Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 16

IS G.o.d COGNIZABLE BY REASON?

"The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but the confession of despair."--LIGHTFOOT.

At the outset of this inquiry we attempted a hasty grouping of the various parties and schools which are arrayed against the doctrine that G.o.d is cognizable by human reason, and in general terms we sought to indicate the ground they occupy.

Viewed from a philosophical stand-point, we found one party marshalled under the standard of Idealism; another of Materialism and, again, another of Natural Realism. Regarded in their theological aspects, some are positive Atheists; others, strange to say, are earnest Theists; whilst others occupy a position of mere Indifferentism. Yet, notwithstanding the remarkable diversity, and even antagonism of their philosophical and theological opinions, they are all agreed in denying to reason any valid cognition of G.o.d.

The survey of Natural Theism we have completed in the previous chapter will enable us still further to indicate the exact points against which their attacks are directed, and also to estimate the character and force of the weapons employed. With or without design, they are, each in their way, a.s.sailing one or other of the principles upon which we rest our demonstration of the being of G.o.d. As we proceed, we shall find that Mill and the Constructive Idealists are really engaged in undermining "the _principle of substance_;" their doctrine is a virtual denial of all objective realities answering to our subjective ideas of matter, mind, and G.o.d. The a.s.saults of Comte and the Materialists of his school are mainly directed against "_the principle of causality_" and "_the principle of intentionality_;" they would deny to man all knowledge of causes, efficient and final. The attacks of Hamilton and his school are directed against "the _principle of the unconditioned_," his philosophy of the conditioned is a plausible attempt to deprive man of all power to think the Infinite and Perfect, to conceive the Unconditioned and Ultimate Cause; whilst the Dogmatic Theologians are borrowing, and recklessly brandishing, the weapons of all these antagonists, and, in addition to all this, are endeavoring to show the insufficiency of "_the principle of unity_" and the weakness and invalidity of "the _moral principles_," which are regarded by us as relating man to a Moral Personality, and as indicating to him the existence of a righteous G.o.d, the ruler of the world. It is necessary, therefore, that we should concentrate our attention yet more specifically on these separate lines of attack, and attempt a minuter examination of the positions a.s.sumed by each, and of the arguments by which they are seeking, directly or indirectly, to invalidate the fundamental principles of Natural Theism.

(i.) _We commence with the Idealistic School_, of which John Stuart Mill must be regarded as the ablest living representative.

The doctrine of this school is that all our knowledge is necessarily confined to _mental_ phenomena; that is, "to _feelings_ or states of consciousness," and "the succession and co-existence, the likeness and unlikeness between these feelings or states of consciousness."[226] All our general notions, all our abstract ideas, are generated out of these feelings[227] by "_inseparable a.s.sociation_," which registers their inter-relations of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The results of this inseparable a.s.sociation const.i.tute at once the sum total and the absolute limit of all possible cognition.

[Footnote 226: J. S. Mill, "Logic," vol. i. p. 83 (English edition).]

[Footnote 227: In the language of Mill, every thing of which we are conscious is called "feeling." "Feeling, in the proper sense of the term, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought are the subordinate species."--"Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. -- 3.]

It is admitted by Mill that one _apparent_ element in this total result is the general conviction that our own existence is really distinct from the external world, and that the personal _ego_ has an essential ident.i.ty distinct from the fleeting phenomena of sensation. But this persuasion is treated by him as a mere illusion--a leap beyond the original datum for which we have no authority. Of a real substance or substratum called Mind, of a real substance or substratum called Matter, underlying the series of feelings--"the thread of consciousness"--we do know and can know nothing; and in affirming the existence of such substrata we are making a supposition we can not possibly verify. The ultimate datum of speculative philosophy is not "_I think_," but simply "_Thoughts or feelings are_." The belief in a permanent subject or substance, called matter, as the ground and plexus of physical phenomena, and of a permanent subject or substance, called mind, as the ground and plexus of mental phenomena, is not a primitive and original intuition ?f reason. It is simply through the action of the principle of a.s.sociation among the ultimate phenomena, called feelings, that this (erroneous) separation of the phenomena into two orders or aggregates--one called mind or self; the other matter, or not self--takes place; and without this curdling or a.s.sociating process no such notion or belief could have been generated. "The principle of substance," as an ultimate law of thought, is, therefore, to be regarded as a transcendental dream.

