A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory Part 5

Chapter II.

The Scheme Of Necessity Makes G.o.d The Author Of Sin.

I told ye then he should prevail, and speed On his bad errand; man should be seduced, And flatter'd out of all, believing lies Against his Maker; no decree of mine Concurring to necessitate his fall, Or touch'd with slightest moment of impulse His free-will, to her own inclining left In even scale.-MILTON.

The scheme of necessity, as we have already said, presents two phases in relation to the existence of moral evil; one relating to the agency of man, and the other to the agency of G.o.d. In the preceding chapter, we examined the attempts of the most learned and skilful advocates of this scheme to reconcile it with the free-agency and accountability of man. We have seen how ineffectual have been all their endeavours to show that their doctrine does not destroy the responsibility of man for his sins.

It is the design of the present chapter to consider the doctrine of necessity under its other aspect, and to demonstrate that it makes G.o.d the author of sin. If this can be shown, it may justly lead us to suspect that the scheme contains within its bosom some dark fallacy, which should be dragged from its hiding-place into the open light of day, and exposed to the abhorrence and detestation of mankind.

In discussing this branch of our subject, we shall pursue the course adopted in relation to the first; for if the doctrine of necessity does not make G.o.d the author of sin, we may conclude that this has been shown by some one of its most profound and enlightened advocates. If the attempts of a Calvin, and an Edwards, and a Leibnitz, to maintain such a doctrine, and yet vindicate the purity of G.o.d may be shown to be signal failures, we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between these tenets as maintained by them. Nay, if in order to vindicate their system from so great a reproach, they have been compelled to adopt positions which are clearly inconsistent with the divine holiness, and thus to increase rather than to diminish the reproach; surely their system itself should be more than suspected of error. We shall proceed, then, with this view, to examine their speculations in regard to the agency of G.o.d in its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil.

Section I.

The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that the system of necessity does not make G.o.d the author of sin.

Most of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured to soften their views, so as to bring them into a conformity with the common sentiments of mankind, by supposing that G.o.d merely _permits_, without _producing_ the sinful volitions of men. But Calvin rejects this distinction with the most positive disdain. "A question of still greater difficulty arises," says he, "from other pa.s.sages, where G.o.d is said to incline or draw Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal understanding scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means, and even in operations common to himself and them, is free from any fault, and yet righteously condemns those whose ministry he uses. Hence was invented the distinction between _doing_ and _permitting_; because to many persons this has appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious are subject to the power and government of G.o.d, so that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for the execution of his judgments. The modesty of those who are alarmed by absurdity, might perhaps be excusable, if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine justice from all accusation by _a pretence utterly dest.i.tute of any foundation in truth_."(59) Here the distinction between G.o.d's _permitting_ and _doing_ in relation to the sins of men, is declared by Calvin to be utterly without foundation in truth, and purely chimerical. So, in various other places, he treats this distinction as "too weak to be supported."

"The will of G.o.d," says he, "is the supreme and first cause of things;"

and he quotes Augustine with approbation to the effect, that "He does not remain an idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an intervention of an actual volition, if I may be allowed the expression, which otherwise could never be considered a cause."(60) According to Calvin, then, nothing ever happens in the universe, not even the sinful volitions of men, which is not caused by G.o.d, even by "the intervention of an actual volition" of the supreme will.

It is evident that Calvin scorns to have any recourse to a permissive will in G.o.d, in order to soften down the stupendous difficulties under which his system seems to labour. On the contrary, he sometimes betrays a little impatience with those who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged features of what he conceived to be the truth. "The fathers," says he, "are sometimes too scrupulous on this subject, and afraid of a simple confession of the truth."(61) He entertains no such fears. He is even bold and rigid enough in his consistency to say, "that G.o.d often actuates the reprobate by the interposition of Satan, but in such a manner that Satan himself acts his part by the divine impulse."(62) And again, he declares that by means of Satan, "G.o.d excites the will and strengthens the efforts"

of the reprobate.(63) Indeed, his great work, whenever it touches upon this awful subject, renders it perfectly clear that Calvin despises all weak evasions in the advocacy of his stern doctrine.

It has been truly said, that Calvin never thinks of "deducing the fall of man from the abuse of human freedom." So far is he from this, indeed, that he seems to lose his patience with those who trace the origin of moral evil to such a source. "They say it is nowhere declared in express terms,"

says Calvin, "that G.o.d decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as though the same G.o.d, whom the Scriptures represent as doing whatever he pleases, created the n.o.blest of his creatures without any determinate end.

