Cavalry in Future Wars Part 15

Now, the Cavalry Ma.s.ses move under different conditions to the rest of the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former, being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these columns is comparatively unimportant.

Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Ma.s.ses to the rest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour to shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division is two and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerably immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should be able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number of waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness and mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot, and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of view be admitted.

The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be practical for Cavalry ma.s.ses to fill up their supply columns direct from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second echelons of waggons will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.

For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose well enough.

No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or how mobile, circ.u.mstances will still arise during periods of great concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency horse ration, which within a small compa.s.s contains great nourishment.

Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times the nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice to keep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. These demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck at Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished as consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be made independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of the greatest importance.

The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the units under all circ.u.mstances which can be reasonably foreseen.

In this direction much has been done, and materials for the destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the latter in the course of rapid movements--_i.e._, just in the most important sphere of our activities--seem to me highly problematical, as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid and safe pa.s.sage of Cavalry Ma.s.ses with all their attendant trains over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were united into one bridging train.

Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided; as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in close connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back upon the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it would therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and their bridging equipment thus augmented.

More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the matter of the pioneer detachments to be a.s.signed to the Cavalry Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses, which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the Great such bridging equipment was often a.s.signed to the Cavalry marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over similar obstacles.

Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line; our present allowance is altogether insufficient.

The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall have to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expend very considerable quant.i.ties of ammunition to attain the object we fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficult in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operations partaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications are likely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all a considerable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man's person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggons attached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment of these require also corresponding development.

Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted, the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of all races of born hors.e.m.e.n. A practicable method of attachment is certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences, however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only the carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequately sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off an engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at all, at greater distances at field practice.

I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail, on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual a.s.sistance in ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.

Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to secure the carbine on the back.

It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycle detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,[19] and I think I am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt (Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this direction to rob the hors.e.m.e.n of their confidence in themselves by teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement--_i.e._, when the enemy is still at a considerable distance--they promise little results, and in the moments when the 'Ma.s.ses' are sent forward to the attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in the battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on the flanks or rear of the enemy's chief ma.s.ses, they might prove invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all form suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the striking power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very materially.

[Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be 'transportable' (?'folding').]

By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied; only--and this is of the greatest importance--more adequate steps to insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent Cavalry Ma.s.ses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very own.

The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another requirement--namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of two regiments one battery of four pieces should be a.s.signed. Many will be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be required, and in most of these it is more a question of having _some_ Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire power--_i.e._, a few sh.e.l.ls into a village at the right time may be all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need may first arise.

Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if necessary, to a.s.sign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time not to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape from control.[20]

[Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.]

Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when such is required is fully retained.

The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.[21]

[Footnote 21: King William I. had already suggested the formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869--in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of 1868--already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.]

This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply, then it will find in these--at least in part--compensation for its numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds in raising its training to a corresponding height.

It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new methods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up.

But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry is still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There has been no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fields wherein the developments and demands of modern times have brought about a complete disturbance of all military relations.

That a method of training which does not take into account the phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to find. In its training our Cavalry _must_ excel all others if it would maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition wherever it hinders our advance.

If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is thus an unconditional necessity.

Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry against Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tactical units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a complete revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tend evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept in mind in our training.

Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now, when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end--that end being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre, screen, or break the enemy's communications--this change in the conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.

Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations, and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.

To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent 'Ma.s.ses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to the smallest reconnoitring patrol.

In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War.

It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission both with regard to time and s.p.a.ce, attain higher results with the individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere of the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizon of general military conditions.

In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters, and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials, and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to strike out new ways to find our objective.

CHAPTER II

RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING

When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'--_i.e._, the breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men.

Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.

Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry, maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then 'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing methods.

On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the short time available for their education, can only be well and quickly taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And, further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation improves the endurance of the horse--on that point at least experience leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point by no means to be neglected.

The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems to me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain from our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reached more directly and better than is at present the case.

In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole education--that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.

More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with arms (_i.e._, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be encouraged by every conceivable means.

To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming the preliminary steps of the man's education--_i.e._, the elementary training of man and horse--more rapidly than has. .h.i.therto been the case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will soon be clear where to apply the lever.

First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year than has. .h.i.therto been generally the case. By the increased demands and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the new Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent, considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what manner to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for the practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for each stage in the training.

But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would, therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary concession increased demands on the degree of training.

Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of waiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a common practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the commencement of their second year's training.[22] One can well go on with riding on the bit at the point where the course was interrupted by the manoeuvres.