Darwiniana Part 9

I have seen enough of savages to be able to declare that nothing can be more admirable than this description of what a savage has to learn. But it is incomplete. Add to all this the knowledge which a savage is obliged to gain of the properties of plants, of the characters and habits of animals, and of the minute indications by which their course is discoverable: consider that even an Australian can make excellent baskets and nets, and neatly fitted and beautifully balanced spears; that he learns to use these so as to be able to transfix a quartern loaf at sixty yards; and that very often, as in the case of the American Indians, the language of a savage exhibits complexities which a well-trained European finds it difficult to master: consider that every time a savage tracks his game he employs a minuteness of observation, and an accuracy of inductive and deductive reasoning which, applied to other matters, would a.s.sure some reputation to a man of science, and I think we need ask no further why he possesses such a fair supply of brains. In complexity and difficulty, I should say that the intellectual labour of a "good hunter or warrior" considerably exceeds that of an ordinary Englishman. The Civil Service Examiners are held in great terror by young Englishmen; but even their ferocity never tempted them to require a candidate to possess such a knowledge of a parish as Mr.

Wallace justly points out savages may possess of an area a hundred miles or more in diameter.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that a savage has more brains than seems proportioned to his wants, all that can be said is that the objection to natural selection, if it be one, applies quite as strongly to the lower animals. The brain of a porpoise is quite wonderful for its ma.s.s, and for the development of the cerebral convolutions. And yet since we have ceased to credit the story of Arion, it is hard to believe that porpoises are much troubled with intellect: and still more difficult is it to imagine that their big brains are only a preparation for the advent of some accomplished cetacean of the future. Surely, again, a wolf must have too much brains, or else how is it that a dog with only the same quant.i.ty and form of brain is able to develop such singular intelligence? The wolf stands to the dog in the same relation as the savage to the man; and, therefore, if Mr.

Wallace's doctrine holds good, a higher power must have superintended the breeding up of wolves from some inferior stock, in order to prepare them to become dogs.

Mr. Wallace further maintains that the origin of some of man's mental faculties by the preservation of useful variations is not possible. Such, for example, are "the capacity to form ideal conceptions of s.p.a.ce and time, of eternity and infinity; the capacity for intense artistic feelings of pleasure in form, colour, and composition; and for those abstract notions of form and number which render geometry and arithmetic possible." "How,"

he asks, "were all or any of these faculties first developed, when they could have been of no possible use to man in his early stages of barbarism?"

Surely the answer is not far to seek. The lowest savages are as devoid of any such conceptions as the brutes themselves. What sort of conceptions of s.p.a.ce and time, of form and number, can be possessed by a savage who has not got so far as to be able to count beyond five or six, who does not know how to draw a triangle or a circle, and has not the remotest notion of separating the particular quality we call form, from the other qualities of bodies? None of these capacities are exhibited by men, unless they form part of a tolerably advanced society. And, in such a society, there are abundant conditions by which a selective influence is exerted in favour of those persons who exhibit an approximation towards the possession of these capacities.

The savage who can amuse his fellows by telling a good story over the nightly fire, is held by them in esteem and rewarded, in one way or another, for so doing--in other words, it is an advantage to him to possess this power. He who can carve a paddle, or the figure-head of a canoe better, similarly profits beyond his duller neighbour. He who counts a little better than others, gets most yams when barter is going on, and forms the shrewdest estimate of the numbers of an opposing tribe. The experience of daily life shows that the conditions of our present social existence exercise the most extraordinarily powerful selective influence in favour of novelists, artists, and strong intellects of all kinds; and it seems unquestionable that all forms of social existence must have had the same tendency, if we consider the indisputable facts that even animals possess the power of distinguishing form and number, and that they are capable of deriving pleasure from particular forms and sounds. If we admit, as Mr. Wallace does, that the lowest savages are not raised "many grades above the elephant and the ape;" and if we further admit, as I contend must be admitted, that the conditions of social life tend, powerfully, to give an advantage to those individuals who vary in the direction of intellectual or aesthetic excellence, what is there to interfere with the belief that these higher faculties, like the rest, owe their development to natural selection?

