Anarchism Part 9

[13] I have only seen Malatesta's dialogue _Between Peasants_ in a French translation: _Entre Paysans, Traduit de l'Italien_, 6th ed., Paris, 1892.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA

Individualist and Communist Anarchism -- Arthur Mulberger -- Theodor Hertzka's _Freeland_ -- Eugen Duhring's "Anticratism"

-- Moritz von Egidy's "United Christendom" -- John Henry Mackay -- Nietzsche and Anarchism -- Johann Most -- Auberon Herbert's "Voluntary State" -- R. B. Tucker.

There is a well-marked geographical division, not only in the Anarchism of agitation, but also in Anarchist theory. The Anarchist Communism, to which the "propaganda of action" is allied, appears to be almost exclusively confined to the Romance peoples, the French, Spaniards, and Italians; while the Teutonic nations appear to incline more towards individualist Anarchism. If this geographical division is not quite exact, it must be remembered that these views themselves are not so clearly separated, and that the ideas of Proudhon rarely develop into pure Individualism as proclaimed by Stirner. The external distinction between Individualists and Communists is certainly marked most clearly by the condemnation of the foolish propaganda of action of the former; and in order to prevent the disagreeable confusion of their views with the perpetrators of bomb outrages, the theorists of Germany and England give their systems more harmless names, such as Free Land, Anticratism, United Christianity, Voluntarism, and so on.

It is perhaps owing to this circ.u.mstance that States which supervise mental movements in the minds of their citizens so closely, so anxiously, as do Austria and Germany, allow the extension of the theoretical propaganda of a movement which is only distinguished from the doctrines of Kropotkin, as explained above, by a difference in formulating the common axiom on which they are based.

In the beginning of the seventies there appeared in Germany an eager worshipper of Proudhon, named Arthur Mulberger, born in 1847, who has practised since 1873 as a physician, and lately as medical officer in Crailsheim, and who has explained with great clearness separate portions of Proudhon's teaching in various articles in magazines and reviews.[1] Mulberger's writings have certainly chiefly an historical value; but he is one of the few who have not merely written about and criticised Proudhon, but have thoroughly studied him. He is accordingly, in spite of his somewhat partisan att.i.tude as a supporter of Proudhon, certainly his most trustworthy and faithful interpreter.

[1] Now collected as _Studien uber Proudhon_, Stuttgart, 1893.

Of all modern phenomena, which, according to Proudhon's a.s.sumption that complete economic freedom must absorb all political authority, should introduce Anarchy by means of economic inst.i.tutions, the most important is undoubtedly the so-called "Free Land" movement, whose "father" is Theodor Hertzka. Born on the 13th July, 1845, at Buda Pesth, Hertzka studied law, but afterwards turned to journalism, in which he gained the reputation of the most brilliant journalist in Vienna. In the seventies he was editor of the _Neue Freie Presse_, and in 1880 he founded the Vienna _Allgemeine Zeitung_; but since 1889 he has been editor of the _Zeitschrift fur Staatsund Volkwirthschaft_.

His book _Freeland_, a picture of the society of the future (_Freiland, ein Sociales Zukunftsbild_), which appeared in 1889, had an extraordinary success, and produced a movement for the realisation of the demands and ideas therein expressed. The expedition which was sent out to "Freeland," after years of agitation, prepared at great expense and watched with the eager curiosity of all Europe, appears to-day, however--as was hardly to be wondered at--to have failed.

"Freeland," as depicted by Hertzka in his social romance, is a community founded upon the principle of unlimited publicity combined with unlimited freedom. Everyone throughout "Freeland" must be able to know at any time what commodities are in greater or less demand, and what branches of work produce greater or less profit. Thus in "Freeland" everybody has the right and the power to apply himself, as far as he is capable, to those forms of production that are at any time most profitable. A careful department of statistics publishes in an easily read and rapid form every movement of production and consumption, and thus the movement of prices in all commodities is quickly brought to everyone's notice. But in order that everyone may undertake that branch of production most suitable and profitable to him, from the information thus obtained, the necessary means of production, including the forces of nature, are freely at the disposal of all, without interest, but a repayment has to be made out of the result of production.

Each has a right to the full return from his labour; this is obtained by free a.s.sociation of the workers. The entrance into each a.s.sociation is free to everyone, and anyone can leave any a.s.sociation at any time.

Each member has a right to a share in the net product of the a.s.sociation corresponding to the work done by him. The work done is reckoned for each member in proportion to the number of hours worked.

