Anarchy, State and Utopia Part 5

At the very least, we can parallel these statements about desert with ones about ent.i.tlements. And if, correctly, we describe people as ent.i.tled to their natural a.s.sets even if it's not the case that they can be said to deserve them, then the argument parallel to E above, with "are ent.i.tled to" replacing "deserve" throughout, will go through. This gives us the acceptable argument G: 1. People are ent.i.tled to their natural a.s.sets.2. If people are ent.i.tled to something, they are ent.i.tled to whatever flows from it (via specified types of processes).3. People's holdings flow from their natural a.s.sets.Therefore,4. People are ent.i.tled to their holdings.5. If people are ent.i.tled to something, then they ought to have it (and this overrides any presumption of equality there may be about holdings).

Whether or not people's natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are ent.i.tled to them, and to what flows from them.bj A recognition of people's ent.i.tlements to their natural a.s.sets (the first premiss of argument G) might be necessary to avoid the stringent application of the difference principle which would lead, we already have seen, to even stronger property rights in other persons than redistributive theories usually yield. Rawls feels that he avoids this 42 42 because people in his original position rank the principle of liberty as lexicographically prior to the difference principle, applied not only to economic well-being but to health, length of life, and so on. (However, see note 29 above.) because people in his original position rank the principle of liberty as lexicographically prior to the difference principle, applied not only to economic well-being but to health, length of life, and so on. (However, see note 29 above.) We have found no cogent argument to (help) establish that dif ferences in holding arising from differences in natural a.s.sets should be eliminated or minimized. Can the theme that people's natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view be used differently, for example, to justify a certain shaping shaping of the original position? Clearly if the shaping is designed to nullify differences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets, we need an argument for this goal, and we are back to our unsuccessful quest for the route to the conclusion that such differences in holdings ought to be nullified. Instead, the shaping might take place by excluding the partic.i.p.ants in the original position from knowing of their own natural endowments. In this way the fact that natural endowments are arbitrary from a moral point of view would help to impose and to justify the veil of ignorance. But how does it do this; why should knowledge of natural endowments be excluded from the original position? Presumably the underlying principle would be that if any particular features are arbitrary from a moral point of view, then persons in the original position should not know they possess them. But this would exclude their knowing of the original position? Clearly if the shaping is designed to nullify differences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets, we need an argument for this goal, and we are back to our unsuccessful quest for the route to the conclusion that such differences in holdings ought to be nullified. Instead, the shaping might take place by excluding the partic.i.p.ants in the original position from knowing of their own natural endowments. In this way the fact that natural endowments are arbitrary from a moral point of view would help to impose and to justify the veil of ignorance. But how does it do this; why should knowledge of natural endowments be excluded from the original position? Presumably the underlying principle would be that if any particular features are arbitrary from a moral point of view, then persons in the original position should not know they possess them. But this would exclude their knowing anything anything about themselves, for each of their features (including rationality, the ability to make choices, having a life span of more than three days, having a memory, being able to communicate with other organisms like themselves) will be based upon the fact that the sperm and ovum which produced them contained particular genetic material. The physical fact that those particular gametes contained particular organized chemicals (the genes for people rather than for muskrats or trees) is arbitrary about themselves, for each of their features (including rationality, the ability to make choices, having a life span of more than three days, having a memory, being able to communicate with other organisms like themselves) will be based upon the fact that the sperm and ovum which produced them contained particular genetic material. The physical fact that those particular gametes contained particular organized chemicals (the genes for people rather than for muskrats or trees) is arbitrary from a moral point of view; from a moral point of view; it is, from a moral point of view, an accident. Yet the persons in the original position are to know some of their attributes. it is, from a moral point of view, an accident. Yet the persons in the original position are to know some of their attributes.

Perhaps we are too quick when we suggest excluding knowledge of rationality, and so forth, merely because these features arise from arise from morally arbitrary facts. For these features also have moral significance ; that is, moral facts depend upon or arise from them. Here we see an ambiguity in saying that a fact is arbitrary from a moral point of view. It might mean that there is no moral reason why the fact ought to be that way, or it might mean that the fact's being that way is of no moral significance and has no moral consequences. Rationality, the ability to make choices, and so on, are not morally arbitrary in this second sense. But if they escape exclusion on this ground, now the problem is that the natural a.s.sets, knowledge of which Rawls wishes to exclude from the original position, are not morally arbitrary in this sense either. At any rate, the ent.i.tlement theory's claim that moral ent.i.tlements may arise from or be partially based upon such facts is what is now at issue. Thus, in the absence of an argument to the effect that dif ferences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets ought to be nullified, it is not clear how anything about the original position can be based upon the (ambiguous) claim that differences in natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view. morally arbitrary facts. For these features also have moral significance ; that is, moral facts depend upon or arise from them. Here we see an ambiguity in saying that a fact is arbitrary from a moral point of view. It might mean that there is no moral reason why the fact ought to be that way, or it might mean that the fact's being that way is of no moral significance and has no moral consequences. Rationality, the ability to make choices, and so on, are not morally arbitrary in this second sense. But if they escape exclusion on this ground, now the problem is that the natural a.s.sets, knowledge of which Rawls wishes to exclude from the original position, are not morally arbitrary in this sense either. At any rate, the ent.i.tlement theory's claim that moral ent.i.tlements may arise from or be partially based upon such facts is what is now at issue. Thus, in the absence of an argument to the effect that dif ferences in holdings due to differences in natural a.s.sets ought to be nullified, it is not clear how anything about the original position can be based upon the (ambiguous) claim that differences in natural a.s.sets are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

COLLECTIVE a.s.sETS.

