Australasian Democracy Part 9

In the presence of great activity on the part of the State, it is interesting to note to what extent the working cla.s.ses have exerted themselves on their own behalf. Distributive co-operation has not become popular owing, partly, according to the _Australasian_,[3] "to the vicissitudes in trade which are inseparable from new countries, and to the temptations which are consequently held out to the workers from time to time to change their occupations and abodes. Partly, too, an explanation may be found in the efficacy of existing agencies for distribution. But we cannot help thinking that it is due also, in part, to the pernicious ideas which lead so many of our artisans to cry out against capital, and to seek the aid of the State, instead of trusting to their own efforts and determining to become capitalists themselves in a way which has been proved by the co-operative societies at home to be thoroughly practical." Though the _Australasian_ is strongly individualistic in its bias, it appears to be justified in its reference to a certain lack of initiative shown by Australasian workmen; they are inclined to look upon the State as a gold mine from which they can draw permanent dividends, especially as they are scarcely, if at all, affected directly by the periodical calls upon the {258} shareholders; but, in his strictures upon the att.i.tude of labour towards capital, the writer should have added that the wealthy cla.s.ses are at least as ready to misjudge every effort made by the Labour Representatives to pa.s.s remedial measures through the legislatures.

Proceeding to deal with the co-operation of producers, he says that "there is co-operation of this kind already in our b.u.t.ter and cheese factories, where the farmer who conveys his produce to the factory may also be a shareholder, and at the end of the half-year may receive a dividend on his shares and a bonus on the milk supplied, in addition to the established price. Co-operation of a like kind prevails, to some extent, though not so largely as might be desired, between the graziers and the companies for the export of Australian meat." These remarks, which refer primarily to Victoria, are generally true of Australasia.

But, while the working cla.s.ses look constantly to the State for a.s.sistance in various forms, they can be shown to have made considerable provision against the future. In spite of bad times, the number of depositors in Australasian Savings Banks rose from 742,000 in 1891 to 895,000 in 1895, and the total amount of deposits from 19 to 26 millions. Victoria and South Australia, which are followed closely by New Zealand, have the largest number of depositors in proportion to population, 29 and 24 per 100 respectively, and Queensland and New {259} South Wales the highest average amount of deposits.[4] In the three Provinces, therefore, in which the paternal action of the Government is carried to the furthest extent, we find the widest diffusion of an important exemplification of the spirit of thrift. I am far from suggesting a relation of cause and effect, as the amount of savings must depend largely upon the rate of wages, the abundance or scarcity of employment, the cost of living, and many other factors, and would merely point out that the policy in question does not appear to have deterred the working cla.s.ses from individual efforts.

As regards Friendly Societies, South Australia takes the lead with a membership exceeding one in ten of the population; Victoria comes next with one in fifteen, and is third in the average amount of funds per member. Under the latter head New Zealand occupied the first place with 18 8s. 2d., and is followed by Western Australia with 17 10s.

4d., but the latter amount is of no comparative importance owing to the very small number of subscribers.[5]

In 1895 the average amount of a.s.surance per head of the population in Australasia was 20, the average sum a.s.sured per policy 285, and the average number of policies per 1,000 of the population, 70. Compared with the United Kingdom, {260} Australasia has a considerable advantage in the first of these figures, has the proportion reversed in the second, but wins by more than two to one on the last, which is the most interesting as a further indication of the prevalence of the instinct of providence among Australasian workmen.[6] Prior to the recent crisis the working cla.s.ses had availed themselves largely of the opportunities which Building Societies offered to them to secure the freehold of their homes by payments spread over a term of years; but a run upon the deposits lodged in these inst.i.tutions, which set in towards the end of 1891, and continued during 1892, affected them disastrously, and the large majority of even the soundest of them were obliged eventually, owing to the heavy withdrawal of deposits, to close their doors. Though some have since been re-opened, upon terms agreed to between the shareholders and depositors, their business has collapsed for the time, the amount of advances in Victoria having fallen from over two millions in 1890 and in 1891 to less than a hundred thousand pounds in 1893.[7] In the apparent absence of statistics of the number of freeholders in several Provinces, no general idea can be formed of the extent to which the working cla.s.ses have, through Building Societies and otherwise, invested their savings in the acquisition of {261} freehold properties. The only figures that I have been able to obtain give the estimated number of owners as 30,600, 91,500, and 184,500 for New South Wales, New Zealand, and Victoria respectively. As far as the two latter Provinces are concerned, the total populations being only 699,000 and 1,174,000, it is absurd to suppose that the electors, a large proportion of whom are freeholders, will be captivated by the advocates of the Single Tax. It cannot too often be repeated that the Australasian Governments, all of which are, to a greater or lesser degree, aiming at the multiplication of small owners or perpetual lease-holders, are rendering it practically impossible that an agitation for the confiscation of land values should be successful, and are fostering the growth of that cla.s.s of settlers which is believed to be Conservative in the best sense of the word. But large estates, except in the case of certain kinds of pastoral land, are doomed to extinction, either in the natural course of events, owing to the costliness of labour, or from the pressure of heavy graduated taxation, the workmen of Australasia being thoroughly convinced of its justice as a means of raising revenue and of its efficacy as a means of causing land to be subdivided or placed upon the market. They have also, as has been seen, supported legislation which has authorised the re-purchase and subdivision of landed estates.

