American Eloquence Volume IV Part 7

MR. SPEAKER:

What are the great questions which now divide the nation? In the midst of the political Babel which has been produced by the intermingling of secessionists, rebels, pardoned traitors, hissing Copperheads, and apostate Republicans, such a confusion of tongues is heard that it is difficult to understand either the questions that are asked or the answers that are given. Ask what is the "President's policy," and it is difficult to define it. Ask what is the "policy of Congress," and the answer is not always at hand. A few moments may be profitably spent in seeking the meaning of each of these terms.

In this country the whole sovereignty rests with the people, and is exercised through their Representatives in Congress a.s.sembled. The legislative power is the sole guardian of that sovereignty. No other branch of the government, no other department, no other officer of the government, possesses one single particle of the sovereignty of the nation. No government official, from the President and Chief-Justice down, can do any one act which is not prescribed and directed by the legislative power. Suppose the government were now to be organized for the first time under the Const.i.tution, and the President had been elected, and the judiciary appointed; what could either do until Congress pa.s.sed laws to regulate their proceedings? What power would the President have over any one subject of government until Congress had legislated on that subject? * * * The President could not even create bureaus or departments to facilitate his executive operations. He must ask leave of Congress. Since, then, the President cannot enact, alter, or modify a single law; cannot even create a petty office within his own sphere of operations; if, in short, he is the mere servant of the people, who issue their commands to him through Congress, whence does he derive the const.i.tutional power to create new States, to remodel old ones, to dictate organic laws, to fix the qualifications of voters, to declare that States are republican and ent.i.tled to command Congress, to admit their Representatives? To my mind it is either the most ignorant and shallow mistake of his duties, or the most brazen and impudent usurpation of power. It is claimed for him by some as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. How absurd that a mere executive officer should claim creative powers. Though commander-in-chief by the Const.i.tution, he would have nothing to command, either by land or water until Congress raised both army and navy. Congress also prescribes the rules and regulations to govern the army; even that is not left to the Commander-in-chief.

Though the President is commander-in-chief, Congress is his commander; and, G.o.d willing, he shall obey. He and his minions shall learn that this is not a government of kings and satraps, but a government of the people, and that Congress is the people. * * * To reconstruct the nation, to admit new States, to guarantee republican governments to old States, are all legislative acts. The President claims the right to exercise them. Congress denies it, and a.s.serts the right to belong to the legislative branch. They have determined to defend these rights against all usurpers. They have determined that, while in their keeping, the Const.i.tution shall not be violated with impunity. This I take to be the great question between the President and Congress. He claims the right to reconstruct by his own power. Congress denies him all power in the matter except that of advice, and has determined to maintain such denial. "My policy" a.s.serts full power in the Executive. The policy of Congress forbids him to exercise any power therein.

Beyond this I do not agree that the "policy" of the parties is defined.

To be sure, many subordinate items of the policy of each may be easily sketched. The President * * * desires that the traitors (having sternly executed that most important leader Rickety Wirz, as a high example) should be exempt from further fine, imprisonment, forfeiture, exile, or capital punishment, and be declared ent.i.tled to all the rights of loyal citizens. He desires that the States created by him shall be acknowledged as valid States, while at the same time he inconsistently declares that the old rebel States are in full existence, and always have been, and have equal rights with the loyal States. He opposes the amendment to the Const.i.tution which changes the basis of representation, and desires the old slave States to have the benefit of their increase of freemen without increasing the number of votes; in short, he desires to make the vote of one rebel in South Carolina equal to the votes of three freemen in Pennsylvania or New York. He is determined to force a solid rebel delegation into Congress from the South, which, together with Northern Copperheads, could at once control Congress and elect all future Presidents.

Congress refuses to treat the States created by him as of any validity, and denies that the old rebel States have any existence which gives them any rights under the Const.i.tution. Congress insists on changing the basis of representation so as to put white voters on an equality in both sections, and that such change shall precede the admission of any State. * * * Congress denies that any State lately in rebellion has any government or const.i.tution known to the Const.i.tution of the United States, or which can be recognized as a part of the Union. How, then, can such a State adopt the (XIIIth) amendment? To allow it would be yielding the whole question, and admitting the unimpaired rights of the seceded States. I know of no Republican who does not ridicule what Mr. Seward thought a cunning movement, in counting Virginia and other outlawed States among those which had adopted the const.i.tutional amendment abolishing slavery.