Rawls' view seems to be that everyone has some ent.i.tlement or claim on the totality of natural a.s.sets (viewed as a pool), with no one having differential claims. The distribution of natural abilities is viewed as a "collective a.s.set." 43 43

We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common a.s.set and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.... No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.44

People will differ in how they view regarding natural talents as a common a.s.set. Some will complain, echoing Rawls against utilitarianism, 45 45 that this "does not take seriously the distinction between persons"; and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. "The two principles of justice ... rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare." that this "does not take seriously the distinction between persons"; and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. "The two principles of justice ... rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare." 46 46 Only if one presses Only if one presses very very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, a.s.sets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we, thick with particular traits, should be cheered that (only) the thus purified men within us are not regarded as means is also unclear. hard on the distinction between men and their talents, a.s.sets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we, thick with particular traits, should be cheered that (only) the thus purified men within us are not regarded as means is also unclear.

People's talents and abilities are are an a.s.set to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere. (Otherwise they wouldn't choose to deal with them.) Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose. In a free society, people's talents do benefit others, and not only themselves. Is it the extraction of even more benefit to others that is supposed to justify treating people's natural a.s.sets as a collective resource? What justifies this extraction? an a.s.set to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere. (Otherwise they wouldn't choose to deal with them.) Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose. In a free society, people's talents do benefit others, and not only themselves. Is it the extraction of even more benefit to others that is supposed to justify treating people's natural a.s.sets as a collective resource? What justifies this extraction?

No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.47

And if there weren't "another way to deal with them"? Would it then follow that one should eliminate these distinctions? What exactly would be contemplated in the case of natural a.s.sets? If people's a.s.sets and talents couldn't couldn't be harnessed to serve others, would something be done to remove these exceptional a.s.sets and talents, or to forbid them from being exercised for the person's own benefit or that of someone else he chose, even though this limitation wouldn't improve the absolute position of those somehow unable to harness the talents and abilities of others for their own benefit? Is it so implausible to claim that envy underlies this conception of justice, forming part of its root notion? be harnessed to serve others, would something be done to remove these exceptional a.s.sets and talents, or to forbid them from being exercised for the person's own benefit or that of someone else he chose, even though this limitation wouldn't improve the absolute position of those somehow unable to harness the talents and abilities of others for their own benefit? Is it so implausible to claim that envy underlies this conception of justice, forming part of its root notion?bk We have used our ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings to probe Rawls' theory, sharpening our understanding of what the ent.i.tlement conception involves by bringing it to bear upon an alternative conception of distributive justice, one that is deep and elegant. Also, I believe, we have probed deep-lying inadequacies in Rawls' theory. I am mindful of Rawls' reiterated point that a theory cannot be evaluated by focusing upon a single feature or part of it; instead the whole theory must be a.s.sessed (the reader will not know how whole a theory can be until he has read all of Rawls' book), and a perfect theory is not to be expected. However we have examined an important part of Rawls' theory, and its crucial underlying a.s.sumptions. I am as well aware as anyone of how sketchy my discussion of the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings has been. But I no more believe we need to have formulated a complete alternative theory in order to reject Rawls' undeniably great advance over utilitarianism, than Rawls needed a complete alternative theory before he could reject utilitarianism. What more does one need or can one have, in order to begin progressing toward a better theory, than a sketch of a plausible alternative view, which from its very different perspective highlights the inadequacies of the best existing well-worked-out theory? Here, as in so many things, we learn from Rawls.

We began this chapter's investigation of distributive justice in order to consider the claim that a state more extensive than the minimal state could be justified on the grounds that it was necessary, or the most appropriate instrument, to achieve distributive justice. According to the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings that we have presented, there is no argument based upon the first two principles of distributive justice, the principles of acquisition and of transfer, for such a more extensive state. If the set of holdings is properly generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice.48 (Nor, we have claimed, will the Lockean proviso actually provide occasion for a more extensive state.) If, however, these principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play. Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and a.s.suming (I) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (a.s.sumed to be those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a (Nor, we have claimed, will the Lockean proviso actually provide occasion for a more extensive state.) If, however, these principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play. Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and a.s.suming (I) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (a.s.sumed to be those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society. This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each society will be the following: given rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society. This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each society will be the following: given its its particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very complex and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very complex and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot cannot use the a.n.a.lysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them. use the a.n.a.lysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them.

CHAPTER 8.

Equality, Envy, Exploitation, Etc.

EQUALITY.