They maintain, that he was possessed of free choice, that he might be the author of his own fate, but that G.o.d decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of G.o.d's omnipotence, by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing besides."(64) The fall of man, says Calvin, was decreed from all eternity, and it was brought to pa.s.s by the omnipotence of G.o.d. To suppose that Adam was the author of his own fate and fall, is to deny the omnipotence of G.o.d, and to rob him of his sovereignty.

Now, if to say that G.o.d created man, and then left his sin to proceed wholly from himself, be to rob G.o.d of his omnipotence, and to affirm that he made man for no determinate end, the same consequences would follow from the position that G.o.d created Satan, and then left his sin and rebellion to proceed wholly from himself. But, strange as it may seem, the very thing which Calvin so vehemently denies in regard to man, he a.s.serts in relation to Satan; and he even feels called upon to make this a.s.sertion in order to vindicate the divine purity against the calumny of being implicated in the sin of Satan! "But since the devil was created by G.o.d,"

says he, "we must remark, that this wickedness which we attribute to his nature is not from creation, but from corruption. For whatever evil quality he has, he has acquired by his defection and fall. And of this Scripture apprizes us; but, believing him to have come from G.o.d, just as he now is, we shall ascribe to G.o.d himself that which is in direct opposition to him. For this reason, Christ declares, that Satan, 'when he speaketh a lie, speaketh of his own;' and adds the reason, 'because he abode not in the truth.' When he says that he abode not in the truth, he certainly implied that he had once been in it; and when he calls him the father of a lie, _he precludes his imputing to G.o.d the depravity of his nature, which originated wholly from himself_. Though these things are delivered in a brief and rather obscure manner, yet they are abundantly sufficient to vindicate the majesty of G.o.d from every calumny."(65) Thus, in order to show that G.o.d is not the author of sin, Calvin a.s.sumes the very positions in regard to the rebellion of Satan which his opponents have always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgression of man. What then, on Calvin's own principles, becomes of the omnipotence of G.o.d? Does this extend merely to man and not to Satan? Is it not evident that Calvin's scheme in regard to the sin of the first man, is here most emphatically condemned out of his own mouth? Does he not here endorse the very consequence which his adversaries have been accustomed to deduce from his scheme of predestination, namely, that it makes G.o.d the author of sin?

This scheme of doctrine, it must be confessed, is not without its difficulties. It clothes man, as he came from the hand of his Maker, with the glorious attributes of freedom; but to what end? Is this attribute employed to account for the introduction of sin into the world? Is it employed to show that man, and not G.o.d, is the author of moral evil? It is sad to reflect that it is not. The fall of man is referred to the direct "omnipotence of G.o.d." The feeble creature yields to the decree and power of the Almighty, who, because he does so, kindles into the most fearful wrath and dooms him and all his posterity to temporal, spiritual, and eternal death. Such is the doctrine which is advanced, in order to secure the omnipotence of G.o.d, and to exalt his sovereignty. But is it not a great leading feature of deism itself, that it exalts the power of G.o.d at the expense of his infinite moral perfections? So we have understood the matter; and hence, it seems to us, that Christian divines should be more guarded in handling the attribute of omnipotence. "The rigid theologians,"

says Leibnitz, "have held the greatness of G.o.d in higher estimation than his goodness, the lat.i.tudinarians have done the contrary; _true orthodoxy has these two perfections equally at heart_. The error which abases the greatness of G.o.d should be called _anthropomorphism_, and _despotism_ that which divests him of his goodness."(66)

If Calvin's doctrine be true, G.o.d is not the author of sin, inasmuch as he made man pure and upright; but yet, by the same power which created him, has he plunged him into sin and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a sinful nature be inconsistent with the infinite purity of G.o.d, will it not be difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in man, after his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence?

If we ask, How can G.o.d be just in causing man to sin, and then punishing him for it? Calvin replies, That all his dealings with us "are guided by equity."(67) We know, indeed, that all his ways are guided by the most absolute and perfect justice; and this is the very circ.u.mstance which creates the difficulty. The more clearly we perceive, and the more vividly we realize, the perfection of the divine equity, the more heavily does the difficulty press upon our minds. This a.s.surance brings us no relief; we still demand, if G.o.d be just, as in truth he is, how can he deal with us after such a manner? The answer we obtain is, that G.o.d is just. And if this does not satisfy us, we are reminded that "it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety."(68) We seek for light, and, instead of light, we are turned off with reproaches for the want of piety. We have not that faith, we humbly confess, which "from its exaltation looks down on these mists with contempt;"(69) but we have a reason, it may be "a carnal understanding," which longs to be enlarged and enlightened by faith. Hence, it cannot but murmur when, instead of being enlarged and enlightened by faith, it is utterly overwhelmed and confounded by it. And these murmurings of reason, which we can no more prevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean from its depths, are met and sought to be quelled with the rebuke, "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against G.o.d?" We reply not against G.o.d, but against man's interpretation of G.o.d's word; and who art thou, O man, that puttest thyself in the place of G.o.d? "Men," saith Bacon, "are ever ready to usurp the style, '_Non ego, sed Dominus_;' and not only so, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those who have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon, that the 'causeless curse shall not come.' "

