e.n and a few light troops to cross at a point where the river is scattered over considerable breadth, with branches separated by islands; he himself, of course, proceeded by way of the natural ford, his object being that the Gauls should be deceived and array themselves against him only, while they set their guards with less care at other points along the river. This object was accomplished. Mago had already got across the river when Hannibal and his followers were crossing by the ford. On reaching the middle of the stream they raised a war cry and the trumpeters joined with the blare of their instruments, and Mago fell upon their antagonists from the rear. In this way the elephants and all the rest were ferried safely over. They had just finished crossing when Scipio's own force arrived. Both sides, then, sent hors.e.m.e.n to reconnoitre, after which they entered upon a cavalry battle with the same results as attended the war as a whole. The Romans, that is, after first seeming to get the worst of it and losing a number of men were victorious.

Then Hannibal, in haste to set out for Italy but suspicious of the more direct roads, turned aside from them and followed another, on which he underwent bitter hardships. The mountains there are exceedingly precipitous and the snow falling in great quant.i.ties was driven by the winds and filled the chasms, and the ice was frozen to a great thickness. These things conspired to cause them fearful suffering, and many of his soldiers perished through the winter cold and lack of food; many also returned home. There is a story to the effect that he himself would also have turned back but for the fact that the road already traversed was longer and more difficult than the portion left before him. For this reason he did not retrace his steps, but suddenly appearing south of the Alps spread astonishment and terror among the Romans.

So he advanced taking possession of whatever lay before him. Scipio sent his brother Gaius[29] Scipio, who was serving as a lieutenant under him, into Spain to either seize and hold it or bring Hannibal back, but he himself marched against Hannibal. They waited a few days; then both moved into action. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^4] BEFORE BEGINNING OPERATIONS, HANNIBAL CALLED TOGETHER THE SOLDIERS AND BROUGHT IN THE CAPTIVES WHOM HE HAD TAKEN BY THE WAY: HE ASKED THE LATTER WHETHER THEY CHOSE TO UNDERGO IMPRISONMENT AND TO ENDURE A GRIEVOUS SLAVERY, OR TO FIGHT IN SINGLE COMBAT WITH ONE ANOTHER ON CONDITION THAT THE VICTORS SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT RANSOM. WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, HE SET THEM TO FIGHTING. AND AT THE END OF THE CONFLICT HE ADDRESSED his own soldiers, encouraging them and whetting their eagerness for war. Scipio also did this on the Roman side. Then the contest began and looked at the outset as if it would involve the entire armies: but Scipio in a preliminary cavalry skirmish was defeated, lost many men, was wounded and would have been killed, had not his son Scipio, though only seventeen years old, come to his aid; he was consequently alarmed lest his infantry should similarly meet with a reverse, and he at once fell back and that night withdrew from the field.

[Footnote 29: Gnaeus Scipio is meant whenever Zonaras writes this form.]

VIII, 24.--Hannibal did not learn of his withdrawal till daybreak and then went to the Po, and finding there neither rafts nor boats,--for they had been burned by Scipio,--he ordered his brother Mago to swim across with the cavalry and pursue the Romans, whereas he himself marched up toward the sources of the river and commanded that the elephants cross where the tributary streams converged. In this manner, while the water was temporarily dammed and torn piecemeal by the animals' bulk, he effected a crossing more easily below them. Scipio overtaken stood his ground and would have offered battle but for the fact that by night the Gauls in his army deserted. Embarra.s.sed by this occurrence and still suffering from his wound he once more broke up at night and located his entrenchments on high ground. He was not pursued, but subsequently the Carthaginians came up and encamped, with the river between the two forces.

Scipio on account of his wound and because of what had taken place was inclined to wait and send for reinforcements; and Hannibal after many attempts to provoke him to battle, finding that he could not do this and that he was short of food, attacked a fort where a large supply for the Romans was stored. As he made no headway he employed money to bribe the commander of the garrison, which thus came into his possession by betrayal. He hoped also to attain his other objects, partly by arms and partly by gold. Meanwhile Longus had entrusted Sicily to his lieutenant and had come in response to Scipio's call.