It is to be regretted that inconsiderate and incautious Republicans should ever have supposed that the slight amendments already proposed to the Const.i.tution, even when incorporated into that instrument, would satisfy the reforms necessary for the security of the government. Unless the rebel States, before admission, should be made republican in spirit, and placed under the guardianship of loyal men, all our blood and treasure will have been spent in vain. * * *

The law of last session with regard to Territories settled the principles of such acts. Impartial suffrage, both in electing the delegates and in ratifying their proceedings, is now the fixed rule.

There is more reason why colored voters should be admitted in the rebel States than in the Territories. In the States they form the great ma.s.s of the loyal men. Possibly, with their aid, loyal governments may be established in most of those States. Without it all are sure to be ruled by traitors; and loyal men, black or white, will be oppressed, exiled, or murdered.

There are several good reasons for the pa.s.sage of this bill. In the first place, it is just. I am now confining my argument to negro suffrage in the rebel States. Have not loyal blacks quite as good a right to choose rulers and make laws as rebel whites? In the second place, it is a necessity in order to protect the loyal white men in the seceded States. With them the blacks would act in a body; and it is believed then, in each of said States, except one, the two united would form a majority, control the States, and protect themselves. Now they are the victims of daily murder. They must suffer constant persecution or be exiled.

Another good reason is that it would insure the ascendency of the Union party. "Do you avow the party purpose?" exclaims some horror-stricken demagogue. I do. For I believe, on my conscience, that on the continued ascendency of that party depends the safety of this great nation. If impartial suffrage is excluded in the rebel States, then every one of them is sure to send a solid rebel representation to Congress, and cast a solid rebel electoral vote. They, with their kindred Copperheads of the North, would always elect the President and control Congress. While slavery sat upon her defiant throne, and insulted and intimidated the trembling North, the South frequently divided on questions of policy between Whigs and Democrats, and gave victory alternately to the sections. Now, you must divide them between loyalists, without regard to color, and disloyalists, or you will be the perpetual va.s.sals of the free-trade, irritated, revengeful South. For these, among other reasons, I am for negro suffrage in every rebel State. If it be just, it should not be denied; if it be necessary, it should be adopted; if it be a punishment to traitors, they deserve it.

VIII.--FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION.

THE periods into which this series has been divided will furnish, perhaps, some key to the brief summary of tariff discussion in the United States which follows. For it is not at all true that tariff discussion or decision has been isolated; on the contrary, it has influenced, and been influenced by, every other phase of the national development of the country.

Bancroft has laid none too great stress on the influence of the English mercantile system in forcing the American Revolution, and on the att.i.tude of the Revolution as an organized revolt against the English system. One of the first steps by which the Continental Congress a.s.serted its claim to independent national action was the throwing open of American ports to the commerce of all nations--that is, to free trade. It should, however, be added that the extreme breadth of this liberality was due to the inability of Congress to impose any duties on imports; it had a choice only between absolute prohibition and absolute free trade, and it chose the latter. The States were not so limited.

Both under the revolutionary Congress and under the Confederation they retained the entire duty power, and they showed no fondness for free trade. Commerce in general was light, and tariff receipts, even in the commercial States, were of no great importance; but, wherever it was possible, commercial regulations were framed in disregard of the free-trade principle. In order to retain the trade in firewood and vegetables within her own borders, New York, in 1787, even laid prohibitory duties on Connecticut and New Jersey boats; and retaliatory measures were begun by the two States attacked.

The Const.i.tution gave to Congress, and forbade to the States, the power to regulate commerce. As soon as the Const.i.tution came to be put into operation, the manner and objects of the regulation of commerce by Congress became a public question. Many other considerations were complicated with it. It was necessary for the United States to obtain a revenue, and this could most easily be done by a tariff of duties on imports. It was necessary for the Federalist majority to consider the party interests both in the agricultural States, which would object to protective duties, and in the States which demanded them. But the highest consideration in the mind of Hamilton and the most influential leaders of the party seems to have been the maintenance of the Union. The repulsive force of the States toward one another was still sufficiently strong to be an element of constant and recognized danger to the Union. One method of overcoming it, as a part of the whole Hamiltonian policy, was to foster the growth of manufactures as an interest entirely independent of State lines and dependent on the national government, which would throw its whole influence for the maintenance of the Union. This feeling runs through the speeches even of Madison, who prefaced his remarks by a declaration in favor of "a trade as free as the policy of nations would allow." Protection, therefore, began in the United States as an instrument of national unity, without regard to national profit; and the argument in its favor would have been quite as strong as ever to the mind of a legislator who accepted every deduction as to the economic disadvantages of protection. Arguments for its economic advantages are not wanting; but they have no such form and consistency as those of subsequent periods. The result of the discussion was the tariff act of July 4, 1789, whose preamble stated one of its objects to be "the encouragement and protection of manufactures." Its average duty, however, was but about 8.5 per cent. It was followed by other acts, each increasing the rate of general duties, until, at the outbreak of the War of 1812, the general rate was about 21 per cent. The war added about 6 per cent, to this rate.

