Belgium Part 14

One of the reasons of Joseph II's failure to reform Belgian inst.i.tutions was that his monarchical power rested mainly on the n.o.bility, the clergy and the peasants, who were bound to resent the sacrifice of their privileges and traditions. The French Republic and its outcome, the Napoleonic regime, were more successful, not because they displayed more diplomacy and moderation, but because, in spite of their excesses and autocratic procedure, they really brought a new idea into the country and based their power on a new conception of society.

The bourgeois elements of the Vonckist school and the population of the great towns had by now been permeated with the spirit of the Revolution. They had adopted the principle of the Rights of Man and of equal citizenship, and, for the sake of such ideals, they were prepared to make some allowances. The first years of the French regime were nevertheless a bitter disappointment.

[_JEMAPPES_]

By the declaration of Pillnitz (1791), Leopold II, brother of the French queen, had laid the basis of the first coalition and manifested his intention of intervening in favour of Louis XVI. After his death (1792) Francis II pursued a still more aggressive policy towards the Revolution, and the Girondins, who had just come into power, obliged the King of France to declare war against Austria. The first attacks against Belgium were easily repulsed by the imperial troops, commanded by national leaders, but the victory of Jemappes (November 6th), won by Dumouriez with the help of a Belgian legion, opened the Belgian provinces to the revolutionary troops. General Dumouriez was a moderate and intended to remain faithful to the principles of liberty. He issued a proclamation, approved by the Convention, declaring that his soldiers were coming as allies and as brothers. When, on November 14th, he was offered the keys of Brussels by the magistrates, he refused them, saying: "Keep the keys yourselves and keep them carefully; let no foreigner rule you any more, for you are not made for such a fate."

Greatly impressed by the warm reception given him in Mons and Brussels by the Vonckists, he did not realize that the country was far from being unanimous. The French general declared the Scheldt open, in accordance with a decree of the Republic which had proclaimed the freedom of the river.

Ill.u.s.tration: BELGIUM UNDER FRENCH RULE.

While the Belgians hesitated to declare a Convention and to organize themselves according to the Republican regime, they began to feel the first effects of the occupation. The French army, in the region of Liege, lived only on requisitions. Cambon had presented to the Convention (December 1792) a decree suppressing all distinctions and privileges in the conquered territories, these being replaced by the sovereignty of the people. This sovereignty being without expression in Belgium, the provinces were practically administered by a number of Jacobin Commissaries, whose most important task was to confiscate the goods of the n.o.bles and of the clergy and to enforce the circulation of the revolutionary paper money (a.s.signats). These measures provoked a reaction in favour of Statism, and the conservatives obtained an overwhelming majority in the elections held in December. Meanwhile, England and the United Provinces, alarmed by the progress of the French in the Netherlands, had joined the first coalition (January 1793), and the Jacobins, dominating the Convention, had entered upon an annexationist policy, nothing short of the left bank of the Rhine being able, according to them, to secure France against the attacks of the reaction. In order to appease the scruples of the French moderates, the Jacobins endeavoured to provoke manifestations in favour of annexation in the Belgian provinces. A regular propaganda was organized by the Clubs. Orators, wearing the scarlet hood and armed with pikes, addressed the crowds in the market-places. The deputy Chepy, who had taken the leadership of the movement, declared that he was determined to obtain reunion by "the power of reason, the touching insinuations of philanthropy and by all means of revolutionary tactics." On many occasions crowds driven into a church were surrounded by armed "Sans Culottes" and obliged to manifest their attachment to the Republic by loud acclamations. In March 1793 a rising was imminent, ten thousand armed peasants being already concentrated near Grammont. It was prevented, at the last moment, by the return of Dumouriez, who ordered Chepy to be arrested, liberated hostages and enforced the rest.i.tution of the spoils taken from churches and castles. In a letter to the Convention, he protested against the mad policy pursued by the Jacobin Commissaries, and adjured them to read through the story of the Netherlands, where they would find that the good will of the Belgian people could never be obtained by force.

[_NEERWINDEN_]

Defeated at Neerwinden (March 1793), Dumouriez was obliged to retreat, and on April 28th the Austrians re-entered Brussels. The restoration was favourably greeted by the people, especially as Francis II adhered faithfully to the old privileges, abstaining from levying recruits, after the refusal of the States of Brabant, and personally taking the oath of the Joyous Entry (April 1794). This was the last time that this ancient ceremony was performed.