{262}

Lastly, they have realised since 1890 that, for the furtherance of their aspirations, the strength of their Unions should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the representation of Labour in Parliament.

The great strike of that year has been described so fully that it is unnecessary to say more than that a strong combination of labour, which had made itself master of the situation, was confronted upon the outbreak of hostilities by rapidly organised but powerful a.s.sociations of employers; that the struggle, which spread over the whole Continent and New Zealand, terminated in the success of the latter, and that the workmen realised that, even had they succeeded, the victory would have been won at too heavy a cost in the misery entailed upon themselves and their families. Many of them were dissatisfied with the generalship of their leaders during the strike, and realised that the exhaustion of their funds rendered them unable to engage again in a huge industrial struggle. In the following years low prices, the financial crisis, and the consequent scarcity of employment and fall in wages, further weakened the Unions and intensified the conviction that strikes should be superseded by the ballot-box. In some Provinces, also, it was felt that the rivalry of parties had degenerated into a contest between the ins and the outs, and that progressive measures would not be pa.s.sed until Labour had entered as a compact body into the arena.

I have discussed in the earlier chapters the {263} history and results of Labour representation in several of the Provinces, and have shown that the Labour Party has been successful in South Australia, where it has formed an alliance with the Government, though maintaining a separate organisation, and in New South Wales, where it has held the balance of power between the Protectionists and Free Traders, but has failed utterly in Queensland, where mainly through its own fault, but partly through the astuteness of its opponents, it has occupied a position of antagonism to all the vested interests of the community.

In Victoria the Labour Party acts usually with the Government, but seeks to obtain its objects by the exercise of its strength more than by friendly negotiations. In New Zealand no distinct Party was formed, but the working-men representatives threw in their lot with the Government and, by consistent support, helped to secure the imposition of graduated taxation and the enactment, among other measures, of a compulsory Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and of a large number of Industrial Statutes.

A great similarity of aims and aspirations can be traced between the different Labour Parties if we ignore side issues and exclude that of Queensland, which is affected by the taint of aggressive socialism.

Judging from the respective programmes and from conversations which I have had with many of the leaders, I find that, subject to certain exceptions {264} which I shall mention, they are united upon the following propositions:--

Manhood or adult suffrage, shorn of the plural vote, should be the basis of representation in the a.s.sembly. The Legislative Council should be abolished, as it prevents the wishes of the people from being carried into effect.

Direct taxation should consist of graduated death duties and graduated taxes on incomes and land values.

Parliament should secure to every worker for wages sanitary and safe conditions of employment, and immunity from excessive hours of labour.

Machinery should be provided by Parliament by which industrial disputes may be referred to an impartial tribunal.

The workers should protect themselves not only against foreign goods, but against undesirable immigrants, whether they be Orientals or indigent Europeans.

The consideration of these questions, and of the wider issues with which they are concerned, will cover most of the points of recent interest in Australasian politics.

(1) It is doubtful whether Responsible Government, in the sense of government by a Ministry which carries out a definite policy approved by the country, and, in return, receives allegiance from its {265} supporters in Parliament, has ever been acclimatised in Australasia except in New South Wales under the influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, when it was sought to transplant a delicate system, hallowed by conventions and dependent for its success upon the election of a special cla.s.s of representatives, among a community necessarily ruled by men who had little experience of public life? Australian Parliaments, save on the rare occasions when some important issue, such as that of the tariff, has come to the front, have not been divided on ordinary party lines, and have amused themselves with the excitement of a constant succession of new Ministries selected on personal and not on political considerations.

New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria, to take three Provinces at random, have had, respectively, 28, 42, and 26 Ministries in 40 years. The policy of the Opposition has often been almost identical with that of the Government. Again, coalitions between former opponents have been of frequent occurrence; the Ministries formed by Messrs. Deakin and Gillies in Victoria, and by Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, are recent instances of this tendency. In some rural const.i.tuencies, also, candidates appeal to the electorate on personal grounds and are not required to declare their adhesion to a party. I was struck, when present at the elections in South Australia and New Zealand, by the subsequent animated discussions in {266} the newspapers as to the probable effect of the changes in the personnel of the Members upon the prospects of the Government. This is the more noticeable from the fact that the freedom of action allowed to representatives has been curtailed since the return to Parliament of Labour Members, who are pledged to a definite programme and have put forward questions on which there is a distinct line of cleavage.

