Annals of a Fortress Part 25

In applying these principles to the defence of the town of La Roche-Pont, whose strategical position is one of major importance, since it connects Besancon with Dijon, and forms a salient on the flanks of an army which manoeuvres from Epinal and from Vesoul upon Langres and Chaumont, it would be necessary to construct around this place, whose old fortifications are no longer of any value (Fig. 85) eight forts, A, on the brows of the plateaus which surround the town, and thirteen batteries or redoubts, B, a little behind or to command the meeting of the river Abonne with the Saone and enfilade the valleys. Thus the group of roads which from the point C lead to Langres and Champlitte, from D to Dijon and Beaune, from E to Besancon and Dole, from F to Gray and from G to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, would be occupied. A _tete du pont_ H, protected by batteries which would dominate the Saone, would enable an army to manoeuvre on both banks.

This pa.s.sive defence would occupy a perimeter of forty miles, and the zone of action of the permanent works, a perimeter of sixty miles.

The purely pa.s.sive defence would require, for the eight forts, four thousand eight hundred men; for the thirteen batteries two thousand men; for the guard of the intermediary trenches and the service of the _enceinte de preservation_, not including the forts and batteries, eighteen thousand men; reserve in the fortress, two thousand five hundred men; total, twenty-seven thousand three hundred men, whilst the effective investment would require an army of one hundred thousand men.

But if this great intrenched camp contained an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men in addition to the troops necessary for the pa.s.sive defence, this army could besides, on a very extended perimeter or on some advantageous points, occupy within the zone of action of the forts, an _enceinte de combat_ defended by field works, which would enable it to a.s.sume the offensive at the opportune moment.

The armament of the forts would consist of a hundred and sixty guns of large calibre, and that of the batteries of forty-five guns of long range. With the reserve park this would give a total of two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance.

Harnessed guns would be also necessary to support the trenches of the pa.s.sive defence.

Each fort would cost about 48,900. The eight together 391,200 Each battery or redoubt would cost about 6,000. The thirteen together 78,000 -------- Total 469,200 ========

To make head against an invasion at all points at once has always been a difficult problem to solve; and it is still more so if we confine ourselves to the defensive, for the enemy starts from a base of operation with a view to concentrating himself upon a point unknown to the defenders. The latter has therefore only a line to oppose to the apex of a triangle of action. He must limit himself to preserving the heart of the country and certain districts that are already naturally protected, and which allow him to operate on the flanks of the invading forces; regions behind which lie extensive tracts of country from which supplies may be drawn.

Let us suppose that on the zone of defence of which La Roche-Pont forms the centre, an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men were a.s.sembled, which was able to reach Belfort through Besancon or by the road from Vesoul to Langres through Gray or Chatillon-sur-Seine through Dijon, these towns of Besancon, Vesoul, Langres, and Dijon being themselves in a condition to arrest the enemy's advance: the latter in attempting to make his way to Paris would be obliged either to watch this zone with an army of three hundred thousand men, or to move, and that with extreme caution, along the Luneville and Nancy routes.

If a defensive zone of the same importance is disposed on the north, a point becomes very dangerous, especially if the capital is provided with an _enceinte de preservation_, and an _enceinte de combat_ allowing an army to manoeuvre.

Three hundred thousand men therefore would be required to watch the defensive zone of Burgundy and the same number that of the north, and four hundred thousand men to invest Paris; total, one million, without reckoning the troops required for keeping open the communication between the three armies and guarding the base of operations.

It follows that the slightest check might entail a serious disaster.

As the army of Metz under the ramparts of the town was not able to manoeuvre, the two hundred thousand men employed in blockading it were rendered inactive for two months.

If the French army had been able to move within a perimeter of 60 miles, with a good supply of provisions, it would have reduced three hundred thousand men to inaction; since the Germans, who leave nothing to chance, reckon--and not unreasonably--that on the field it is desirable to be at least two to one. It would seem then that the art of war now-a-days--as far as resistance to an invader is concerned--consists not in endeavouring to defend any extensive lines which may be taken or outflanked, but in establishing a small number of centres of defence, sufficiently remote from each other and connected by a system of railways in the rear; which are capable of holding out long, and which compel the enemy either to divide in order to watch them or to take them, or to expose his flanks to an attack if he leaves them alone, or to see himself cut off from his base of operations if he advances _en ma.s.se_ against one of them without covering himself against the others....

But we must confess to a limited confidence in fortifications on this immense scale. It is certain that they are ruinous: it is not certain that they are effective in proportion to the enormous expense they occasion.

