An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism Part 4

To this it may be replied, that Christian females may, and can say and do much to bring these evils to an end; and the present is a time and an occasion when it seems most desirable that they should know, and appreciate, and _exercise_ the power which they do possess for so desirable an end.

And in pointing out the methods of exerting female influence for this object, I am inspired with great confidence, from the conviction that what will be suggested, is that which none will oppose, but all will allow to be not only practicable, but safe, suitable, and Christian.

To appreciate these suggestions, however, it is needful previously to consider some particulars that exhibit the spirit of the age and the tendencies of our peculiar form of government.

The prominent principle, now in development, as indicating the spirit of the age, is the perfect right of all men to entire freedom of opinion.

By this I do not mean that men are coming to think that "it is no matter what a man believes, if he is only honest and sincere," or that they are growing any more lenient towards their fellow-men, for the evil consequences they bring on themselves or on others for believing wrong.

But they are coming to adopt the maxim, that no man shall be forced by pains and penalties to adopt the opinions of other minds, but that every man shall be free to form his own opinions, and to propagate them by all lawful means.

At the same time another right is claimed, which is of necessity involved in the preceding,--the right to oppose, by all lawful means, the opinions and the practices of others, when they are deemed pernicious either to individuals or to the community. _Facts_, _arguments_ and _persuasions_ are, by all, conceded to be lawful means to employ in propagating our own views, and in opposing the opinions and practices of others.

These fundamental principles of liberty have in all past ages been restrained by coercive influences, either of civil or of ecclesiastical power. But in this nation, all such coercive influences, both of church and state, have ceased. Every man may think what he pleases about government, or religion, or any thing else; he may propagate his opinions, he may controvert opposite opinions, and no magistrate or ecclesiastic can in any legal way restrain or punish.

But the form of our government is such, that every measure that bears upon the public or private interest of every citizen, is decided by _public sentiment_. All laws and regulations in civil, or religious, or social concerns, are decided by the _majority of votes_. And the present is a time when every doctrine, every principle, and every practice which influences the happiness of man, either in this, or in a future life, is under discussion. The whole nation is thrown into parties about almost every possible question, and every man is stimulated in his efforts to promote his own plans by the conviction that success depends entirely upon bringing his fellow citizens to think as he does. Hence every man is fierce in maintaining his own right of free discussion, his own right to propagate his opinions, and his own right to oppose, by all lawful means, the opinions that conflict with his own.

But the difficulty is, that a right which all men claim for themselves, with the most sensitive and pertinacious inflexibility, they have not yet learned to accord to their fellow men, in cases where their own interests are involved. Every man is saying, "Let me have full liberty to propagate my opinions, and to oppose all that I deem wrong and injurious, but let no man take this liberty with my opinions and practices. Every man may believe what he pleases, and propagate what he pleases, provided he takes care not to attack any thing which belongs to me."

And how do men exert themselves to restrain this corresponding right of their fellow men? Not by going to the magistrate to inform, or to the spiritual despot to obtain ecclesiastical penalties, but he resorts to methods, which, if successful, are in effect the most severe pains and penalties that can restrain freedom of opinion.

What is dearer to a man than _his character_, involving as it does, the esteem, respect and affection of friends, neighbours and society, with all the confidence, honour, trust and emolument that flow from general esteem? How sensitive is every man to any thing that depreciates his intellectual character! What torture, to be ridiculed or pitied for such deficiencies! How cruel the suffering, when his moral delinquencies are held up to public scorn and reprehension! Confiscation, stripes, chains, and even death itself, are often less dreaded.

It is this method of punishment to which men resort, to deter their fellow-men from exercising those rights of liberty which they so tenaciously claim for themselves. Examine now the methods adopted by almost all who are engaged in the various conflicts of opinion in this nation, and you will find that there are certain measures which combatants almost invariably employ.

They either attack the intellectual character of opponents, or they labour to make them appear narrow-minded, illiberal and bigoted, or they impeach their honesty and veracity, or they stigmatize their motives as mean, selfish, ambitious, or in some other respect unworthy and degrading. Instead of truth, and evidence, and argument, personal depreciation, sneers, insinuations, or open abuse, are the weapons employed. This method of resisting freedom of opinions, by pains and penalties, arises in part from the natural selfishness of man, and in part from want of clear distinctions as to the rights and duties involved in freedom of opinion and freedom of speech.

The great fundamental principle that makes this matter clear, is this, that a broad and invariable distinction should ever be preserved between the _opinions_ and _practices_ that are discussed, and the _advocates_ of these opinions and practices.