In relation to the subject under consideration, the amiable and philosophic mind of Melanchthon seems to have been more consistent, at one time, than that of most of the reformers. "He laid down," says D'Aubigne, "a sort of fatalism, which might lead his readers to think of G.o.d as the author of evil, and which consequently has no foundation in Scripture: 'since whatever happens,' said he, 'happens by necessity, agreeably to divine foreknowledge, it is plain our will hath no liberty whatever.' " It is certainly a very mild expression to say, that the doctrine of Melanchthon might lead his readers to think of G.o.d as the author of evil.

This is a consequence which the logical mind of Melanchthon did not fail to draw from his own scheme of necessity. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, in the edition of 1525, he a.s.serted "that G.o.d wrought all things, evil as well as good; that he was the author of David's adultery, and the treason of Judas, as well as of Paul's conversion."

This doctrine was maintained by Melanchthon on practical as well as on speculative grounds. It is useful, says he, in its tendency to subdue human arrogance; it represses the wisdom and cunning of human reason. We have generally observed, that whenever a learned divine denounces the arrogancy of reason, and insists on an humble submission to his own doctrines, that he has some absurdity which he wishes us to embrace; he feels a sort of internal consciousness that human reason is arrayed against him, and hence he abuses and vilifies it. But reason is not to be kept in due subordination by any such means. If sovereigns would maintain a legitimate authority over their subjects, they should bind them with wise and wholesome laws, and not with arbitrary and despotic enactments, which are so well calculated to engender hatred and rebellion. In like manner, the best possible way to tame the refractory reason of man, and hold it in subjection, is to bind it with the silken cords of divine truth, and not fetter it with the harsh and galling absurdities of man's invention. Melanchthon himself furnished a striking ill.u.s.tration of the justness of this remark; for although, like other reformers, he taught the doctrine of a divine fatality of all events, in order to humble the pride of the human intellect, his own reason afterward rebelled against it. He not only recanted the monstrous doctrine which made G.o.d the author of sin, but he openly combatted it.

In the writings of Beza and Zwingle there are pa.s.sages, in relation to the origin of evil, more offensive, if possible, than any we have adduced from Calvin and Melanchthon. The mode in which the reformers defended their common doctrine was, with some few exceptions, the same in substance. They have said nothing which can serve to dispel, or even materially lessen, the stupendous cloud of difficulties which their scheme spreads over the moral government of G.o.d.

Considering the condition of the Church, the state of human knowledge, and, in short, all the circ.u.mstances of the times in which the reformers lived and acted, it is not very surprising that they should have fallen into such errors. The corruptions of human nature, manifesting themselves in the Romish Church, had so extravagantly exalted the powers of man, and especially of the priesthood, and so greatly depressed or obscured the sovereignty of G.o.d, that the reformers, in fighting against those abuses, were naturally forced into the opposite extreme. It is not at all wonderful, we say, that a reaction, which shook the very foundations of the earth, should have carried the authors of it beyond the bounds of moderation and truth. They would have been more than human if they had not fallen into some such errors as these which we have ascribed to them. But the great misfortune is, that these errors should have been stereotyped and fixed in the symbolical books of the Protestant Churches, and made to descend from the reformers to their children's children, as though they were of the very essence of the faith once delivered to the saints. This is the misfortune, the lamentable evil, which has furnished the Romish Church with its most powerful weapons of attack;(70) which has fortified the strongholds of atheism and infidelity; and which has, beyond all question, fearfully r.e.t.a.r.ded the great and glorious cause of true religion.

If we would examine the most elaborate efforts to defend these doctrines, or rather the great central dogma of necessity from which they all radiate, we must descend to later times; we must turn our attention to the immortal writings of a Leibnitz and an Edwards.

Section II.

The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make G.o.d the author of sin.

This philosopher employed all the resources of a sublime genius, and all the stores of a vast erudition, in order to maintain the scheme of necessity, and at the same time vindicate the purity of the Divine Being.

That subtle and adroit sceptic, M. Bayle, had drawn out all the consequences of the doctrine of necessity in opposition to the free-agency of man, and to the holiness of G.o.d. Leibnitz wrote his great "Essais de Theodicee," for the purpose of refuting these conclusions of Bayle, as well as those of all other sceptics, and of reconciling his system with the divine attributes. In the preface to his work he says, "We show that evil has another source than the will of G.o.d; and that we have reason to say of moral evil, that G.o.d only permits it, and that he does not will it.

