Cavalry in Future Wars Part 6

Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the protection of a retreat.[3] In the pursuit the main object is to keep the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until complete exhaustion sets in. But for the ma.s.s of the Cavalry the idea of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry, even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by any rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.

[Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' -- 376.]

The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken, and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders further effort on their part impossible.

On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the ultimate intention of antic.i.p.ating him at some point on the line of his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in a sheerly desperate position.

Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of their powers of endurance.

It is evident that in such situations the princ.i.p.al role falls to the firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and recommence the engagement. In case of antic.i.p.ating an enemy at a defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find employment.

What can be achieved in this direction is best ill.u.s.trated by Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the capitulation of Clover Hill.

The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, and his fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be of greater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless, indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanent dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.

Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery of the victor.

In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention from our beaten main body.

Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.

In such circ.u.mstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.

The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible means of circ.u.mventing points of resistance. This conception, which restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits, seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show how rarely such a circ.u.mvention can hope to succeed. But even where neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining tactical results.

Again, these attempts at circ.u.mvention lead easily to a loss of direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision, and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.

The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride round and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice before the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason of the local conditions, and partly because of the consideration which has to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and the position of the following columns.

The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This a.s.sumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.

Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be insisted upon that the a.s.sailant's Artillery will have to act under the increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latter will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in the past. The actual a.s.sault remains necessary now, as ever, to bring about the final decision.

Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry out the most important of their inc.u.mbent duties.

Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its opportunities and its full justification.

In this direction the hors.e.m.e.n of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles (Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding, rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).

The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too unfavourable to the a.s.sailants.

Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved incontrovertibly that the double role of Cavalry on foot and on horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular result.[4]

[Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._, endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.]

Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa, largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be transferred to European circ.u.mstance without important modifications.

But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army, and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of a set purpose for such opportunities?

It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rear of--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.

In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger ma.s.ses of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that in the magnitude of the ma.s.ses themselves there lies the germ of weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very favourable opportunities.

It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough musketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that their education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, in peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.

But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which render it materially superior to the Infantry.

I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized, cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.

Let us look at this question a little more closely.

A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service, and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers, generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to the active list.

Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength, is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.

It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us, shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations, I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its sense of superiority.

Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously increased.

We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of the enemy's Infantry the role of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end, unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit of the Arm, to lay princ.i.p.al stress upon the offensive, even when fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special circ.u.mstances.

Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to a.s.sume that Cavalry on foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any special advantages offered by local circ.u.mstances.

The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive, and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to exceptionally favourable circ.u.mstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit, then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.

If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turn well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.

Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry 'Ma.s.ses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.

CHAPTER V

THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS

Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'etre_ of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field, the actual collision of Cavalry 'Ma.s.ses' remains the predominant factor.

The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree than with any other Arm, for with the hors.e.m.e.n the personal impression conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the ma.s.s as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying, kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, which communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supports him.

On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing momentum to its final decision.

Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct disposition and execution at the head of a great body of hors.e.m.e.n.

Several factors unite to explain this circ.u.mstance. In the first place, only the shortest moment of time is available for consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the melee. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the Leader of a Cavalry 'Ma.s.s' to take in with accuracy the strength and dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence of information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general consideration of the circ.u.mstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the action lie in his intact reserves.

For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to Headquarters for further instructions.

It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will only be a.s.sured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in motion is technically finished down to the last detail.