Finally, with respect to the development of the moral sense out of the simple feelings of pleasure and pain, liking and disliking, with which the lower animals are provided, I can find nothing in Mr. Wallace's reasonings which has not already been met by Mr. Mill, Mr. Spencer, or Mr. Darwin.

I do not propose to follow the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart through the long string of objections in matters of detail which they bring against Mr. Darwin's views. Every one who has considered the matter carefully will be able to ferret out as many more "difficulties"; but he will also, I believe, fail as completely as they appear to me to have done, in bringing forward any fact which is really contradictory of Mr. Darwin's views.

Occasionally, too, their objections and criticisms are based upon errors of their own. As, for example, when Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer insist upon the resemblances between the eyes of _Cephalopoda_ and _Vertebrata_, quite forgetting that there are striking and altogether fundamental differences between them; or when the Quarterly Reviewer corrects Mr. Darwin for saying that the gibbons, "without having been taught, can walk or run upright with tolerable quickness, though they move awkwardly, and much less securely than man." The Quarterly Reviewer says, "This is a little misleading, inasmuch as it is not stated that this upright progression is effected by placing the enormously long arms behind the head, or holding them out backwards as a balance in progression."

Now, before carping at a small statement like this, the Quarterly Reviewer should have made sure that he was quite right. But he happens to be quite wrong. I suspect he got his notion of the manner in which a gibbon walks from a citation in "Man's Place in Nature." But at that time I had not seen a gibbon walk. Since then I have, and I can testify that nothing can be more precise than Mr. Darwin's statement. The gibbon I saw walked without either putting his arms behind his head or holding them out backwards. All he did was to touch the ground with the outstretched fingers of his long arms now and then, just as one sees a man who carries a stick, but does not need one, touch the ground with it as he walks along.

Again, a large number of the objections brought forward by Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer apply to evolution in general, quite as much as to the particular form of that doctrine advocated by Mr. Darwin; or, to their notions of Mr. Darwin's views and not to what they really are. An excellent example of this cla.s.s of difficulties is to be found in Mr. Mivart's chapter on "Independent Similarities of Structure." Mr. Mivart says that these cannot be explained by an "absolute and pure Darwinian," but "that an innate power and evolutionary law, aided by the corrective action of natural selection, should have furnished like needs with like aids, is not at all improbable" (p. 82).

I do not exactly know what Mr. Mivart means by an "absolute and pure Darwinian;" indeed Mr. Mivart makes that creature hold so many singular opinions that I doubt if I can ever have seen one alive. But I find nothing in his statement of the view which he imagines to be originated by himself, which is really inconsistent with what I understand to be Mr. Darwin's views.

I apprehend that the foundation of the theory of natural selection is the fact that living bodies tend incessantly to vary. This variation is neither indefinite, nor fortuitous, nor does it take place in all directions, in the strict sense of these words.

Accurately speaking, it is not indefinite, nor does it take place in all directions, because it is limited by the general characters of the type to which the organism exhibiting the variation belongs. A whale does not tend to vary in the direction of producing feathers, nor a bird in the direction of developing whalebone. In popular language there is no harm in saying that the waves which break upon the sea-sh.o.r.e are indefinite, fortuitous, and break in all directions. In scientific language, on the contrary, such a statement would be a gross error, inasmuch as every particle of foam is the result of perfectly definite forces, operating according to no less definite laws. In like manner, every variation of a living form, however minute, however apparently accidental, is inconceivable except as the expression of the operation of molecular forces or "powers" resident within the organism. And, as these forces certainly operate according to definite laws, their general result is, doubtless, in accordance with some general law which subsumes them all. And there appears to be no objection to call this an "evolutionary law." But n.o.body is the wiser for doing so, or has thereby contributed, in the least degree, to the advance of the doctrine of evolution, the great need of which is a theory of variation.