Not much later influenced by ambition on the one hand and also by the fact of a victory over some marauders he presented himself in battle array. He lost the day by falling into an ambuscade, and when Hannibal appeared upon the scene with his infantry and elephants the followers of the Roman leader turned to flight and many were put to the sword, many also heedless of the river fell in and were choked. Only a few saved themselves with Longus. However, Hannibal though victorious was not happy, because he had lost many soldiers and all of his elephants, except one, as a result of the winter and from wounds.

Accordingly, they arranged an armistice without any desire for peace implied and both sides retired to the territory of their allies and pa.s.sed the winter in the cities there. Plenty of provisions kept coming to the Romans, but Hannibal, not satisfied with the contributions of the allies, made frequent raids upon the Roman villages and cities and sometimes would conquer, sometimes be repulsed. Once he was beaten by Longus with the cavalry and received a wound. Some of the Roman settlers encouraged by this came out by themselves to oppose him when he a.s.sailed them. These would-be warriors he destroyed and received the capitulation of the place, which he razed to the ground. Of the captives taken he killed the Romans but released the rest. This he did also in the case of all those taken alive, hoping to conciliate the cities by their influence.

And, indeed, many of the Gauls as well as Ligurians and Etruscans either murdered the Romans dwelling within their borders or surrendered them and then transferred their allegiance.

As Hannibal was advancing toward Etruria Longus attacked him in the midst of a great storm. Many fell on both sides and Hannibal entered Ligurian territory and delayed some time. He was suspicious of even his own men and was free to trust no one, but made frequent changes of costume, wore false hair, spoke different languages at different times (for he knew a number, including Latin) and both night and day he would frequently make the rounds of his camp. He was always listening to some conversations in the guise of an entirely different person from Hannibal and occasionally he talked thus in character.

VIII, 25.--While this was going on in Italy the other Scipio, Gaius, had sailed along the coast to Spain, and had won over, partly by force and partly without opposition, all the districts to the Iber that border on the sea and considerable of the upper peninsula. He had also defeated Banno in battle and had taken him prisoner. Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, on learning this crossed the Iber and reduced some of the rebels, but at Scipio's approach he fell back.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217 (_a.u._ 537)] The people of Rome again chose Flaminius and Geminus consuls. Just after the advent of spring Hannibal was apprised that Flaminius together with Servilius Geminus would march against him with a large force, and he devoted his attention to deceiving them. He pretended that he was going to spend his time and meet the issue where he was, and when the Romans, thinking that he was permanently located, began to show carelessness in their line of march, he started just after nightfall, leaving his cavalry behind at camp, noiselessly traversed the pa.s.ses and hastened on toward Aretium; and the cavalry, after he had got far ahead, set out to follow him. When the consuls found out that they had been tricked, Geminus stayed behind to hara.s.s the revolted districts and prevent them from a.s.sisting the Carthaginians, and Flaminius alone pursued, eager that his alone should be the credit of the expected victory. He succeeded in occupying Aretium beforehand, for Hannibal in taking a shorter road had encountered difficult marching, and had lost numerous men, many pack animals, and one of his eyes. It was late, then, before he reached Aretium and found there Flaminius, whom he regarded with contempt. He did not give battle, for the situation was unsuitable, but by way of testing his enemy's disposition he laid waste the country. At this the Romans made a sally and he retired, to give them the idea that he was afraid. During the night he broke up and found a satisfactory spot for battle, where he remained. He arranged that most of the infantry should form an ambush along the mountain sides and ordered all the cavalry to lie in wait concealed from view outside the pa.s.s; he himself encamped with a few followers on the hilltop. Flaminius was in good spirits and when he saw him with but a few men on the high ground he believed that the rest of the army must have been sent to some distant point and hoped to take him easily thus isolated. So he carelessly entered the mouth of the pa.s.s and there (for it was late) pitched camp. About midnight, when they were sleeping unguarded through scorn of their enemies, the Carthaginians surrounded them on every side at once and by using from a distance javelins, slings, and arrows they killed some still in their beds, others just seizing their arms, without receiving any serious harm in return. The Romans, having no tangible adversaries and with darkness and mist prevailing, found no chance to employ their valor. So great was the uproar and of such a nature the disordered alarm that seized them, that they were not even aware of earthquakes then prevailing, although many buildings fell in ruins and many mountains either were cleft asunder or collapsed so that they blocked up ravines, and rivers shut off from their ancient outlet sought another. Such were the earthquakes which overwhelmed Etruria, yet the combatants were not conscious of them. Flaminius himself and a vast number of others fell, though not a few managed to climb a hill. When it became day, they started to flee and being overtaken surrendered themselves and their arms on promise of free pardon. Hannibal, however, recking little of his oaths, imprisoned and kept under guard the Romans themselves, but released their subjects and allies among all the captives he had in his army. After this success he hastened toward Rome and proceeded as far as Narnia devastating the country and winning over the cities, save Spoletium; there he surrounded and slew the praetor Gaius Centenius who was in ambush. He made an attack upon Spoletium, but was repulsed, and as he saw that the bridge over the Nar had been torn down and ascertained that this had been done also in the case of the other rivers which he was obliged to cross, he ceased his headlong rush upon Rome. Instead, he turned aside into Campania, for he heard that the land was excellent and that Capua was a great city, and thought that if he should first occupy these he might acquire the rest of Italy in a short time.