The work done by the freely elected and responsible managers or directors is reckoned, by means of free agreement made with each member of the union, as equal to a certain number of hours' work per day. The profit made by the community is reckoned up at the close of each working year, and after deduction for repayment of capital, and the taxes payable to the "Freeland" commonwealth, is divided amongst its members. The members, in case of the failure or liquidation of the a.s.sociation, are liable for its debts in proportion to their share of the profits. This liability for the debts of the a.s.sociation corresponds, in case of dissolution, to the claim of the guarantor members on the property available. The highest authority of the a.s.sociation is the General a.s.sembly, in which every member possesses the same voting power, active and pa.s.sive. The conduct of the business of the company is placed in the hands of a directorate, chosen by the General a.s.sembly for a certain period, whose appointment is, however, revocable at any time. Besides this the General a.s.sembly elects every year an overseer who has to watch over the conduct of the directors.

There are neither masters nor servants; only free workers; there are also no proprietors, only employers of the capital of the a.s.sociation.

The forms of capital necessary for production are therefore as free from owners as is the land.

The most extensive publicity of all business proceedings is the prime supposition for the proper working of this organisation, which can only exist by the removal of all hindrances to the free activity of the individual will guided by enlightened self-interest. There can and need be no business secrets; on the contrary, it is the highest interest of all to see that everyone's capacity for work is directed to where it will produce the best results. The working-statements of the producers are therefore published; the purchase and sale of all imaginable products and commodities of "Freeland" trade takes place in large warehouses, managed and supervised for the benefit of the community.

The highest authority in "Freeland" is at the same time the banker of the whole population. Not merely every a.s.sociation, but every person has his account in the books of the Central Bank, which looks after all payments inwards as well as all money paid out from the greatest to the smallest by means of a comprehensive clearing system.

All the expenditure of the community is defrayed by all in common, and by each person singly, exactly in proportion to its income; for which purpose the Central Bank debits each with his share in the total.

The chief item in the budget of "Freeland" expenditure is "maintenance"; which includes everything spent on account of persons incapacitated for work or excused from it, and who therefore have a right to free support, such as all women, children, sick persons, defectives, and men over sixty years of age. On the other hand, justice, police, military, and finance arrangements cost nothing in "Freeland." There are no paid judges or police officials, still fewer soldiers, and the taxes, as seen above, come in of their own accord.

There is not even a code of criminal or civil law. For the settlement of any disputes that may arise, arbitrators are chosen, who make their decisions verbally, and from whom there is an appeal to the Board of Arbitrators. But they have practically nothing to do, for there is neither robbery nor theft in "Freeland"; since "men who are normal in mind and morals cannot possibly commit any violences against other people in a community in which all proper interests of each member are equally regarded." Criminals are therefore treated as people who are suffering from mental or moral disease.

We need not point out that we here have to deal with an attempt to revive Proudhon's thoughts and plans, and that our criticisms on these apply equally to _Freeland_. If to-day extravagant praise is lavished on Hertzka's originality, that only proves that people who criticise and condemn Proudhon so readily have not read him; and even when Archdukes give the "Freeland" project their moral and financial support, that only proves again how little, even now, the real meaning of Anarchism is understood, and how slavishly people submit to words.

Eugen Duhring has raved against "the State founded on force" as often as against Anarchism, in his various writings; he has as often p.r.o.nounced a scornful judgment upon the literary connections of Anarchism as he has sought to ally himself with the so-called "honourable" Anarchists in his little paper (_The Modern Spirit--Der Moderen Volkergeist_, in Berlin) that is apparently brought out for the sake of a Duhring cult. There appears at least to be a contradiction between the theory of Anarchism and Duhring's Anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, Duhring undoubtedly belongs to the Anarchists, and has never very seriously defended himself against this charge. His haughty and bia.s.sed criticisms of Proudhon, Stirner, and Kropotkin (he excepts only Bakunin, the enemy of the "Hebrew" Marx) are sufficiently explained by his own unexampled weakness and love of belittling others, without seeking any further motives; "it must be night where his own stars shine"; and as his followers have generally read nothing else beside his lucubrations, it is very easy to explain the great influence which Duhring exercises at present upon the youth of Germany, and why he is regarded by some people as the only man of genius since Socrates, and as a man of the most unparalleled originality, which he is not, by a long way.