When Mr. Mivart tells us that his "aim has been to support the doctrine that these species have been evolved by ordinary _natural laws_ (for the most part unknown), aided by the _subordinate_ action of 'natural selection'" (pp. 332-3), he seems to be of opinion that his enterprise has the merit of novelty. All I can say is that I have never had the slightest notion that Mr. Darwin's aim is in any way different from this. If I affirm that "species have been evolved by variation [Footnote: Including under this head hereditary transmission.] (a natural process, the laws of which are for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of natural selection," it seems to me that I enunciate a proposition which const.i.tutes the very pith and marrow of the first edition of the "Origin of Species."

And what the evolutionist stands in need of just now, is not an iteration of the fundamental principle of Darwinism, but some light upon the questions, What are the limits of variation? and, If a variety has arisen, can that variety be perpetuated, or even intensified, when selective conditions are indifferent, or perhaps unfavourable to its existence? I cannot find that Mr. Darwin has ever been very dogmatic in answering these questions. Formerly, he seems to have inclined to reply to them in the negative, while now his inclination is the other way. Leaving aside those broad questions of theology, philosophy, and ethics, by the discussion of which neither the Quarterly Reviewer nor Mr. Mivart can be said to have damaged Darwinism--whatever else they have injured--this is what their criticisms come to. They confound a struggle for some rifle-pits with an a.s.sault on the fortress.

In some respects, finally, I can only characterise the Quarterly Reviewer's treatment of Mr. Darwin as alike unjust and unbecoming. Language of this strength requires justification, and on that ground I add the remarks which follow.

The Quarterly Reviewer opens his essay by a careful enumeration of all those points upon which, during the course of thirteen years of incessant labour, Mr. Darwin has modified his opinions. It has often and justly been remarked, that what strikes a candid student of Mr. Darwin's works is not so much his industry, his knowledge, or even the surprising fertility of his inventive genius; but that unswerving truthfulness and honesty which never permit him to hide a weak place, or gloss over a difficulty, but lead him, on all occasions, to point out the weak places in his own armour, and even sometimes, it appears to me, to make admissions against himself which are quite unnecessary. A critic who desires to attack Mr. Darwin has only to read his works with a desire to observe, not their merits, but their defects, and he will find, ready to hand, more adverse suggestions than are likely ever to have suggested themselves to his own sharpness, without Mr.

Darwin's self-denying aid.

Now this quality of scientific candour is not so common that it needs to be discouraged; and it appears to me to deserve other treatment than that adopted by the Quarterly Reviewer, who deals with Mr. Darwin as an Old Bailey barrister deals with a man against whom he wishes to obtain a conviction, _per fas aut nefas_, and opens his case by endeavouring to create a prejudice against the prisoner in the minds of the jury. In his eagerness to carry out this laudable design, the Quarterly Reviewer cannot even state the history of the doctrine of natural selection without an oblique and entirely unjustifiable attempt to depreciate Mr. Darwin. "To Mr. Darwin," says he, "and (through Mr. Wallace's reticence) to Mr. Darwin alone, is due the credit of having first brought it prominently forward and demonstrated its truth." No one can less desire than I do, to throw a doubt upon Mr. Wallace's originality, or to question his claim to the honour of being one of the originators of the doctrine of natural selection; but the statement that Mr. Darwin has the sole credit of originating the doctrine because of Mr. Wallace's reticence is simply ridiculous. The proof of this is, in the first place, afforded by Mr. Wallace himself, whose n.o.ble freedom from petty jealousy in this matter smaller folk would do well to imitate, and who writes thus:--"I have felt all my life, and I still feel, the most sincere satisfaction that Mr. Darwin had been at work long before me and that it was not left for me to attempt to write the 'Origin of Species.' I have long since measured my own strength, and know well that it would be quite unequal to that task." So that if there was any reticence at all in the matter, it was Mr. Darwin's reticence during the long twenty years of study which intervened between the conception and the publication of his theory, which gave Mr. Wallace the chance of being an independent discoverer of the importance of natural selection. And, finally, if it be recollected that Mr. Darwin's and Mr. Wallace's essays were published simultaneously in the "Journal of the Linnaean Society" for 1858, it follows that the Reviewer, while obliquely depreciating Mr. Darwin's deserts, has in reality awarded to him a priority which, in legal strictness, does not exist.