The people of Rome when informed of the defeat were grieved and lamented both for themselves and for the lost. They were in sore straits and tore down the bridges over the Tiber, save one, and proceeded hurriedly to repair their walls, which were weak in many places. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^9] WISHING TO HAVE A DICTATOR READY, THEY HAD PROCLAIMED ONE IN a.s.sEMBLY. SATISFIED IF THEY THEMSELVES ONLY SHOULD BE SAVED, THEY HAD DESPATCHED NO AID TO THE ALLIES. BUT NOW, LEARNING THAT HANNIBAL HAD SET OUT INTO CAMPANIA, THEY DETERMINED TO a.s.sIST THE ALLIES ALSO. To Hannibal they opposed the dictator Fabius and the master of horse Marcus Minucius. These leaders set out in his direction but did not come into close quarters with him. They followed and kept him in view in the hope that a favorable opportunity for battle might possibly befall. Fabius was unwilling to risk a conflict with cowed and beaten soldiers against a greater number who had been victorious. Furthermore he hoped that the more his foes should injure the country, the sooner would they be in want of food. Calculating in this way he did not defend Campania nor any other district. For these reasons he confined hostilities entirely within Campania; unknown to the enemy he had surrounded them on every side and now kept guard over them. He himself secured an abundance of provisions both from the sea and from the territory of allies, but the invaders, he knew, had only the products of the land which they were devastating to depend upon.

Therefore he waited and did not mind the delay. Hence also he was blamed by his fellow-citizens and was even given the name of The Delayer.

VIII, 26.--When it came to be nearly winter and Hannibal could not pa.s.s that season where he was owing to a lack of the necessities of life and had been checked in many attempts to get out of Campania, he devised a plan of this kind. He first slew all the captives, that no one of them might escape and acquaint the Romans with what was being done. Then he gathered the cattle which were in camp, affixed torches to their horns, and went at nightfall to the mountains forming the boundary of Samnium, where he lighted the torches and threw the cattle into a fright. They, maddened by the fire and the driving, set fire to the forest in many places and consequently rendered it easy for Hannibal to cross the mountains. The Romans in the plain as well as those on the heights dreaded an ambuscade and would not budge. Thus Hannibal got across and made his way into Samnium.

Fabius, ascertaining the next day what had been done, gave chase and routed those left behind on the road to hinder his men's progress, afterward defeating also troops that came to the a.s.sistance of the first party. He then encamped not far from the enemy, yet would not come into conflict with them. However, he prevented them from scattering and foraging, so that Hannibal in perplexity at first started for Rome. As Fabius would not fight, but quietly accompanied him, he again turned back into Samnium. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^10] AND FABIUS FOLLOWING ON CONTINUED TO BESIEGE HIM FROM A SAFE DISTANCE, BEING ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE ANY OF HIS OWN TROOPS, especially since he could obtain necessities in abundance, whereas he saw that his foe actually possessed nothing outside of his weapons and that no a.s.sistance was sent to him from home. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^11] FOR THE CARTHAGINIANS WERE DISPOSED TO MAKE SPORT OF HIM IN THAT HE WROTE OF HIS SPLENDID PROGRESS AND HIS MANY SUCCESSES AND IN THE SAME BREATH ASKED SOLDIERS OF THEM AND MONEY. THEY SAID THAT HIS REQUESTS WERE NOT IN ACCORD WITH HIS SUCCESSES: CONQUERORS OUGHT TO FIND THEIR ARMY SUFFICIENT, AND TO FORWARD MONEY TO THEIR HOMES INSTEAD OF DEMANDING MORE.