But now that the notion of _mind_ or _self_, and of _matter_ or not _self_, do exist as common convictions of our race, what is philosophy to make of them? After a great many qualifications and explanations, Mr.

Mill has, in his "Logic," summed up his doctrine of Constructive Idealism in the following words: "As body is the mysterious _something_ which excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious _something_ which feels and thinks."[228] But what is this "mysterious something?"

Is it a reality, an ent.i.ty, a subject; or is it a shadow, an illusion, a dream? In his "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," where it may be presumed, we have his maturest opinions, Mr. Mill, in still more abstract and idealistic phraseology, attempts an answer. Here he defines matter as "_a permanent possibility of sensation_,"[229] and mind as "_a permanent possibility of feeling_."[230] And "the belief in these permanent possibilities," he a.s.sures us, "includes all that is essential or characteristic in the belief in substance."[231] "If I am asked,"

says he, "whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm with confidence that this conception of matter includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical, and sometimes from theological theories. The reliance of mankind on the real existence of visible and tangible objects, means reliance on the reality and permanence of possibilities of visual and tactual sensations, when no sensations are actually experienced."[232]

"Sensations," however, let it be borne in mind, are but a subordinate species of the genus feeling.[233] They are "states of consciousness"--phenomena of mind, not of matter; and we are still within the impa.s.sable boundary of ideal phenomena; we have yet no cognition of an external world. The sole cosmical conception, for us, is still a succession of sensations, or states of consciousness. This is the one phenomenon which we can not transcend in knowledge, do what we will; all else is hypothesis and illusion. The _non-ego_, after all, then, may be but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the possible modifications of the _ego_.

[Footnote 228: "Logic," bk. i, ch. iii. -- 8.]

[Footnote 229: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 243.]

[Footnote 230: Ibid., vol. i. p. 253.]

[Footnote 231: Ibid., vol. i. p. 246.]

[Footnote 232: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 243, 244.]

[Footnote 233: "Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. -- 3.]

And now that matter, as a real existence, has disappeared under Mr.

Mill's a.n.a.lysis, what shall be said of mind or self? Is there any permanent subject or real ent.i.ty underlying the phenomena of feeling? In feeling, is there a personal self that feels, thinks, and wills? It would seem not. Mind, as well as matter, resolves itself into a "series of feelings," varying and fugitive from moment to moment, in a sea of possibilities of feeling. "My mind," says Mill, "is but a series of feelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, however supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness, which are not, though they might be, realized."[234]

[Footnote 234: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 254.]

The ultimate fact of the phenomenal world, then, in the philosophy of Mill, is neither matter nor mind, but feelings or states of consciousness a.s.sociated together by the relations, amongst themselves, of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The existence of self, except as "a series of feelings;" the existence of any thing other than self, except as a feigned unknown cause of sensation, is rigorously denied. Mr. Mill does not content himself with saying that we are ignorant of the _nature_ of matter and mind, but he a.s.serts we are ignorant of the _existence_ of matter and mind as real ent.i.ties.

The bearing of this doctrine of Idealism upon Theism and Theology will be instantly apparent to the reader. If I am necessarily ignorant of the existence of the external world, and of the personal _ego_, or real self, I must be equally ignorant of the existence of G.o.d. If one is a mere supposition, an illusion, so the other must be. Mr. Mill, however, is one of those courteous and affable writers who are always conscious, as it were, of the presence of their readers, and extremely careful not to shock their feelings or prejudices; besides, he has too much conscious self-respect to avow himself an atheist. As a speculative philosopher, he would rather regard Theism and Theology as "open questions," and he satisfies himself with saying, if you believe in the existence of G.o.d, or in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. "As a theory," he tells us that his doctrine leaves the evidence of the existence of G.o.d exactly as it was before. Supposing me to believe that the Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing G.o.d's existence to be _as real as my own_[235]. And as for evidence, the argument of Paley's 'Natural Theology,' or, for that matter, of his 'Evidences of Christianity,' would stand exactly as it does.

The design argument is drawn from the a.n.a.logies of human experience.