Growth toward democracy very commonly brings a curious bias toward protection, contrasted with the fundamental free-trade argument that a protective system and a system of slave labor have identical bases. The bias toward a p.r.o.nounced protective system in the United States makes its appearance with the rise of democracy; and, after the War of 1812, is complicated with party interests. New England was still the citadel of Federalism. The war and its blockade had fostered manufactures in New England; and the manufacturing interest, looking to the Democratic party for protection, was a possible force to sap the foundations of the citadel. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of the Treasury, prepared, and Calhoun carried through Congress, the tariff of 1816. It introduced several protective features, the "minimum" feature, by which the imported article was a.s.sumed to have cost at least a certain amount in calculating duties, and positive protection for cottons and woollens.

The duties paid under this tariff were about 30 per cent. on all imports, or 33 per cent. on dutiable goods. In 1824 and 1828, under the lead of Clay, tariffs were adopted which made the tariff of duties still higher and more systematically protective; they touched high-water mark in 1830, being 40 per cent. on all imports, or 48.8 per cent. on dutiable goods. The influence of nullification in forcing through the compromise tariff of 1833, with its regular decrease of duties for ten years, has been stated in the first volume.

Under the workings of the compromise tariff there was a steady decrease in the rate on all imports, but not in the rate on dutiable goods, the comparison being 22 per cent. on total to 32 per cent. on dutiable for 1833, and 16 per cent. on total to 32 per cent. on dutiable for 1841.

The conjunction of the increase in non-dutiable imports and the approach of free trade, with general financial distress, gave the Whigs success in the elections of 1840; and in 1841 they set about reviving protection. Unluckily for them, their chosen President, Harrison, was dead, and his successor, Tyler, a Democrat by nature, taken up for political reasons by the Whigs, was deaf to Whig eloquence on the subject of the tariff. After an unsuccessful effort to secure a high tariff and a distribution of the surplus among the States, the semi-protective tariff of 1842 became law. Its result for the next four years was that the rate on dutiable goods was altered very little, while the rate on total imports rose from 16 per cent. to 26 per cent. The return of the Democrats to power was marked by the pa.s.sage of the revenue tariff of 1846, which lasted, with a slight further reduction of duties in 1857, until 1861. Under its operation the rates steadily decreased until, in 1861, they were 18.14 per cent, on dutiable goods, and 11.79 per cent. on total imports.

The platform of the Republican party in the election of 1856 made no declaration for or against free trade or protection. The results of the election showed that the electoral votes of Pennsylvania and Illinois would have been sufficient to give the party a victory in 1856. Both party policy and a natural regard to its strong Whig membership dictated a return to the protective feature of the Whig policy. In March, 1860, Mr. Morrill introduced a protective tariff bill in the House of Representatives, and it pa.s.sed that body; and, in June, the Republican National Convention adopted, as one of its resolutions, a declaration in favor of a protective system. The Democratic Senate postponed the Morrill bill until the following session. When it came up again for consideration, in February, 1861, conditions had changed very considerably. Seven States had seceded, taking off fourteen Senators opposed to the bill; and it was pa.s.sed. It was signed by President Buchanan, March 2, 1861, and went into operation April 1, raising the rates to about 20 per cent. In August and in December, two other acts were pa.s.sed, raising the rates still higher. These were followed by other increases, which ran the maximum up, in 1868, to 48 per cent. on dutiable goods, the highest rate from 1860 to date. It may be noted, however, that the rate of 1830--48.8 per cent. on dutiable goods--still retains its rank as the highest in our history.

The controlling necessity for ready money, to prevent the over-issue of bonds and green-backs, undoubtedly gained votes in Congress sufficient to sustain the policy of protection, as a means of putting the capital of the country into positions where it could be easily reached by internal-revenue taxation. This conjunction of internal revenue and protection proved a mutual support until the payment of the war debt had gone so far as to provoke the reaction. The Democratic National Convention of 1876 attacked the tariff system as a masterpiece of iniquity, but no distinct issue was made between the parties on this question. In 1880 and 1884, the Republican party was the one to force the issue of protection or free trade upon its opponent, but its opponent evaded it.