Mr. Mivart, whose opinions so often concur with those of the Quarterly Reviewer, puts the case in a way, which I much regret to be obliged to say, is, in my judgment, quite as incorrect; though the injustice may be less glaring. He says that the theory of natural selection is, in general, exclusively a.s.sociated with the name of Mr. Darwin, "on account of the n.o.ble self-abnegation of Mr. Wallace." As I have said, no one can honour Mr. Wallace more than I do, both for what he has done and for what he has not done, in his relation to Mr. Darwin. And perhaps nothing is more creditable to him than his frank declaration that he could not have written such a work as the "Origin of Species." But, by this declaration, the person most directly interested in the matter repudiates, by antic.i.p.ation, Mr. Mivart's suggestion that Mr. Darwin's eminence is more or less due to Mr. Wallace's modesty.

VI

EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY

[1878]

In the former half of the eighteenth century, the term "evolution" was introduced into biological writings, in order to denote the mode in which some of the most eminent physiologists of that time conceived that the generations of living things took place; in opposition to the hypothesis advocated, in the preceding century, by Harvey in that remarkable work [Footnote: The _Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium_, which Dr.

George Ent extracted from him and published in 1651.] which would give him a claim to rank among the founders of biological science, even had he not been the discoverer of the circulation of the blood.

One of Harvey's prime objects is to defend and establish, on the basis of direct observation, the opinion already held by Aristotle; that, in the higher animals at any rate, the formation of the new organism by the process of generation takes place, not suddenly, by simultaneous accretion of rudiments of all, or of the most important, of the organs of the adult; nor by sudden metamorphosis of a formative substance into a miniature of the whole, which subsequently grows; but by _epigenesis_, or successive differentiation of a relatively h.o.m.ogeneous rudiment into the parts and structures which are characteristic of the adult.

"Et prim, quidem, quoniam per _epigenesin_ sive partium superexorientium additamentum pullum fabricari certum est: quaenam pars ante alias omnes exstruatur, et quid de illa ejusque generandi modo observandum veniat, dispiciemus. Ratum sane est et in ovo manifeste apparet quod _Aristoteles_ de perfectorum animalium generatione enuntiat: nimirum, non omnes partes simul fieri, sed ordine aliam post aliam; primumque existere particulam genitalem, cujus virtute postea (tanquam ex principio quodam) reliquae omnes partes prosiliant. Qualem in plantarum seminibus (fabis, puta, aut glandibus) gemmam sive apicem protuberantem cernimus, totius futurae arboris principium. _Estque haec particula, velut filius emanc.i.p.atus seorsumquc collocatus, et principium per se vivens; unde postea, membrorum ordo describitur; et quaecunque ad absolvendum animal pertinent, disponuntur._ [Footnote: _De Generatione Animalium_, lib. ii. cap. x.] Quoniam enim _nulla pars se ipsam generat; sed postquam generata est, se ipsam jam auget; ideo eam primum oriri necesse est, quae principium augendi contineat (sive enim planta, sive animal est, aeque omnibus inest quod vim habeat vegetandi, sive nutriendi_), [Footnote: _De Generatione_, lib. ii. cap. iv.] simulque reliquas omnes partes suo quamque ordine distinguat et formet; proindeque in eadem primogenita particula anima primario inest, sensus, motusque, et totius vitae auctor et principium." (Exercitatio 51.)

