Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 25

The second subdivision of the physical school, _the Mechanical_ or _Atomist theorists_, attempted the explanation of the universe by a.n.a.logies derived from mechanical collocations, arrangements, and movements. The universe was regarded by them as a vast superstructure built up from elemental particles, aggregated by some inherent force or mutual affinity.

_Anaximander of Miletus_ (born B.C. 610) we place at the head of the Mechanical sect of the Ionian school; first, on the authority of Aristotle, who intimates that the philosophic dogmata of Anaximander "resemble those of Democritus," who was certainly an Atomist; and, secondly, because we can clearly trace a genetic connection between the opinions of Democritus and Leucippus and those of Anaximander.

The ????, or first principle of Anaximander, was t? ?pe????, _the boundless, the illimitable, the infinite_. Some historians of philosophy have imagined that the infinite of Anaximander was the "unlimited all,"

and have therefore placed him at the head of the Italian or "idealistic school." These writers are manifestly in error. Anaximander was unquestionably a sensationalist. Whatever his "infinite" may be found to be, one thing is clear, it was not a "metaphysical infinite"--it did not include infinite power, much less infinite mind.

The testimony of Aristotle is conclusive that by "the infinite"

Anaximander understood the mult.i.tude of primary, material particles. He calls it "a ??a, or mixture of elements."[420] It was, in fact, a _chaos_--an original state in which the primary elements existed in a chaotic combination without _limitation_ or division. He a.s.sumed a certain "_prima materia_," which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but a "mixture" of all, to be the first principle of the universe. The account of the opinions of Anaximander which is given by Plutarch ("De Placita," etc.) is a further confirmation of our interpretation of his infinite. "Anaximander, the Milesian, affirmed the infinite to be the first principle, and that all things are generated out of it, and corrupted again into it. _His infinite is nothing else but matter._"

"Whence," says Cudworth, "we conclude that Anaximander's infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were actually or potentially contained all manner of qualities, by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may easily guess whence Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were."[421] The reader, whose curiosity may lead him to consult the authorities collected by Cudworth (pp. 185-188), will find in the doctrine of Anaximander a rude antic.i.p.ation of the modern theories of "spontaneous generation" and "the trans.m.u.tation of species." In the fragments of Anaximander that remain we find no recognition of an ordering Mind, and his philosophy is the dawn of a Materialistic school.

[Footnote 420: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. ii.]

[Footnote 421: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. pp. 186, 187.]

_Leucippus of Miletus_ (B.C. 500-400) appears, in the order of speculation, as the successor of Anaximander. _Atoms_ and _s.p.a.ce_ are, in his philosophy, the ???a?, or first principles of all things.

"Leucippus (and his companion, Democritus) a.s.sert that the plenum and the vacuum [_i.e._, body and s.p.a.ce] are the first principles, whereof one is the Ens, the other Non-ens; the differences of the body, which are only figure, order, and position, are the causes of all others."[422]

[Footnote 422: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," p. 21 (Bohn's edition).]

He also taught that the elements, and the worlds derived from them, are _infinite_. He describes the manner in which the worlds are produced as follows: "Many bodies of various kinds and shapes are borne by amputation from the infinite [_i.e._, the chaotic ??a of Anaximander]

into a vast vacuum, and then they, being collected together, produce a vortex; according to which, they, dashing against each other, and whirling about in every direction, are separated in such a way that like attaches itself to like; bodies are thus, without ceasing, united according to the impulse given by the vortex, and in this way the earth was produced."[423] Thus, through a boundless void, atoms infinite in number and endlessly diversified in form are eternally wandering; and, by their aggregation, infinite worlds are successively produced. These atoms are governed in their movements by a dark negation of intelligence, designated "Fate," and all traces of a Supreme Mind disappear in his philosophy. It is a system of pure materialism, which, in fact, is Atheism.

[Footnote 423: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," p. 389.]

_Democritus of Abdera_ (B.C. 460-357), the companion of Leucippus, also taught "that _atoms_ and the _vacuum_ were the beginning of the universe."[424] These atoms, he taught, were infinite in number, h.o.m.ogeneous, extended, and possessed of those primary qualities of matter which are necessarily involved in extension in s.p.a.ce--as size, figure, situation, divisibility, and mobility. From the combination of these atoms all other existences are produced; fire, air, earth, and water; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; the soul itself is an aggregation of round, moving atoms. And "motion, which is the cause of the production of every thing, he calls _necessity_."[425]

Atoms are thus the only real existences; these, without any pre-existent mind, or intelligence, were the original of all things.

[Footnote 424: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," p. 395.]

[Footnote 425: Id, ib., p. 394.]