From the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings, it infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar, but superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings. _If_ it prove these, n.o.body but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves a mysterious _substratum_ for them.[236] The argument from design, it seems to us, however, would have no validity if there be no external world offering marks of design. If the external world is only a mode of feeling, a series of mental states, then our notion of the Divine Existence may be only "an a.s.sociation of feelings"--a mode of Self. And if we have no positive knowledge of a real self as existing, and G.o.d's existence is no more "real than our own," then the Divine existence stands on a very dubious and uncertain foundation. It can have no very secure hold upon the human mind, and certainly has no claim to be regarded as a fundamental and necessary belief. That it has a very precarious hold upon the mind of Mr. Mill, is evident from the following pa.s.sage in his article on "_Later Speculations of A. Comte_."[237] "We venture to think that a religion may exist without a belief in a G.o.d, and that a religion without a G.o.d may be, even to Christians, an instructive and profitable object of contemplation."

And now let us close Mr. Mill's book, and, introverting our mental gaze, interrogate _consciousness_, the verdict of which, even Mr. Mill a.s.sures us, is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal.[238]

[Footnote 235: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 254.]

[Footnote 236: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 259.]

[Footnote 237: Westminster Review, July, 1835 (American edition), p. 3.]

[Footnote 238: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 161.]

1. We have an ineradicable, and, as it would seem, an intuitive faith in the real existence of an external world distinct from our sensations, and also of a personal self, which we call "I," "myself," as distinct from "my sensations," and "my feelings." We find, also, that this is confessedly the common belief of mankind. There have been a few philosophers who have affected to treat this belief as a "mere prejudice," an "illusion;" but they have never been able, practically, so to regard and treat it. Their language, just as plainly as the language of the common people, betrays their instinctive faith in an outer world, and proves their utter inability to emanc.i.p.ate themselves from this "prejudice," if such it may please them to call it. In view of this acknowledged fact, we ask--Does the term "_permanent possibility of sensations_" exhaust all that is contained in this conception of an external world? This evening I _remember_ that at noonday I beheld the sun, and experienced a sensation of warmth whilst exposing myself to his rays; and I _expect_ that to-morrow, under the same conditions, I shall experience the same sensations. I now _remember_ that last evening I extinguished my light and attempted to leave my study, but, coming in contact with the closed door, experienced a sense of resistance to my muscular effort, by a solid and extended body exterior to myself; and I _expect_ that this evening, under the same circ.u.mstances, I shall experience the same sensations. Now, does a belief in "a permanent possibility of sensations" explain all these experiences? does it account for that immediate knowledge of an _external_ object which I had on looking at the sun, or that presentative knowledge of _resistance_ and _extension_, and of an extended, resisting _substance_, I had when in contact with the door of my study? Mr. Mill very confidently affirms that this belief includes all; and this phrase expresses all the meaning attached to extended "matter" and resisting "substance" by the common world.[239] We as confidently affirm that it does no such thing; and as "the common world" must be supposed to understand the language of consciousness as well as the philosopher, we are perfectly willing to leave the decision of that question to the common consciousness of our race. If all men do not believe in a permanent _reality_--a substance which is external to themselves, a substance which offers resistance to their muscular effort, and which produces in them the sensations of solidity, extension, resistance, etc.--they believe nothing and know nothing at all about the matter.

[Footnote 239: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i.

p. 243.]

Still less does the phrase "_a permanent possibility of feelings"_ exhaust all our conception of a personal self. Recurring to the experiences of yesterday, I _remember_ the feelings I experienced on beholding the sun, and also on pressing against the closed door, and I confidently _expect_ the recurrence, under the same circ.u.mstances, of the same feelings. Does the belief in "a permanent possibility of feelings" explain the act of memory by which I recall the past event, and the act of prevision by which I antic.i.p.ate the recurrence of the like experience in the future? Who or what is the "I" that remembers and the "I" that antic.i.p.ates? The "ego," the personal mind, is, according to Mill, a mere "series of feelings," or, more correctly, a flash of "_present_ feelings" on "a background of possibilities of present feelings."[240] If, then, there be no permanent substance or reality which is the subject of the present feeling, which receives and retains the impress of the past feeling, and which antic.i.p.ates the recurrence of like feelings in the future, how can the _past_ be recalled, how distinguished from the present? and how, without a knowledge of the past as distinguished from the present, can the _future_ be forecast? Mr.

Mill feels the pressure of this difficulty, and frankly acknowledges it.