Harvey proceeds to contrast this view with that of the "Medici," or followers of Hippocrates and Galen, who, "badly philosophising," imagined that the brain, the heart, and the liver were simultaneously first generated in the form of vesicles; and, at the same time, while expressing his agreement with Aristotle in the principle of epigenesis, he maintains that it is the blood which is the primal generative part, and not, as Aristotle thought, the heart.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the doctrine of epigenesis, thus advocated by Harvey, was controverted, on the ground of direct observation, by Malpighi, who affirmed that the body of the chick is to be seen in the egg, before the _punctum sanguineum_ makes it appearance.

But, from this perfectly correct observation a conclusion which is by no means warranted was drawn; namely, that the chick, as a whole, really exists in the egg antecedently to incubation; and that what happens in the course of the latter process is no addition of new parts, "alias post alias natas," as Harvey puts it, but a simple expansion, or unfolding, of the organs which already exist, though they are too small and inconspicuous to be discovered. The weight of Malpighi's observations therefore fell into the scale of that doctrine which Harvey terms _metamorphosis_, in contradistinction to epigenesis.

The views of Malpighi were warmly welcomed, on philosophical grounds, by Leibnitz, [Footnote: "Cependant, pour revenir aux formes ordinaires ou aux ames materielles, cette duree qu'il leur faut attribuer a la place de celle qu'on avoit attribuee aux atomes pourroit faire douter si elles ne vont pas de corps en corps; ce qui seroit la metempsychose, a peu pres comme quelques philosophes ont cru la transmission du mouvement et celle des especes. Mais cette imagination est bien eloignee de la nature des choses.

Il n'y a point de tel pa.s.sage; et c'est ici ou les transformations de Messieurs Swammerdam, Malpighi, et Leewenhoek, qui sont des plus excellens observateurs de notre tems, sont venues a mon secours, et m'ont fait admettre plus ais.e.m.e.nt, que l'animal, et toute autre substance organisee ne commence point lorsque nous le croyons, et que sa generation apparente n'est qu'une developpement et une espece d'augmentation. Aussi ai je remarque que l'auteur de la _Recherche de la Verite_, M. Regis, M.

Hartsoeker, et d'autres habiles hommes n'ont pas ete fort eloignes de ce sentiment." Leibnitz, _Systeme Nouveau de la Nature_, 1695. The doctrine of "Emboitement" is contained in the _Considerations sur le Principe de Vie_, 1705; the preface to the _Theodicee_, 1710; and the _Principes de la Nature et de la Grace_ (-- 6), 1718.] who found in them a support to his hypothesis of monads, and by Malebranche; [Footnote: "Il est vrai que la pensee la plus raisonnable et la plus conforme a l'experience sur cette question tres difficile de la formation du foetus; c'est que les enfans sont deja presque tout formes avant meme l'action par laquelle ils sont concus; et que leurs meres ne font que leur donner l'accroiss.e.m.e.nt ordinaire dans le temps de la grossesse." _De la Recherche de la Verite_, livre ii. chap. vii. p. 334, 7th ed., 1721.]

while, in the middle of the eighteenth century, not only speculative considerations, but a great number of new and interesting observations on the phenomena of generation, led the ingenious Bonnet, and Haller, [Footnote: The writer is indebted to Dr. Allen Thomson for reference to the evidence contained in a note to Haller's edition of Boerhaave's _Praelectiones Academicae_, vol. v. pt. ii. p. 497, published in 1744, that Haller originally advocated epigenesis.] the first physiologist of the age, to adopt, advocate, and extend them.