Proposals for the extension of the franchise, for the abolition of the plural vote, or for the imposition of a tax on incomes and land values, are such as divide the electorate into two camps and perpetuate the division in the House. This state of things, combined, perhaps, with the financial crisis which raised problems demanding continuity of administration for their solution, has contributed to the greater stability of Ministries. Another factor, which has given const.i.tuencies a greater hold on their representatives, and has tended thereby to make them adhere more closely to one or other of the parties, is the payment of Members, which has now been adopted in all the Lower Houses except that of Western Australia, and in the Upper Houses of South Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. Australia has been confronted with the difficulty experienced by every young country, that the men who should naturally enter Parliament are prevented by commercial or professional duties from devoting the necessary time, and that, in the absence of men of leisure, const.i.tuencies {267} are much hampered in their choice of candidates. The payment of Members, it is needless to say, offers no inducement to the successful merchant or lawyer, but has increased the compet.i.tion among men to whom the salary is an inducement. My inquiries as to its effect upon the tone of politicians have elicited mutually contradictory replies. On the one hand I am a.s.sured that the attractions of the salary have led men to resort to disreputable practices in order to be selected as candidates and to seek to retain the fickle affections of their const.i.tuents by similar means; on the other, that necessitous Members have been raised by the salary above temptations which their poverty made it difficult for them to resist; and such temptations must increase in number with each extension of the functions of the State unless it be dissociated from political influence. It is clear that a knowledge of the inner life of a Parliament could alone supply materials for the adequate discussion of this question, and that a similar consideration applies to the discussion of the effects of State socialism upon political morality. The possible abuses are many: railways may be constructed with a view to popularity; the rents of Crown tenants may be remitted, and borrowers may be allowed to fall in arrears with the interest on their advances; subsidies and bonuses voted by Parliament may be misapplied; and the unemployed may be conciliated by unnecessary public works. Personal corruption, I am confident, {268} does not exist, but that safeguards have been felt to be necessary is proved by the appointment of independent Railway Commissioners by New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand, and of Public Works Committees by Victoria and New South Wales. In the latter country, as has been seen, the Commissioners have been most successful, but New Zealand has reverted to the system of political control, and Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia have reduced the number of Commissioners from three to one. This change, which must have lessened the efficacy of non-political control, was advocated on grounds of economy at a time when all forms of expenditure were being cut down to the lowest point. In Victoria the Leongatha Labour Settlement has diminished the difficulties connected with the unemployed, and its administration has been studied by the other Provinces with a view to similar action. The general political tone is healthy, and is stimulated, in all the Provinces, by a high-cla.s.s press, which uses its great influence in a conscientious manner. But, as long as Treasurers can balance their accounts by recourse to loans, and are tempted, as is inevitable, to apply borrowed money to placatory enterprises, the dangers which are necessarily connected with State socialism are multiplied tenfold. They would be lessened if the objects for which loans might be contracted were defined, as has been suggested, by Act of Parliament, {269} or if Federation were to eventuate at an early date and the right to borrow were limited to the Federal Authority.

In New Zealand alone have I found direct evidence of the misuse of political patronage. Upon the third reading of the Appropriation Bill in 1896, Captain Russell, the Leader of the Opposition, made use of the following words: "I maintain that for years past the administration of the Government has been anything but good. They have hunted for popularity and they have hunted their enemies. They have hunted their enemies to a very great extent. You find positions which were capably filled by old and valued servants now filled by friends of the Government. We have a system of espionage in existence which is disgusting.... The Civil Servants should not depend on the favour and their popularity with Ministers for promotion, but rather on good honest service, and that is not the case now. Why, a Civil Servant dare not come and speak to an Opposition Member for fear of that fact being reported to the Ministers. (An Hon. Member: No!) It is all very well to say 'No,' but I am acquainted with dozens of Civil Servants in Wellington, and they will not come and speak to me in the street for fear of being reported."[8] In his reply the Premier made no attempt to meet these charges, which I have quoted because I have gathered corroborative {270} evidence in different parts of the country, though it is not such as admits of being adduced as definite proof, and because the Minister of Lands made an exceedingly candid admission shortly after the elections. In the course of a speech delivered at Geraldine he is reported by a Ministerial newspaper to have said: "They had endeavoured during their term of office to do what they could in the interests of the Colony as a whole, but they had been very badly treated by two cla.s.ses of the public at the elections. In the session of 1895, they would remember, the Government pa.s.sed a measure to give relief to pastoral Crown tenants who lost a large number of sheep in the snow. The Government did this in the interest of the people as a whole, as they thought, but how had they been treated by the people they helped in time of distress? (A voice: Very badly.) Yes, there might have been one or two exceptions, but generally speaking they fought tooth and nail against the Government. Then, again, the Government saved the Bank of New Zealand and the Colony from ruin, but still the old leaven of the Bank fought and voted against the Government at the elections. He considered this very unfair on their part, considering what the Government had done for them."[9] Sir Robert Stout, a former Premier of New Zealand, has also brought a grave indictment against the Government, from {271} which I quote the portion referring to appointments:--