THE legitimacy of altering social inst.i.tutions to achieve greater equality of material condition is, though often a.s.sumed, rarely argued argued for. Writers note that in a given country the wealthiest for. Writers note that in a given country the wealthiest n n percent of the population holds more than that percentage of the wealth, and the poorest percent of the population holds more than that percentage of the wealth, and the poorest n n percent holds less; that to get to the wealth of the top percent holds less; that to get to the wealth of the top n n percent from the poorest, one must look at the bottom percent from the poorest, one must look at the bottom p p percent (where percent (where p p is vastly greater than is vastly greater than n), n), and so forth. They then proceed immediately to discuss how this might be altered. On the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings, one and so forth. They then proceed immediately to discuss how this might be altered. On the ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings, one cannot cannot decide whether the state must do something to alter the situation merely by looking at a distributional profile or at facts such as these. It depends upon how the distribution came about. Some processes yielding these results would be legitimate, and the various parties would be ent.i.tled to their respective holdings. If these distributional facts decide whether the state must do something to alter the situation merely by looking at a distributional profile or at facts such as these. It depends upon how the distribution came about. Some processes yielding these results would be legitimate, and the various parties would be ent.i.tled to their respective holdings. If these distributional facts did did arise by a legitimate process, then they themselves are legitimate. This is, of course, arise by a legitimate process, then they themselves are legitimate. This is, of course, not not to say that they may not be changed, provided this can be done without violating people's ent.i.tlements. Any persons who favor a particular end-state pattern may choose to transfer some or all of their own holdings so as (at least temporarily) more nearly to realize their desired pattern. to say that they may not be changed, provided this can be done without violating people's ent.i.tlements. Any persons who favor a particular end-state pattern may choose to transfer some or all of their own holdings so as (at least temporarily) more nearly to realize their desired pattern.

The ent.i.tlement conception of justice in holdings makes no presumption in favor of equality, or any other overall end state or patterning. It cannot merely be a.s.sumed a.s.sumed that equality must be built into any theory of justice. There is a surprising dearth of arguments for equality capable of coming to grips with the considerations that underlie a nonglobal and nonpatterned conception of justice in holdings. that equality must be built into any theory of justice. There is a surprising dearth of arguments for equality capable of coming to grips with the considerations that underlie a nonglobal and nonpatterned conception of justice in holdings.1 (However, there is no lack of unsupported statements of a presumption in favor of equality.) I shall consider the argument which has received the most attention from philosophers in recent years; that offered by Bernard Williams in his influential essay "The Idea of Equality." (However, there is no lack of unsupported statements of a presumption in favor of equality.) I shall consider the argument which has received the most attention from philosophers in recent years; that offered by Bernard Williams in his influential essay "The Idea of Equality." 2 2 (No doubt many readers will feel that all hangs on some other argument; I would like to see (No doubt many readers will feel that all hangs on some other argument; I would like to see that that argument precisely set out, in detail.) argument precisely set out, in detail.)

Leaving aside preventive medicine, the proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth. Now in very many societies, while ill health may work as a necessary condition of receiving treatment, it does not work as a sufficient condition, since such treatment costs money, and not all who are ill have the money; hence the possession of sufficient money becomes in fact an additional necessary condition of actually receiving treatment.... When we have the situation in which, for instance, wealth is a further necessary condition of the receipt of medical treatment, we can once more apply the notions of equality and inequality: not now in connection with the inequality between the well and the ill, but in connection with the inequality between the rich ill and the poor ill, since we have straightforwardly the situation of those whose needs are the same not receiving the same treatment, though the needs are the ground of the treatment. This is an irrational state of affairs ... it is a situation in which reasons are insufficiently operative; it is a situation insufficiently controlled by reasons-and hence by reason itself.3

Williams seems to be arguing that if among the different descriptions applying to an activity, there is one that contains an "internal goal" of the activity, then (it is a necessary truth that) the only proper grounds for the performance of the activity, or its allocation if it is scarce, are connected with the effective achievement of the internal goal. If the activity is done upon others, the only proper criterion for distributing the activity is their need for it, if any. Thus it is that Williams says (it is a necessary truth that) the only proper criterion for the distribution of medical care is medical need. Presumably, then, the only proper criterion for the distribution of barbering services is barbering need. But why must the internal goal of the activity take precedence over, for example, the person's particular purpose in performing the activity? (We ignore the question of whether one activity can fall under two different descriptions involving different internal goals.) If someone becomes a barber because he likes talking to a variety of different people, and so on, is it unjust of him to allocate his services to those he most likes to talk to? Or if he works as a barber in order to earn money to pay tuition at school, may he cut the hair of only those who pay or tip well? Why may not a barber use exactly the same criteria in allocating his services as someone else whose activities have no internal goal involving others? Need a gardener allocate his services to those lawns which need him most?

In what way does the situation of a doctor differ? Why must his activities be allocated via the internal goal of medical care? (If there was no "shortage," could some then then be allocated using other criteria as well?) It seems clear that be allocated using other criteria as well?) It seems clear that he he needn't do that; just because he has this skill, why should needn't do that; just because he has this skill, why should he he bear the costs of the desired allocation, why is he less ent.i.tled to pursue his own goals, within the special circ.u.mstances of practicing medicine, than everyone else? So it is bear the costs of the desired allocation, why is he less ent.i.tled to pursue his own goals, within the special circ.u.mstances of practicing medicine, than everyone else? So it is society society that, somehow, is to arrange things so that the doctor, in pursuing his own goals, allocates according to need; for example, the society pays him to do this. But why must the society do this? (Should they do it for barbering as well?) Presumably, because medical care is important, people need it very much. This is true of food as well, though farming does that, somehow, is to arrange things so that the doctor, in pursuing his own goals, allocates according to need; for example, the society pays him to do this. But why must the society do this? (Should they do it for barbering as well?) Presumably, because medical care is important, people need it very much. This is true of food as well, though farming does not not have an internal goal that refers to other people in the way doctoring does. When the layers of Williams' argument are peeled away, what we arrive at is the claim that society (that is, each of us acting together in some organized fashion) should make provision for the important needs of all of its members. This claim, of course, has been stated many times before. Despite appearances, Williams presents no argument for it. have an internal goal that refers to other people in the way doctoring does. When the layers of Williams' argument are peeled away, what we arrive at is the claim that society (that is, each of us acting together in some organized fashion) should make provision for the important needs of all of its members. This claim, of course, has been stated many times before. Despite appearances, Williams presents no argument for it.bl Like others, Williams looks only to questions of allocation. He ignores the question of where the things or actions to be allocated and distributed come from. Consequently, he does not consider whether they come already tied to people who have ent.i.tlements over them (surely the case for service activities, which are people's Like others, Williams looks only to questions of allocation. He ignores the question of where the things or actions to be allocated and distributed come from. Consequently, he does not consider whether they come already tied to people who have ent.i.tlements over them (surely the case for service activities, which are people's actions actions), people who therefore may decide for themselves to whom they will give the thing and on what grounds. people who therefore may decide for themselves to whom they will give the thing and on what grounds.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY.