It is a sacred and imperious duty, that rests on every human being, to exert all his influence in opposing every thing that he believes is dangerous and wrong, and in sustaining all that he believes is safe and right. And in doing this, no compromise is to be made, in order to shield country, party, friends, or even self, from any just censure.

Every man is bound by duty to G.o.d and to his country, to lay his finger on every false principle, or injurious practice, and boldly say, "this is wrong--this is dangerous--this I will oppose with all my influence, whoever it may be that advocates or practises it." And every man is bound to use his efforts to turn public sentiment against all that he believes to be wrong and injurious, either in regard to this life, or to the future world. And every man deserves to be respected and applauded, just in proportion as he fearlessly and impartially, and in a _proper spirit_, _time_ and _manner_, fulfils this duty.

The doctrine, just now alluded to, that it is "no matter what a man believes, if he is only honest and sincere," is as pernicious, as it is contrary to religion and to common sense. It is as absurd, and as impracticable, as it would be to urge on the mariner the maxim, "no matter which way you believe to be north, if you only steer aright." A man's character, feelings, and conduct, all depend upon his opinions. If a man can reason himself into the belief that it is right to take the property of others and to deceive by false statements, he will probably prove a thief and a liar. It is of the greatest concern, therefore, to every man, that his fellow-men should _believe right_, and one of his most sacred duties is to use all his influence to promote correct opinions.

But the performance of this duty, does by no means involve the necessity of attacking the character or motives of the _advocates_ of false opinions, or of holding them up, individually, to public odium.

Erroneous opinions are sometimes the consequence of unavoidable ignorance, or of mental imbecility, or of a weak and erring judgment, or of false testimony from others, which cannot be rectified. In such cases, the advocates of false opinions are to be pitied rather than blamed; and while the opinions and their tendencies may be publicly exposed, the men may be objects of affection and kindness.

In other cases, erroneous opinions spring from criminal indifference, from prejudice, from indolence, from pride, from evil pa.s.sions, or from selfish interest. In all such cases, men deserve blame for their pernicious opinions, and the evils which flow from them.

But, it maybe asked, how are men to decide, when their fellow-men are guilty for holding wrong opinions; when they deserve blame, and when they are to be regarded only with pity and commiseration by those who believe them to be in the wrong? Here, surely, is a place where some correct principle is greatly needed.

Is every man to sit in judgment upon his fellow-man, and decide what are his intellectual capacities, and what the measure of his judgment? Is every man to take the office of the Searcher of Hearts, to try the feelings and motives of his fellow-man? Is that most difficult of all a.n.a.lysis, the estimating of the feelings, purposes, and motives, which every man, who examines his own secret thoughts, finds to be so complex, so recondite, so intricate; is this to be the basis, not only of individual opinion, but of public reward and censure? Is every man to const.i.tute himself a judge of the amount of time and interest given to the proper investigation of truth by his fellow-man? Surely, this cannot be a correct principle.

Though there may be single cases in which we can know that our fellow-men are weak in intellect, or erring in judgment, or perverse in feeling, or misled by pa.s.sion, or biased by selfish interest, as a general fact we are not competent to decide these matters, in regard to those who differ from us in opinion.

For this reason it is manifestly wrong and irrelevant, when discussing questions of duty or expediency, to bring before the public the character or the motives of the individual advocates of opinions.

But, it may be urged, how can the evil tendencies of opinions or of practices be investigated, without involving a consideration of the character and conduct of those who advocate them? To this it may be replied, that the tendencies of opinions and practices can never be ascertained by discussing individual character. It is _cla.s.ses_ of persons, or large _communities_, embracing persons of all varieties of character and circ.u.mstances, that are the only proper subjects of investigation for this object. For example, a community of Catholics, and a community of Protestants, may be compared, for the purpose of learning the moral tendencies of their different opinions. Scotland and New England, where the principles opposite to Catholicism have most prevailed, may properly be compared with Spain and Italy, where the Catholic system has been most fairly tried. But to select certain individuals who are defenders of these two different systems, as examples to ill.u.s.trate their tendencies, would be as improper as it would be to select a kernel of grain to prove the good or bad character of a whole crop.

To ill.u.s.trate by a more particular example. The doctrines of the Atheist school are now under discussion, and Robert Owen and f.a.n.n.y Wright have been their prominent advocates.

In agreement with the above principles, it is a right, and the duty of every man who has any influence and opportunity, to show the absurdity of their doctrines, the weakness of their arguments, and the fatal tendencies of their opinions. It is right to show that the _practical_ adoption of their principles indicates a want of common sense, just as sowing the ocean with grain and expecting a crop would indicate the same deficiency. If the advocates of these doctrines carry out their principles into practice, in any such way as to offend the taste, or infringe on the rights of others, it is proper to express disgust and disapprobation. If the female advocate chooses to come upon a stage, and expose her person, dress, and elocution to public criticism, it is right to express disgust at whatever is offensive and indecorous, as it is to criticize the book of an author, or the dancing of an actress, or any thing else that is presented to public observation. And it is right to make all these things appear as odious and reprehensible to others as they do to ourselves.