As long as Fabius was in the field, no disaster happened to the Romans, but when he started for Rome on some public business, they met with a setback. Rufus, his master of horse, was only a young man and therefore full of empty conceit; he was not observant of the errors of warfare and was wearied by the delays of Fabius: hence, when he once held the leadership of the army alone, he disregarded the injunctions of the dictator and hastened to bring on a set battle, in which at first he seemed to be victorious, but was soon defeated. Indeed, he would have been utterly destroyed, had not some Samnites arrived by chance to aid the Romans and impressed the Carthaginians with the idea that Fabius was approaching. When for this reason they retired he thought that he had vanquished them and sent messages to Rome magnifying his exploit and also slandering the dictator; he called Fabius timorous and hesitating and a sympathizer with the enemy.

The people of Rome believed that Rufus had really conquered, and in view of this unexpected encouragement they commended and honored him.

They were suspicious of Fabius both because of the outcome and because he had not ravaged his own land in Campania, and it would have taken but little to make them depose him from his command. However, as they believed him useful, [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^14] THEY DID NOT DEPOSE HIM BUT THEY a.s.sIGNED EQUAL POWER TO HIS MASTER OF HORSE SO THAT BOTH HELD COMMAND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. WHEN THIS HAD BEEN DECREED, FABIUS HARBORED NO WRATH AGAINST EITHER THE CITIZENS OR RUFUS; BUT RUFUS, WHO HAD NOT SHOWN THE RIGHT SPIRIT IN THE FIRST PLACE, WAS NOW ESPECIALLY PUFFED UP AND COULD NOT CONTAIN HIMSELF. HE KEPT ASKING FOR THE RIGHT TO HOLD SOLE SWAY A DAY AT A TIME, OR FOR SEVERAL DAYS ALTERNATELY.

FABIUS, POSSESSED WITH DREAD THAT HE MIGHT WORK SOME HARM IF HE SHOULD GET POSSESSION OF THE UNDIVIDED POWER, WOULD NOT CONSENT TO EITHER PLAN OF HIS, BUT DIVIDED THE ARMY IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY EACH, THE SAME AS THE CONSULS, HAD A SEPARATE FORCE. AND IMMEDIATELY RUFUS ENCAMPED APART, IN ORDER TO ILl.u.s.tRATE THE FACT THAT HE WAS HOLDING SWAY IN HIS OWN RIGHT AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE DICTATOR. Hannibal, accordingly, perceiving this came up as if to seize a position, and drew him into battle. He then encompa.s.sed him about by means of an ambuscade and plunged him into danger, to such an extent, indeed, that he would have annihilated his entire army, if Fabius had not a.s.sailed Hannibal in the rear and prevented it.

After this experience [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^16] RUFUS ALTERED HIS ATt.i.tUDE, LED THE REMNANT OF THE ARMY IMMEDIATELY INTO FABIUS'S QUARTERS AND LAID DOWN HIS COMMAND. HE DID NOT WAIT FOR THE PEOPLE TO REVOKE IT, BUT VOLUNTARILY GAVE UP THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HE, A MERE MASTER OF THE HORSE, HAD OBTAINED FROM HIS SUPERIOR. AND FOR THIS ALL PRAISED HIM. AND FABIUS AT ONCE, NOTHING DOUBTING, ACCEPTED ENTIRE CONTROL AND THE PEOPLE SANCTIONED IT. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^17]

