An Introduction to Philosophy Part 29

Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its origin discussed in Chapter x.x.xI of the "System of Metaphysics,"

"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time.

CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The World as Mechanism."

Section 45. See Chapter x.x.xI, "The Place of Mind in Nature."

Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter x.x.xIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."

Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion.

Section 47. See Chapter x.x.xII, "Mechanism and Teleology."

CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is ent.i.tled "Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of some of his sections:--

Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation."

Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper."

Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us."

Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the a.s.sumption that we perceive external things directly,--an a.s.sumption into which he slips unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion is ent.i.tled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything."

Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation of sentiment characterize them throughout.

The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the first forty-one sections. For brief readings in cla.s.s, to ill.u.s.trate Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38.

The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names in the t.i.tle suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism.

For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part IV, section 6.

Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us a.s.severation rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good exercise to read in cla.s.s, if time permitted, the two sections of his "Inquiry" ent.i.tled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).

Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg and Hoffding (English translation of the latter, London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in Ueberweg.

It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"

(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905).

CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him).

See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."

Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who has not begun to reflect, in the first cla.s.s. John Locke is a good representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy."

Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes on Chapter XII. As a good ill.u.s.tration of objective idealism in one of its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address, "The Conception of G.o.d" (N.Y., 1902).

Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter x.x.xIV (ent.i.tled "Of G.o.d"), "System of Metaphysics."

CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, "The Insufficiency of Materialism."

Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body"

(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists.

Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality."

The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "G.o.d or Substance"

contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the back of the first-mentioned volume.

Professor Royce is a good ill.u.s.tration of the idealistic monist; see the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute,"

or G.o.d, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite minds are parts.

Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere.

The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."

CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of G.o.d is established; in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles of Philosophy."

Section 61. We have an excellent ill.u.s.tration of Locke's inconsistency in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are not long, and might well be read and a.n.a.lyzed in cla.s.s.

Section 62. See the note to section 51.

Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first wrote it, merely supplementing it here.

We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume ent.i.tled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of philosophical essays ent.i.tled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903).

Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results.

It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means:

"The att.i.tude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in Lecture VI.

The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can a.s.similate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in section 64.

But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202).

Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned.

That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note his reasons for taking the various pragmatic att.i.tudes which he does take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The doctrine is simply a.s.sumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121).

Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made, and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly written.

Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from the above to merit another t.i.tle. In the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey brings out the distinction between his own position and that of Professor James.

To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.

Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the "Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side, Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben, "Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July, 1908.

CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge"

(London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., 1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), Preface.