But what is more important, we show that G.o.d can not only permit sin, but even concur therein, and contribute to it, without prejudice to his holiness; although, absolutely speaking, he might have prevented it." Such is the task which Leibnitz has undertaken to perform; let us see how he has accomplished it.

"The ancients," says he, "attributed the cause of evil to matter; but where shall we, who derive all things from G.o.d, find the source of evil?"(71) He has more than once answered this question, by saying that the source of evil is to be found in the ideas of the divine mind.

"Chrysippus," says he, "has reason to allege that vice comes from the original const.i.tution of some spirits. It is objected to him that G.o.d has formed them; and he can only reply, that the imperfection of matter does not permit him to do better. This reply is good for nothing; for matter itself is indifferent to all forms, and besides G.o.d has made it. Evil comes rather from forms themselves, but abstract; that is to say, from ideas that G.o.d has not produced by an act of his will, no more than he has produced number and figures; and no more, in one word, than all those possible essences which we regard as eternal and necessary; for they find themselves in the ideal region of possibles; that is to say, in the divine understanding. G.o.d is then not the author of those essences, in so far as they are only possibilities; but there is nothing actual, but what he discerned and called into existence; and he has permitted evil, because it is enveloped in the best plan which is found in the region of possibles; that plan the supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. It is this notion which at once satisfies the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of G.o.d, and yet leaves room for the entrance of evil."(72)

In reading the lofty speculations of Leibnitz, we have been often led to wonder how one, whose genius was so great, could have permitted himself to rest in conceptions which appear so vague and indistinct. In the above pa.s.sage we have both light and obscurity; and we find it difficult to determine which predominates over the other. We are clearly told that G.o.d is not the author of evil, because this proceeds from abstract forms which were from all eternity enveloped in his understanding, and not from any operation of his will. But how does evil proceed from abstract forms; from the ideal region of the possible? Leibnitz does not mean that evil proceeds from abstract ideas, before they are embodied in the creation of real moral agents. Why then did G.o.d create beings which he knew from all eternity would commit sin? and why, having created them, did he contribute to their sins by a divine concourse? This is coming down from the _ideal_ region of the possible, into the world of _real_ difficulties.

According to the philosophy of Leibnitz, G.o.d created every intelligent being in the universe with a perfect knowledge of its whole destiny; and there is, moreover, a concourse of the divine will with all their volitions. Now, here we are in the very midst of the concrete world, and here is a difficulty which cannot be avoided by a flight into the ideal region of the possible. How can there be a concourse of the divine will with the human will in one and the same sinful volition, without a stain upon the immaculate purity of G.o.d? How can the Father of Lights, by an operation of his will, contribute to our sinful volitions, without prejudice to his holiness? This is the problem which Leibnitz has promised to solve; and we shall, with all patience, listen to his solution.

The solution of this problem, says he, is effected by means of the "privative nature of evil." We shall state this part of his system in his own words: "As to the physical concourse," says he, "it is here that it is necessary to consider that truth which has made so much noise in the schools, since St. Augustine has shown its importance, that evil is a privation, whereas the action of G.o.d produces only the positive. This reply pa.s.ses for a defective one, and even for something chimerical in the minds of many men; but here is an example sufficiently a.n.a.logous, which may undeceive them."

"The celebrated Kepler, and after him M. Descartes, have spoken of the _natural inertia_ of bodies, and that we can consider it as a perfect image, and even as a pattern of the original limitation of creatures, in order to make us see that privation is the formal cause of the imperfections and inconveniences which are found in substance as well as in actions. Suppose that the current of a river carries along with it many vessels which have different cargoes, some of wood, and others of stone; some more, and some less. It will happen that the vessels which are more heavily laden will move more slowly than the others, provided there is nothing to aid their progress.... Let us compare the force which the current exercises over the vessels and what it communicates to them, with the action of G.o.d, who produces and preserves whatever is positive in the creature, and imparts to them perfection, being, and force; let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the more heavily laden vessel with the defect which is found in the qualities and in the actions of the creature, and we shall perceive that there is nothing so just as this comparison.

