Annals of a Fortress Part 20

Fig. 66 presents on a larger scale the plan of the outwork constructed by Vauban. Before the three fronts of this work, demi-lunes with tenailles behind defended the approaches.

Four barracks were built at _a_. Cavaliers arose on the bastions, and the covered ways, with their _places d'armes_, were furnished with traverses. In the event of this work being taken, the main body of the fortress could still hold out some days.

Fig. 67 gives the sections of these works, which were cased with masonry, presenting a strong defence which only a regular siege could affect.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 67.]

But it is desirable to point out the reasons that determined the plan of this work, and the method adopted by the ill.u.s.trious engineer.

Vauban fortified according to the nature of the position, and was not one of those _esprits routiniers_ who, when once a certain system has made good its claims, insist on applying it on all occasions.

The fortresses, which, like that of La Roche-Pont, are situated at the extremity of a promontory and present only a narrow front to the besieger, a.s.suredly give certain advantages to the defence, since they have scarcely to fear more than one attack and are accessible only on one side; but this position is not without its drawbacks, especially if, as in the present instance, a fan-shaped plateau spreads outside the fortress; for then the besiegers sweep the defences with converging fires, to which the besieged can oppose only a narrow front unprovided with considerable flankments. On the east side the large bastion, in the middle of which Vauban had left standing the fifteenth-century tower, which thus gave him a good revetted cavalier, sufficiently flanked the eastern brow of the outer plateau; but on the western side such a flankment failed entirely, on account of the outward bend caused by the promontory. To obviate these disadvantages Vauban inclined his capital some paces eastwards.[58]

He had thought at first of suppressing the south flanks of the two extreme bastions, but in that case the exteriors of the east and west faces of these bastions would have been too slanting to sweep the crests of the plateau effectively, while the two curtains answered this object.

Besides, the enemy could not then, without risk, commence his trenches on the slopes of the plateau and rapidly approach fronts insufficiently flanked. Vauban therefore set out the plan of the great outwork according to the following method (Fig. 68):--To the outside he gave a length of 180 toises, or 1,156 feet. To the western side, _a c_, 1,120 feet; to the eastern side, _b d_, 1,054 feet--that is, he placed the points _c_ and _d_ according with the edge of the plateau; the two angles _a_ and _b_ being equal to one another. On the centre of the side _a b_ of the polygon he erected the perpendicular, _e f_, having a length equal to one-sixth of _a b_. From this extreme point, _f_, were drawn the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, on which the lengths of the faces of the bastion, _a k_, _b i_, were set off equal to two-sevenths of the outer side, _a b_. To find the flanks of the bastion, according to the method usually adopted in these defences, points _k_ and _i_, he described arcs of a circle, _k l_, taking _i k_ as the radius. The point of intersection of this arc with the line _b h_ gave the length and the direction of the flank of the bastion; but, not having been able to trace a regular half-hexagon, and the angles _a_ and _b_ being less obtuse than those of a regular hexagon, by proceeding in this manner, the gorges of the bastion would have been too contracted. Therefore, to determine the flank of the bastion, from the points _i_ and _k_, he let fall perpendiculars to the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, and the point _h_ gave the re-entering angle in the curtain, _h g_, parallel to the side _a b_. This exposed the flanks a little too much, but enabled them to sweep the outsides more effectively, and in this particular case that was the princ.i.p.al consideration.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 68.]

The width of the ditch of the main work was fixed at 112 ft. 7 in., to the rounding of the counterscarp; and this was determined by a tangent to this rounding, drawn from the angle of the epaule of the opposite bastion.

The ditches being dry, Vauban sunk cunettes in the middle, 23 ft. 4 in.

wide and 6 ft. 8 in. deep. Double caponnieres connected the tenailles with the demi-lunes. The demi-lune was set out as follows:--Taking _g k_ as radius, the arc _k m_ was drawn. Its meeting with the perpendicular, _e f_, prolonged, gave the point of intersection _m_, the salient of the demi-lune. From _m_, the face _m n_ was directed upon a point, _o_, taken on the face of the bastion at 31 ft. 3 in. from the angle of the epaule, _i_. The width of the covered way was fixed at 31 ft. 3 in., and that of the glacis at 124 ft. 4 in. The internal _places d'armes_ were 100 ft. across the demi-gorge and 133 ft. 4 in. along the faces. These _places d'armes_ were closed by traverses. The ditch of the demi-lune was 89 ft. 7 in. in width. The tenailles, _g_, constructed in the direction of the lines of defence, were 43 ft. 9 in. wide at the base.