In 1884, both parties admit the necessity of a reduction in the rates of duties, if for no other reason, in order to reduce the surplus of Government receipts over expenditures, which is a constant stimulus to congressional extravagance. The Republican policy is in general to retain the principle of protection in the reduction; while the Democratic policy, so far as it is defined, is to deal as tenderly as possible with interests which have become vested under a protective system. What influence will be exerted by the present over-production and depression in business cannot, of course, be foretold; but the report of Mr. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, in December, 1884, indicates an attempt to induce manufacturers to submit to an abandonment of protection, as a means of securing a decrease in cost of production, and a consequent foreign market for surplus product.

In taking Clay's speech in 1832 as the representative statement of the argument for protection, the editor has consulted Professor Thompson, of the University of Pennsylvania, and has been guided by his advice. On the other side, the statement of Representative Hurd, in 1881, has been taken as, on the whole, the best summary of the free-trade argument. In both cases, the difficulty has been in the necessary exclusion of merely written arguments.

HENRY CLAY,

OF KENTUCKY. (BORN 1777, DIED 1852.)

ON THE AMERICAN SYSTEM;

IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FEBRUARY 2-6, 1832.

THE question which we are now called upon to determine, is not, whether we shall establish a new and doubtful system of policy, just proposed, and for the first time presented to our consideration, but whether we shall break down and destroy a long-established system, carefully and patiently built up and sanctioned, during a series of years, again and again, by the nation and its highest and most revered authorities. And are we not bound deliberately to consider whether we can proceed to this work of destruction without a violation of the public faith? The people of the United States have justly supposed that the policy of protecting their industry against foreign legislation and foreign industry was fully settled, not by a single act, but by repeated and deliberate acts of government, performed at distant and frequent intervals. In full confidence that the policy was firmly and unchangeably fixed, thousands upon thousands have invested their capital, purchased a vast amount of real and other estate, made permanent establishments, and accommodated their industry. Can we expose to utter and irretrievable ruin this countless mult.i.tude, without justly incurring the reproach of violating the national faith? * * *

When gentlemen have succeeded in their design of an immediate or gradual destruction of the American system, what is their subst.i.tute? Free trade! The call for free trade is as unavailing, as the cry of a spoiled child in its nurse's arms, for the moon, or the stars that glitter in the firmament of heaven. It never has existed, it never will exist.

Trade implies at least two parties. To be free, it should be fair, equal, and reciprocal. But if we throw our ports wide open to the admission of foreign productions, free of all duty, what ports of any other foreign nation shall we find open to the free admission of our surplus produce? We may break down all barriers to free trade on our part, but the work will not be complete until foreign powers shall have removed theirs. There would be freedom on one side, and restrictions, prohibitions, and exclusions on the other. The bolts and the bars and the chains of all other nations will remain undisturbed. It is, indeed, possible, that our industry and commerce would accommodate themselves to this unequal and unjust state of things; for, such is the flexibility of our nature, that it bends itself to all circ.u.mstances. The wretched prisoner incarcerated in a jail, after a long time, becomes reconciled to his solitude, and regularly notches down the pa.s.sing days of his confinement.

Gentlemen deceive themselves. It is not free trade that they are recommending to our acceptance. It is, in effect, the British colonial system that we are invited to adopt; and, if their policy prevails, it will lead substantially to the recolonization of these States, under the commercial dominion of Great Britain. * * *

I dislike this resort to authority, and especially foreign and interested authority, for the support of principles of public policy. I would greatly prefer to meet gentlemen upon the broad ground of fact, of experience, and of reason; but, since they will appeal to British names and authority, I feel myself compelled to imitate their bad example.

Allow me to quote from the speech of a member of the British Parliament, bearing the same family name with my Lord G.o.derich, but whether or not a relation of his, I do not know. The member alluded to was arguing against the violation of the treaty of Methuen--that treaty not less fatal to the interests of Portugal than would be the system of gentlemen to the best interests of America,--and he went on to say:

"It was idle for us to endeavor to persuade other nations to join with us in adopting the principles of what was called 'free trade.' Other nations knew, as well as the n.o.ble lord opposite, and those who acted with him, what we meant by 'free trade' was nothing more nor less than, by means of the great advantages we enjoyed, to get a monopoly of all their markets for our manufactures, and to prevent them, one and all, from ever becoming manufacturing nations. When the system of reciprocity and free trade had been proposed to a French amba.s.sador, his remark was, that the plan was excellent in theory, but, to make it fair in practice, it would be necessary to defer the attempt to put it in execution for half a century, until France should be on the same footing with Great Britain, in marine, in manufactures, in capital, and the many other peculiar advantages which it now enjoyed. The policy that France acted on was that of encouraging its native manufactures, and it was a wise policy; because, if it were freely to admit our manufactures, it would speedily be reduced to the rank of an agricultural nation, and therefore a poor nation, as all must be that depend exclusively upon agriculture.

