Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 19

There are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "the Philosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of the Conditioned had "not been generalized by any previous philosopher;" and, in laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and important contribution to speculative thought.

The principles upon which this philosophy is based are:

1. _The Relativity of all Human Knowledge._--Existence is not cognized absolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are related to our faculties, and, in fact, determined by these faculties themselves. All knowledge, therefore, is _relative_--that is, it is of phenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determined by our own faculties." Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of all relation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it can not possibly be _known_.

2. _The Conditionality of all Thinking_.--Thought necessarily supposes conditions. "To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can not out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is supported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within and through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is only of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is to condition."[295] Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned, and as such can not possibly be _thought_.

3. _The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, is a mere "negation of thought._"--By this Hamilton does not mean that the idea of the Infinite is a negative idea. "The Infinite and the Absolute are _only_ the names of two counter _imbecilities_ of the human mind"[296]--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute limitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or an infinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge.[297]

The grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, "_that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable_." Or, again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other."[298] This is the celebrated "Law of the Conditioned."

[Footnote 295: "Discussions," p. 21.]

[Footnote 296: Ibid., p. 28.]

[Footnote 297: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 373.]

[Footnote 298: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 373.]

In attempting a brief criticism of "the Philosophy of the Conditioned,"

we may commence by inquiring:

I. _What is the real import and significance of the doctrine "that all human knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal_?"

Hamilton calls this "the great axiom" of philosophy. That we may distinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on the subject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he uses the words "_phenomenal_" and "_relative._" The importance of an exact terminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, in three Lectures (VIII., IX., X.), he has given a full explication of the terms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word "_phenomenon_" is set down as the necessary "_correlative_" of the word "_subject_" or "_substance_." "These terms can not be explained apart, for each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in and through its correlative. The term '_subject_' is used to denote the unknown (?) basis which lies under the various _phenomena_ or properties of which we become aware, whether in our external or internal experience."[299] "The term '_relative_' is _opposed_ to the term '_absolute_;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually a.s.sert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, _in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties_."[300] Now, in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "that which is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation."[301]

The _absolute_ can not, therefore, be "_the correlative_" of the conditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. The _subject,_ however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and, consequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical.

Furthermore, Hamilton tells us the subject _may be comprehended_ in and through its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being aloof from all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. "The subject" and "the absolute" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and, if they are not synonymous, then their ant.i.thetical terms, "phenomenal"

and "relative," can not be synonymous.

[Footnote 299: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.]

[Footnote 300: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 301: "Discussions," p. 21.]

It is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms as synonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in his philosophy of the conditioned. "All our knowledge is of the relative _or_ phenomenal." Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. and IX., in which he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, these terms are used as precisely a.n.a.logous. Now, in opposition to this, we maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing may be "in relation" and yet not be a phenomenon. "The subject or substance"

may be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself, _correlated_ to the phenomenon. The ego, "the conscious _subject_"[302]

as a "_self-subsisting ent.i.ty_" is necessarily related to the phenomena of thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the conscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena," with more indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory a.s.sertion, "that the _subject_ is unknown," he still teaches, with equal positiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self, as a perceiving _subject."_ And still more explicitly he says: "As clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at every moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications [phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications, and a _self-subsisting ent.i.ty_."[303] Again: "Thought is possible only in and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence as the _subject_ to which the act belongs.

It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc.; these special modes are all only the phenomena of the I."[304] We are, therefore, conscious of the _subject_ in the most immediate, and direct, and intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can not be "_unknown_." We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should deal in such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence of violating that fundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton so frequently and earnestly insists, viz., "that the testimony of consciousness must be accepted in all its integrity".

[Footnote 302: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O.W.

Wight), p. 181.]

[Footnote 303: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 373.]

[Footnote 304: Ibid., vol. i. p. 166.]

It is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admit _the relativity of human knowledge_, and yet at the same time reject the doctrine of Hamilton, _that all human knowledge is only of the phenomenal_.

"The relativity of human knowledge," like most other phrases into which the word "relative" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety of meanings. If by this phrase is meant "that we can not know objects except as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related to them," we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leading to no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simply another way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it must come within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can only know as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase is meant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they present," we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart from their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the substances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and through their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no longer any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from matter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself," apart from its qualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is meant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative," we accept this statement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal with difference and relation; the relation of subject and object; the relation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena to reality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionably correlated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehend the necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and s.p.a.ce, succession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. We may thus admit the _relative character of human thought_, and at the same time deny that it is an ontological disqualification.[305]

It is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holds the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He a.s.sumes a middle place between Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism of the latter with the realism of the former. "He identifies the _phenomenon_ of the German with the _quality_ of the British philosophy,"[306] and a.s.serts, as a regulative law of thought, that the quality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and unknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentially different from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant, _phenomenon_ means an object as we envisage or represent it to ourselves, in opposition to the _noumenon_, or a thing as it is in itself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements supplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of s.p.a.ce and time; as regards thought, the categories of Quant.i.ty, Quality, Relation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it neither in s.p.a.ce nor in time. To think a thing in itself would be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal is thus the product of the inherent laws of our own const.i.tution, and, as such, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge.[307]

[Footnote 305: Martineau's "Essays," p. 234.]