"By the Statute Law of New Zealand, no one who has been a member of either House can be appointed to any position in the Civil Service until he has for twelve months ceased to be a member of Parliament. A vacancy occurred in the position of Sergeant-at-arms, and it was announced that an ex-member, who had at the elections retired in favour of a Ministerial candidate, had received the office. When Parliament met, the appointment gave rise to much discussion. Ultimately a large majority supported the Ministry in conferring the appointment temporarily, the official appointment to be made at the end of twelve months. If this had been the only flagrant violation of the law it might have been overlooked; but it is only a type of what has been done. The Civil Service Reform Act, 1886, provides that no one, save an expert, can be appointed to the Civil Service unless he enters as a cadet. Some departments, such as the railway, postal, and telegraph departments, are exempted from the provisions of the Act. The cadets must obtain their positions by compet.i.tion; the examination is annual.

The Ministry, however, appointed some cadets out of their order, and some who had never even submitted to an examination at all. There is a provision for "temporary" clerks. When vacancies arise in the service these are given to {272} temporary clerks. The policy of "spoils for the victors" has been openly defended. To carry out this pernicious system the law has been violated. It has been said that only those of the 'right colour' of political opinions should receive appointments in the Civil Service."[10]

However great may be one's sympathy with the efforts of the Government to encourage settlement and to promote industrial conciliation and arbitration, one cannot but rejoice at the increased strength of the Opposition, which will be sufficient to enforce greater purity of administration and the enactment of legislation which will prevent a recurrence of the evil.

The realisation of the dangers of an unmuzzled democracy has caused a widespread anxiety which has been displayed in vehement but, for the most part, unsuccessful opposition to proposed changes in the const.i.tution of the a.s.sembly. New Zealand and South Australia have adopted adult suffrage, coupled with the abolition of plural voting; Victoria and New South Wales manhood suffrage, a.s.sociated in the former case with the plural vote but not in the latter. In Victoria, the Conservatives, if I may so characterise the less-advanced party, have put forward a proposal which is unique in Australasia. They suggest that, while each man should continue to have a vote, the present plural votes should be replaced by a second vote which {273} should be possessed equally by all freeholders whatever be the size and number of their properties. They believe that they would thereby place the power in the hands of the more stable elements of the population, and that they are not unlikely to be supported by the freeholders, who const.i.tute nearly two-thirds of the electors on the rolls for the a.s.sembly.

At present the Labour parties are engaged in onslaughts upon the Legislative Councils with a view to their ultimate abolition, but are prepared to accept, as an instalment, any proposals which would cripple their power. They concurred heartily with the Bill introduced in 1896 by the Government of New South Wales and rejected by the Council after it had been pa.s.sed by large majorities through the a.s.sembly, which provided for the reference to a popular vote of matters in dispute between the two Houses. Similar measures are also advocated by the Governments of Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania; while in New Zealand, it is proposed that deadlocks shall be obviated by a joint session of both Houses, which shall sit as one Chamber. It may be that an Act of 1891 which, as will be seen, tends to popularise the Legislative Council in New Zealand will account for the less drastic character of the solution put forward in that Province. It is probable that it will become customary in Australasia to submit distinct issues to the electorate, on a separate ballot-paper, at the time of a general {274} election. The Government of South Australia ascertained in this manner the popular wishes in regard to religious instruction in State schools, and the payment to denominational schools of a capitation grant for secular results; and the recent "Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act" of New Zealand provides that Local Option polls shall be taken concurrently with the election of representatives. Under references similar to that in South Australia, it may be objected, Ministers may be supported on their general policy, but be required to introduce a measure to which they are opposed. Such a position, however, would not apparently be regarded as inconsistent, as most of the candidates in South Australia stated their willingness to give effect to the popular vote, in whatever direction it might be expressed. Disputes between the two Houses will, I believe, be decided similarly, on the score of the expense of a special poll, unless the issue be such as to demand an immediate settlement.