However much Duhring may belittle Proudhon, he is himself, at least as a social politician, and certainly as an economist, merely a weak dilution of Proudhon. In _The Modern Spirit_ Proudhon's Anarchism was recently credited with the intention of abolishing not only all government, but all organisation. Duhring, it was said, had reduced this mistaken view to its proper origin, and in place of Anarchism had set up "Anticratism," which does not intend to overthrow direction and organisation, but merely to abolish all unjust force, "the State founded on force." We who know Proudhon, know that what is here ascribed to Duhring is exactly what Proudhon taught as "no-government"

(_An-arche_); and there was nothing left to the great Duhring but to bluff his half-fledged scholars with a new word that means nothing more or less than Anarchy. That which is Duhring's own, namely, the so-called "theory of force," has not an origin of any great profundity. He takes as the elements of society two human beings--not at all the s.e.xual pair--but the celebrated "two men" of Herr Duhring, one of whom oppresses the other, uses force to him, and makes him work for him. These "two men" explain, for him, all economic functions and social problems; the origin of social distinctions, of political privileges, of property, capital, betterment, exploitation, and so on.

By these two famous men he lets himself be guided directly into Proudhon's path. "Wealth," declares Duhring, "is mastery over men and things." Proudhon would never have been so silly--although Duhring means the same as he does--as to call wealth the mastery over men and things, and Engel formulates the proposition more correctly as: "Wealth is the mastery over men, by means of mastery over things"; although this deserves the name of a definition neither in the logical nor economic sense. But Duhring uses his ambiguous proposition in order to be able to represent riches on the one hand as being something quite justifiable and praiseworthy (the mastery over things), and on the other as robbery (mastery over men), as "property due to force." Here we have a miserable degradation and commonplace expression of the antimony of Proudhon: "Property is theft," and "Property is liberty." We also find Proudhon, again distorted, in Duhring's statement that the time spent in work by various workers, whether they be navvies or sculptors, is of equal value.

The "personalist Sociality" of Duhring, as its creator terms it elsewhere, is the conception of arrangements and organisations by means of which every individual person may satisfy all the necessities and luxuries of life, from the lowest to the highest, through the mutual working together and combination with every other individual. This personalist Sociality is, of course, anti-monarchical, and opposed to all privileges of position and birth; it is also "anti-religionist," for it recognises no authorities that are beyond control, except only conformity to nature. It starts from the actual condition of the individual; but this can only be known by its actions, and is not determined by birth. As regards public affairs, positions that are technically prominent should be given by universal, direct, and equal suffrage to persons who have shown by their actions that they possess the necessary qualifications for them.

As regards the anti-religious element, which in Duhring's case really implies Anti-Semitism, the place of all religion and everything religious is taken by Duhring's philosophy of actuality or being.

Among the just claims of the individual person Duhring reckons not only bodily freedom and immunity from injury, but also immunity from economic injury. Just as on the one hand every kind of slavery or limitation by united action or social forms must be unhesitatingly rejected, so, on the other hand, unlimited power of disposal over the means of production and natural capital must be limited by suitable public laws in such a way that no one can be excluded from the means supplied by nature, and reduced to a condition of starvation. The right to labour, as well as freedom of choice in labour, must everywhere be maintained.

The economic corner-stones of personalist Sociality are, as Duhring's follower, Emil Dole,[2] explains, "metallic currency as the foundation of all economic relationships, and individual property, especially capital, as the necessary and inviolable foundation for every condition that is not based on robbery and violence. The logic and necessity of any form of society rests on private property, and that is also the basis of Duhring's system; but his reforms are directed to rejecting the ingredients of injustice, robbery, and violence towards persons that are commingled with these fundamental forms. To bring this about, the principle under which the merely economic mechanics of values have free play must be rejected; and instead of it, the original personal and political rights of men must be recognised.

Duhring therefore regards a general a.s.sociation of workers as far more essential than strikes, and would wish political means (in the narrower sense of politics) brought once more into the foreground, and extended much farther than before. He certainly rejects the trickery of Parliament, but not a representation of the working cla.s.ses seriously meant and honourably carried out. He also does not yield to that logic of wretchedness which expects every reform to arise from ever-increasing misery, but takes into account material and mental progress and the condition of the ma.s.ses."

[2] Dole, _Eugen Duhring, etwas von dessen Charakter, Leistungen, und reformatorischen Beruf_, Leipzig, 1893.

Compare also Fr. Engel's, Duhring's _Umwalzung der Wissenschaft_, 3d ed. Stuttgart, 1894.