[Footnote 306: M'Cosh's "Defense of Fundamental Truth," p. 106.]

[Footnote 307: Mansel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant," pp. 21, 22.]

This, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded by Hamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable" are presented to, and known by, the mind _under modifications determined by the faculties themselves_."[308] This doctrine he ill.u.s.trates by the following supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness in perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception."[309] The conclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are not known to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our minds are capable of perceiving them.

[Footnote 308: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.]

[Footnote 309: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129; and also vol. i. p. 147.]

Let us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man is justified in making this a.s.sertion unless, 1. He knows things as they exist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3.

He is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as they appear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not know things as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know that there is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear?

What is this "_thing in itself_" about which Hamilton has so much to say, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily understand what is meant by the _thing_; it is the object as existing--a substance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is meant by _in itself_? There can be no _in itself_ besides or beyond the _thing_. If Hamilton means that "the thing itself" is the thing apart from all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do not acknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoid of all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may be permitted. With such a definition of Being _in se_, the logic of Hegel is invincible, "Being and Nothing are identical."

And now, if "the thing in itself" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutely _unknown_, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By what right does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse its predicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, in relation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plain that, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to be inscrutable, it is a.s.sumed to be partially _known_? And it is obvious, notwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, that Hamilton does regard "the thing in itself" as partially known. "The external reality" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the "total object of consciousness."[310] The primary qualities of matter are known as in the things themselves; "they develop themselves with rigid necessity out of the simple datum of _substance occupying s.p.a.ce_."[311]

"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they are the attributes of _body as body_," and as such "are known immediately in themselves,"[312] as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that we not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as they exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an _a priori_ manner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary Qualities may be deduced _a priori_; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies." If, then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves,"

"the things themselves" must also be, at least, partially known; and Hamilton can not consistently a.s.sert the relativity of _all_ knowledge.

Even if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in part dependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded by our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the a.s.sertion that all our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. "The admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is right) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him, is not inextricable. It is for us 'to a.n.a.lyze and distinguish what elements,' in an 'act of knowledge,' are contributed by the object, and what by the organs or by the mind."[313]

[Footnote 310: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129.]

[Footnote 311: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357]

[Footnote 312: Ibid., pp. 377, 378.]

[Footnote 313: Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p.

44.]

Admitting the relative character of human thought as a psychological fact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead of visiting us with disability to transcend phenomena, _operates as a revelation of what exists beyond_. "The finite body cut out before our visual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object gives us also the infinite s.p.a.ce; and both terms--the limited appearance and the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal cert.i.tude and clearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use in predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance, the strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us as dotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we should have no apprehension, but which as their condition, is unreservedly known."[314]

"What we have said with regard to s.p.a.ce and time applies equally t? the case of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perception introduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body reveals also the s.p.a.ce around, and an interrupted succession exhibits the uniform time beneath, so does the pa.s.sing phenomenon demand for itself a power beneath. The s.p.a.ce, and time, and power, not being part of the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us, therefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect."[315]

"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of s.p.a.ce, and Time, and Causation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixed ent.i.ties belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of phenomenal disposition and succession."[316] In these instances of relation between a phenomenon given in perception and an ent.i.ty as a logical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality of intellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought is not an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power.

[Footnote 314: "Essays," pp. 193,194.]

[Footnote 315: Ibid., p. 197.]

[Footnote 316: Ibid., p. 195.]

There is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton's reasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at the outset. The Absolute is defined as _that which exists in and by itself, aloof from and out of all relation_. An absolute, as thus defined, does not and can not exist; it is a pure abstraction, and, in fact, a pure non-ent.i.ty. "The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being and in action, and is applicable to G.o.d as self-existent."[317] It may mean the absence of all _necessary_ relation, but it does not mean the absence of _all_ relation. If G.o.d can not _voluntarily_ call a finite existence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is certainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit which subst.i.tutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know G.o.d out of all relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created universe, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A G.o.d without attributes, and out of all relations, is for us no G.o.d at all. G.o.d as a being of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as the unconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, as voluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this is the living and true G.o.d. The G.o.d of a false philosophy is not the true G.o.d; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and not realities.

2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned, viz., that "conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought," and that thought necessarily imposes conditions on its object.