Cavaliers were made on the bastions to obtain convenient views over the slopes of the plateau. Their faces and sides, parallel to those of the bastions, had to be placed at a considerable distance from the epaulements, in order that the un-cased external foot of the talus might leave the necessary room for the easy working of the pieces of artillery.[59]

The same method was followed for the sides _a c_ and _b d_. The width of the ditch was increased to 100 ft., and the great demi-lune, _t_, was so formed that its faces had a length of 332 ft. and its narrow sides 66 ft. The old bastions restored and enlarged, _u v_, were armed with cavaliers, and the escarp of these bastions was 6 ft. 6-1/2 in. higher than that of the bastions of the outwork,[60] which difference, for that matter, was favoured by the conformation of the ground.

All the escarps and counterscarps were cased with strong masonry, with counterforts in the terre-plein; as shown in the sections of Fig. 67 and Fig. 69.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 69.]

The works communicated with each other by posterns. As the fortress of La Roche-Pont was only a.s.sailable on one side, the number of cannon necessary for its defence might be, it appeared, in proportion to its extent, inconsiderable. The number amounted to thirty twenty-four pounders, ten twelve-and four-pounders to arm the demi-lunes.

At the end of the reign of Louis XIV., the efforts of the coalition were directed towards the north-eastern frontiers, and the garrison of La Roche-Pont did not get a view of the enemy. However, during the course of the eighteenth century, this fortress was kept in pa.s.sable condition.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 57: See Fig. 60.]

[Footnote 58: See Fig. 65.]

[Footnote 59: See Fig. 67, the section on E, F.]

[Footnote 60: See Fig. 67, the sections on G H and I K.]

CHAPTER XVI.

_THE SEVENTH SIEGE._

On the 31st of December, 1813, the grand army of Bohemia, one hundred and eighty thousand men strong, and commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, crossed the Rhine at Bale, entered Switzerland, and penetrated into France. Its right bore down on Belfort, Colmar, and Strasburg, its centre marched for Langres, its left for Dijon. The same day the Prussians were crossing the Rhine at Mayence. The invasion of the eastern frontier had to be met by sixty thousand men, at most, echeloned between Epinal and Langres; and this force consisted only of dispirited soldiers and of recruits scarcely knowing how to use their arms. Prince Schwartzenberg's army--which had some reason to fear being attacked on the side of Savoy by the forces commanded by Prince Eugene, and knew that the _debris_ of the army of Spain had orders to make for Lyons with all speed--wishing to secure its base of operation, left detachments before Besancon, Dole, along the Saone and between Dijon and Langres, with injunctions to occupy the most favourable strategic position. La Roche-Pont was to be taken; and the generalissimo of the Bohemian army imagined that it was not in a condition to hold out eight-and-forty hours, for he knew that it had no garrison, and that the citizens were little disposed to defend themselves.

Among the inhabitants of La Roche-Pont were some royalist families, whose emissaries had a.s.sured the commander-in-chief of the Bohemian army that the whole population were impatiently awaiting the arrival of the Allies to declare for the Bourbons. Prince Schwartzenberg was too clear-sighted, and knew too well to what illusions the royalists were ready to yield themselves, to place an unlimited faith in these statements; and he was anxious not to encounter serious obstacles during his first stages, that he might put himself as speedily as possible in communication with his allies on their way from the north-east. He therefore informed the royalists of La Roche-Pont that it was undesirable to provoke a political manifestation on his march; that the best means of a.s.suring the success of the Allies was to remain quiet; that his troops, in conformity with the proclamation issued by the coalition on entering French territory, would respect property; that they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance, and that their glory would consist in concluding peace as quickly as possible, so as to restore to Europe the repose it so much needed.

In the meantime Napoleon, on learning that the German troops had entered France from the south through Basle, had sent pressing orders into the Bourbonnais, Auvergne, and Burgundy, to make a levy of conscripts as soon as possible and send them to Paris. At the same time the depots of Dauphiny and Provence, as also the conscripts in the eastern departments, were to a.s.semble at Lyons to close to the enemy the approaches from Switzerland and Savoy, and if necessary to operate on his rear.

The prefects of Burgundy, Picardy, and Normandy, and of Touraine and Brittany, were to appeal to the communes to form companies of National Guards _d'elite_, who were to march to Paris, Meaux, Montereau, and Troyes.