The first line of attack of the Labour Members is thus seen to be an agitation which aims at enabling the electorate of the a.s.sembly to override the Council; the second is directed at its Conservative tendencies. The policy pursued depends upon the const.i.tution of the Council: if it is elective, it should be so modified as to become a Chamber of paid representatives, subject to no property qualification and elected upon a wide franchise, such as the South Australian Council, in which a combination {275} of Ministerialists and Labour Members has been able to obtain a bare majority. If it is nominated, the life tenure should be superseded by nomination for a short term of years, which will enable successive Ministries to introduce a new leaven of persons who are in touch with popular feeling, and will be prevented, by the limit placed upon the duration of their appointments, from being subjected to reactionary influences. The Council, that is to say, is to become a mere machine for registering the wishes of the a.s.sembly. The only success which has. .h.i.therto attended this agitation is the enactment in 1891 of a measure in New Zealand which limited to seven years the duration of subsequent appointments; but the Government now desire to abolish the life tenure, and they are followed herein by New South Wales, by providing for the gradual retirement of all the members who hold their seats for life. They also propose, whether seriously or in order to cast ridicule upon the Council, that women shall be eligible for appointment to that body. In regard to the general position of the nominated Councils, which are not limited as to the number of their members, it may be stated that the Imperial Government decided, upon a case submitted to them from New Zealand, that the Governor should accept the recommendations of his const.i.tutional advisers in the matter of additional appointments.

Strangely enough, the Premier of Queensland, the only other Australasian Province that has a nominated Legislative {276} Council, though a strong const.i.tutionalist, aimed a blow at its prestige in a proposal, which he carried through the a.s.sembly but not through the Council, that the former House alone should be vested with the power of selecting the delegates to the pending Federal Convention.

Before leaving this portion of the subject, I must mention that other proposals affecting the form of Government of the Provinces have been discussed in Parliament and are likely to attract serious attention.

Theoretically, indeed, it has been a.s.serted, apart from the question of the power of the Upper Houses, and the point is of interest as showing the ideas germinating in the minds of Australasian politicians, that five changes are required in order that the Parliamentary machinery may be brought into proper relations with the people: the election of Ministers by the a.s.sembly; continuity of representation in the a.s.sembly, to be secured by the division of the country into const.i.tuencies returning two representatives who retire alternately at fixed periods; the Swiss form of Initiative and Referendum; and the right of a certain proportion of the members to convoke a special session of Parliament, and of an absolute majority of the electors in a const.i.tuency to require the resignation of their member. The first and second of these reforms, as I have shown, are included in the programme of the Ministry of South Australia, which, however, in spite of its success at the polls, has not pressed them forward {277} during the first session of the New Parliament. Continuity of representation could easily be arranged, as all the const.i.tuencies return two members.

An Elective Executive Bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives in New Zealand and received a large measure of support, though it was opposed by the Premier and the leader of the Opposition.

The idea has taken a strong hold upon the imagination of the Labour Members in all the Provinces.

It may be thought that I have laid stress upon a variety of fantastic theories, but the objection takes insufficient account of the facility with which changes can be effected in the absence of a strong force of traditional conservatism. I must admit, as a failing of Australasian politicians, that they are inclined to welcome innovations which are superficially attractive, without due consideration of the ulterior consequences. To quote an extreme case, the Government of New Zealand proposed, in a Single Bill, not only to abolish the life tenure of Members of the Legislative Council, but to provide machinery for the settlement of disputes between the two Houses and to establish a modified form of the Swiss Referendum. But I am confident that several of the proposals to which I have referred, notably that for an Elective Executive, meet with a large measure of support in the const.i.tuencies.

This movement has gathered strength from the disinclination of Ministries to resign except upon a {278} direct vote of want of confidence. Some of them look with equanimity upon the defeat of cardinal principles of important Bills, whether it be due to the strength of the Opposition or the defection of their own followers, and do not hesitate, if sufficient pressure be exercised, to withdraw them altogether. As the Ministry tends, therefore, to become a body which carries out the wishes of the whole House, and ceases to lead its own Party, the position would be simplified if the whole House elected the Executive for a fixed period. Another argument is found in the increasing desire of the a.s.sembly to shift its legislative duties to the shoulders of the Executive. Parliament decides the broad principles of measures and leaves the details to be filled in by Regulations made by the Department concerned under the supervision of the Minister and with the approval of the Executive Council.

(2) Graduated death duties are imposed in all the seven Provinces, though in Tasmania the tax levied on the largest properties does not exceed 3 per cent. Western Australia came into line with the other Provinces in 1895, when a Bill imposing graduation up to 10 per cent.

was pa.s.sed, almost without discussion, through both Houses of Parliament. The Premier admitted that it had not been rendered necessary by the condition of the finances, but contended that it should be placed upon the Statute Book while there were few rich men in the community who would resent it.

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Other forms of direct taxation are as follows: New Zealand, South Australia, and New South Wales have taxation on incomes and land values, the two former with, the latter without, graduation; Victoria has a graduated income tax and an ungraduated land tax on estates above a certain value; Tasmania, an ungraduated tax on incomes and the capital value of land; Queensland, an ungraduated income tax, which is only collected on dividends paid by public companies. The taxation in New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand, and South Australia has been promoted, if not inspired, by the Labour Movement in Parliament, and const.i.tutes its greatest triumph. In Victoria the taxation of land values was rejected by the Legislative Council.

