Charles the Bold Part 23

[Footnote 8: "_O proeclarum et memorabile facinus hujus regis Francorum_."]

[Footnote 9: Basin, _Histoire des regnes de Charles VII. et de Louis XI_., Quicherat ed., ii., 204. This also appears in _Excerpta ex Amelgardi. De gestis Ludovici XI_., cap. xxiii. Martene's _Amplissima Collectio,_ iv., 740 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 10: Quoted in Kirk, i., 606, note.]

[Footnote 11: Jean de Roye, _Chronique Scandaleuse_, ed. Mandrot, i., 220.]

[Footnote 12: Comines-Lenglet, iii., 83.]

[Footnote 13: Johannes de Los, _Chronicon_, p. 60. _Quia hora nendum venerat._ De Ram, "Troubles du pays de Liege."]

[Footnote 14: Commynes-Dupont, _Preuves_, iii., 242. Letter of Jehan de Mazilles to his sister.]

[Footnote 15: Hagenbach, later Governor of Alsace.]

[Footnote 16: _Conte aux escros_. This word strictly applies to the prisoners on a jailer's list--evidently used in jest.]

CHAPTER XIII

A NEW ACQUISITION

1469-1473

This successful expedition against Liege carried Charles of Burgundy to the very crest of his prosperity. His self-esteem was moreover gratified by the regard shown to him at home and abroad. A man who could force a royal neighbour into playing the pitiful role enacted by Louis XI. at Peronne was a.s.suredly a man to be respected if not loved.

And messages of admiration and respect couched in various terms were despatched from many quarters to the duke as soon as he was at Brussels to receive them.

Ghent had long since made apologies for the sorry reception accorded to their incoming Count of Flanders in 1467, but Charles had postponed the formal _amende_ until a convenient moment of leisure. January 15, 1469, was finally appointed for this ceremony and the occasion was utilised to show the duke's grandeur, the city's humiliation, to as many people as possible who might spread the report far and wide.

It was a Sunday. Out in the courtyard of the palace the snow was thick on the ground where a group of Ghent burghers cooled their heels for an hour and a half, awaiting a summons to the ducal presence. There, too, where every one could see those emblems of the artisans'

corporate strength, fluttered fifty-two banners unfurled before the deans of the Ghentish _metiers_.[1]

Within, the great hall of the palace showed a splendid setting for a brilliant a.s.sembly. The most famous Burgundian tapestries hung on the walls. Episodes from the careers of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of other notable ancients formed the background for the duke and his n.o.bles, knights of the Golden Fleece, in festal array. As spectators, too, there were all the envoys and amba.s.sadors then present in Brussels from "France, England, Hungary, Bohemia, Naples, Aragon, Sicily, Cyprus, Norway, Poland, Denmark, Russia, Livornia, Prussia, Austria, Milan, Lombardy, and other places."

Charles himself was installed grandly on a kind of throne, and to his feet Olivier de la Marche conducted the civic procession of penitents.

Before this pompous gathering, after a statement of the city's sin and sorrow, the precious charter called the Grand Privilege of Ghent was solemnly read aloud, and then cut up into little pieces with a pen-knife. Next followed a recitation of the penalties imposed upon, and accepted by, the citizens (closing of the gates, etc)., and then the paternal Count of Flanders, duly mollified, p.r.o.nounced the fault forgiven with the benediction, "By virtue of this submission and by keeping your promises and being good children, you shall enjoy our grace and we will be a good prince." "May our Saviour Jesus Christ confirm and preserve this peace to the end of this century," is the pious e.j.a.c.u.l.a.t.i.o.n with which the _Relation_ closes.

Among the witnesses of the above scene, when the independent citizens of Ghent meekly posed as the duke's children, were envoys from George Podiebrad, ex-king of Bohemia. Lately deposed by the pope, he was seeking some favourable ally who might help him to recover his realm.