These arrangements were hardly made in time to present a serious obstacle to the invaders. The civil authorities and the regular troops began to make a hasty retreat before the armies of the coalition, and were leaving the inhabitants to themselves without arms or guidance. It thus happened that some bodies of troops coming from the south found themselves in an isolated position, and uncertain whether they ought to continue their route or fall back. Such a case happened on the Saone; three battalions of infantry, certain artillerymen called to Vincennes to a.s.semble at the great central depot which the Emperor was organising there, and some detachments of various arms making their way for Dijon, to push on thence towards Troyes--found themselves on the flank of the left column of the army of Bohemia. They retraced their steps, and made a rather long detour, hoping to get beyond the enemy's right, and resume the route for Troyes through Beaune, Semur, Montbard, and Chatillon-sur-Seine; but surprised by bad weather and snow, during a night march in the mountains of the Cote-d'Or, they lost their way, and found themselves in the morning at Saint-Seine, which was already occupied by a body of Austrian pioneers. The French were much limited in point of munitions, and had no artillery. They could not force the pa.s.sage, and were obliged to fall back into the valley of Suzon, hoping still to find the road from Dijon to Langres clear. But at Thil-le-Chatel they came upon another body of the enemy, and had to retire towards the small town of La Roche-Pont, for it was evident that they were cut off. The colonel who commanded this small column was instructed, should it be impossible to reach Langres, to take up a position at Auxonne or at La Roche-Pont, to keep his ground there, and to form a nucleus of defence until the arrival of Augereau's force, which was to march from Lyons through Macon, Chalon, and Gray, to fall on the rear of Prince Schwartzenberg.

Such were the events that had happened at this juncture at La Roche-Pont. Conformably to the last orders transmitted by the prefect, companies of National Guards had been promptly organised. The inhabitants of La Roche-Pont, like their neighbours of Auxonne, Dole, and Saint-Jean-de-Losne, preserve military habits; and sieges--not without reason, as we have seen--are a tradition among them. There were always companies of archers and arbalisters at La Roche-Pont during the Middle Ages, and at a later date bombardiers and artillerymen. Under the Consulate La Roche-Pont had been a depot for the army concentrated between Dijon and the Swiss frontier to pa.s.s the Saint-Bernard, and munitions had been stored there; some siege pieces had also been placed there, and still remained. At the approach of Prince Schwartzenberg's army the population of La Roche-Pont was in agitation; and even before the prefectoral instructions had arrived, three companies of National Guards, one of which was of artillerymen, had been spontaneously formed.

All had old muskets of the time of the Revolution, or good hunting weapons. The lower town, occupied in great part by rich families, of which several were devoted to the royal cause, did not share in these preparations for war. Some indiscreet revelations made the upper town aware of the intrigues of the royalists. The mayor was a man who had been conspicuous for his devotion to the Emperor while the Empire had been in vigour; but who, seeing its fortunes decline, became daily more and more of a royalist.

If he had not actively opposed, he had at least obstructed the formation of a company of National Guards _d'elite_, endeavouring to gain time.

The little citadel of La Roche-Pont was occupied by a company of sixty veterans, for the most part invalided, under the orders of an old one-armed captain of engineers, who had served in almost all the campaigns of the Empire. When it was known that the enemy had entered France, Captain Allaud--that was his name--had asked for orders from Dijon, but had not received them. However, he employed his men in restoring and replenishing the a.r.s.enal. He enjoyed a certain amount of authority in the upper town. The male population of the _cite_, composed in great part of men who had been soldiers--all the youth had left in the first months of 1813--never called Captain Allaud anything but "the Governor," and had applied to him to form companies, only asking for munitions. Now the a.r.s.enal of La Roche-Pont contained a good supply of powder and b.a.l.l.s, about twenty old bronze pieces of small calibre, six twenty-four pounders, two howitzers, four small mortars, and about a hundred muskets past service. The six gendarmes remaining till then at La Roche-Pont had been summoned to Dijon at the beginning of January.