A point of interest is the distinction made by Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia between incomes derived from property and those which are the result of personal exertion. It is thought to be equitable that the former should be taxed at a higher rate, and the principle is similar to that which dictates the taxation of land upon its unimproved value.

(3) I have referred very briefly in the present chapter to certain forms of industrial legislation; speaking generally, they are based upon English examples and do not call for any particular comment. The Labour Parties are keenly interested in these matters because it is simpler, apart from greater efficacy, that inspectors should protect their {280} interest under Acts of Parliament than that they should be compelled constantly to engage in negotiations with individual employers.

(4) As I have already pointed out, the consideration of Australasian problems must be accompanied by a recollection of the difference of conditions from those existing in Great Britain. Even in the latter country it is obvious that the intimate relations between employers and employed are being replaced, especially in the manufacturing centres, by a purely monetary bond; but they can never, except in individual cases, have had any existence in Australasia, where capitalists and workmen have approached each other and entered into agreements as strangers. Consequently the workmen, attached neither to people nor places, have been prepared to move as their varying interests have suggested and have formed few lasting ties with their employers. Many of the industries, indeed, have tended to accentuate this absence of cordial relations: in pastoralism, for instance, the small permanent staff is supplemented for a few weeks in the year by a large number of shearers and others, who sign a definite agreement with their employers, and, provided that the conditions are carried out, can have no interest either in them or in their properties. Incidentally, an a.s.sociation recently formed at Sydney which engages shearers and provides them with consecutive employment at different sheds, should not only be a financial success, but allay the {281} natural dissatisfaction of a body of men who, though they earn high wages, can depend upon neither regularity nor permanency in their work. I could show that similar conditions prevail in the sugar industry and, to some extent, in agriculture; but enough has been said to prove that the working cla.s.ses are differently situated from those in older countries and partially to explain their willingness to form themselves into Trades Unions and the combativeness of these organisations.

The great maritime strike, though it has been followed by the Broken Hill strikes of 1891 and 1892, the shearers' strikes of 1891 and 1894, and periodical hostilities at Newcastle, has modified largely the att.i.tude of the working cla.s.ses in regard to the efficacy of industrial warfare. The later struggles have princ.i.p.ally affected Queensland and New South Wales, which was the first of the Provinces to attempt to deal with the matter by Act of Parliament. A Board of Conciliation was established upon the recommendation of a Royal Commission, but is admitted to have been a failure in the absence of any compulsory reference of disputes. On the occasion of the most recent disturbances, at Newcastle in 1896, which originated upon an application of the miners for higher wages, the Premier, following English precedents, intervened, and was enabled to settle the dispute, though not until the strike had lasted for three months and had caused much of the foreign trade to be diverted to foreign ports. Actual {282} and prospective losses caused the owners, though they made a small concession at the request of the Premier, to refuse to reinstate the miners except at a slightly lower rate of wages than that against which they had struck. The offer, as modified by the Premier, was accepted by the miners, who had thus, at the cost of much misery, brought about a reduction in their wages. The disturbances of 1894 in Queensland, which reached an acute stage, were met by the Government by resolute administration under special powers obtained by Act of Parliament, but no attempt was made to intervene between the disputants or to make use of the Conciliation Act of 1892, which, as far as I know, has remained a dead letter. It is useless, therefore, to discuss the Act further than to say that its machinery can only be set in motion by a Local Authority, but it may not be unfair to attribute the unsympathetic att.i.tude of the Government to the bitterness engendered by the extravagances of the Labour Party.

In most of the Provinces neither the employers nor the workmen are prepared, as yet, to bind themselves to refer their disputes to an impartial tribunal and to abide by its decision. Though the tendency in that direction is on the increase, it has been suggested that, in the meanwhile, Boards should be const.i.tuted which would be empowered to consider disputes, and, after the examination of books and witnesses, to issue a public report. The judgment would not be enforceable, but might be expected, in {283} the majority of cases, to lead to a settlement of the difficulty; at any rate, it would influence public opinion, which is a large factor in all industrial struggles. But South Australia and New Zealand have pa.s.sed this stage, and have placed drastic measures on their Statute Book which provide, in certain cases, for compulsory awards. The compulsory provisions of the South Australian Act apply only to employers and workmen who are organised and have voluntarily accepted them by the process of registration.