In all this it is easy to recognise Proudhon's views; even sometimes his theory of property. And even if their views are not alike formally, and Duhring does not quite understand Proudhon's "Mutualism," yet he ought to have regarded the French social reformer somewhat less condescendingly and confusedly. But he has also had a very low opinion of Stirner; yet, however persistently he and his followers may deny it, Duhring's "Personalism" is not only exactly the same as Stirner's "individual" (_Einziger_), but Duhring himself is the most repellent ill.u.s.tration of the egoist-individual of Stirner.

Both Stirner and Proudhon have a.s.sumed as the necessary pre-supposition of the abolition of government, individuals who are able to govern themselves, _i. e._, moral individuals, which means "persons."

When, finally, Duhring apparently seeks to limit the Anarchist phrase of the abolition of all government, by saying that Anticratism is the denial of all unrighteous exercise of force and usurpation of authority, this is palpable fencing. Duhring would tell the ma.s.ses which form of force is right and which wrong; which should be maintained, and which not; and the ma.s.ses will hasten to follow his dictates. Duhring, the great opponent of all metaphysics and _a priori_ conceptions, at once sets up, just like Jean Jacques Rousseau, "the modern Hebrew," an absolute concept "justice," and transforms the world according to it. Who can help laughing at this?

Duhring has tried to reconcile his prejudice against the Jews with the foregoing doctrine, by distinguishing nations from the standpoint of personalism, and regarding the existence of higher races side by side with lower races as a hindrance--indeed the most serious hindrance--to the realisation of "personalist Sociality."

"Nothing is easier than to make a wise grimace."

Perhaps the most peculiar of the circle of theoretical Anarchists is Herr von Egidy. If Duhring has succeeded in enlivening Anarchism by an admixture of Anti-Jewish persecution, Herr von Egidy has accomplished the far greater success of enlivening Anarchism with a new religious cult, called "United Christianity," added to the spirit of Prussian militarism and squiredom. When the new Apostle stood as a candidate for the Reichstag in 1893, supporting his new Christianity and the military programme rejected by the dissolved Parliament, he was able to secure 3000 votes. This is a piece of statistics that shows the confusion of ideas existing in so-called intelligence.

Moritz von Egidy[3] was born at Mainz on 29th August, 1847, served in the Prussian army, and reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

Afterwards he exchanged his military command for an apostleship, after gaining knowledge by private study. His Christianity is a religion without dogma or confession, _a lucus a non lucendo_, but deserves respect as a social phenomenon in view of conditions in Germany.

[3] See, for a study of his views, the popular publication, _Einiges Christenthum_, Berlin, 1893, and the weekly paper (since 1894), _Versohrung_ (_Reconciliation_).

The "United Christendom" is to be the union of all men in the idea of time and applied Christianity, in the sense of a humanity that approaches more nearly to G.o.d. The new religion only values and lays stress on life, on "morality lived"; doctrine and dogma must be laid aside; and thus Von Egidy arrives at the remarkable paradox of "a religion without dogma or confession." The purpose of religion is practical, and in dogmas he sees forms, among which each individual may choose for himself, forms which (according to the main principle of development which he places in the forefront of all his arguments) are in a state of continual flux and change. What religion has to offer is to be expressed not in dogmas, but only in points of view; not in inst.i.tutions, but in directions for guidance. For this purpose it is not necessary that Egidy's disciples should form themselves into a church, for that even contradicts the spirit of this religion; their master rather tells them "to organise nothing, to actualise nothing."

Not parties, nor unions, but only persons and actions, is what he wants, and these will each in his own way lead men into the earthly paradise of which Egidy speaks with truly prophetic confidence.

The State, as we now know it, is for Egidy, who goes to work very cautiously, no more and no less than a link in the eternal chain of development; a stage, beyond which he looks into a divinely appointed kingdom of the future, that will no longer rest upon the pillars of force and fear, which "contradict the consciousness of G.o.d, wherein there will be no difference between governed and government." He quickly disposes of the objection that men are not fit for such an ideal State. "Once we have created conditions in accordance with the divine will, the men for them will be there. If there was a paradise for the first primitive man, why should there not be one for civilised man of to-day? We only need to create it for ourselves; and once we have gained entrance to it we shall not be driven out of it a second time--we have had our warning. Of course the 'old Adam' must be left outside." Of course! But Egidy forgets in the ardour of inspiration that it is not so easy to leave the old Adam outside, and that his a.s.sumption of a primitive paradise for mankind, for the _homme sauvage_ of the "social contract," directly contradicts the theory of evolution which he has just unhesitatingly accepted. He also contradicts himself when he at first maintains that the "conditions in accordance with the divine will" will produce men fitted for them, and afterwards says: "Do not let us trouble about programmes and systems, or modes of execution; only get the right men, and we need not trouble ourselves about how to realise our proposals."