THEREAFTER AS HEAD OF THE ARMY HE AFFORDED GREATEST SECURITY, AND WHEN ABOUT TO RETIRE FROM OFFICE SENT FOR THE CONSULS, SURRENDERED THE ARMY TO THEM, AND ADVISED THEM VERY FULLY REGARDING ALL THE DETAILS OF WHAT MUST BE DONE. AND THEY WERE NOT UNDULY BOLD, BUT ACTED ENTIRELY ON THE SUGGESTION OF FABIUS, notwithstanding that Geminus had had some previous success. He had seen the Carthaginian fleet at anchor off Italy but not venturing to display any hostility because of the Roman ability to meet it, and he had started on a retaliatory voyage, first making sure the good conduct of the Corsicans and Sardinians by a cruise past their coasts; he had then landed in Libya and plundered the sh.o.r.e district. In spite of this achievement he was not so puffed up by it as to risk a decisive engagement with Hannibal, but was willing to abide by the injunctions of Fabius. One consequence was that the cities were no longer found siding with the Carthaginians, as they had done; for they feared that Hannibal would be driven out of Italy and they themselves suffer some calamity at the hands of the Romans since they were their kinsmen. The majority were engaged in trying to read the future, but a few again espoused the Roman cause, and some sent them offerings. And though Hiero often sent grain (and also sent a statue of Victory), the Romans accepted it only once. Yet they were in such hard straits for money that the silver coinage which was previously unalloyed and pure was now mixed with copper.

IX, 1.--All this is what took place in Italy at that period. Some slaves also formed a conspiracy against Rome, but were apprehended in advance. And a spy caught in the city had his hands cut off and was released that he might tell the Carthaginians his experience with his own lips.--In Spain in a sea-fight near the mouth of the Iber Scipio was victorious; for when the struggle proved to be too even, the sails were cut down in order that the men being placed in a desperate position might struggle more zealously. He also ravaged the country, got possession of numerous fortresses and through his brother Publius Scipio gained control of some Spanish cities. A Spaniard named Habelux affecting loyalty to the Carthaginians but in reality in the Roman service persuaded the Carthaginian guardian of the Spanish hostages to send them to their homes, in order that they might use their influence to bring their cities into friendly relations. Habelux naturally took charge of them, inasmuch as he had been the one to suggest the idea, but first sent to the Scipios and held a discussion about what he desired; then, while he was secretly taking the hostages away by night, he of course got captured. In this way it was the Romans who obtained possession of these men and acquired control of their native states by returning them to their homes.

_(BOOK 15, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] Though in these matters they were fortunate, they encountered elsewhere a fearful disaster, than which they never suffered one more terrible either earlier or subsequently.

It was preceded by certain portents and the solemn verses of the Sibyl which had prophesied the disaster to them so many years before.

Remarkable was also the prediction of Marcius. He also was a soothsayer and it was his rede that, inasmuch as they were Trojans of old, they should be overthrown in the Plain of Diomed. This was in Daunian Apulia and took its name from the settlement of Diomed, which he made there in the course of his wanderings. In that plain is also Cannae, where the present misfortune occurred, close to the Ionian Gulf and near the mouths of the Aufidus. The Sibyl had urged them to beware of the spot, yet said it would avail them naught, even if they should keep it under strictest guard.

Such were the oracular utterances: now what befell the Romans was this. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^21] THE COMMANDERS WERE aeMILIUS PAULUS AND TERENTIUS VARRO, MEN NOT OF SIMILAR TEMPERAMENT. FOR THE ONE WAS A PATRICIAN, POSSESSED OF THE GRACES OF EDUCATION, AND ESTEEMED SAFETY BEFORE HASTE: BUT TERENTIUS HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP AMONG THE RABBLE, WAS PRACTICED IN VULGAR BRAVADO, AND SO DISPLAYED LACK OF PRUDENCE IN NEARLY ALL RESPECTS, THINKING, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE ALONE SHOULD HAVE THE LEADERSHIP IN VIEW OF THE QUIET BEHAVIOR OF HIS COLLEAGUE. NOW THEY BOTH REACHED THE CAMP AT A MOST OPPORTUNE TIME: HANNIBAL HAD NO LONGER ANY PROVENDER; SPAIN WAS IN TURMOIL; THE AFFECTION OF THE ALLIES WAS BEING ALIENATED FROM HIM; AND IF THEY HAD WAITED FOR EVEN THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE PERIOD, THEY WOULD HAVE CONQUERED. AS MATTERS WENT, HOWEVER, THE RECKLESSNESS OF TERENTIUS AND THE SUBMISSIVENESS OF PAULUS COMPa.s.sED THEIR DEFEAT. Hannibal attempted to lead them into a conflict at once, and with a few followers drew near their stronghold: then, when a sortie was made, he purposely fell back to create the impression of being afraid and so drew them the more surely into a set battle. But, as Paulus restrained his own soldiers from pursuit, Hannibal simulated terror and that night packed up as if to depart; and he left behind him numerous articles lying within the palisade and ordered the rest of the baggage to be escorted with a considerable show of carelessness so as to make the Romans devote their attention to plundering it and give him thereby a chance to attack them. He would have translated his wish into fact, if Paulus had not held back his soldiers, in spite of their reluctance, and held back Terentius as well.