Equality of opportunity has seemed to many writers to be the minimal egalitarian goal, questionable (if at all) only for being too weak. (Many writers also have seen how the existence of the family prevents fully achieving this goal.) There are two ways to attempt to provide such equality: by directly worsening the situations of those more favored with opportunity, or by improving the situation of those less well-favored. The latter requires the use of resources, and so it too involves worsening the situation of some: those from whom holdings are taken in order to improve the situation of others. But holdings to which these people are ent.i.tled may not be seized, even to provide equality of opportunity for others. In the absence of magic wands, the remaining means toward equality of opportunity is convincing persons each to choose to devote some of their holdings to achieving it.

The model of a race for a prize is often used in discussions of equality of opportunity. A race where some started closer to the finish line than others would be unfair, as would a race where some were forced to carry heavy weights, or run with pebbles in their sneakers. But life is not a race in which we all compete for a prize which someone has established; there is no unified race, with some person judging swiftness. Instead, there are different persons separately giving other persons different things. Those who do the giving (each of us, at times) usually do not care about desert or about the handicaps labored under; they care simply about what they actually get. No centralized process judges people's use of the opportunities they had; that is not what the processes of social cooperation and exchange are for for.

There is a reason why some inequality of opportunity might seem unfair, unfair, rather than merely unfortunate in that some do not have every opportunity (which would be true even if no one else had greater advantage). Often the person ent.i.tled to transfer a holding has no special desire to transfer it to a particular person; this contrasts with a bequest to a child or a gift to a particular person. He chooses to transfer to someone who satisfies a certain condition (for example, who can provide him with a certain good or service in exchange, who can do a certain job, who can pay a certain salary), and he would be equally willing to transfer to anyone else who satisfied that condition. Isn't it unfair for one party to receive the transfer, rather than another who had less opportunity to satisfy the condition the transferrer used? Since the giver doesn't care to whom he transfers, provided the recipient satisfies a certain general condition, equality of opportunity to be a recipient in such circ.u.mstances would violate no ent.i.tlement of the giver. Nor would it violate any ent.i.tlement of the person with the greater opportunity; while ent.i.tled to what he has, he has no ent.i.tlement that it be more than another has. Wouldn't it be rather than merely unfortunate in that some do not have every opportunity (which would be true even if no one else had greater advantage). Often the person ent.i.tled to transfer a holding has no special desire to transfer it to a particular person; this contrasts with a bequest to a child or a gift to a particular person. He chooses to transfer to someone who satisfies a certain condition (for example, who can provide him with a certain good or service in exchange, who can do a certain job, who can pay a certain salary), and he would be equally willing to transfer to anyone else who satisfied that condition. Isn't it unfair for one party to receive the transfer, rather than another who had less opportunity to satisfy the condition the transferrer used? Since the giver doesn't care to whom he transfers, provided the recipient satisfies a certain general condition, equality of opportunity to be a recipient in such circ.u.mstances would violate no ent.i.tlement of the giver. Nor would it violate any ent.i.tlement of the person with the greater opportunity; while ent.i.tled to what he has, he has no ent.i.tlement that it be more than another has. Wouldn't it be better better if the person with less opportunity had an equal opportunity? If one so could equip him without violating anyone else's ent.i.tlements (the magic wand?) shouldn't one do so? Wouldn't it be fairer? If it if the person with less opportunity had an equal opportunity? If one so could equip him without violating anyone else's ent.i.tlements (the magic wand?) shouldn't one do so? Wouldn't it be fairer? If it would would be fairer, can such fairness also justify overriding some people's ent.i.tlements in order to acquire the resources to boost those having poorer opportunities into a more equal compet.i.tive position? be fairer, can such fairness also justify overriding some people's ent.i.tlements in order to acquire the resources to boost those having poorer opportunities into a more equal compet.i.tive position?

