Australasian Democracy Part 7

(A similar provision applies to the subsequent referendum.)

"When the Const.i.tution has been framed by the Convention, copies thereof shall be supplied to the Members of the Convention, and the President shall declare the sitting of the Convention adjourned to a time and place to be fixed by the Convention, not being less than sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days thereafter. And as soon as convenient the draft const.i.tution shall be submitted for consideration to each House of Parliament sitting in Committee of the whole, and such amendments as may be desired by the Legislature, {232} together with the draft Const.i.tution, shall be remitted to the Convention through the Senior Representative.

"On the rea.s.sembling of the Convention the Const.i.tution as framed prior to the adjournment shall be reconsidered, together with such suggested amendments as shall have been forwarded by the various Legislatures, and the Const.i.tution so framed shall be finally adopted with any amendments that may be agreed to."

"So soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the Convention the question of the acceptance or rejection of the Const.i.tution shall be referred and submitted to the vote of all persons in Victoria qualified and ent.i.tled to vote for the election of Members of the Legislative a.s.sembly."

"The majority of votes shall decide the question, and if the Const.i.tution be thereby rejected, no further action shall be taken pursuant to this Act: Provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than fifty thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill.

"If two Colonies in addition to Victoria accept the Const.i.tution the Legislative Council and the Legislative a.s.sembly of Victoria may adopt a Joint Address to the Queen praying that the Const.i.tution may be pa.s.sed into law by the Imperial Parliament upon receipt from the Parliaments of such two Colonies, either of similar joint or separate Addresses from each House of such Parliaments."

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It will be noticed that the Convention will have entire freedom in regard to any amendments suggested by the Provincial Parliaments, and that if the Const.i.tution be accepted, the Victorian Parliament will not be bound to join in submitting it for Imperial enactment. It is a.s.sumed that it will bow to the popular p.r.o.nouncement unless the Government should have some grave reason for recommending a contrary course. A difficulty, not provided against in the Act, might arise if the Const.i.tution were to be amended during its pa.s.sage through the Imperial Parliament.

The Act pa.s.sed by Western Australia provided for the election of the delegates by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as one Chamber, the area of selection being limited to candidates nominated by not less than twenty persons who are qualified to vote at elections for Members of the a.s.sembly. "The draft Const.i.tution, as finally adopted by the Convention, if approved by Parliament, shall be submitted for the decision of the electors of Western Australia by their vote; and if a majority of the electors voting on such question signify their approval of such Const.i.tution, the same may be adopted by the Colony, provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than six thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Const.i.tution." "The adoption of the Const.i.tution by Western Australia may be signified by the pa.s.sing of an Act or by a joint resolution of both Houses of {234} Parliament, and both Houses may thereupon adopt Addresses to the Queen, praying that the Const.i.tution may be pa.s.sed into law by the Imperial Parliament, subject to the adoption of similar Addresses by at least two other Colonies, of which New South Wales shall be one." Parliament thus retains the initiative in each successive phase of the movement, but will have no power to alter the Bill when it finally leaves the Convention. If the provisions are regarded as unacceptable, it will be able to decline to submit the Bill to the electorate. The Western Australian measure was based in its general language upon that previously introduced in Queensland, but differed from it in several important particulars. In the latter case it was proposed that the election of the delegates should be vested in the members of the a.s.sembly alone, that, of the ten delegates, five should be chosen by the Southern, three by the Northern, and two by the Central Parliamentary Representatives, a provision inserted in view of the somewhat divergent interests of different portions of the Province, and that the draft Const.i.tution should be submitted for the consideration of the electors in such manner as Parliament might prescribe. The Bill was pa.s.sed by the a.s.sembly, in spite of a widespread feeling that Queensland should have followed the course of the other Provinces, and was amended by the Council, which regarded itself as unjustifiably ignored, and provided that it should have an equal {235} share with the a.s.sembly in the appointment of the delegates to the Convention. It is unnecessary to consider the arguments by which the Premier supported his proposal of indirect election, or those put forward by the two Houses during the deadlock which followed upon their disagreement.

Finally, when each House had insisted several times upon its att.i.tude, the Bill was laid aside by the Council. As a result of this action the new movement was blocked at its first step, which was regarded with little anxiety even by those who appreciated the difficulties which were likely to attend the later stages. Great disappointment was felt in Australia, and efforts were made, though in vain, to induce Sir Hugh Nelson to reintroduce the Bill in some form that would be acceptable to both Houses. At the same time public opinion demanded that the Convention should be held, even though one of the Provinces would be unrepresented.