So Hannibal, having failed in this essay also, came by night to Cannae, and since he knew the place as one fit for ambuscades and for a pitched battle, he encamped there. And first he ploughed the whole site over, because it had a sandy subsoil and his object was to have a cloud of dust raised in the conflict; the wind generally springs up there in summer toward noon, and he contrived to get it behind his back. The consuls seeing at dawn that his stockade was empty of men at first waited, apprehending ambush, but later in the broad daylight came to Cannae. Each of the Roman leaders bivouacked apart beside the river, for since they were not congenial they avoided a.s.sociation together. Paulus remained quiet, but Terentius was anxious to force the issue; when he saw, however, that the soldiers were rather listless, he gave up the idea. But Hannibal, who was determined to goad them into battle even against their will, shut them off from their sources of water, prevented their scattering into small parties, and threw the bodies of the slain into the stream above their intrenchments and in plain sight, in order to disgust them with the drinking supply. Then the Romans started to array themselves for battle. Hannibal antic.i.p.ating this movement had planted ambuscades at the foot of the hills but held the remainder of his army drawn up. He also ordered some men at a given signal to simulate desertion; they were to throw away their shields and spears and larger swords but secretly to retain their daggers, so that after his antagonists had received them as unarmed, they might attack them unexpectedly.

The Romans having had in view since early morning the troops arrayed about Hannibal were now arming themselves and taking their places. The trumpets incited both parties, the signals were raised, and then ensued the clash of battle and a contest which a.s.sumed a variety of aspects. Until noon the advantage had not fallen distinctly to either side. Then the wind came up and the false deserters were received as men dest.i.tute of arms and got behind the Romans, alleging the very natural reason that they wanted to be out of the way of the Carthaginian attack. At this moment the men rose from ambush on both sides, Hannibal with his cavalry charged the front ranks, the enemy confused the Romans on every hand, the wind and the dust cloud a.s.sailed their faces violently, causing perplexity, and interfered with their breathing, which was already growing quick and labored from exertion, so that deprived of sight, deprived of voice, they perished in a wild melee, preserving no semblance of order. So great a mult.i.tude fell that Hannibal did not even try to find out the number of the common people, and in regard to the number of the knights and members of the senate he did not write to the Carthaginians at home but indicated it by the finger-rings; these he measured off by the quart and sent away. Only the senators and the knights wore finger-rings. Yet after all a number made good their escape even on this occasion, among them Terentius; Paulus was killed. Hannibal did not pursue nor did he hasten to Rome. He might have set out at once for Rome with either his entire army or at least a portion of it and have quickly ended the war; yet he did not do so, although Maharbal urged him to do so. Hence he was censured as being able to win victories but not understanding how to use them. Since they had delayed this time, they could never again have an opportunity to make haste. Therefore Hannibal regretted it, feeling that he had committed a blunder, and was ever crying out: "Oh Cannae, Cannae!"

IX, 2.--The Romans, who had been in such imminent danger of being destroyed, won back their superiority through Scipio. He was a son of the Publius Scipio in Spain, and had saved the life of his father when the latter was wounded: [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^24] HE WAS AT THIS TIME SERVING IN THE ARMY, HAD FLED TO Ca.n.u.sIUM, AND LATER ACHIEVED RENOWN.

BY COMMON CONSENT OF THE FUGITIVES a.s.sEMBLED AT Ca.n.u.sIUM HE RECEIVED THE LEADERSHIP, SET IN ORDER AFFAIRS AT THAT PLACE, SENT GARRISONS TO THE REGIONS IN PROXIMITY, AND BOTH PLANNED AND EXECUTED ALL MEASURES WELL.