But what is the private character of Robert Owen or f.a.n.n.y Wright?

Whether they are ignorant or weak in intellect; whether they have properly examined the sources of truth; how much they have been biased by pride, pa.s.sion, or vice, in adopting their opinions; whether they are honest and sincere in their belief; whether they are selfish or benevolent in their aims, are not matters which in any way pertain to the discussion. They are questions about which none are qualified to judge, except those in close and intimate communion with them. We may inquire with propriety as to the character of a _community_ of Atheists, or of a community where such sentiments extensively prevail, as compared with a community of opposite sentiments. But the private character, feelings, and motives of the individual advocates of these doctrines, are not proper subjects of investigation in any public discussion.

If, then, it be true, that attacks on the character and motives of the advocates of opinions are entirely irrelevant and not at all necessary for the discovery of truth; if injury inflicted on character is the most severe penalty that can be employed to restrain freedom of opinions and freedom of speech, what are we to say of the state of things in this nation?

Where is there a party which does not in effect say to every man, "if you dare to oppose the principles or practices we sustain, you shall be punished with personal odium?" which does not say to every member of the party, "uphold your party, right or wrong; oppose all that is adverse to your party, right or wrong, or else suffer the penalty of having your motives, character, and conduct, impeached?"

Look first at the political arena. Where is the advocate of any measure that does not suffer sneers, ridicule, contempt, and all that tends to depreciate character in public estimation? Where is the partisan that is not attacked, as either weak in intellect, or dishonest in principle, or selfish in motives? And where is the man who is linked with any political party, that dares to stand up fearlessly and defend what is good in opposers, and reprove what is wrong in his own party?

Look into the religious world. There, even those who take their party name from their professed liberality, are saying, "whoever shall adopt principles that exclude us from the Christian church, and our clergy from the pulpit, shall be held up either as intellectually degraded, or as narrow-minded and bigoted, or as ambitious, partisan and persecuting in spirit. No man shall believe a creed that excludes us from the pale of Christianity, under penalty of all the odium we can inflict."

So in the Catholic controversy. Catholics and their friends practically declare war against all free discussion on this point. The decree has gone forth, that "no man shall appear for the purpose of proving that Catholicism is contrary to Scripture, or immoral and anti-republican in tendency, under penalty of being denounced as a dupe, or a hypocrite, or a persecutor, or a narrow-minded and prejudiced bigot."

On the contrary, those who attack what is called liberal Christianity, or who aim to oppose the progress of Catholicism, how often do they exhibit a severe and uncharitable spirit towards the individuals whose opinions they controvert. Instead of loving the men, and rendering to them all the offices of Christian kindness, and according to them all due credit for whatever is desirable in character and conduct, how often do opposers seem to feel, that it will not answer to allow that there is any thing good, either in the system or in those who have adopted it.

"Every thing about my party is right, and every thing in the opposing party is wrong," seems to be the universal maxim of the times. And it is the remark of some of the most intelligent foreign travellers among us, and of our own citizens who go abroad, that there is no country to be found, where freedom of opinion, and freedom of speech is more really influenced and controlled by the fear of pains and penalties, than in this land of boasted freedom. In other nations, the control is exercised by government, in respect to a very few matters; in this country it is party-spirit that rules with an iron rod, and shakes its scorpion whips over every interest and every employment of man.

From this mighty source spring constant detraction, gossiping, tale-bearing, falsehood, anger, pride, malice, revenge, and every evil word and work.

Every man sets himself up as the judge of the intellectual character, the honesty, the sincerity, the feelings, opportunities, motives, and intentions, of his fellow-man. And so they fall upon each other, not with swords and spears, but with the tongue, "that unruly member, that setteth on fire the course of nature, and is set on fire of h.e.l.l."

Can any person who seeks to maintain the peaceful, loving, and gentle spirit of Christianity, go out into the world at this day, without being bewildered at the endless conflicts, and grieved and dismayed at the bitter and unhallowed pa.s.sions they engender? Can an honest, upright and Christian man, go into these conflicts, and with unflinching firmness stand up for all that is good, and oppose all that is evil, in whatever party it may be found, without a measure of moral courage such as few can command? And if he carries himself through with an unyielding integrity, and maintains his consistency, is he not exposed to storms of bitter revilings, and to peltings from both parties between which he may stand?