Bonnet affirms that, before fecundation, the hen's egg contains an excessively minute but complete chick; and that fecundation and incubation simply cause this germ to absorb nutritious matters, which are deposited in the interstices of the elementary structures of which the miniature chick, or germ, is made up. The consequence of this intussusceptive growth is the "development" or "evolution" of the germ into the visible bird. Thus an organised individual (_tout organise_) "is a composite body consisting of the original, or _elementary_, parts and of the matters which have been a.s.sociated with them by the aid of nutrition;" so that, if these matters could be extracted from the individual (_tout_), it would, so to speak, become concentrated in a point, and would thus be restored to its primitive condition of a _germ_; "just as by extracting from a bone the calcareous substance which is the source of its hardness, it is reduced to its primitive state of gristle or membrane." [Footnote: _Considerations sur les Corps organises, chap. x.] "Evolution" and "development" are, for Bonnet, synonymous terms; and since by "evolution"

he means simply the expansion of that which was invisible into visibility, he was naturally led to the conclusion, at which Leibnitz had arrived by a different line of reasoning, that no such thing as generation, in the proper sense of the word, exists in Nature. The growth of an organic being is simply a process of enlargement as a particle of dry gelatine may be swelled up by the intussusception of water; its death is a shrinkage, such as the swelled jelly might undergo on desiccation. Nothing really new is produced in the living world, but the germs which develop have existed since the beginning of things; and nothing really dies, but, when what we call death takes place, the living thing shrinks back into its germ state.

[Footnote: Bonnet had the courage of his opinions, and in the _Palingenesie Philosophique_, part vi. chap, iv., he develops a hypothesis which he terms "evolution naturelle;" and which, making allowance for his peculiar views of the nature of generation, bears no small resemblance to what is understood by "evolution" at the present day:--

"Si la volonte divine a cree par un seul Acte l'Universalite des etres, d'ou venoient ces plantes et ces animaux dont Moyse nous decrit la Production au troisieme et au cinquieme jour du renouvellement de notre monde?

"Abuserois-je de la liberte de conjectures si je disois, que les Plantes et les Animaux qui existent aujourd'hui sont parvenus par une sorte d'evolution naturelle des Etres organises qui peuplaient ce premier Monde, sorti immediatement des MAINS du CREATEUR?...

"Ne supposons que trois revolutions. La Terre vient de sortir des MAINS du CREATEUR. Des causes preparees par sa SAGESSE font developper de toutes parts les Germes. Les Etres organises commencent a jouir de l'existence.

Ils etoient probablement alors bien differens de ce qu'ils sont aujourd'hui. Ils l'etoient autant que ce premier Monde differoit de celui que nous habitons. Nous manquons de moyens pour juger de ces dissemblances, et peut-etre que le plus habile Naturaliste qui auroit ete place dans ce premier Monde y auroit entierement meconnu nos Plantes et nos Animaux."]

The two parts of Bonnet's hypothesis, namely, the doctrine that all living things proceed from pre-existing germs, and that these contain, one inclosed within the other, the germs of all future living things, which is the hypothesis of "_emboitement_;" and the doctrine that every germ contains in miniature all the organs of the adult, which is the hypothesis of evolution or development, in the primary senses of these words, must be carefully distinguished. In fact, while holding firmly by the former, Bonnet more or less modified the latter in his later writings, and, at length, he admits that a "germ" need not be an actual miniature of the organism; but that it may be merely an "original preformation" capable of producing the latter. [Footnote: "Ce mot (germe) ne designera pas seulement un corps organise _reduit en pet.i.t_; il designera encore toute espece de _preformation originelle dont un Tout organique peut resulter comme de son principe immediat."--Palingenesie Philosophique_, part X. chap. II.]

But, thus defined, the germ is neither more nor less than the "particula genitalis" of Aristotle, or the "primordium vegetale" or "ovum" of Harvey; and the "evolution" of such a germ would not be distinguishable from "epigenesis."