The process is compet.i.tive in the following way. If the person with greater opportunity didn't exist, the transferrer might deal with some person having lesser opportunity who then would be, under those circ.u.mstances, the best person available to deal with. This differs from a situation in which unconnected but similar beings living on different planets confront different difficulties and have different opportunities to realize various of their goals. There, the situation of one does not not affect that of another; though it would be better if the worse planet were better endowed than it is (it also would be better if the better planet were better endowed than affect that of another; though it would be better if the worse planet were better endowed than it is (it also would be better if the better planet were better endowed than it it is), it wouldn't be is), it wouldn't be fairer. fairer. It also differs from a situation in which a person does not, though he could, choose to It also differs from a situation in which a person does not, though he could, choose to improve improve the situation of another. In the particular circ.u.mstances under discussion, a person having lesser opportunities would be better off if some particular person having better opportunities didn't exist. The person having better opportunities can be viewed not merely as someone better off, or as someone not choosing to aid, but as someone the situation of another. In the particular circ.u.mstances under discussion, a person having lesser opportunities would be better off if some particular person having better opportunities didn't exist. The person having better opportunities can be viewed not merely as someone better off, or as someone not choosing to aid, but as someone blocking blocking or or impeding impeding the person having lesser opportunities from becoming better off. the person having lesser opportunities from becoming better off.4 Impeding another by being a more alluring alternative partner in exchange is not to be compared to directly Impeding another by being a more alluring alternative partner in exchange is not to be compared to directly worsening worsening the situation of another, as by stealing from him. But still, cannot the person with lesser opportunity justifiably complain at being so impeded by another who does not the situation of another, as by stealing from him. But still, cannot the person with lesser opportunity justifiably complain at being so impeded by another who does not deserve deserve his better opportunity to satisfy certain conditions? (Let us ignore any similar complaints another might make about his better opportunity to satisfy certain conditions? (Let us ignore any similar complaints another might make about him. him.) While feeling the power of the questions of the previous two paragraphs (it is I I who ask them), I do not believe they overturn a thoroughgoing ent.i.tlement conception. If the woman who later became my wife rejected another suitor (whom she otherwise would have married) for me, partially because (I leave aside my lovable nature) of my keen intelligence and good looks, neither of which did I earn, would the rejected less intelligent and less handsome suitor have a legitimate complaint about unfairness? Would my thus impeding the other suitor's winning the hand of fair lady justify taking some resources from others to pay for cosmetic surgery for him and special intellectual training, or to pay to develop in him some sterling trait that I lack in order to equalize our chances of being chosen? (I here take for granted the impermissibility of worsening the situation of the person having better opportunities so as to equalize opportunity; in this sort of case by disfiguring him or injecting drugs or playing noises which prevent him from fully using his intelligence. who ask them), I do not believe they overturn a thoroughgoing ent.i.tlement conception. If the woman who later became my wife rejected another suitor (whom she otherwise would have married) for me, partially because (I leave aside my lovable nature) of my keen intelligence and good looks, neither of which did I earn, would the rejected less intelligent and less handsome suitor have a legitimate complaint about unfairness? Would my thus impeding the other suitor's winning the hand of fair lady justify taking some resources from others to pay for cosmetic surgery for him and special intellectual training, or to pay to develop in him some sterling trait that I lack in order to equalize our chances of being chosen? (I here take for granted the impermissibility of worsening the situation of the person having better opportunities so as to equalize opportunity; in this sort of case by disfiguring him or injecting drugs or playing noises which prevent him from fully using his intelligence.5) No such consequences follow. No such consequences follow. (Against whom would the rejected suitor have a legitimate complaint? Against what?) Nor are things different if the differential opportunities arise from the acc.u.mulated effects of people's acting or transferring their ent.i.tlement as they choose. The case is even easier for consumption goods which cannot plausibly be claimed to have any such triadic impeding effect. (Against whom would the rejected suitor have a legitimate complaint? Against what?) Nor are things different if the differential opportunities arise from the acc.u.mulated effects of people's acting or transferring their ent.i.tlement as they choose. The case is even easier for consumption goods which cannot plausibly be claimed to have any such triadic impeding effect. Is Is it unfair that a child be raised in a home with a swimming pool, using it daily even though he is no more it unfair that a child be raised in a home with a swimming pool, using it daily even though he is no more deserving deserving than another child whose home is without one? Should such a situation be prohibited? Why then should there be objection to the transfer of the swimming pool to an adult by bequest? than another child whose home is without one? Should such a situation be prohibited? Why then should there be objection to the transfer of the swimming pool to an adult by bequest?

The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these "rights" require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these "rights" require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other other people may have rights and ent.i.tlements over these. No one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and ent.i.tlements over. people may have rights and ent.i.tlements over these. No one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and ent.i.tlements over.6 Other people's rights and ent.i.tlements Other people's rights and ent.i.tlements to particular things (that to particular things (that pencil, pencil, their their body, and so on) and how they choose to exercise these rights and ent.i.tlements fix the external environment of any given individual and the means that will be available to him. If his goal requires the use of means which others have rights over, he must enlist their voluntary cooperation. Even to body, and so on) and how they choose to exercise these rights and ent.i.tlements fix the external environment of any given individual and the means that will be available to him. If his goal requires the use of means which others have rights over, he must enlist their voluntary cooperation. Even to exercise exercise his right to determine how something he owns is to be used may require other means he must acquire a right to, for example, food to keep him alive; he must put together, with the cooperation of others, a feasible package. his right to determine how something he owns is to be used may require other means he must acquire a right to, for example, food to keep him alive; he must put together, with the cooperation of others, a feasible package.