Should they become involved in an industrial dispute, the Governor may, upon the recommendation of the President of the State Board of Conciliation, cause the matter to be referred to it, and the Board may make an award which will be binding upon the parties concerned. In New Zealand, on the other hand, while the proceedings must be initiated by employers or workmen who are registered, the other party, though unregistered, may be called upon, should the Board of Conciliation fail to effect a settlement, to attend before the Court of Arbitration and to obey its award, subject to the general proviso that an employer may suspend or discontinue any industry and an employe cease from working therein. In neither Province is a strike or lock-out permitted during the deliberations of the tribunal.

The Acts do not apply to unorganised workers, except indirectly, partly because they have not been the cause of the great industrial struggles of the past, {284} partly because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce awards against them. It may also have been thought that they would be encouraged thereby to form themselves into Unions, and that the best chance of industrial peace lies in negotiations between responsible bodies of workers and employers who will have too much at stake to be willing to proceed thoughtlessly to extremities. As regards registration, it has been found that the workers of South Australia, though their leaders had supported the compulsory provisions, have been backward in this direction; but that, in New Zealand, no such hesitation has been displayed. The workers in that country do not appear to share the disinclination to agree to the intervention of an arbitrator which is stated to be increasing in Great Britain.

In South Australia, to give a brief account of the new tribunals, Boards of Conciliation may be either Private Boards, const.i.tuted under industrial agreements and endowed with such jurisdiction as may be confided to them in the agreements; or Public Boards, which include Local Boards const.i.tuted for particular localities and particular industries, and the State Board of Conciliation. In New Zealand, the first reference is to an elective Board of Conciliation const.i.tuted for the district in which the dispute has occurred. Should it fail to effect a settlement, the matter may be referred to the Court of Arbitration, which, similarly with the State Board {285} of Conciliation in South Australia, consists of an equal number of representatives of employers and employed and a chairman nominated by the Government, who must, in the former country, be a judge of the Supreme Court. These tribunals are invested with full powers to require the attendance and examination of witnesses, and may either make an award which shall take effect for a period not exceeding two years, and may be enforced by legal process against a.s.sociations and individuals, or they may confine themselves, at their discretion, to a recommendation which will be merely a direction to the parties concerned.

In South Australia the State Board has also the power to inquire into, and report upon, industrial disputes, though the parties be not registered. This portion of the Act has alone been brought into operation, and that unsuccessfully, as, though the representatives of employers and employed on the Board arrived at a unanimous decision upon a dispute affecting the rate of wages, the employer in question refused to be guided by its judgment. The general failure of the Act, though the affirmation of the principle of Conciliation has been valuable, has been due partly to the absence of serious disputes in South Australia, but princ.i.p.ally to the unwillingness both of employers and employed to place themselves in a position in which they will lose control over the terms of employment.

The Act pa.s.sed by the Government of New {286} Zealand, on the contrary, has. .h.i.therto been entirely efficacious, and has prevented the interruption of harmonious relations between employers and employed.

It was first tested upon a dispute which arose over the action of the Consolidated Goldfields Company in reducing wages in the mines from 10s. to 8s. 4d. per day. The men, who were not members of a union, went out on strike, and were then offered wages at the rate of 9s.

Upon the advice of their leaders, the men accepted the offer provisionally; and, having formed themselves into a union which they promptly caused to be registered, referred the matter to the Board of Conciliation. The decision of the Board, which it is unnecessary to specify, was refused by the men, who appealed to the Court of Arbitration. The award of the latter body, which fixed the wages of miners at 9s. 6d. per day, a rate smaller than that which had been received by the men, but larger than that against which they had protested, has been observed loyally by the Company and its employes.

The next dispute arose at Christchurch upon the expiration of the agreement which had been in operation between the boot manufacturers and their workmen for several years, and upon the desire of the former to subst.i.tute new terms which were regarded as distasteful. It was concerned with several matters of detail, but hinged princ.i.p.ally upon the question whether non-unionists should be allowed to work with unionists. As in the {287} former case, an appeal was made from the Board of Conciliation's award to the Court of Arbitration, whose decision, it is noteworthy, both sides had signified their willingness to accept. The award applied to all the bootmakers in the Province with the exception of three or four who were not identified with the boot manufacturers' a.s.sociation, and was accompanied by remarks p.r.o.nounced, it must be remembered, by a judge of the Supreme Court, which cannot fail to be of interest to the Trades Unionists in all parts of the world. I do not, therefore, apologise for quoting them at length:--