A few days later, Pichegru started a great offensive movement in Flanders, and on June 26th, the victory of Fleurus again placed the Belgian provinces in French hands. While Jourdan pursued the imperialists towards the Rhine, taking Maestricht on his way, Pichegru continued the campaign in Holland. Zeeland Flanders had already been conquered by Moreau, and the treaty of The Hague (May 1795) restored to the Belgian provinces most of the districts lost by the treaty of Munster, nearly a century and a half before. France obtained Zeeland Flanders with the left bank of the Scheldt, and, in Limburg, the key positions of Maestricht and Venloo. She obtained, besides, the right to place garrisons, in war-time, in Bois-le-Duc and other towns of North Brabant. Holland was promised compensation in Gelder.

[_REPUBLICAN RULE_]

While the internal policy of the Republic was veiled in so much ideology and marred by tyrannous cupidity, its foreign policy was based on sound realism. The French plenipotentiaries, like Joseph II, but far more clearly, perceived that the possession of the key positions on the Scheldt and on the Meuse was essential to the security of the country and to its commercial prosperity. A comparison between the clauses of the treaty of The Hague and of the treaty of Munster is particularly enlightening. Apparently, the demands of the French were moderate; in fact, they entirely reversed the situation created in the seventeenth century. No wholesale annexations would have given the French equivalent advantages. The choice of the Republic was dictated by sound strategic principles and determined by the same motives as had guided the Dutch in 1648.

But the Belgian people, suffering from all the evils of foreign occupation, could derive but scant satisfaction from the restoration of the lost districts. The Convention was waging war on the world and bleeding Belgium white in order to find the necessary resources. The provinces were obliged to pay a contribution of 80,000,000 francs, amounting to six times the previous yearly budget. Hostages were taken from the towns which could not contribute their share. Requisitions of all raw material were systematically organized. Cambon boasted to the Convention that the Netherlands not only provided for the upkeep of the Republican armies, but also enriched the national treasury. Under the management of the "Agence de Commerce et d'Extraction de la Belgique,"

the treasuries of churches, convents, corporations and munic.i.p.alities were carted away, together with pictures, works of art and industrial machines. The Republican agents, nicknamed the "French sponges," even went as far as plundering private property. At the same time, the value of the a.s.signats had fallen to a ridiculously low level, and in order to check the corresponding rise in prices the authorities had fixed a "maximum" and obliged the traders to keep their shops open.

All Dumouriez's promises had been long forgotten and no account whatever was taken now of the wishes of the population. Old charters were destroyed and people were obliged to plant "trees of liberty" in the market-places. The names of the streets were altered, the use of the Republican calendar enforced and the "decadi" (observance of the tenth day) subst.i.tuted for Sunday. Religious festivals were replaced by feasts in honour of "Nature" or "Mankind," and most of the churches were closed or transformed into barracks, storehouses or temples devoted to the worship of the "Supreme Being." Finally, in 1795, a proposal was made to the Committee of Public Safety to annex the territory of the Austrian Netherlands. In spite of a few protests, the proposal was adopted, on October 1, 1795, and the country divided into nine departments--Lys, Escaut, Deux Nethes, Meuse Inferieure, Dyle, Ourthe, Jemappes, Sambre et Meuse and Forets.

The regime of the Directoire was equally hateful to the Belgians, who derived scant benefit from their annexation. The Flemish language was proscribed from official doc.u.ments, all public manifestations of Catholic worship were forbidden, and the estates of religious communities confiscated. After the coup d'etat of the eighteenth Fructidor, the Directoire exacted from every priest an oath of hatred against monarchy. Most of the Belgian priests having refused to take this oath, deportations and persecutions followed. Many churches were destroyed, among them St. Lambert, the cathedral of Liege.

By the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), Francis II submitted to the annexation of the Austrian Netherlands, but Great Britain refused to give up the fight, faithful to her traditional policy, which could not admit the presence of the French on the Belgian coast, which was all the more threatening now that they held the left bank of the Scheldt.

The next year the second coalition was formed, and the Directoire applied to the Belgian departments the new law of conscription.

Up to that moment, with the exception of the rising avoided by Dumouriez, the Belgians had not attempted to rebel. Exhausted by the Brabanconne revolution, divided among themselves, they had merely shown a pa.s.sive resistance to Republican propaganda and to the efforts made by their masters to induce them to take part in rationalistic worship.