Supported by the great authority of Haller, the doctrine of evolution, or development, prevailed throughout the whole of the eighteenth century, and Cuvier appears to have substantially adopted Bonnet's later views, though probably he would not have gone all lengths in the direction of "emboitement." In a well-known note to Laurillard's "eloge," prefixed to the last edition of the "Oss.e.m.e.ns fossiles," the "radical de l'etre" is much the same thing as Aristotle's "particula genitalis" and Harvey's "ovum." [Footnote: "M. Cuvier considerant que tous les etres organises sont derives de parens, et ne voyant dans la nature aucune force capable de produire l'organisation, croyait a la pre-existence des germes; non pas a la pre-existence d'un etre tout forme, puisqu'il est bien evident que ce n'est que par des developpemens successifs que l'etre acquiert sa forme; mais, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, a la pre-existence du _radical de l'etre_, radical qui existe avant que la serie des evolutions ne commence, et qui remonte certainement, suivant la belle observation de Bonnet, a plusieurs generations."--Laurillard, _eloge de Cuvier_, note 12.]

Bonnet's eminent contemporary, Buffon, held nearly the same views with respect to the nature of the germ, and expresses them even more confidently.

"Ceux qui ont cru que le coeur etoit le premier forme, se sont trompes; ceux qui disent que c'est le sang se trompent aussi: tout est forme en meme temps. Si l'on ne consulte que l'observation, le poulet se voit dans l'oeuf avant qu'il ait ete couve." [Footnote: _Histoire Naturelle_, tom. ii.

ed. ii. 1750, p. 350.]

"J'ai ouvert une grande quant.i.te d'oeufs a differens temps avant et apres l'incubation, et je me suis convaincu par mes yeux que le poulet existe en entier dans le milieu de la cicatricule au moment qu'il sort du corps de la poule." [Footnote: _Ibid_., p. 351.]

The "moule interieur" of Buffon is the aggregate of elementary parts which const.i.tute the individual, and is thus the equivalent of Bonnet's germ, [Footnote: See particularly Buffon, _l. c._ p. 41.] as defined in the pa.s.sage cited above. But Buffon further imagined that innumerable "molecules organiques" are dispersed throughout the world, and that alimentation consists in the appropriation by the parts of an organism of those molecules which are a.n.a.logous to them. Growth, therefore, was, on this hypothesis, a process partly of simple evolution, and partly of what has been termed "syngenesis." Buffon's opinion is, in fact, a sort of combination of views, essentially similar to those of Bonnet, with others, somewhat similar to those of the "Medici" whom Harvey condemns. The "molecules organiques" are physical equivalents of Leibnitz's "monads."

It is a striking example of the difficulty of getting people to use their own powers of investigation accurately, that this form of the doctrine of evolution should have held its ground so long; for it was thoroughly and completely exploded, not long after its enunciation, by Casper Friederich Wolff, who in his "Theoria Generationis," published in 1759, placed the opposite theory of epigenesis upon the secure foundation of fact, from which it has never been displaced. But Wolff had no immediate successors.

The school of Cuvier was lamentably deficient in embryologists; and it was only in the course of the first thirty years of the present century, that Prevost and Dumas in France, and, later on, Dollinger, Pander, Von Bar, Rathke, and Remak in Germany, founded modern embryology; while, at the same time, they proved the utter incompatibility of the hypothesis of evolution, as formulated by Bonnet and Haller, with easily demonstrable facts.

Nevertheless, though the conceptions originally denoted by "evolution" and "development" were shown to be untenable, the words retained their application to the process by which the embryos of living beings gradually make their appearance; and the terms "Development," "Entwickelung," and "Evolutio," are now indiscriminately used for the series of genetic changes exhibited by living beings, by writers who would emphatically deny that "Development" or "Entwickelung" or "Evolutio," in the sense in which these words were usually employed by Bonnet or by Haller, ever occurs.

Evolution, or development, is, in fact, at present employed in biology as a general name for the history of the steps by which any living being has acquired the morphological and the physiological characters which distinguish it. As civil history may be divided into biography, which is the history of individuals, and universal history, which is the history of the human race, so evolution falls naturally into two categories--the evolution of the individual, and the evolution of the sum of living beings.

It will be convenient to deal with the modern doctrine of evolution under these two heads.