The psychological opinions of Democritus were as decidedly materialistic as his physical theories. All knowledge is derived from sensation. It is only by material impact that we can know the external world, and every sense is, in reality, a kind of touch. Material images are being continually thrown off from the surface of external objects which come into actual contact with the organs of sense. The primary qualities of matter, that is, those which are involved in extension in s.p.a.ce, are the only objects of real knowledge; the secondary qualities of matter, as softness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, and the like, are but modifications of the human sensibilities. "The sweet exists only in form--the bitter in form, hot in form, color in form; but in causal reality only atoms and s.p.a.ce exist. The sensible things which are supposed by opinion to exist have no real existence, but atoms and s.p.a.ce alone exist."[426]

[Footnote 426: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 96. The words of Democritus, as reported by s.e.xtus Empiricus.]

Thus by Democritus was laid the basis of a system of absolute materialism, which was elaborated and completed by Epicurus, and has been transmitted to our times. It has undergone some slight modifications, adapting it to the progress of physical science; but it is to-day substantially the theory of Democritus. In Democritus we have the culmination of the mechanical theory of the Ionian or Physical school. In physics and psychology it terminated in pure materialism. In theology it ends in positive Atheism.

The fundamental error of all the philosophers of the physical school was the a.s.sumption, tacitly or avowedly, that sense-perception is the only source of knowledge. This was the fruitful source of all their erroneous conclusions, the parent of all their materialistic tendencies. This led them continually to seek an ????, or first principle of the universe, which should, under some form, be appreciable to _sense_; and consequently the course of thought tended naturally towards materialism.

Thales was unquestionably a dualist. Instructed by traditional intimations, or more probably guided by the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, he recognized, with more or less distinctness, an incorporeal Deity as the moving, animating, and organizing cause of the universe.

The idea of G.o.d is a truth so self-evident as to need no demonstration.

The human mind does not attain to the idea of a G.o.d as the last consequence of a series of antecedent principles. It comes at once, by an inherent and necessary movement of thought, to the recognition of G.o.d as the First Principle of all principles. But when, instead of hearkening to the simple and spontaneous intuitions of the mind, man turns to the world of sense, and loses himself in discursive thought, the conviction of a personal G.o.d becomes obscured. Then, amid the endlessly diversified phenomena of the universe, he seeks for a cause or origin which in some form shall be appreciable to sense. The mere study of material phenomena, scientifically or unscientifically conducted, will never yield the sense of the living G.o.d. Nature must be interpreted, can only be interpreted in the light of certain _a priori_ principles of reason, or we can never "ascend from nature up to nature's G.o.d." Within the circle of mere sense-perception, the dim and undeveloped consciousness of G.o.d will be confounded with the universe.

Thus, in Anaximenes, G.o.d is partially confounded with "air," which becomes a symbol; then a vehicle of the informing mind; and the result is a semi-pantheism. In Herac.l.i.tus, the "ether" is, at first, a semi-symbol of the Deity; at length, G.o.d is utterly confounded with this ether, or "rational fire," and the result is a definite _materialistic pantheism_. And, finally, when this feeling or dim consciousness of G.o.d, which dwells in all human souls, is not only disregarded, but p.r.o.nounced to be an illusion--a phantasy; when all the a.n.a.logies which intelligence suggests are disregarded, and a purely mechanical theory of the universe is adopted, the result is the utter negation of an Intelligent Cause, that is, _absolute Atheism_, as in Leucippus and Democritus.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued_).

PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL _(continued_).

IDEALIST: PYTHAGORAS--XENOPHANES--PARMENIDES--ZENO. NATURAL REALIST: ANAXAGORAS.

SOCRATIC SCHOOL.

SOCRATES.

In the previous chapter we commenced our inquiry with the a.s.sumption that, in the absence of the true inductive method of philosophy which observes, and cla.s.sifies, and generalizes facts, and thence attains a general principle or law, two only methods were possible to the early speculators who sought an explanation of the universe--1st, That of reasoning from physical a.n.a.logies; or, 2d, That of deduction from rational conceptions, or _a priori_ ideas.

Accordingly we found that one cla.s.s of speculators fixed their attention solely on the mere phenomena of nature, and endeavored, amid sensible things, to find a _single_ element which, being more subtile, and pliable, and universally diffused, could be regarded as the ground and original of all the rest, and from which, by a vital transformation, or by a mechanical combination and arrangement of parts, all the rest should be evolved. The other cla.s.s pa.s.sed beyond the simple phenomena, and considered only the abstract _relations_ of phenomena among themselves, or the relations of phenomena to the necessary and universal ideas of the reason, and supposed that, in these relations, they had found an explanation of the universe. The former was the Ionian or Sensation school; the latter was the Italian or Idealist school.

We have traced the method according to which the Ionian school proceeded, and estimated the results attained. We now come to consider the method and results of

THE ITALIAN OR IDEALIST SCHOOL.

This school we have found to be naturally subdivided into--1st, The _Mathematical_ sect, which attempted the explanation of the universe by the abstract conceptions of number, proportion, order, and harmony; and, 2d, The _Metaphysical_ school, which attempted the interpretation of the universe according to the _a priori_ ideas of unity, of Being _in se_, of the Infinite, and the Absolute.

_Pythagoras of Samos_(born B.C. 605) was the founder of the Mathematical school.