America acted, too, upon the same principle with France. America legislated for futurity--legislated for an increasing population.

America, too, was prospering under this system. In twenty years, America would be independent of England for manufactures altogether. * * * But since the peace, France, Germany, America, and all the other countries of the world, had proceeded upon the principle of encouraging and protecting native manufacturers." * * *

I regret, Mr. President, that one topic has, I think, unnecessarily been introduced into this, debate. I allude to the charge brought against the manufacturing system, as favoring the growth of aristocracy. If it were true, would gentlemen prefer supporting foreign acc.u.mulations of wealth by that description of industry, rather than in their own country? But is it correct? The joint-stock companies of the North, as I understand them, are nothing more than a.s.sociations, sometimes of hundreds, by means of which the small earnings of many are brought into a common stock, and the a.s.sociates, obtaining corporate privileges, are enabled to prosecute, under one superintending head, their business to better advantage. Nothing can be more essentially democratic or better devised to counterpoise the influence of individual wealth. In Kentucky, almost every manufactory known to me is in the hands of enterprising and self-made men, who have acquired whatever wealth they possess by patient and diligent labor. Comparisons are odious, and but in defence would not be made by me. But is there more tendency to aristocracy in a manufactory, supporting hundreds of freemen, or in a cotton plantation, with its not less numerous slaves, sustaining perhaps only two white families--that of the master and the overseer?

I pa.s.s, with pleasure, from this disagreeable topic, to two general propositions which cover the entire ground of debate. The first is, that, under the operation of the American system, the objects which it protects and fosters are brought to the consumer at cheaper prices than they commanded prior to its introduction, or, than they would command if it did not exist. If that be true, ought not the country to be contented and satisfied with the system, unless the second proposition, which I mean presently also to consider, is unfounded? And that is, that the tendency of the system is to sustain, and that it has upheld, the prices of all our agricultural and other produce, including cotton.

And is the fact not indisputable that all essential objects of consumption affected by the tariff are cheaper and better since the act of 1824 than they were for several years prior to that law? I appeal for its truth to common observation, and to all practical men. I appeal to the farmer of the country whether he does not purchase on better terms his iron, salt, brown sugar, cotton goods, and woollens, for his laboring people? And I ask the cotton-planter if he has not been better and more cheaply supplied with his cotton-bagging? In regard to this latter article, the gentleman from South Carolina was mistaken in supposing that I complained that, under the existing duty, the Kentucky manufacturer could not compete with the Scotch. The Kentuckian furnishes a more substantial and a cheaper article, and at a more uniform and regular price. But it was the frauds, the violations of law, of which I did complain; not smuggling, in the common sense of that practice, which has something bold, daring, and enterprising in it, but mean, barefaced cheating, by fraudulent invoices and false denominations.

I plant myself upon this fact, of cheapness and superiority, as upon impregnable ground. Gentlemen may tax their ingenuity, and produce a thousand speculative solutions of the fact, but the fact itself will remain undisturbed. Let us look into some particulars. The total consumption of bar-iron in the United States is supposed to be about 146,000 tons, of which 112,866 tons are made within the country, and the residue imported. The number of men employed in the manufacture is estimated at 29,254, and the total number of persons subsisted by it at 146,273. The measure of protection extended to this necessary article was never fully adequate until the pa.s.sage of the act of 1828; and what has been the consequence? The annual increase of quant.i.ty since that period has been in a ratio of near twenty-five per centum, and the wholesale price of bar-iron in the Northern cities was, in 1828, $105 per ton; in 1829, $100; in 1830, $90; and in 1831, from $85 to $75--constantly diminishing. We import very little English iron, and that which we do is very inferior, and only adapted to a few purposes.