The benefits which would follow Federation are so obvious as scarcely to require enumeration. The Federal Government would be able to deal adequately with the problem of National Defence and to speak authoritatively, to the manifest satisfaction of the Imperial Authorities, upon such matters as the contribution of Australia towards the expenses of the Imperial squadron maintained upon its coast; the consolidation of the debts would, it has been estimated, enable a million pounds to be saved upon the annual bill of interest; Interprovincial {236} Free Trade would promote intercourse between neighbours who have hitherto been estranged by arbitrary lines of demarcation; and in the words of the Chief Justice of Queensland,[4]

"The first effect in point of importance, though some time may elapse before the effect is fully felt, will be the creation of an Australian Nation, forming a distinct const.i.tuent part of the British Empire, having one mind, speaking with one voice instead of the six, often discordant and sometimes inarticulate, voices now heard, consulted on all matters of Imperial concern, and exercising a powerful influence in the political affairs of the whole world." Such would appear to be the destiny of Australia, which has, however, doubtless been benefited by the independent development of its component parts. In the absence of distinctions of race and language, in the general diffusion of the Roman Catholics among the Protestants, and the steady determination to exclude coloured races, the early establishment of Federal relations would have produced among Australians a monotonous uniformity of characteristics, which has to some extent been prevented by the divergent political tendencies of the several Provinces.

But, to put the practical question, what are the prospects of Federation? The general impression is not one of hopefulness: it is pointed out that the {237} Provinces have so long maintained an independent existence that they are unlikely to submit to a curtailment of their powers except under the imperative impulse of the fear of foreign invasion; that all but the leading politicians realise that they would be affected prejudicially by a change which would dwarf the Legislatures with which they are connected; that many, especially during the period of depression, dread the creation of a new taxing and governing body; and that the Labour members, in the natural belief that their influence would be smaller in a Federal Parliament, are either apathetic or actively hostile. The economic aspects of Intercolonial Free Trade, in reference to its probable effect upon the prosperity of manufacturers and producers in the different Provinces, also form an important factor in the situation. Time alone can show whether popular partic.i.p.ation in the successive stages of the movement, though it will not be universal, will generate an enthusiasm sufficient to outweigh the opposing forces and weld Australia into a strong and united Nation.

APPENDIX TO IX.

THE NEW FEDERAL SCHEME.[5]

Now that the Adelaide Convention has completed its labours, it is possible to give a connected view of the provisions of the draft Const.i.tution Bill, as it will be submitted to the local {238} Parliament, and then after it has been again dealt with by a second meeting of the Convention at Sydney, to the vote of the people.

The Bill provides for the const.i.tution of the Commonwealth of Australia and for the appointment of a governor-general by the Queen, at a salary of 10,000. The Federal Parliament is to consist of two Houses--the Senate and the House of Representatives. The former chamber will be composed of six members for each state. They are to be elected by the electors of the Legislative a.s.sembly in each colony for a term of six years, and one-half will retire every three years. For the election of these senators each colony will be regarded as one electorate, and no one will be allowed to vote at more than one polling-booth on the day of election. In other words, the election will be conducted on the same lines as the recent election of representatives to the Federation Convention. At the first meeting of the Senate, the members elected for each state will be divided by lot into two cla.s.ses, and the seats of those in the first cla.s.s are to be vacated at the end of the third year, but the others will continue to be members of that House for the full term of six years. In this way one-half the members of the Senate will be elected by the people every third year.

The House of Representatives is to be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the several states, and the number which each colony will return will depend on its population. This Chamber is, as nearly as practicable, to contain double the number of members of the Senate. The House of Representatives would therefore consist, at the outset, of about seventy-two members, which would give as nearly as possible, one member for every 50,000 of the population. Victoria would, roughly speaking, have about twenty-two members. In order, however, to protect the interests of the smaller states in this House, it is provided that Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia, shall be ent.i.tled to at least five members each, although on the population basis, the island colony might not be able to claim more than four members. Until the Federal Parliament otherwise provides, each local or state Parliament can determine into how many electoral divisions the colony should be divided for the purpose of returning members to the House of Representatives, but should it not divide the state into {239} electoral districts, then each colony is to be regarded as one electorate, in the same way as in the case of the election of senators.

The duration of every House of Representatives will be three years, unless it is sooner dissolved by the Governor-General. There is no power, however, conferred on the Governor-General to dissolve the Senate. The qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives is in each state to be that for electors of the more numerous House--or Legislative a.s.sembly--of the state. The members of both Houses are to receive an allowance of 400 each per annum for their services.

The following are the subjects the Commonwealth Parliament is to be empowered to legislate upon and deal with:--

1. The regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and among the several states.

2. Customs and excise and bounties.

3. Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation.

4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the commonwealth.

5. Postal and telegraphic services.

6. The military and naval defence of the commonwealth and the several states, and the calling out of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the commonwealth.

7. Munitions of war.

8. Navigation and shipping.

9. Ocean beacons and buoys and ocean lighthouses and lightships.

10. Astronomical and meteorological observations.

11. Quarantine.

12. Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits.

13. Census and statistics.

14. Currency, coinage, and legal tender.

15. Banking, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money.

16. Insurance, excluding state insurance not extending beyond the limits of the state concerned.

17. Weights and measures.

18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes.

19. Bankruptcy and insolvency.

20. Copyrights and patents of inventions, designs, and trade marks.

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21. Naturalisation and aliens.

22. Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations, formed in any state or part of the commonwealth.

23. Marriage and divorce.

24. Parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

25. The service and execution throughout the commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and judgments of the courts of the states.

26. The recognition throughout the commonwealth of the laws, the public acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the states.

27. Immigration and emigration.

28. The influx of criminals.

29. External affairs and treaties.