We are conscious of the difficulties which are to be encountered by the student who seeks to attain a definite comprehension of the real opinions of Pythagoras. The genuineness of many of those writings which were once supposed to represent his views, is now questioned. "Modern criticism has clearly shown that the works ascribed to Timaeus and Archytas are spurious; and the treatise of Ocellus Luca.n.u.s on 'The Nature of the All' can not have been written by a Pythagorean."[427] The only writers who can be regarded as at all reliable are Plato and Aristotle; and the opinions they represent are not so much those of Pythagoras as "the Pythagoreans." This is at once accounted for by the fact that Pythagoras taught in secret, and did not commit his opinions to writing. His disciples, therefore, represent the _tendency_ rather than the actual tenets of his system; these were no doubt modified by the mental habits and tastes of his successors.

[Footnote 427: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 24.]

We may safely a.s.sume that the proposition from which Pythagoras started was the fundamental idea of all Greek speculation--_that beneath the fleeting forms and successive changes of the universe there is some permanent principle of unity_[428] The Ionian school sought that principle in some common physical element; Pythagoras sought, not for "elements," but for "relations," and through these relations for ultimate laws indicating primal forces.

[Footnote 428: See Plato, "Timaeus," ch. ix. p. 331 (Bohn's edition); Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. v. ch. iii.]

Aristotle affirms that Pythagoras taught "that _numbers_ are the first principles of all ent.i.ties," and, "as it were, a _material_ cause of things,"[429] or, in other words, "that numbers are substances that involve a separate subsistence, and are primary causes of ent.i.ties."[430]

[Footnote 429: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. v.]

[Footnote 430: Id., ib., bk. xii. ch. vi.]

Are we then required to accept the dictum of Aristotle as final and decisive? Did Pythagoras really teach that numbers are real ent.i.ties--the _substance_ and cause of all other existences? The reader may be aware that this is a point upon which the historians of philosophy are not agreed. Ritter is decidedly of opinion that the Pythagorean formula "can only be taken symbolically."[431] Lewes insists it must be understood literally.[432] On a careful review of all the arguments, we are constrained to regard the conclusion of Ritter as most reasonable. The hypothesis "that numbers are real ent.i.ties" does violence to every principle of common sense. This alone const.i.tutes a strong _a priori_ presumption that Pythagoras did not entertain so glaring an absurdity. The man who contributed so much towards perfecting the mathematical sciences, who played so conspicuous a part in the development of ancient philosophy, and who exerted so powerful a determining influence on the entire current of speculative thought, did not obtain his ascendency over the intellectual manhood of Greece by the utterance of such enigmas. And further, in interpreting the philosophic opinions of the ancients, we must be guided by this fundamental canon--"The human mind has, under the necessary operation of its own laws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, and the human heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages." Now if a careful philosophic criticism can not render the _reported_ opinions of an ancient teacher into the universal language of the reason and heart of humanity, we must conclude either that his opinions were misunderstood and misrepresented by some of his successors, or else that he stands in utter isolation, both from the present and the past. His doctrine has, then, no relation to the successions of thought, and no place in the history of philosophy. Nay, more, such a doctrine has in it no element of vitality, no germ of eternal truth, and must speedily perish. Now it is well known that the teaching of Pythagoras awakened the deepest intellectual sympathy of his age; that his doctrine exerted a powerful influence on the mind of Plato, and, through him, upon succeeding ages; and that, in some of its aspects, it now survives, and is more influential to-day than in any previous age; but this element of immutable and eternal truth was certainly not contained in the inane and empty formula, "that numbers are real existences, the causes of all other existences!" If the fame of Pythagoras had rested on such "airy nothings," it would have melted away before the time of Plato.

[Footnote 431: "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 359.]

[Footnote 432: "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 38.]

We grant there is considerable force in the argument of Lewes. He urges, with some pertinence, the unquestionable fact that Aristotle a.s.serts, again and again, that the Pythagoreans taught "that numbers are the principles and substance of things as well as the causes of their modifications;" and he argues that we are not justified in rejecting the authority of Aristotle, unless better evidence can be produced.

So far, however, as the authority of Aristotle is concerned, even Lewes himself charges him, in more than one instance, with strangely misrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors.[433] Aristotle is evidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize the historian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to question his integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits the egotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has the full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly a.s.sociates the "_numbers_" of Pythagoras with the "_forms_" and "_ideas_" of Plato. He a.s.serts that Plato identifies "forms" and "numbers," and regards them as real ent.i.ties--substances, and causes of all other things. "_Forms are numbers_[434]... so Plato affirmed, similar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes to other things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, a.s.serted with them_."[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments in refuting the doctrines of both.

[Footnote 433: "Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras"

(Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy"). He represents him as employing mind (????) simply as "a _machine_" for the production of the world;--"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of its being necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by force to his a.s.sistance" "Metaphysics," (bk. i. ch. iv.). But he is evidently inconsistent with himself, for in "De Anima" (bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells us that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ in the whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_." We may further ask, is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final cause, even according to Aristotle?