In inst.i.tuting a comparison between that inferior article and our superior iron, subjects entirely different are compared. They are made by different processes. The English cannot make iron of equal quality to ours at a less price than we do. They have three cla.s.ses, best-best, and best, and ordinary. It is the latter which is imported. Of the whole amount imported there is only about 4,000 tons of foreign iron that pays the high duty, the residue paying only a duty of about thirty per centum, estimated on the prices of the importation of 1829. Our iron ore is superior to that of Great Britain, yielding often from sixty to eighty per centum, while theirs produces only about twenty-five. This fact is so well known that I have heard of recent exportations of iron ore to England.

It has been alleged that bar-iron, being a raw material, ought to be admitted free, or with low duties, for the sake of the manufacturers themselves. But I take this to be the true principle: that if our country is producing a raw material of prime necessity, and with reasonable protection can produce it in sufficient quant.i.ty to supply our wants, that raw material ought to be protected, although it may be proper to protect the article also out of which it is manufactured.

The tailor will ask protection for himself, but wishes it denied to the grower of wool and the manufacturer of broadcloth. The cotton-planter enjoys protection for the raw material, but does not desire it to be extended to the cotton manufacturer. The ship-builder will ask protection for navigation, but does not wish it extended to the essential articles which enter into the construction of his ship. Each in his proper vocation solicits protection, but would have it denied to all other interests which are supposed to come into collision with his.

Now, the duty of the statesman is to elevate himself above these petty conflicts; calmly to survey all the various interests, and deliberately to proportion the measures of protection to each according to its nature and the general wants of society. It is quite possible that, in the degree of protection which has been afforded to the various workers in iron, there may be some error committed, although I have lately read an argument of much ability, proving that no injustice has really been done to them. If there be, it ought to be remedied.

The next article to which I would call the attention of the Senate, is that of cotton fabrics. The success of our manufacture of coa.r.s.e cottons is generally admitted. It is demonstrated by the fact that they meet the cotton fabrics of other countries in foreign markets, and maintain a successful compet.i.tion with them. There has been a gradual increase of the exports of this article, which is sent to Mexico and the South American republics, to the Mediterranean, and even to Asia. * * *

I hold in my hand a statement, derived from the most authentic source, showing that the identical description of cotton cloth, which sold in 1817 at twenty-nine cents per yard, was sold in 1819 at twenty-one cents, in 1821 at nine-teen and a half cents, in 1823 at seventeen cents, in 1825 at fourteen and a half cents, in 1827 at thirteen cents, in 1829 at nine cents, in 1830 at nine and a half cents, and in 1831 at from ten and a half to eleven. Such is the wonderful effect of protection, compet.i.tion, and improvement in skill, combined. The year 1829 was one of some suffering to this branch of industry, probably owing to the principle of compet.i.tion being pushed too far. Hence we observe a small rise of the article of the next two years. The introduction of calico-printing into the United States, const.i.tutes an important era in our manufacturing industry. It commenced about the year 1825, and has since made such astonishing advances, that the whole quant.i.ty now annually printed is but little short of forty millions of yards--about two thirds of our whole consumption. * * *

In respect to woollens, every gentleman's own observation and experience will enable him to judge of the great reduction of price which has taken place in most of these articles since the tariff of 1824. It would have been still greater, but for the high duty on raw material, imposed for the particular benefit of the farming interest. But, without going into particular details, I shall limit myself to inviting the attention of the Senate to a single article of general and necessary use. The protection given to flannels in 1828 was fully adequate. It has enabled the American manufacturer to obtain complete possession of the American market; and now, let us look at the effect. I have before me a statement from a highly respectable mercantile house, showing the price of four descriptions of flannels during six years. The average price of them, in 1826, was thirty-eight and three quarter cents; in 1827, thirty-eight; in 1828 (the year of the tariff), forty-six; in 1829, thirty-six; in 1830, (notwithstanding the advance in the price of wool), thirty-two; and in 1831, thirty-two and one quarter. These facts require no comments. I have before me another statement of a practical and respectable man, well versed in the flannel manufacture in America and England, demonstrating that the cost of manufacture is precisely the same in both countries: and that, although a yard of flannel which would sell in England at fifteen cents would command here twenty-two, the difference of seven cents is the exact difference between the cost in the two countries of the six ounces of wool contained in a yard of flannel.

Brown sugar, during ten years, from 1792 to 1802, with a duty of one and a half cents per pound, averaged fourteen cents per pound. The same article, during ten years, from 1820 to 1830, with a duty of three cents, has averaged only eight cents per pound. Nails, with a duty of five cents per pound, are selling at six cents. Window-gla.s.s, eight by ten, prior to the tariff of 1824, sold at twelve or thirteen dollars per hundred feet; it now sells for three dollars and seventy-five cents. * * *