What is the end of these things to be? Must we give up free discussion, and again chain up the human mind under the despotism of past ages? No, this will never be. G.o.d designs that every intelligent mind shall be governed, not by coercion, but by reason, and conscience, and truth.

Man must reason, and experiment, and compare past and present results, and hear and know all that can be said on _both_ sides of every question which influences either private or public happiness, either for this life or for the life to come.

But while this process is going on, must we be distracted and tortured by the baleful pa.s.sions and wicked works that unrestrained party-spirit and ungoverned factions will bring upon us, under such a government as ours? Must we rush on to disunion, and civil wars, and servile wars, till all their train of horrors pa.s.s over us like devouring fire?

There is an influence that can avert these dangers--a spirit that can allay the storm--that can say to the troubled winds and waters, "peace, be still."

It is that spirit which is gentle and easy to be entreated, which thinketh no evil, which rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth, which is not easily provoked, which hopeth all things, which beareth all things. Let this spirit be infused into the ma.s.s of the nation, and then truth may be sought, defended, and propagated, and error detected, and its evils exposed; and yet we may escape the evils that now rage through this nation, and threaten us with such fiery plagues.

And is there not a peculiar propriety in such an emergency, in looking for the especial agency and a.s.sistance of females, who are shut out from the many temptations that a.s.sail the other s.e.x,--who are the appointed ministers of all the gentler charities of life,--who are mingled throughout the whole ma.s.s of the community,--who dwell in those retirements where only peace and love ought ever to enter,--whose comfort, influence, and dearest blessings, all depend on preserving peace and good will among men?

In the present aspect of affairs among us, when everything seems to be tending to disunion and distraction, it surely has become the duty of every female instantly to relinquish the att.i.tude of a partisan, in every matter of clashing interests, and to a.s.sume the office of a mediator, and an advocate of peace. And to do this, it is not necessary that a woman should in any manner relinquish her opinion as to the evils or the benefits, the right or the wrong, of any principle or practice. But, while quietly holding her own opinions, and calmly avowing them, when conscience and integrity make the duty imperative, every female can employ her influence, not for the purpose of exciting or regulating public sentiment, but rather for the purpose of promoting a spirit of candour, forbearance, charity, and peace.

And there are certain prominent maxims which every woman can adopt as peculiarly belonging to her, as the advocate of charity and peace, and which it should be her especial office to ill.u.s.trate, enforce, and sustain, by every method in her power.

The first is, that every person ought to be sustained, not only in the right of propagating his own opinions and practices, but in opposing all those principles and practices which he deems erroneous. For there is no opinion which a man can propagate, that does not oppose some adverse interest; and if a man must cease to advocate his own views of truth and rect.i.tude, because he opposes the interest or prejudices of some other man or party, all freedom of opinion, of speech, and of action, is gone.

All that can be demanded is, that a man shall not resort to falsehood, false reasoning, or to attacks on character, in maintaining his own rights. If he states things which are false, it is right to show the falsehood,--if he reasons falsely, it is right to point out his sophistry,--if he impeaches the character or motives of opponents, it is right to express disapprobation and disgust; but if he uses only facts, arguments, and persuasions, he is to be honoured and sustained for all the efforts he makes to uphold what he deems to be right, and to put down what he believes to be wrong.

Another maxim, which is partially involved in the first, is, that every man ought to allow his own principles and practices to be freely discussed, with patience and magnanimity, and not to complain of persecution, or to attack the character or motives of those who claim that he is in the wrong. If he is belied, if his character is impeached, if his motives are a.s.sailed, if his intellectual capabilities are made the objects of sneers or commiseration, he has a right to complain, and to seek sympathy as an injured man; but no man is a consistent friend and defender of liberty of speech, who cannot bear to have his own principles and practices subjected to the same ordeal as he demands should be imposed on others.

Another maxim of peace and charity is, that every man's own testimony is to be taken in regard to his motives, feelings, and intentions. Though we may fear that a fellow-man is mistaken in his views of his own feelings, or that he does not speak the truth, it is as contrary to the rules of good breeding as it is to the laws of Christianity, to a.s.sume or even insinuate that this is the case. If a man's word cannot be taken in regard to his own motives, feelings, and intentions, he can find no redress for the wrong that may be done to him. It is unjust and unreasonable in the extreme to take any other course than the one here urged.

Another most important maxim of candour and charity is, that when we are to a.s.sign motives for the conduct of our fellow-men, especially of those who oppose our interests, we are obligated to put the best, rather than the worst construction, on all they say and do. Instead of a.s.signing the worst as the probable motive, it is always a duty to _hope_ that it is the best, until evidence is so unequivocal that there is no place for such a hope.