The men-at-arms of the fifteenth century cased themselves and their horses in iron to resist crossbow bolts, lance-thrusts, and strokes of axe or sword. Fire artillery, which at first aimed at nothing more than subst.i.tuting powder for the mechanism of engines worked by counterpoise or ropes, and like these discharged only stone b.a.l.l.s, becomes improved and uses iron b.a.l.l.s and leaden bullets; and instead of being ponderous and fixed as formerly, moves on wheels and is rendered easily manageable, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century places pistols and arquebusses in the hands of foot-soldiers and hors.e.m.e.n. What plan do the men-at-arms adopt? They thicken the plates of their armour and line them so thoroughly that they are no longer fit for a charge. This method lasts about fifty years, until it is perceived that the best way to enable cavalry to face artillery, so as not to be crushed by it, is to allow it to move rapidly.

Cannon are made whose b.a.l.l.s pierce through and through the wooden planks of a vessel. Immediately these planks are cased with iron. To-day's b.a.l.l.s are resisted by the vessel's sides. The plates of iron are doubled ... and forthwith the penetrating force of the projectiles is increased; but those of the next day pierce them. Steel is made to take the place of iron: but after thousands upon thousands have been spent the projectile has always the best of it. But it happens in a naval engagement that an Admiral steams at full speed right athwart an enemy's ship and sinks it! In fact it is by rapidity of movement and facility in manoeuvring that victories at sea are ensured much more than by increased protective plating.

And in the art of fortification we are exactly at the same point as were the men-at-arms of the end of the fifteenth century, who heaped plates on plates to protect themselves from artillery. It is time the art of fortification should be modified.

It will be objected that a vessel or a horseman can move about, but that a fortress is immovable, and that consequently pa.s.sive force cannot here be replaced by active force or agility. This is a mistake. Though a fortress cannot be moved, the defensive system of a district can and ought to be studied, in view of various contingencies. In future warfare the plan of temporary fortification ought to play a princ.i.p.al part and may be made to do so. In other terms, an army ought to be able to fortify itself everywhere, and take advantage of every position. It is temporary fortification therefore which it is desirable to render easy, prompt, and efficacious, in order to defeat the combinations studied beforehand by the enemy, to reduce him in certain cases to the defensive, when he was hoping to attack, and to embarra.s.s his movements on the great scale by unforeseen resistance at a point which he expected to pa.s.s with ease, and oblige him incessantly to modify his plans by rapidly executed arrangements for defence.

Vauban's fortresses have had their day; who can conjecture what may be accomplished in a future war by the system of defence of which an example has just been presented?

Still the most reliable fortress for a country is a good and well-commanded army, and a well-educated, brave, and intelligent population, resolved to make every sacrifice rather than undergo the humiliation of a foreign occupation.

Captain Jean's papers contained many other critical remarks which cannot be recorded here. These doc.u.ments sufficiently indicate that, whatever may have been said about the matter, there were among our officers some who worked, and many who had antic.i.p.ated the dangers to which we were exposed by a blind confidence in our valour and an utter ignorance of the progress made by our enemies. Indeed among these papers of Captain Jean's, numerous notes, dated 1866, 1867, 1868, show the inefficiency of the defensive system then recognised in France, and the necessity of providing our strong places with works adapted to the recent progress in artillery.

Will the town of La Roche-Pont witness the realisation of Captain Jean's projects, or is its military history closed for ever? The future will show.

In the meantime it is engaged in cultivating its vineyards, and its suburbs are invading once more the slopes of the plateau on the south and the west. The lower part of its donjon of the 12th century is still visible above the escarpment of the little citadel, and antiquaries can discover Roman bas.e.m.e.nts at some points in its wall. When cellars are excavated, Gallo-Roman coins are sometimes found with broken pieces of red and black pottery, charred wood, and even flint hatchets.

These evidences of the antiquity of the cite are deposited in a small museum which also contains sculptures taken from the abbey and the castle.

If you go to La Roche-Pont, ascend the ruins of the donjon. From this elevated point the view on a clear spring morning is very fine; towards the south it extends as far as the Saone, showing the little river Abonne, winding along the vale through meadows and orchards. On the north spreads the plateau covered with clumps of trees, and bounded only by the blue outlines of the hills of the Haute-Marne. At your feet the town with its ramparts looks like a vessel moored at the extremity of a promontory. We are reminded then of all the events which this little nook of ground has witnessed, of the ruins that have been acc.u.mulated by human pa.s.sion, and the blood that has been so lavishly shed. We fancy we hear the shouts with which these walls have so often echoed.