As may be seen, his "United Christianity" not only has a Socialist side, but it is sheer Socialism, the main basis of which is moral and intellectual self-consciousness. Egidy has certainly not drawn up a definite programme, and could not draw it up; "since we are all at the present moment, without exception, undergoing a thorough transformation of 'the inner man,' it is more reasonable to defer single efforts till the general consciousness has become enlightened on essential points." Egidy can thus only open up "points of view" on the social question, leaving everything else to the individual and to natural evolution. Hence a definite social doctrine is excluded.

Thus, upon the question of property, he says that property is "not so much the source as the logical consequence of the immature ideas of human rights and duties which we still hold. With the progressive transformation of our ideas generally, with the adoption of a totally different view of life, with the dawn of a new view of the world, our conceptions of property will also alter; not sooner, but surely. This new view of life will give a direction and aim to our endeavours for improvement. The new treatment of the question of property, however, will only be one of the results of the general new tendencies.

Certainly it will be one of the most important; but we do not need beforehand to recognise any one of the manifold tendencies indicated as a binding law; just as we may generally take what is called Socialism into consideration, as soon as it is offered to us on a firmly defined form, but never accept it without further demur as a new law.

"Instead of the words 'equality' and 'freedom,' I say 'self-reliance'

and 'independence.' They express better that which concerns the individual; and they also avoid the objection of being 'impossible.'

That even self-reliance and independence may experience a certain limitation from the demands of our life in common one with another, I know quite well; but they do not mislead us beforehand to the same erroneous ideas and especially not to the same demands, so impossible of fulfilment, as the word equality. The highest attainable is always merely that we create for the individual equal, _i. e._, equally good, conditions of existence. But owing to the inequality of individuals similar conditions do not always produce by any means the same result of well-being; the utilisation of the conditions is a matter for the individual, and is unequal. Thus we should have to arrange these conditions as _un_equal for each individual in order to give all individuals really equal conditions of existence. Apart from the fundamental impossibility in our human imperfection, of doing absolute justice to these requirements, the equality thus restored would the very next moment be impaired in a thousand different directions."

Egidy is a pure Anarchist, perhaps the purest of all, but he is certainly not the wisest. "The greatest fault in Anarchism," he says, "in the eyes of the opponent whom it has to overcome, is its name.

This, however, is not quite fair to the representatives of these ideas; for why must everything have a name, and why must names be sought which annihilate what at present exists, instead of choosing names which indicate the highest connotation of meanings so far recognised? Why say, 'without government'? Why not rather, 'self-discipline, self-government'? Discipline and government mean things of great value; without which we could not imagine human existence. The only question is, who exercises government over us, and who wields the rod of discipline: whether it is others or we ourselves?" To be sure, he draws a distinction between "Anarchists of Blood" and "n.o.ble Anarchists"; he condemns the former and a.s.sociates himself with the latter. But that does not hinder this remarkable man from having a Bismarckian patriotism, sullen prejudices against the Jews, and, above all, incomprehensible zeal on behalf of Prussian Militarism and Monarchy.

"The monarchical idea in itself," says this most remarkable of all Anarchists, "by no means contradicts the idea of the self-reliance and independence of the individual. The prince will not be lacking in the comprehension necessary for a redrafting of the monarchical idea to suit the people when they have attained their majority. The prince belongs to the people; the prince the foremost of the people; the prince in direct intercourse with the people. The prince neither absolute ruler nor const.i.tutional regent; but the prince a personality, an ego; with a right to execute his will as equal as that of any one of the people. No confused responsibility of ministers thrust in between people and prince. There is no 'crown' as a conception; there is only a living wearer of the crown--the king, the prince--as responsible head of the people. The present servants of the crown become commissioners of the people." Compare these expressions with Proudhon's att.i.tude in regard to the dynastic question described above, and consider, in order to do justice to each, that Egidy as well as Proudhon had in view when speaking a monarch who knew how to surround himself at least with the appearance of "social imperialism."

If, indeed, Egidy were one day to be disillusioned by his "social prince," just as Proudhon was by _his_ monarch, yet it should not be forgotten that the "social prince" might also likewise be greatly disillusioned some day as to the loyalty of Egidy's followers.