He had conceived a plan for a coalition between Bohemia, Poland, Austria, and Hungary to present a solid rampart against the Turks, and strong enough to dictate to emperor and pope. He was ready for intrigue with any power and had approached Louis XI. and Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, before turning to Charles of Burgundy.[2]

Meantime, the Emperor Frederic tried to knit links with this same Matthias by suggesting that he might be the next emperor, a.s.suring him that he could count on the support of the electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Saxony. He himself was world-weary and was anxious to exchange his imperial cares for the repose of the Church could he only find a safe guardian for his son, Maximilian, and a desirable successor for himself. Would not Matthias consider the two offices?

Potent arguments like these induced Matthias not only to turn his back on Podiebrad, but to accept that deposed monarch's crown which the Bohemian n.o.bles offered him May 3, 1469. Then he proceeded to ally himself with Frederic, elector palatine, and with the elector of Bavaria. This was the moment when the ex-king of Bohemia made renewed offers of friendly alliance to Charles of Burgundy. In his name the Sire de Stein brought the draft of a treaty of amity to Charles which contained the provision that Podiebrad should support the election of Charles as King of the Romans, in consideration of the sum of two hundred thousand florins (Rhenish).[2]

This modest sum was to secure not only Podiebrad's own vote but his "influence" with the Archbishop of Mayence, the Elector of Saxony and the Margrave of Brandenburg.[4] While Podiebrad thus dangled the ultimate hopes of the imperial crown before the duke's eyes, he over-estimated his credulity. As a matter of fact the royal exile had no "influence" at all with the first named elector, and the last, too, showed no disposition whatsoever to serve his unstable policy. Both were content to advise Emperor Frederic. The sole result of the empty overtures was to increase Charles's own sense of importance.

Another negotiation which sought him unasked had, however, a material influence on the course of events, and must be touched on in some detail. Sigismund of Austria--first duke then archduke,--Count of Tyrol, cousin of the Emperor Frederic, was a member of the House of Habsburg. In 1449, he had married Eleanor of Scotland, and became brother-in-law of Louis during the term of the dauphin's first marriage. An indolent, extravagant prince, he was greatly dominated by his courtiers. His heritage as Count of Tyrol included certain territories lying far from his capital, Innsbruck. Certain portions of Upper Alsace, lands on both sides of the Rhine, Thurgau, Argau in Switzerland, Breisgau, and some other seigniories in the Black Forest were under his sway.

These particular domains were so remote from Innsbruck that the authority of the hereditary overlord had long been eluded. The n.o.bles pillaged the land near their castles very much at their own sweet will. The hara.s.sed burghers appealed to the Alsatian Decapole,[5] and again to the free Swiss cantons for protection, and sometimes obtained more than they wanted.

Mulhouse was seriously affected by these lawless depredations. To her, Berne promised aid in a twenty-five years' alliance signed in 1466, and at Berne's insistance the cowardly n.o.bles restrained their license. But when the city attempted to extend its authority Sigismund interfered. Having no army, however, he could not recover Waldshut, which the Swiss claimed a right to annex, except by offering ten thousand florins for the town's ransom. Poor in cash as he was in men, he had, however, no means to pay this ransom and begged aid in every direction. Moreover, he feared further aggressions from the cantons, which were growing more daring. What man in Europe was better able to teach them a lesson than Charles, the destroyer of Liege, the stern curber of undue liberty in Flanders? Was he not the very person to tame insolent Swiss cowherds?

In the course of the year 1468, Sigismund made known to Charles his desire for a bargain, intimating that in case of the duke's refusal, he would carry his wares to Louis XI. At that moment, Charles was busied with Liege and showed no interest in Sigismund's proposition.

The latter tried to see Louis XI. personally in accordance with his imperial cousin's advice that an interview might be more effective than a letter.