This last measure, however, provoked a rising among the peasantry. Many young men, liable to conscription, preferred to die fighting for their liberty than for the French. The movement was quite desperate. It could expect no help from outside, neither could it be supported by the n.o.bles, who had fled the country, or by the high clergy, who were now powerless. The peasants were a.s.sembled in the villages, at the sound of the tocsin, wearing their working clothes and often armed only with clubs or forks. They raided small towns and villages, cut down the trees of liberty, destroyed the registers on which the conscription lists were based and molested those who were suspected of French sympathies. The rising, begun in the Pays de Waes, spread to Brabant, and especially to the Campine. The repression, entrusted to General Jardon, was merciless. Most of the leaders were shot and their followers dispersed after heavy losses.

[_NAPOLEON_]

The rule of Napoleon restored peace to the Low Countries. The emperor carried the war far from the Belgian frontiers. The United Provinces had become a va.s.sal kingdom, under the sceptre of Napoleon's brother Louis (1806), and, with the exception of a British landing on the island of Walcheren which miscarried (1809), the Belgian provinces were spared military operations up to the eve of the fall of the imperial regime.

In spite of the aversion caused by incessant conscription levies and by the strict censorship which stifled intellectual life, the Belgians benefited largely from the stern rule of the emperor, who re-established discipline and succeeded in subst.i.tuting many Belgian notables for the French officials who had, up to then, governed the country. Prefects were placed at the head of the departments, which were divided into arrondiss.e.m.e.nts and munic.i.p.alities, each of these divisions possessing its own councils and its own courts: justices of the peace, courts of the first instance, courts of a.s.size with a jury, above which were installed Courts of Appeal and a Court of Ca.s.sation.

A "general code of simple laws," still known as the Code Napoleon, was subst.i.tuted, in 1804, for the confused and intricate customs and laws preserved from the Middle Ages, and the fiscal methods were similarly transformed, inaugurating a system of direct and indirect taxes.

The Concordat, signed in 1801, re-established religious peace, Catholicism being recognized as the State religion. Churches were reopened and the observance of Sunday re-established.

Already, as First Consul, Napoleon devoted great attention to external trade. Ostend, which had been bombarded by the British in 1798, was restored, and after the peace of Amiens Antwerp enjoyed a few years of remarkable prosperity. In 1802, 969 ships entered the port; in 1803 the customs receipts rose to over 6,000,000 francs, in 1804 to over 8,000,000, and in 1805 to over 15,000,000. But the emperor's decree of November 21, 1806, establishing the Continental blockade, after the Battle of Trafalgar, converted Antwerp into a powerful naval base and a great centre of naval dockyards, without any benefit to the rest of the country. The activity of the nation was again confined to agriculture and industry. In this latter domain the period is marked by the introduction of spinning machinery by the Gantois Lievin Bauwens, who succeeded in obtaining models of the new British jennies. This was the origin of the prosperity of Ghent. While, in 1802, only 220 persons were employed in this industry, there were over 10,000 in 1810. Another innovation was brought about by a British engineer, William c.o.c.kerill, who, in 1799, initiated the use of new carding and spinning machines in Verviers. Many French cloth manufacturers were sent to the Walloon town by the French Government in order to study the new process.

[_WATERLOO_]

There are no periods of Belgian history where intellectual and artistic production reached such a low level as under the Napoleonic regime. How could it be otherwise at a time when official patronage directed every activity towards imperial worship? In France, such worship, stimulated by brilliant victories, might have inspired some sincere manifestations, but in Belgium, where the people submitted to the French regime only as to a necessary evil, military glory could not provoke any genuine enthusiasm. It was more than compensated for by conscription and arbitrary imprisonments. According to La Tour du Pain, prefect of the Dyle, the Belgians were "neither English, nor Austrian, nor anti-French--they were Belgian." In the way of administration and judicial organization, they learnt their lesson, but it was a distasteful lesson. They were too wise to disregard the benefit which they might derive from the simplification of procedure brought about by the reforms, and they remembered them at the right time, but they remained stubbornly hostile to a foreign domination which could not be supported by any dynastic loyalism, and most of them greeted with enthusiasm the arrival of the allied armies which penetrated into the country in January 1814, after the battle of Leipzig. This enthusiasm was considerably cooled by the time of Waterloo, when it was known that, in order to const.i.tute a powerful State on the northern frontiers of France and to reward William of Orange for his services to the allied cause, Belgium's destinies would henceforth be linked with those of the Northern provinces. This decision, already declared in the secret protocol of London, was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna.