There are particular rights over particular things held by particular persons, and particular rights to reach agreements with others, if if you and they together can acquire the means to reach an agreement. (No one has to supply you with a telephone so that you may reach an agreement with another.) No rights exist in conflict with this substructure of particular rights. Since no neatly contoured right to achieve a goal will avoid incompatibility with this substructure, no such rights exist. The particular rights over things fill the s.p.a.ce of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. The reverse theory would place only such universally held general "rights to" achieve goals or to be in a certain material condition into its substructure so as to determine all else; to my knowledge no serious attempt has been made to state this "reverse" theory. you and they together can acquire the means to reach an agreement. (No one has to supply you with a telephone so that you may reach an agreement with another.) No rights exist in conflict with this substructure of particular rights. Since no neatly contoured right to achieve a goal will avoid incompatibility with this substructure, no such rights exist. The particular rights over things fill the s.p.a.ce of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. The reverse theory would place only such universally held general "rights to" achieve goals or to be in a certain material condition into its substructure so as to determine all else; to my knowledge no serious attempt has been made to state this "reverse" theory.

SELF-ESTEEM AND ENVY.

It is plausible to connect equality with self-esteem.7 The envious person, if he cannot (also) possess a thing (talent, and so on) that someone else has, prefers that the other person not have it either. The envious man prefers neither one having it, to the other's having it and his not having it. The envious person, if he cannot (also) possess a thing (talent, and so on) that someone else has, prefers that the other person not have it either. The envious man prefers neither one having it, to the other's having it and his not having it.bm People often have claimed that envy underlies egalitarianism. And others have replied that since egalitarian principles are separately justifiable, we need attribute no disreputable psychology to the egalitarian; he desires merely that correct principles be realized. In view of the great ingenuity with which people dream up principles to rationalize their emotions, and given the great difficulty in discovering arguments arguments for equality as a value in itself, this reply is, to say the least, unproven. (Nor is it proven by the fact that once people accept egalitarian principles, they might support the worsening of their own position as an application of these general principles.) for equality as a value in itself, this reply is, to say the least, unproven. (Nor is it proven by the fact that once people accept egalitarian principles, they might support the worsening of their own position as an application of these general principles.) Here I prefer to focus on the strangeness strangeness of the emotion of envy. Why do some people of the emotion of envy. Why do some people prefer prefer that others not have their better score on some dimension, rather than being pleased at another's being well-off or having good fortune; why don't they at least just shrug it off? One line seems especially worth pursuing: A person with a score along some dimension would rather another person with a higher score that others not have their better score on some dimension, rather than being pleased at another's being well-off or having good fortune; why don't they at least just shrug it off? One line seems especially worth pursuing: A person with a score along some dimension would rather another person with a higher score H H had scored less well than had scored less well than H, H, even though this will not raise his own score, in those cases when the other person's having a higher score than himself threatens or undermines his own self-esteem and makes him feel inferior to the other in some important way. How can another's activities, or characteristics, affect one's own self-esteem? Shouldn't my self-esteem, feeling of worth, and so forth, depend only upon facts about me? If it is me that I'm evaluating in some way, how even though this will not raise his own score, in those cases when the other person's having a higher score than himself threatens or undermines his own self-esteem and makes him feel inferior to the other in some important way. How can another's activities, or characteristics, affect one's own self-esteem? Shouldn't my self-esteem, feeling of worth, and so forth, depend only upon facts about me? If it is me that I'm evaluating in some way, how can can facts about other persons play a role? The answer, of course, is that we evaluate how facts about other persons play a role? The answer, of course, is that we evaluate how well well we do something by comparing our performance to others, to what others can do. A man living in an isolated mountain village can sink 15 jump shots with a basketball out of 150 tries. Everyone else in the village can sink only 1 jump shot out of 150 tries. He thinks (as do the others) that he's very good at it. One day, along comes Jerry West. Or, a mathematician works we do something by comparing our performance to others, to what others can do. A man living in an isolated mountain village can sink 15 jump shots with a basketball out of 150 tries. Everyone else in the village can sink only 1 jump shot out of 150 tries. He thinks (as do the others) that he's very good at it. One day, along comes Jerry West. Or, a mathematician works very very hard and occasionally thinks up an interesting conjecture, nicely proves a theorem, and so on. He then discovers a whole group of whizzes at mathematics. He dreams up a conjecture, and they quickly prove or disprove it (not in all possible cases, because of Church's theorem), constructing very elegant proofs; they themselves also think up very deep theorems, and so on. hard and occasionally thinks up an interesting conjecture, nicely proves a theorem, and so on. He then discovers a whole group of whizzes at mathematics. He dreams up a conjecture, and they quickly prove or disprove it (not in all possible cases, because of Church's theorem), constructing very elegant proofs; they themselves also think up very deep theorems, and so on.

In each of these cases, the person will conclude that he wasn't very good very good or or adept adept at the thing after all. There is no standard of doing something well, independent of how it is or can be done by others. At the end of his book at the thing after all. There is no standard of doing something well, independent of how it is or can be done by others. At the end of his book Literature and Revolution, Literature and Revolution, in describing what man will be like (eventually) in a communist society, Leon Trotsky says: in describing what man will be like (eventually) in a communist society, Leon Trotsky says: Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser, and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise.

If this were to occur, the average person, at the level only only of Aristotle, Goethe, or Marx, wouldn't think he was very good or adept at those activities. He would have problems of self-esteem! Someone in the circ.u.mstances of the described basketball player or mathematician might prefer that the other persons lacked their talents, or prefer that they stop continually demonstrating their worth, at least in front of him; that way his self-esteem will avoid battering and can be sh.o.r.ed up. of Aristotle, Goethe, or Marx, wouldn't think he was very good or adept at those activities. He would have problems of self-esteem! Someone in the circ.u.mstances of the described basketball player or mathematician might prefer that the other persons lacked their talents, or prefer that they stop continually demonstrating their worth, at least in front of him; that way his self-esteem will avoid battering and can be sh.o.r.ed up.