It did not prove a propitious time, however; Louis was deeply engaged with Burgundy and he was not disposed to take any steps that might estrange the Swiss--and any espousal of Sigismund's interests might alienate them. He did not even permit an opening to be made, but stopped Sigismund's approach to him by a message that he would not for a moment entertain a suggestion inimical to those dear friends of his in the cantons--a sentiment that quickly found its way to Switzerland.

Thus stayed in his effort to win Louis's ear, Sigismund decided that he would make another essay towards a Burgundian alliance, this time face to face with the duke. On to Flanders he journeyed and found Charles in the midst of the ostentatious magnificence already described. Ordinary affairs of life were conducted with a splendour hardly attained by the emperor in the most pompous functions of his court. Sigismund was absolutely dazzled by the evidence of easy prosperity. The fact that a maiden was the duke's sole heiress led the Austrian to conceive the not unnatural idea that this attractive Burgundian wealth might be turned into the impoverished imperial coffers by a marriage between Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian, the emperor's son.

[Ill.u.s.tration: MARY OF BURGUNDY FROM CONTEMPORANEOUS MINIATURE REPRODUCED IN BARANTE, "LES DUCS DE BOURGOGNE"]

The visitor not only thought of this possibility, but he immediately broached it to Charles. The bait was swallowed. As to the main proposition which Sigismund had come expressly to make, that, too, was not rejected. The duke perceived that the transfer of the Rhenish lands to his jurisdiction might militate to his advantage. A pa.s.sage would be opened towards the south for his troops without the need of demanding permission from any reluctant neighbour. The risk of trouble with the Swiss did not affect him when weighing the advantages of Sigismund's proffer, a proffer which he finally decided to accept.

Probably he found his guest a pleasant party to a bargain, for not only did he broach the tempting alliance between Mary and Maximilian, but he, too, seems to have hinted that the t.i.tle of "King of the Romans" might be added to the long list of appellations already signed by Charles.[6] As Sigismund was richer in kin, if not in coin, than the feeble Podiebrad, Charles gave serious heed to the suggestion which fell incidentally from his guest's lips, in the course of the long conversations held at Bruges.

Certain precautions were taken to protect Charles from being dragged into Swiss complications against his will, and then in May, 1469, the treaty of St. Omer was signed,[7] wherein the Duke of Burgundy accorded his protection to Sigismund of Austria and received from him all his seigniorial rights within certain specified territories.

The most important part of this cession comprised Upper Alsace and the county of Ferrette, but there were also many other fragments of territory and rights of seigniory involved, besides lordship over various Rhenish cities, such as Rheinfelden, Saeckingen, Lauffenburg, Waldshut and Brisac. This last named town commanded the route eastward, as Waldshut that to the southeast, and Thann the highway through the Vosges region.

Fifty thousand florins was the price for the property and the claims transferred from Sigismund to Charles. Ten thousand were to be paid at once, in order to ransom Waldshut from the Swiss. The remainder was due on September 24th. On his part, Sigismund specifically recognised the duke's right to redeem all domains nominally his but mortgaged for the time being, certain estates or seignorial rights having been thus alienated for 150 years.

This territorial transfer was not a sale. It was a mortgage, but a mortgage with possession to the mortgagee and further restricted by the provision that there could be no redemption unless the mortgager could repay at Besancon the whole loan plus all the outlay made by the mortgagee up to that date. Instalment payments were expressly ruled out. The entire sum intact was made obligatory. Therefore the danger of speedy redemption did not disquiet Charles. He knew the man he had to deal with. Sigismund's lack of foresight and his prodigality were notorious. There was faint chance that he could ever command the amount in question. Accordingly, Charles was fairly justified in counting the mortgaged territory as annexed to Burgundy in perpetuity.

Sigismund pocketed his florins eagerly. Nothing could have been more welcome to him. But this relief from the pressure of his pecuniary embarra.s.sment did not inspire him with love for the man who held his lost lands. His sentiments towards Charles were very similar to those of an heir towards a usurer who has helped him in a temporary strait by mulcting him of his natural rights.