From August 1, 1814, the Prince of Orange administered the Southern provinces on behalf of the Powers.

Ill.u.s.tration: UNITED KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS.

CHAPTER XXIV

BLACK, YELLOW AND RED

The Vienna settlement, creating the joint kingdom of the Netherlands, suited the Powers which made it. It suited England, since it placed the Belgian provinces, and especially Antwerp, out of the reach of France.

It suited Prussia, which acquired a strong foothold on the plateaux commanding the Meuse and the right to interfere in the affairs of Luxemburg. It suited Holland, whose position was considerably strengthened by the addition of rich and populous provinces. It suited Austria and Russia, since it created a strong buffer State acting as a bulwark against French annexionism in the North. It suited everybody but the Belgians themselves, who had never been consulted, in spite of their desire to be independent, made evident by the Brabanconne Revolution and their att.i.tude under the French regime. They had been disposed of as being without legitimate owner, and if the idea of granting them the right to rule themselves ever occurred to European diplomacy at the time, it was promptly dismissed, under the a.s.sumption that Belgian independence meant, sooner or later, reabsorption by France.

The project of reuniting Belgium and Holland affords an excellent example of a scheme plausible enough on paper, but which could not resist the test of reality. It not only seemed sound from the Powers'

selfish point of view, it ought to have worked for the common benefit of Belgians and Dutch alike. An end was made to the bitter struggle waged by Holland against the Southern provinces. The commerce of Antwerp ceased to threaten the Dutch ports, the Scheldt was open, the commercial blockade lifted at last, and Belgian trade able to regain its former importance after two centuries of stagnation. Belgium must benefit from the a.s.sociation with a strong maritime Power, possessing rich colonies and a limitless capacity for expansion. Holland's prosperity, on the other hand, must be largely increased through the agricultural and industrial resources of the Southern provinces. Even from a purely historical point of view the idea of reconst.i.tuting the Burgundian Netherlands must have appealed to those who had preserved the memory of their former grandeur. This was not a mere inert buffer State: it might become the strong central nation which European balance of power so urgently required, since the Renaissance, to relieve the tension of Franco-British or Franco-Prussian relations. Thus could be bridged the gap created, during two centuries, by the religious wars.

The old tradition of Philip the Good and Charles V was to be renewed, and the Netherlands to take once more their rank at the outposts of European civilization.

[_THE JOINT KINGDOM_]

And, indeed, under exceptionally favourable conditions, sound union, if not "complete and intimate fusion," could have been the outcome of this bold experiment. Had the Powers formally recognized Belgian nationality and provided for the respect of the country's inst.i.tutions under the new regime, the Belgians might have reconciled themselves to the idea of wiping away past grievances. The Dutch might have justified their att.i.tude under the plea that they had not been fighting Belgium, but Spain or France, and that their policy had been dictated by the necessity in which they had been placed of defending themselves against foreign invasion. William I might have conciliated public opinion in Belgium by respecting scrupulously the country's customs, which had survived Spanish and Austrian domination, by avoiding all undue interference in religious affairs, by protecting the rights of the French-speaking minority and by placing the Belgians exactly on the same footing as the Dutch. In fact, his policy aimed at achieving the complete and intimate a.s.similation advised at Vienna from the Dutch point of view and without any consideration for the natural feeling of a people whose traditions and religion were different from his own.

The new Const.i.tution was the Dutch Const.i.tution adopted in 1814, revised by a commission including an equal number of Belgian and Dutch delegates. It provided for equal toleration for all creeds and a two Chamber Parliament where an equal number of deputies from both countries would sit. (This in spite of the fact that Belgium had 50 per cent. more inhabitants than Holland.) This Const.i.tution or "fundamental law," as it was called, was adopted by the Dutch, but rejected by the Belgian States General. Instead of amending the law, the king considered abstentions as favourable votes and ignored all opposition, so that the new Const.i.tution was pa.s.sed, in spite of a strong adverse majority. This singular procedure was called, at the time, "Dutch arithmetic."

In several aspects, the policy of William I resembled that pursued thirty years before by Joseph II. It had the same qualities and the same defects. Though taking into consideration the material interests of the people, he ignored their character and traditions and the psychological problems with which he was confronted. Faced with opposition, he attempted to override all resistance by a.s.serting his sovereign will, with little consideration for the democratic spirit which pervaded Western Europe at the time.