The people of Rome heard of the defeat but did not believe it. When they at last came to believe it, they were filled with sorrow and met in the senate-house, but were ready to break up without accomplishing anything, when finally Fabius proposed that they send scouts to bring a report of what had really happened and what Hannibal was doing. He advised them not to lament but to go about in silence that the necessary measures might be taken, and furthermore to collect as large a force as they might and to call upon adjoining settlements for aid.

After this, upon learning that Hannibal was in Apulia and receiving a letter from Terentius stating that he was alive and what he was doing, they recovered a little of their courage. Marcus Junius was named dictator and Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius Gracchus master of the horse.

Immediately they enrolled not only those of the citizens who were in their prime but also those even who were past the fighting age; they added to their forces prisoners on promise of pardon and slaves on promise of freedom and a brigand here and there; moreover they called on their allies to help, reminding them of any kindness ever shown them and promising in addition to give to some of them grain, to others money, as they had never done before; they also sent emissaries to Greece to either persuade or hire men to serve as their allies.

Hannibal, learning that the Romans had united their troops and were engaged in preparations, still delayed at Cannae despairing of a capture by a.s.sault. Of the captives he released the allied contingent without ransom as before, but the Romans he kept, hoping to dispose of them by sale, since this would make him better off but the Romans worse off. When no one came from Rome in quest of the captives, he ordered them to send some of their number home after ransom, provided they had first taken oath to return. When even then the Romans refused to ransom them, he shipped those who were of any value to Carthage, and of the rest he put some to death after maltreating them and forced the others to fight as gladiators, pitting friends and relatives against each other. Those who were sent for ransom returned in order to be true to their oaths, but later fled. They were disfranchised by the censors and committed suicide.

Hannibal sent his brother Mago to report the victory to the Carthaginians and to ask them for money and troops. He on his arrival counted over the rings and described the success naturally in even more glowing terms than it deserved; everything that he asked was voted and they would not listen to Hanno who opposed it and advised them to end the war while they seemed to have the upper hand. However, they never put their vote into effect, but delayed. Hannibal meanwhile had advanced into Campania, had seized a Samnite fortress, and marched upon Neapolis. He sent before him a few soldiers with the booty and when the people of the city, thinking them alone, rushed out upon them, he unexpectedly appeared in person and slew a large number.

He did not capture the city, nor did he lay siege to it for long. The reason will presently be plain. Of the Campanian inhabitants of Capua a part clung to Roman friendship, but others favored Hannibal. After his success at Cannae and when some of their men taken captive had been released the populace was clamorous to revolt to Hannibal, but the men of rank waited for some time. Finally the crowd made a rush upon them as they were a.s.sembled in the senate-house and would have made away with them all but for the action of some one of the crowd who saw how great a misfortune this would be. This person denounced the senators as by all means deserving to perish, but said that they ought first to choose others to fill their places, for the State could not endure without some men to concert measures for them. Having gained the a.s.sent of the Capuan people he ejected each one of them from the senate-house, asking the populace, as he did so, whom they chose in his place. Thus, as they found themselves unable to choose others on short notice, they let all the old senators go unharmed, because they appeared to be necessary. Later they became reconciled with one another and made peace with Hannibal. This is why he quickly retired from Neapolis and came to Capua. He held a conference with the people and made many attractive offers, among other things promising to give them the supreme direction of Italy; for he was anxious that they should be animated by hope and, feeling that they would be working for themselves, develop greater zeal in the struggle.