As for the emperor, when this transfer of territory was an accomplished fact, he began to take fright at the consequences. He did not like this intrusion of a powerful French peer into the imperial circle.[8] At the same time he was ready to make him share responsibility in any further difficulties that might arise between Sigismund and the Swiss.

The least skilful of prophets could have foreseen difficulties for Charles on his own account, both foreign and domestic. His own relations with the Swiss had always been friendly enough, but he had never before been so near a neighbour, while, within the Rhine lands, it was an open question whether the bartered inhabitants were to enjoy or regret their new tie with Burgundy. The importance of their sentiments was a matter of as supreme indifference to Charles as was danger from the Confederation. Neither conciliation nor diplomacy was in his thoughts. He had no conception of the intricacies of the situation. He counted the landgraviate as definitely his by the treaty of St. Omer as Brabant by heritage or Liege by conquest.

The need of a kindly policy towards the little valley towns--a policy that might have won their allegiance--never occurred to him. They were his property and Peter von Hagenbach was, in course of time, made lieutenant-governor in his behalf.

Apart from all personal considerations of enmity and amity of natives and neighbours, the territory of Upper Alsace and the county of Ferrette, delivered from needy Austria to rich Burgundy, like a coat p.a.w.ned by a poor student, was held under very complex and singular conditions.[9] The status of the bargain between Sigismund and Charles was in point of fact something between p.a.w.n and sale, according to the point of view. Sigismund fully intended to redeem it, while Charles did not admit that possibility as remotely contingent. Nor was that the only peculiarity. The itemised list of the ceded territories as given in the treaty was far from telling the facts of the possessions pa.s.sing to Sigismund's proxy.

In the first place the Austrian seigniories were not compact. They were scattered here and there in the midst of lands ruled by others, as the Bishop of Strasburg, the Abbe of St. Blaise in the Black Forest, the count Palatine, the citizens of Basel and of Mulhouse, and others.

The existent variety in the extent and nature of Austrian t.i.tle was extraordinary. Nearly every possible combination of dismembered prerogative and actual tenure had resulted from the long series of ducal compositions. In some localities a toll or a quit-rent was the sole cession, and again a toll or a prerogative was almost the only residue remaining to the ostensible overlord, while all his former property or transferable birthright privileges were lodged in various hands on divers tenures. There were cases in which the mortgagee--n.o.ble, burgher, or munic.i.p.al corporation--had taken the exact place of the Austrian duke and in so doing had become the va.s.sal of his debtor, stripped of all vested interest but his sovereignty.

For in these bargains wherein elements of the Roman contract and feudal customs were curiously blended, two cla.s.ses of rights had been invariably reserved by the ducal mortgagers:

(1) Monopolies, regal in nature, such as a.s.sured free circulation on the highways, the old Roman roads, all jurisdiction of pa.s.sports and travellers' protection.

(2) The suzerainty. This comprised the power to confer fiefs, of requisition of military service, of requesting _aids_ and admission to strongholds, cities, or castles, _le droit de forteresse jurable et rendable_.

In these regards the compact between Charles and Sigismund differed from all previous covenants not only in degree, but in kind. The Duke of Burgundy entered into the _sovereign_ as well as into the mangled, maimed, and curtailed proprietary rights of the hereditary over-lord.

In his a.s.sumption of this involved and doubtful property, Charles laid heavy responsibilities on his shoulders. The actual price of fifty thousand gold florins paid to Sigismund was a mere fraction of the pecuniary obligations incurred, while the weight of care was difficult to gauge. He succeeded to princes weak, frivolous, prodigal, whose misrule had long been a curse to the land. The incursions of the Swiss, the repeated descents of the Rhine n.o.bles from their crag-lodged strongholds to pillage and destroy, terrified merchants and plunged peaceful labourers into misery.