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On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.
It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and antic.i.p.ate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring against their hors.e.m.e.n.
If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the tactical intentions of their Leader.
The best position for Artillery must always be behind some sheltering roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak, escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on the inner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in this position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers the movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in covering a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action can only then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i.e._, with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves, and the strategic pursuit sets in.
The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of 'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few moments.
The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable ma.s.ses moving at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed, the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through which the opposing Cavalry must pa.s.s, and on which there is still time to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.
But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.
In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible to a.s.sign a decisive importance to the partic.i.p.ation of a few Horse Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless, one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillery power as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as to the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that he possesses a marked numerical superiority.
The chief role of the Artillery must always remain the support of dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle, protected by their own hors.e.m.e.n, to strike against the enemy's flank and rear, sh.e.l.l his columns on the march, to drive him out of weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circ.u.mstances, such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost possible damage.
In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their action.
CHAPTER VII
STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY
The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping and employment of the available forces.
Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front, side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road, whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.
Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures to trespa.s.s on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that 'in Reconnaissance the ma.s.s of the Division must be kept together until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'
I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be all solved by the same formulae.
The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also exercise their influence on our decision.
To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher considerations may prevent the ma.s.sing of the Cavalry on a single road or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which in their execution mutually exclude one another.
Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with these many variable demands.
As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer time the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, or execute any similar operation depending on the reports of the Cavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.
As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands concentration.
It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circ.u.mstances may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will involve.
If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front, which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's self to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and such support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in vehicles) can afford.
When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in time at the threatened point.
Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of strategical change of direction.
A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of 'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on 'Reconnaissance'--for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or defiles, have to be surmounted.
In such cases, especially when resistance is to be antic.i.p.ated, it will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under such circ.u.mstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence rolling up his resistance all along the line.
Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front desirable--_i.e._, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example, the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18, 1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's Army was marching to the north-eastward or not.
Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either reinforced or relieved.
Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for 'security' only, to keep one's princ.i.p.al force in groups or ma.s.ses, possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller reconnoitring patrols.
Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained, whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete concentration is a.s.sured in all cases, and only to divide them to the degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.
Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails.
The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is not inconsiderable.
If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a ma.s.s from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if attempted in a single column.
Hence every principle has its limitations, and circ.u.mstances will always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for 'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is precisely on the defensive that it may be of advantage to deal a blow with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic offensive, dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats eccentrically; or if it is necessary to occupy districts of considerable size to break down the resistance of the hostile population, or to interrupt railway communication over a considerable area.
Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country, on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law governs all cases--namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends on the endurance of one's troops. The princ.i.p.al difficulty in the way of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the separate detachments.
If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon them by other circ.u.mstances, and hence one has always to deal with quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very first instructions for the advance of the several columns, according to time and s.p.a.ce, from which no deviation is to be permitted without sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation of orders and intelligence in such a manner that it will work with certainty. These two precautions supplement one another. If one can calculate approximately where the several detachments are to be found at a given time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and will reach their destination without delay.
It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any news they may have obtained about the enemy.
Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it is equally important that the several groups should know what is happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and in combination with the whole.
This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as to the nature of the general situation.
We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the despatch of orders to individual Commanders without at the same time informing their comrades of the bearing of such instructions.
Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy, because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.
However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies have time and opportunity to reach the field.
Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent columns can unite, as one cannot a.s.sign to them any definite point of concentration where the distance between the columns is at all considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.
Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go beyond any one of these until fairly a.s.sured that one can reach the next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.
If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication enough to these to hasten their pace.
The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the advance or the rear guard in order to break down rapidly any minor resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short opportunities as may arise for the utilization of their full power.