This would be one one possible explanation of why certain inequalities in income, or position of authority within an industry, or of an entrepreneur as compared to his employees, possible explanation of why certain inequalities in income, or position of authority within an industry, or of an entrepreneur as compared to his employees, rankle rankle so; so; not not due to the feeling that this superior position is undeserved, but to the feeling that it due to the feeling that this superior position is undeserved, but to the feeling that it is is deserved and earned. It may injure one's self-esteem and make one feel less worthy as a person to know of someone else who has accomplished more or risen higher. Workers in a factory started only recently by someone else previously a worker will be constantly deserved and earned. It may injure one's self-esteem and make one feel less worthy as a person to know of someone else who has accomplished more or risen higher. Workers in a factory started only recently by someone else previously a worker will be constantly confronted confronted by the following thoughts: why not me? why am I only here? Whereas one can manage to ignore much more easily the knowledge that someone else somewhere has done more, if one is not confronted daily with him. The point, though sharper then, does not depend upon another's deserving his superior ranking along some dimension. That there is someone else who is a good dancer will affect your estimate of how good you yourself are at dancing, even if you think that a large part of grace in dancing depends upon unearned natural a.s.sets. by the following thoughts: why not me? why am I only here? Whereas one can manage to ignore much more easily the knowledge that someone else somewhere has done more, if one is not confronted daily with him. The point, though sharper then, does not depend upon another's deserving his superior ranking along some dimension. That there is someone else who is a good dancer will affect your estimate of how good you yourself are at dancing, even if you think that a large part of grace in dancing depends upon unearned natural a.s.sets.

As a framework for discussion that embodies these considerations (and not not as a contribution to psychological theory), consider the following as a contribution to psychological theory), consider the following simple simple model. There are a number of different dimensions, dimensional attributes along which people can vary, model. There are a number of different dimensions, dimensional attributes along which people can vary, D D1, ... , D Dn, that people hold to be valuable. People may differ as to what dimensions they think valuable, and they may differ as to the (nonzero) weights they give to the dimensions they agree in considering valuable. For each person, there will be a factual profile factual profile that presents his objective position along each dimension; for example, on the jump-shot dimension, we might have "able regularly to score ___ jump shots out of 100 tries from 20 feet out," and a person's score might be 20, or 34, or 67. that presents his objective position along each dimension; for example, on the jump-shot dimension, we might have "able regularly to score ___ jump shots out of 100 tries from 20 feet out," and a person's score might be 20, or 34, or 67.

For simplicity, let us a.s.sume that a person's beliefs about his factual profile are reasonably accurate. Also there will be an evaluative profile evaluative profile to represent how the person evaluates his own scores on the factual profile. There will be evaluative cla.s.sifications (for example, excellent, good, satisfactory, poor, awful) representing his evaluation of himself for each dimension. These individual evaluations, how he gets from the factual score to the evaluations, will depend upon his factual beliefs about the factual profiles of other similar beings (the "reference group"), the goals he was given as a child, and so on. All shape his level of aspiration, which itself will vary over time in roughly specifiable ways. Each person will make some overall estimate of himself; in the simplest case this will depend solely on his evaluative profile and his weighting of the dimensions. to represent how the person evaluates his own scores on the factual profile. There will be evaluative cla.s.sifications (for example, excellent, good, satisfactory, poor, awful) representing his evaluation of himself for each dimension. These individual evaluations, how he gets from the factual score to the evaluations, will depend upon his factual beliefs about the factual profiles of other similar beings (the "reference group"), the goals he was given as a child, and so on. All shape his level of aspiration, which itself will vary over time in roughly specifiable ways. Each person will make some overall estimate of himself; in the simplest case this will depend solely on his evaluative profile and his weighting of the dimensions. How How it depends upon this may vary from individual to individual. Some may take the weighted sum of their scores over all the dimensions; others may evaluate themselves as OK if they do well on some reasonably important dimension; still others may think that if they fall down on any important dimension they stink. it depends upon this may vary from individual to individual. Some may take the weighted sum of their scores over all the dimensions; others may evaluate themselves as OK if they do well on some reasonably important dimension; still others may think that if they fall down on any important dimension they stink.