Captain Allaud asked for co-operation in repairing the arms, making cartouches and cartridges, repairing the parapets, the traverses, and epaulements, and fabricating gabions and fascines; and the women made bags for earth,--as if it had been possible to sustain a siege with the sixty veterans and the three companies of National Guards, forming a total of two hundred and sixty men. The Prefect of Dijon had transmitted the order for these select companies of National Guards to fall back upon Langres, but the order had not arrived. The royalists shrugged their shoulders on seeing these two hundred and sixty National Guards exercising on the platform of the outwork, and went so far as to joke in the places of public resort about Captain Allaud's _garrison_. He could not put up with raillery, and talked aloud to his men about running their swords through the jokers. High words and even blows were exchanged in the _cafes_. The mayor ventured to interpose his authority; he was insulted and called a traitor, and the captain was informed of the intrigues set on foot by the royalists. At night the captain had the gates of the _cite_ shut, and the antagonism between the upper and lower town was increasing in violence. "If the Austrians come," said the captain, "the houses of these royalist traitors will be the first marks for our b.a.l.l.s!" Both parties became excited, and the mayor had the impudence to ask the captain on whose authority he was acting. "I am the _commandant de place_," replied the veteran, "since there is no other officer here, and La Roche-Pont is a defensible place.... To prove it to you I arrest you!" And he had the mayor conducted to the citadel.

Great was the excitement in the town, but the royalists were in a feeble minority, and dared not stir. They cried "Vive le Gouverneur!" in the taverns. The mob attempted to plunder the mayor's house, which was situated on the _cite_, and the captain had great difficulty in putting down the disturbance. "Rascals!" cried he to the fellows who were already breaking in the doors of the house, "I will have you shot like dogs. Sacrebleu! you can break open doors; we shall see whether you have so much pluck when the Germans come! Here," added he, turning to a dozen veterans, who were following him, "clear the place of this _canaille_!"

and, setting the example, he dealt blows in abundance with the flat of his sword on the backs of the plunderers.

It was the morning following this riot when the French corps above spoken of presented itself before La Roche-Pont. It was welcomed in the upper town with every demonstration of joy. An army come to their help magnificently accoutred and provided would not have been better received. But this troop, exhausted by fatigue, and having eaten nothing for twenty-four hours, without artillery or munitions, had all the appearance of a band of fugitives. Covered with mud, and scantily clothed, these poor soldiers seemed scarcely able even to defend themselves. But in such times of distress, so much do people cling to any semblance of hope, that the sight of a friendly uniform revives every heart. Seeing themselves so well received, these brave fellows made their entrance into the city in good order, and presented when defiling through the streets, in spite of their exhaustion, a martial appearance which redoubled the enthusiasm of the inhabitants. A colonel, three chiefs of battalions, and some captains, of whom one belonged to the artillery, composed the staff. Two hours after their arrival, these soldiers, most of whom had seen much service, having rested well and brushed themselves up, presented a very different appearance.

The news brought by this small corps proved clearly enough that there was no time to lose, if they wanted to put the town of La Roche-Pont in a condition to defend itself with honour, if not with hope of success.

The colonel, of course, took the command; his name was Dubois. He had been in the campaign in Portugal, then in Russia, whence he had returned captain, and having been appointed _chef de bataillon_ in the Saxon campaign, he had distinguished himself at Dresden, and had been a colonel from the date of the battle of Leipzig. He was a man of about thirty, but appeared to be much older. He had scarcely seen anything but the disastrous side of French glory. His countenance, therefore, did not bear that impress of confidence which was exhibited by many of his brethren in arms, who had been less tried than himself by the misfortunes of the times. Of the war in Spain he had seen only the miseries, the privations, the failure of order, the utter disintegration. With Ney on the return from Moscow he had learned what the performance of duty is without the prestige of glory. At Dresden, the regiment to which he was attached had lost half its men; and the disaster of Leipzig had followed. With each grade in his promotion was a.s.sociated a mournful date.

Colonel Dubois had an appearance of coldness that served to hide his natural timidity and profound distrust of his fellow-men. It must be allowed that there were reasons for his distrust of men and things.

Entering the service at the age of twenty as a common soldier, though he belonged to an honourable family in Poitou and had spent his earliest years in the bosom of his family, he had seen only the sinister side of warfare, and his first companions in arms did not respond to his ideal of the soldier's character. It was still worse when he went to Spain.

His delicate nature had fallen back on itself, and allowed no sign of pity or even sympathy for anyone to be visible. Yet so profoundly does what we call "heart" imprint itself on every action, even when its possessor attempts to conceal its slightest manifestation, that this man, in appearance so cold, and who was not known to have a friend, exercised a moral authority over his soldiers which was very rare at that time.