"The Arbitration Court has not hitherto been in the habit of giving reasons for its decision. It appears to the Court that, sitting as arbitrators, it should as a general rule follow the ordinary practice of arbitrators and simply give its decision without reasons. In the present case, however, so far as I myself am concerned, I think it is desirable that I should, with respect to part of the award, give some indications of the reasons which have induced the Court to arrive at its conclusion. The part of the award to which I refer is that which relates to clauses 1 and 2 of the general rules which the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation has submitted to the Court: '1. (_a_) It is the individual right of the employer to decide whom he shall employ or dismiss. (_b_) It is the individual right of the workman to accept or refuse work from any employer. {288} 2. Employers or employes, either individually or through any organisation, shall not discriminate for or against any person because he is or is not a member of any organisation, neither shall there be any distinction between organised or non-organised labour; both shall work under the same conditions and receive equal pay for equal work.' The Bootmakers' Union, in opposition to the rules so suggested, put forward the contention that employment should be limited to members of the Bootmakers' Union. The Court, however, is not able to accept the extreme view which has been put forward by the Bootmakers' Union. If it were accepted it might follow that an employer, who had work to do and who could not get Union men to do it, might have to bring his operations to a standstill. The effect of it also would be that non-Union men would be absolutely prevented from earning their living in the workshops of the members of the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation. That, so far as I am concerned, seems to be going beyond what the Court ought to decree. On the other hand, however, I am not prepared to accept absolutely clauses 1 and 2 in the form in which the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation has put them forward. The Court ought, I think, to comply with the intention of the Legislature as evidenced in the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and ought not to do anything which is calculated to destroy or weaken any industrial organisation. The {289} intention of the Act is indicated in its t.i.tle--the Act is an Act to encourage the formation of Industrial Unions and a.s.sociations. The Court, therefore, ought not to do anything which will tend to destroy or weaken an industrial a.s.sociation, or interfere with the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed by the Act. We have this also, that for the last three years the shops of the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation have been practically working as Union shops. It is true that manufacturers say--probably with truth--that they were so worked because they could not help it, but the fact remains that they have been working in that way, and the proposed new rules, as put forward by the manufacturers, expressly reverse the previous mode of working. We have this also, that the previous statement was a statement agreed to between the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation and the Bootmakers' Union, the conference which followed the statement was between the a.s.sociation and the Union, and the dispute now before the Court is between the a.s.sociation and the Union. It is only by means of Unions that labour can take advantage of the Act. Under these circ.u.mstances, it seems to me not unreasonable that the Union should stipulate for special privileges to its members.

The Union are fighting the battle, and it is fair that they should say that the results of the victory, so far as it is a victory, and has any beneficial results, should accrue to them, at any rate in the first instance. They fight {290} the battle for their members, and not for the sake of outside labour. Under these circ.u.mstances it appears to me that it is quite reasonable that the members of the Union should have preference in employment; that members of the Union who are competent should not have to wait about while non-members of the Union are employed in the shops of the Boot Manufacturers' a.s.sociation. The Court, therefore, has modified Rules 1 and 2 in this direction. I need hardly say that each case to be decided under this Act must depend on the particular circ.u.mstances attaching to it; that no one case can be treated as a precedent to any future case, and that because under the particular circ.u.mstances of a particular case, this Court has decided as it has decided, that is no reason why, under different or varying circ.u.mstances, a similar decision ought to be come to. The Court in coming to its decision, takes into consideration not general principles so much as the special circ.u.mstances of each particular case."

The award, which modified the regulations on the lines laid down by the Court, is regarded as a great triumph by Trade Unionists, who are, not unnaturally, inclined to apply it as a precedent to all organised trades.

A possible exemplification of the efficacy of the Act occurred at the end of 1896, when the engineers employed in the Australian trade of the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand asked that {291} their wages might be raised to the rate which had prevailed before the financial troubles. They took advantage of the increased traffic caused by the holidays in order to emphasise their demands. The engineers of the ships plying in New Zealand waters made a similar request, which was at once acceded to by the Company, but did not attempt to exert undue pressure. I am not prepared to state that the difference in att.i.tude was due to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of the latter country, but the coincidence is calculated to encourage that belief. The Managing Director of the Company (Mr. James Mills) told me that he was a hearty supporter of compulsion, not so much because he believed in arbitration, as because a strike or lock-out was obviated, and the parties to a dispute, often trivial at the outset, were brought together before they had been embittered by mutual recriminations. Mr.

Kingston, the Premier of South Australia, and the princ.i.p.al promoter of the South Australian Act, has written in a similar strain:--

"Conciliation Boards should be established in antic.i.p.ation of the differences they are designed to prevent. On the occasion of a great strike, the public cries out for conciliation. Suggestions are received from all quarters recommending Conferences and Arbitration; but when war has been declared, and the disputants, as it were, are at each other's throats, each hopeful of ultimate success, they are seldom in the mood to listen to peacemakers. If either party fears the result of the {292} contest, it may favour pacific counsels. There is, however, a vehement probability that the stronger party will reject all overtures and insist on an unconditional surrender and all the advantages which victory can command. The dispute is then determined, not on its merits, but by sheer strength. The vanquished, smarting under a sense of defeat and injustice, capitulate only with the view to the early renewal of the struggle under more favourable circ.u.mstances."[11]