The current is the cause of the movement of the vessel, but not of its r.e.t.a.r.dation; G.o.d is the cause of the perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defect in its actions. Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine, and the schoolmen, have reason to say that G.o.d is the material cause of evil, which consists in what is positive, and not the formal cause of it, which consists in privation, as we can say that the current is the material cause of the r.e.t.a.r.dation, without being its formal cause; that is to say, is the cause of the swiftness of the vessel, without being the cause of the bounds of that swiftness. G.o.d is as little the cause of sin, as the current of the river is the cause of the r.e.t.a.r.dation of the vessel."(73) Or as Leibnitz elsewhere says, G.o.d is the author of all that is positive in our volitions, and the pravity of them arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature.

We have many objections to this mode of explaining the origin of moral evil, some few of which we shall proceed to state. 1. It is a hopeless attempt to ill.u.s.trate the processes of the mind by the a.n.a.logies of matter. All such ill.u.s.trations are better adapted to darken and confound the subject, than to throw light upon it. If we would know anything about the nature of moral evil, or its origin, we must study the subject in the light of consciousness, and in the light of consciousness alone. Dugald Stewart has conferred on Descartes the proud distinction of having been the first philosopher to teach the true method according to which the science of mind should be studied. "He laid it down as a first principle,"

says Stewart, "that nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at all subservient to the knowledge of mind; and that the sensible images involved in all our common forms of speaking concerning its operations, are to be guarded against with the most anxious care, as tending to confound in our apprehensions, two cla.s.ses of phenomena, which it is of the last importance to distinguish accurately from each other."(74) 2. The privative nature of evil, as it is called, is purely a figment of the brain; it is an invention of the schoolmen, which has no corresponding reality in nature. When Adam put forth his hand to pluck the forbidden fruit, and ate it, he committed a sinful act. But why was it sinful?

Because he knew it was wrong; because his act was a voluntary and known transgression of the command of G.o.d. Now, if G.o.d had caused all that was positive in this sinful act, that is, if he had caused Adam to will to put forth his hand and eat the fruit, it is plain that he would have been the cause of his transgression. Nothing can be more chimerical, it seems to us, than this distinction between being the author of the substance of an act, and the author of its pravity. If Adam had obeyed, that is, if he had refused to eat the forbidden fruit, such an act would not have been more positive than the actual series of volitions by which he transgressed. 3.

If what we call sin, arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature, as the slowness of a vessel in descending a stream arises from its cargo, how can he be to blame for it; or, in other words, how can it be moral evil at all? And, 4. Leibnitz has certainly committed a very great oversight in this attempt to account for the origin of evil. He explains it, by saying that it arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature which limits its receptivity; but does he mean that G.o.d cannot communicate holiness to the creature? Does he mean that G.o.d endeavours to communicate holiness, and fails in consequence of the necessary imperfection of the creature? If so, what becomes of the doctrine which he everywhere advances, that G.o.d can very easily cause virtue or holiness to exist if he should choose to do so? If G.o.d can very easily cause this to exist, as Leibnitz contends he can, notwithstanding the necessary imperfection of the creature, why has he not done so? Is it not evident, that the philosophy of Leibnitz merely plays over the surface of this great difficulty, and decks it out with the ornaments of fancy, instead of reaching down to the bottom of it, and casting the illuminations of his genius into its depths?

Section III.

The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that the scheme of necessity does not make G.o.d the author of sin.

"This remarkable man," says Sir James Mackintosh, "the metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists of New-England, when their stern doctrine retained its vigorous authority. His power of subtle argument, perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpa.s.sed among men, was joined, as in some of the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his piety to fervour." It is in his great work on the will, as well as in some of his miscellaneous observations, that Edwards has put forth the powers of his mind, in order to show that the scheme of necessity does not obscure the l.u.s.tre of the divine perfections. With the exception of the Essais de Theodicee of Leibnitz, it is perhaps the greatest effort the human mind has ever made to get rid of the seeming antagonism between the scheme of necessity and the holiness of G.o.d.

According to the system of Edwards, as well as that of his opponents, sin would not have been committed unless it were permitted by G.o.d. But in the scheme of Edwards, the agency of G.o.d bears a more intimate relation to the origin and existence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it.

"G.o.d," says he, disposes "the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow."(75) And this occurrence of sin, in consequence of his disposing and ordering events, enters into his design. For Edwards truly says, that "If G.o.d disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things _knowingly_ and on _design_. G.o.d does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accidentally and unawares, either _without_ or _beside_ his intention."

Thus, we are told, that G.o.d so arranges and disposes the events of his providence as to bring sin to pa.s.s, and that he does so designedly. This broad proposition is laid down, not merely with reference to sin in general, but to certain great sins in particular. "So that," says Edwards, "what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what G.o.d brought to pa.s.s or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word." According to Edwards, then, the events of G.o.d's providence are arranged with a view to bring all the sinful deeds of men "certainly and infallibly" to pa.s.s, as well as their holy acts.