At the revolt of Capua the rest of Campania also became restive, and the news of the town's secession troubled the Romans. As for Hannibal, he started on a campaign against the Nucerini. Under stress of siege and owing to lack of food they thrust out that portion of the population which was not available for fighting. Hannibal would not receive them, however, and gave them a.s.surance of safety only in case they should go back to the city. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^25] THEREFORE THE REST ALSO AGREED TO LEAVE THE CITY CARRYING ONE CHANGE OF CLOTHING. AS SOON, HOWEVER, AS HANNIBAL WAS MASTER OF THE SITUATION, HE SHUT THE SENATORS INTO BATH-HOUSES AND SUFFOCATED THEM, AND IN THE CASE OF THE OTHERS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD THEM TO GO AWAY WHERE THEY PLEASED, HE CUT DOWN ON THE ROAD MANY EVEN OF THEM. A NUMBER OF THEM SAVED THEIR LIVES ONLY BY TAKING REFUGE IN THE WOODS. THEREUPON THE REST BECAME AFRAID AND WOULD NO LONGER COME TO TERMS WITH HIM, BUT RESISTED WHILE THEY WERE ABLE. The people of Nola were planning to range themselves under his banner, but when they saw what had been done to their countrymen, they quietly let Marcellus in and later repulsed Hannibal when he a.s.saulted their city. Repelled from Nola he captured the people of Acerrae by starving them out. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^29] HE MADE THE SAME TERMS WITH THEM AS WITH THE DWELLERS IN NUCERIA AND ALSO ACCORDED THEM THE SAME TREATMENT. After that he directed his forces against Casilinum in which Romans and about a thousand of the allies had taken refuge. These put to death the native citizens who were meditating how to betray them, repulsed Hannibal several times and held out n.o.bly against hunger. When food was failing them they sent a man across the river on an inflated skin to inform the dictator. The latter put jars filled with wheat into the river at night and bade them keep their eyes on the current in the darkness. For a while he thus supplied them with nutriment without being discovered, but eventually a jar was dashed against some obstacle and shattered; then the Carthaginians became aware of what was going on and put chains across the river. After a number had perished of hunger and of their wounds, they abandoned one half of the city, cut down the bridge, and held out in the other half. They now threw turnip seed from the wall upon a spot outside, doing this in order to alarm the enemy and make them believe that they were likely to endure for a long time.

Hannibal, indeed, thinking that they must have plenty of food and astonished at their endurance invited them to capitulate and released them for money. The Romans outside were glad to ransom them, and more than that they showed them honor.

IX, 3.--While these events took place the messengers returned from Delphi saying that the Pythia admonished them to shake off sloth and devote themselves to the war. Then they were filled with new strength. They overtook Hannibal and encamped near him so as to watch his movements. Junius the dictator ordered the Romans to do exactly as the Carthaginians were commanded to do. So they took their food and sleep at the same time, visited the sentries in the same manner, and were doing everything else in similar fashion. When Hannibal understood the situation, he waited for a stormy night and announced to some of his soldiers a skirmish for after nightfall. Junius did the same thing. Thereupon Hannibal ordered different detachments to attack him in succession at different times in order that his opponent might be involved in constant labor as a result of sleeplessness and the storm. He himself rested with the troops not in action. When day was about to break, he recalled the army, as was expected, and the Romans put away their weapons and retired to rest; then all of a sudden he attacked them, with the result that he killed a number and captured the entrenchments, which were deserted.

Conditions in Sicily and Sardinia grew unsettled but did not receive any consideration at the hands of the Romans. [Sidenote: B.C. 215 (_a.u._ 539)] The consuls chosen were Gracchus, previously master of the horse, and Postumius Albinus. Albinus was ambuscaded and destroyed with his entire army by the Boii as he was traversing a wooded mountain. The barbarians cut off his head, scooped out the interior and after gilding it used it for a bowl in their sacred ceremonials.--Portents occurred at this time. A cow brought forth a horse and fire shone out at sea. The consuls Gracchus and Fabius encamped and kept watch of Hannibal while he stayed in Capua, to see what he did. They spent their time in sending scouts in every direction, defending the allies, trying to win back the revolted and injuring their adversaries' interests. Hannibal, so long as he obtained a barely sufficient supply of food at the cost of encountering dangers, led a temperate life, as did his army; but after they had taken Capua and wintered there in idleness with ample provisions, they began to lose their physical strength by not laboring and their intellectual force by tranquillity, and in changing their ancestral habits they learned an accomplishment new to them,--that of being defeated in battle.--When the work of war finally became pressing, Hannibal transferred his quarters to the mountains and gave the army exercise. But they could not get strong in a short s.p.a.ce of time. He was encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements from home, especially in the matter of elephants. He now set out against Nola intending to capture it or else to draw Marcellus, who was ravaging Samnium, away from that region. As he could accomplish nothing, he withdrew from the city and laid waste the country, until he suffered a decisive defeat in battle,--an event which grieved him. Many Spaniards and even many Libyans now forsook him and deserted to the Romans,--a new experience for him. Consequently, despairing of his own and the soldiers' prospects he abandoned that entire region and retired to Capua. Afterward he left there also to take up a different position.