[_POLICY OF WILLIAM I_]

Like Joseph II, William I, very wisely, attached great importance to the economic revival of the country. The embargo once removed, Antwerp made surprising progress, its tonnage being increased twofold between 1818 and 1829. New ca.n.a.ls were built between Maestricht and Bois-le-Duc, Pommeroeul and Antoing, while through the creation of powerful banks, such as the "Societe generale pour favoriser l'Industrie nationale," Belgian manufacturers received adequate credits. The king supported, also, the creation of several factories, such as the "Phoenix" at Ghent and "c.o.c.kerill" at Seraing. It was during his reign that Belgian collieries began considerably to increase their production and that the first blast furnaces were erected near Liege and Charleroi.

The Dutch king attempted also to develop national education. He placed the three Universities (Ghent, Louvain and Liege) under State control.

Many secondary and primary schools were founded all over the country and public instruction made considerable progress.

Such measures would have been beneficial to Belgium, but they needed a deep knowledge of and sympathy for local conditions to be carried out successfully. Neither the king nor his Dutch ministers (the Belgians remained always in a minority in the Cabinet) were able to realize the difficulties which stood in the way and the legitimate grievances which might easily be created by hasty action.

When Holland entered the union, she had a debt of nearly 2,000,000,000 florins, while Belgium's debt was much smaller (30,000,000). The latter was, nevertheless, obliged to bear half of the total liabilities and the heavy taxes rendered necessary by the king's enterprising policy.

Besides, in the distribution of such taxes the interests of Belgium, still almost entirely agricultural, were sacrificed to those of commercial Holland. The latter stood for free trade, the former for protection. It is characteristic of the situation that the first sharp conflict between Belgian and Dutch deputies took place in 1821 over a bill imposing taxes on the grinding of corn and the slaughter of cattle. These immediate grievances overshadowed, in the minds of the Belgians, the encouragement given by the Government to Belgian trade and industry.

A similar disregard for existing conditions and long-established traditions brought about the failure of the measures taken by William I to promote education. Not content with creating new schools, he endeavoured to give the monopoly of public education to the State and to subject the existing private establishments (almost all led by priests) to official control. He further increased Catholic opposition by establishing a Philosophical College at Louvain, where all those intending to enter a seminary were obliged to study.

These examples show how premature was the idea of a "complete union"

between the two countries--an idea put forward, no doubt, owing to the necessity of creating a strong centralized State on the northern boundary of France. Had the Dutch Government possessed as much political wisdom as the Austrian Minister at the court of The Hague, they would have realized that the "kingdom of the Netherlands would never be consolidated as long as the const.i.tutional and administrative union was not replaced by a federal system."

The same solution might have avoided a great deal of discontent with regard to the language question. The difference of language between Northern and Southern Belgium had created no difficulty in the last centuries, owing to the fact that the country was nearly equally divided, and also that the Northern provinces were bilingual, French being used by the bourgeoisie and Flemish by the people. The union with Holland placed the French-speaking population in a minority. On the other hand, twenty years of French occupation had left their mark on the country, and the prestige of French letters had never been so brilliant. It seemed, therefore, urgent to display a great deal of tact in any reform dealing with the language question, in order not to encourage pro-French tendencies at the expense of Dutch sympathy. The idea of introducing Dutch as the official language in Flemish-speaking Belgium seemed wise enough, since it was the language understood by the great majority of the people, but there was no urgent demand for it, and it could have been realized progressively with the development of Flemish education. King William, nevertheless, decreed that no officials or civil servants should remain in office in Northern Belgium unless they spoke and wrote Dutch correctly. Since a great many of these officials belonged to the Flemish bourgeoisie and had only a very incomplete knowledge of the popular language, they were obliged to resign their posts and were supplanted by Dutchmen. So that a measure which might have been popular in Flanders, at another time and under different circ.u.mstances, was considered as a mere pretext for turning Belgian subjects out of office.

It must be made clear that this language question played a secondary part among the causes of discontent. It alienated the Flemish bourgeoisie without conciliating the working cla.s.ses, whose influence in politics, at the time, was very small. It scarcely affected the French-speaking population, since only few Walloon officials were concerned in the matter.

[_BELGIAN GRIEVANCES_]