The soldier--an infallible judge in this matter--is able to discover the weak side of the officer; but he only esteems him and confides entirely in him when he recognises besides military talents a soul of energetic vigour and a heart that beats in unison with his own. The soldier's glance can penetrate without difficulty a cold and harsh exterior, and soon discovers whether this appearance conceals insufficiency, stupidity, or pride; or whether it is only the countenance of a man accustomed to command--the exterior of a soul really accessible to all human sentiments.

In an action Dubois could see his men fall without the slightest show of emotion, and would not permit a soldier to leave his place to help them; but after the battle he was the first and the most attentive in relieving the wounded, and would take no rest till they were carried to the ambulances.

Of the three battalions (they were not complete) which he commanded, two belonged to his own regiment; the third was composed of fragments drawn from all sides. Nevertheless, after two or three days' march, all these men, as well as the companies of various arms which he was to lead to Troyes, knew Colonel Dubois better perhaps than he knew himself. These brave men, after some hours' rest were well satisfied to submit to circ.u.mstances and remain under the orders of their Colonel de _Bois_, as they used to call him--and thought it a fine joke to defend themselves in this _nest_ of La Roche-Pont, cut off from all help.

Though in concert with Captain Allaud he made the most needful preparations for defence--were it only to save his own honour--Colonel Dubois wished to ascertain whether it was possible to reach Langres and Troyes without compromising his troops. He therefore instructed a young orderly officer of energy and intelligence, by whom he was accompanied--giving him two attendants and two guides from the town and known to the captain, all mounted--to reconnoitre the route and return as quickly as possible.

We have seen that before the colonel's arrival the defenders numbered three hundred and twenty men, of whom sixty were veterans. Among these men about fifty were capable of serving the guns, having been artillerymen. The troop brought by the colonel consisted of three battalions, in all one thousand four hundred and fifty men, twenty-five artillerymen, and thirty dismounted hors.e.m.e.n; total, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five men, including officers.

Provisions were the first question. The colonel, having learned the arrest of the mayor, summoned him into his presence, and soon heard the confession of the munic.i.p.al magistrate. He gave him to understand that the proofs of his royalist intrigues were sufficient to justify his being shot there and then, and that the only means of avoiding this unpleasant necessity was to set about provisioning the city without a moment's delay. He added that he only commanded the vanguard of a _corps d'armee_, marching from Lyons in the rear of the enemy, while the Emperor was to take them in front: it was important therefore for the town of La Roche-Pont to be in a position to resist for some days, and if it were obliged to surrender for want of provisions, the Emperor's Government would lay blame on the mayor, as having an understanding with the enemy, and then it was all over with him.

The poor mayor, more dead than alive, promised everything, and swore by all the saints that he was devoted to the Emperor, and that in four-and-twenty hours the fortress should be supplied with all the provisions that could be found in the neighbourhood. "I don't know what there may be in the neighbourhood," replied the colonel; "you probably _do_; but I have to tell you that by four o'clock to-morrow afternoon--it is now a quarter-past six--there must be on this spot, first, rations of meal, meat, and wine for a garrison of two thousand men for twenty-five days at least; secondly, the inhabitants of the town must also be provisioned for thirty days; and that if this is not done, I shall be unfortunately obliged to send you back to your place of confinement, where you will await the decision of the Emperor's Government; I am going to give you twenty men to accompany you and help you. Planton! ask the major to come here!" "But, colonel," said the mayor, "you must be aware that at this time of the year I shall have great difficulty--" "You prefer then to return to prison immediately?"

interrupted the colonel. "Major!" said he when this officer was introduced, "Monsieur le maire de la Roche-Pont engages to provision the town within twenty-four hours. Here is a list of what is required. You will accompany him, and have twenty pressed men with you--thirty if you want them. You must begin at once. I wish you good luck, Monsieur le maire." Addressing himself to the major, while the mayor was retiring, pale and covered with perspiration, in spite of the cold: "Do not suffer this man to go out of your sight, he is a Royalist; keep him at work, and bring him back here with the provisions." "I understand, colonel."

It was many years since the upper and lower town of La Roche-Pont had been so animated. The upper town resounded with the noise of arms, of the excavators going to the works, of guns being taken from the a.r.s.enal and mounted in the batteries, and of the repairing of the carriages. In another part the carpenters were at work making platforms. As in former times, women mingled with the workmen and brought bundles of willows cut from the side of the pool to make gabions. Behind every window some were to be seen sewing bags for earth. Wheelwrights were repairing wheels; and all engaged were singing and laughing as if they were preparing for a fete. The meal and forage carts were coming in, while pigs, cows, and sheep were rendering the streets almost impa.s.sable.