In a society where people generally agree that some dimensions are very important, and there are differences in how people fall along these dimensions, and some inst.i.tutions publicly group people in accordance with their place along these dimensions, then those who score low may feel inferior to those with higher scores; they may feel inferior as persons. (Thus, poor poor people might come to think they are poor people might come to think they are poor people people.) One might try to avoid such feelings of inferiority by changing the society so that either those dimensions which served to distinguish people are downgraded in importance, or so that people do not have an opportunity publicly to exercise their capacities along these dimensions or to learn how others score on them. bn bn It might appear obvious that if people feel inferior because they do poorly along some dimensions, then if these dimensions are downgraded in importance or if scores along them are equalized, people no longer will feel inferior. ("Of course!") The very reason they have for feeling inferior is removed. But it may well be that other dimensions would replace the ones eliminated with the same effects (on different persons). If, after downgrading or equalizing one dimension, say wealth, the society comes generally to agree that some The very reason they have for feeling inferior is removed. But it may well be that other dimensions would replace the ones eliminated with the same effects (on different persons). If, after downgrading or equalizing one dimension, say wealth, the society comes generally to agree that some other other dimension is most important, for example, aesthetic appreciativeness, aesthetic attractiveness, intelligence, athletic prowess, physical grace, degree of sympathy with other persons, quality of o.r.g.a.s.m, then the phenomenon will repeat itself. dimension is most important, for example, aesthetic appreciativeness, aesthetic attractiveness, intelligence, athletic prowess, physical grace, degree of sympathy with other persons, quality of o.r.g.a.s.m, then the phenomenon will repeat itself. 8 8 People generally judge themselves by how they fall along the most important dimensions in which they differ differ from others. People do not gain self-esteem from their common human capacities by comparing themselves to animals who lack them. ("I'm pretty good; I have an opposable thumb and can speak some language.") Nor do people gain or maintain self-esteem by considering that they possess the right to vote for political leaders, though when the franchise was not widely distributed things may have been different. Nor do people in the United States today have a sense of worth because they are able to read and write, though in many other societies in history this has served. When everyone, or almost everyone, has some thing or attribute, it does not function as a basis for self-esteem. Self-esteem is based on from others. People do not gain self-esteem from their common human capacities by comparing themselves to animals who lack them. ("I'm pretty good; I have an opposable thumb and can speak some language.") Nor do people gain or maintain self-esteem by considering that they possess the right to vote for political leaders, though when the franchise was not widely distributed things may have been different. Nor do people in the United States today have a sense of worth because they are able to read and write, though in many other societies in history this has served. When everyone, or almost everyone, has some thing or attribute, it does not function as a basis for self-esteem. Self-esteem is based on differentiating characteristics; differentiating characteristics; that's why it's that's why it's self self-esteem. And as sociologists of reference groups are fond of pointing out, who the others others are changes. First-year students at prestige colleges may have a sense of individual worth based on attending those schools. This feeling is more p.r.o.nounced, indeed, during their last two months of high school. But when are changes. First-year students at prestige colleges may have a sense of individual worth based on attending those schools. This feeling is more p.r.o.nounced, indeed, during their last two months of high school. But when everyone everyone they a.s.sociate with is in a similar position, the fact of going to these schools no longer serves as a basis for self-esteem, except perhaps when they return home during vacation (or in thought) they a.s.sociate with is in a similar position, the fact of going to these schools no longer serves as a basis for self-esteem, except perhaps when they return home during vacation (or in thought) to those not there. to those not there.

Consider how you would set about to bolster the self-esteem of an individual who, perhaps from limited capacity, scored lower than all others on all the dimensions others considered important (and who scored better on no dimension one plausibly could argue was important or valuable). You might tell the person that though his absolute scores were low, he had done well (given his limited capacities). He had realized a greater proportion of his capacities than most and fulfilled more of his potential than others do; considering where he had started, and with what, he had accomplished a great deal. This would reintroduce comparative evaluation, by citing another important (meta)dimension along which he does does do well as compared to others. do well as compared to others.bo These considerations make one somewhat somewhat skeptical of the chances of equalizing self-esteem and reducing envy by equalizing positions along that particular dimension upon which self-esteem is (happens to be) importantly based. Think of the varied attributes one can skeptical of the chances of equalizing self-esteem and reducing envy by equalizing positions along that particular dimension upon which self-esteem is (happens to be) importantly based. Think of the varied attributes one can envy envy another's having, and one will realize the vast opportunities for differential self-esteem. Recall now Trotsky's speculation that under communism everyone would reach the level of Aristotle, Goethe, or Marx, and from his ridge new peaks would rise. Being at this ridge would no more give everyone self-esteem and a feeling of individual worth than does the ability to speak a language or the possession of hands able to grasp things. Some simple and natural a.s.sumptions might even lead to a principle of the conservation of envy. And one might worry, another's having, and one will realize the vast opportunities for differential self-esteem. Recall now Trotsky's speculation that under communism everyone would reach the level of Aristotle, Goethe, or Marx, and from his ridge new peaks would rise. Being at this ridge would no more give everyone self-esteem and a feeling of individual worth than does the ability to speak a language or the possession of hands able to grasp things. Some simple and natural a.s.sumptions might even lead to a principle of the conservation of envy. And one might worry, if if the number of dimensions is not unlimited and if great strides are made to eliminate differences, that as the number of differentiating dimensions shrinks, envy will become more severe. For with a small number of differentiating dimensions, many people will find they don't do well on the number of dimensions is not unlimited and if great strides are made to eliminate differences, that as the number of differentiating dimensions shrinks, envy will become more severe. For with a small number of differentiating dimensions, many people will find they don't do well on any any of them. Though the weighted sum of a number of independently varying normal distributions itself will be normal, if each individual (who knows his score on each dimension) weights the dimensions differently from the way other persons do, the total sum of all the different individuals' differently weighted combinations need not itself be a normal distribution, even though the scores on each dimension are normally distributed. Everyone might view themselves as at the upper end of a distribution (even of a normal distribution) since each sees the distribution through the perspective of the particular weights he a.s.signs. The fewer the dimensions, the less the opportunity for an individual successfully to use as a basis for self-esteem a nonuniform weighting strategy that gives greater weight to a dimension he scores highly in. (This suggests that envy can be reduced only by a fell-swoop elimination of all differences.) of them. Though the weighted sum of a number of independently varying normal distributions itself will be normal, if each individual (who knows his score on each dimension) weights the dimensions differently from the way other pers