Nature however remains the same; the meadows continue to be enamelled with flowers, and clothe with a mantle of beauty the ruins that have been heaped up by the fury of men. A feeling of deep sadness comes over us, and we say to ourselves: "What use is it all?" "What use!" replies at once a voice in the depth of our our soul. "What is the use of independence? What good is the love of our country? What use is the memory of self-sacrifice?" Do not blaspheme, Egoistic Philosophy; be silent before centuries of struggle--before that layer upon layer of the bones of the dead, and those heaps of successive ruins which have formed our country's soil. Though often ravaged, this hill has never been abandoned by its inhabitants; the more affronts it has had to sustain, the more its children have become attached to its side, the more they hold to the soil that has been impregnated with the blood of their ancestors, and the more hatred they feel towards those who would attempt to detach them from this ancestral tomb. This is patriotism; and it is the only human pa.s.sion that can be dignified with the t.i.tle of holy. War makes nations, and war raises them again when they sink down under the influence of material interests. War is struggle, and we find struggle everywhere in nature; it secures greatness and duration to the best educated, the most capable, the n.o.blest, the most worthy to survive. And in the present day more than ever, success in war is the result of intelligence and of that which develops intelligence--Work.

Whenever what is called fraternity between nations shall become a reality, the reign of senile barbarism and of shameful decay will not be far distant.

Before this rock on which so many generations have fought to defend their independence, to resist aggression and to keep the rapacious foreigner at a distance, it is not an expression of regret that is called for--it is rather of homage to the dead which hearts full of grat.i.tude cannot withhold. They do not ask for tears but for imitation.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 65: The battle of Champigny had extended our lines to four thousand six hundred and twenty yards from the Fort de la Faisanderie.]

EXPLANATION

OF SOME OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK.

AGGER (Latin), terrace, or platform, which the Romans raised before the fronts attacked, for the purpose of setting up their projectile machines, securing a commanding position, and masking the troops a.s.sembled for an a.s.sault.

BAILEY, fore-court; court of the outer works, or yard. The stables and the lodgings for the garrison were usually disposed in the bailey of the strong castles of the Middle Ages (see p. 169).

BALISTA (Latin, _onager_), an engine for propelling stones, worked by means of strongly-twisted cords.

BARBICAN, exterior defence protecting an entrance, and allowing a large a.s.semblage of men to prepare for sorties, or to protect a retreat.

Barbicans were either of masonry or earth, or constructed of a simple palisade. They were always of a circular form (see p. 169).

BASTION, an earthwork, cased externally with masonry, salient beyond the main body of the fortress, and possessing two faces, two flanks, and a gorge, so as to sweep the ground without, to cross the fires, and to flank the curtains. The gorge of bastions is open, closed, or retrenched. Bastions are said to be full when their _terre-plein_ is level with the curtains; empty, when their _terre-plein_ is beneath that level; armed with a cavalier, when upon their _terre-plein_ is raised a battery of earth which commands the country without over the parapets (see p. 278, 310).

BOULEVARD, an earthwork--in use at the time when fire artillery had attained a certain degree of importance--for placing cannon outside ancient defences still preserved. Boulevards were of all forms--square, circular, and triangular (see p. 229).

BRAIE, an exterior defence of trifling height, protecting the foot of the ramparts, and hindering the enemy's approach.

BRETeCHE, timber construction intended to strengthen and to flank a front or a salient (see p. 184).

CAT, timber gallery, low and long, covered with a longitudinal very pointed and strongly ironed roof. Placed on wheels, these galleries were advanced to the foot of the walls, after the ditch was filled up, and enabled the miners to begin working into the masonry under cover. The name _rat_ was given to these galleries in some provinces.

CATAPULT, engine for shooting large darts by means of a powerful bow.

CAVALIER, earthwork raised in the middle of a bastion, or upon any point of the defence, to command the exterior. In the sixteenth century the besieging armies erected cavaliers around defences to mount cannon upon them. Our siege batteries are the modern a.n.a.logues of these works (see p. 237, 312).

CHEMISE, exterior inclosure of a donjon; the chemise of the donjon consists of a wall which leaves a s.p.a.ce of some yards between it and the donjon. A postern with a drawbridge gives a communication between one of the rooms of the donjon and the rampart walk of the chemise (see p.

201).

CLAVICULA (Latin), exterior defence, raised outside the gates of a camp, and which obliged those who endeavoured to enter to present their flank to the defenders of the ramparts (see p. 92).

COVERED WAY, road formed on the counterscarp and protected by the relief of the glacis (see p. 307).