He admits that, on the hypothesis that mind is simply "a series of feelings," the phenomena of memory and expectation are "inexplicable"

and "incomprehensible."[241] He is, therefore, under the necessity of completing his definition of mind by adding that it is a series of feelings which "_is aware of itself as a series_;" and, still further, of supplementing this definition by the conjecture that "_something which has ceased to exist, or is not yet in existence, can still, in a manner, be present_."[242] Now he who can understand how a series of feelings can flow on in time, and from moment to moment drop out of the present into non-existence, and yet be _present_ and _conscious of itself as a series_, may be accorded the honor of understanding Mr.

Mill's definition of mind or self, and may be permitted to rank himself as a distinguished disciple of the Idealist school; for ourselves, we acknowledge we are dest.i.tute of the capacity to do the one, and of all ambition to be the other. And he who can conceive how the _past_ feeling of yesterday and the _possible_ feeling of to-morrow can be in any manner _present_ to-day; or, in other words, how any thing which has ceased to exist, or which never had an existence, can _now_ exist, may be permitted to believe that a thing can be and not be at the same moment, that a part is greater than the whole, and that two and two make five; but we are not ashamed to confess our inability to believe a contradiction. To our understanding, "possibilities of feeling" are not actualities. They may or may not be realized, and until realized in consciousness, they have no real being. If there be no other background of mental phenomena save mere "possibilities of feeling," then present feelings are the only existences, the only reality, and a loss of immediate consciousness, as in narcosis and coma, is the loss of all personality, all self-hood, and of all real being.

[Footnote 240: "Exam. of Hamilton," vol. i. p. 260.]

[Footnote 241: Ibid, p. 262.]

[Footnote 242: Ibid.]

2. What, then, is the verdict of consciousness as to the existence of a permanent substance, an abiding existence which is the subject of all the varying phenomena? Of what are we really conscious when we say "I think," "I feel," "I will?" Are we simply conscious of thought, feeling, and volition, or of a self, a person, which thinks, feels, and wills?

The man who honestly and unreservedly accepts the testimony of consciousness in all its integrity must answer at once, _we have an immediate consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of a personal self as pa.s.sively or actively related to the phenomena_. We are conscious not merely of the act of volition, but of a self, a power, producing the volition. We are conscious not merely of feeling, but of a being who is the subject of the feeling. We are conscious not simply of thought, but of a real ent.i.ty that thinks. "It is clearly a flat contradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of myself, but only of my sensations or volitions. Who, then, is that _I_ that is conscious, and how can I be conscious of such states as _mine?_"[243]

[Footnote 243: Mansel, "Prolegomena Logica," p. 122, and note E, p.

281.]

The testimony of consciousness, then, is indubitable that we have a direct, immediate cognition of _self_--I know myself as a distinctly existing being. This permanent self, to which I refer the earlier and later stages of consciousness, the past as well as the present feeling, and which I know abides the same under all phenomenal changes, const.i.tutes my personal ident.i.ty. It is this abiding self which unites the past and the present, and, from the present stretches onward to the future. We know self immediately, as existing, as in active operation, and as having permanence--or, in other words, as a "_substance_." This one immediately presented substance, myself, may be regarded as furnishing a positive basis for that other notion of substance, which is representatively thought, as the subject of all sensible qualities.

3. We may now inquire what is the testimony of consciousness as to the existence of the extra-mental world? Are we conscious of perceiving external objects immediately and in themselves, or only mediately through some vicarious image or representative idea to which we fict.i.tiously ascribe an objective reality?

The answer of common sense is that we are immediately conscious, in perception, of an _ego_ and a _non-ego_ known together, and known in contrast to each other; we are conscious of a perceiving subject, and of an external reality, as the object perceived.[244] To state this doctrine of natural realism still more explicitly we add, that we are conscious of the immediate perception of certain essential attributes of matter objectively existing. Of these primary qualities, which are immediately perceived as real and objectively existing, we mention _extension_ in s.p.a.ce and _resistance_ to muscular effort, with which is indissolubly a.s.sociated the idea of _externality_. It is true that extension and resistance are only qualities, but it is equally true that they are qualities of something, and of something which is external to ourselves. Let any one attempt to conceive of extension without something which is extended, or of resistance apart from something which offers resistance, and he will be convinced that we can never know qualities without knowing substance, just as we can not know substance without knowing qualities. This, indeed, is admitted by Mr. Mill.[245]

And if this be admitted, it must certainly be absurd to speak of substance as something "unknown." Substance is known just as much as quality is known, no less and no more.

[Footnote 244: Hamilton, "Lectures," vol. 1. p. 288.]

[Footnote 245: "Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. -- 6.]