A Smaller History of Rome Part 7

Early in the spring of B.C. 219 he proceeded to lay siege to Saguntum, a city of Greek origin, founded by the Zacynthians. Though situated to the south of the Iberus, and therefore not included under the protection of the treaty between Hasdrubal and the Romans, Sagantum had concluded an alliance with the latter people. There could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon this city would inevitably bring on a war with Rome; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or, rather, it was unquestionably his real object. The immediate pretext of his invasion was the same of which the Romans so often availed themselves--some injury inflicted by the Saguntines upon one of the neighboring tribes, who invoked the a.s.sistance of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city was long and desperate, and it was not till after a siege of nearly eight months that he made himself master of the place. During all this period the Romans sent no a.s.sistance to their allies. They had, indeed, as soon as they heard of the siege, dispatched emba.s.sadors to Hannibal, but he referred them for an answer to the government at home, and they could obtain no satisfaction from the Carthaginians, in whose councils the war-party had now a decided predominance. A second emba.s.sy was sent, after the fall of Saguntum, to demand the surrender of Hannibal, in atonement for the breach of the treaty. After much discussion, Q. Fabius, one of the Roman emba.s.sadors, holding up a fold of his toga, said, "I carry here peace and war; choose ye which ye will." "Give us which you will," was the reply. "Then take war," said Fabius, letting fall his toga. "We accept the gift," cried the Senators of Carthage. Thus commenced the Second Punic War.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Coin of Hiero.]

[Footnote 30: Gallicus ager.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Lake Trasimenus.]

CHAPTER XII.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: FIRST PERIOD, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNae. B.C.

218-216.

The Second Punic War was not so much a contest between the powers of two great nations--between Carthage and Rome--as between the individual genius of Hannibal on one hand, and the combined energies of the Roman people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar.

His command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the government at Carthage, and the latter seemed disposed to devolve all responsibility upon him. Even now they did little themselves to prepare for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who, after the conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting the scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the same time he did not neglect to provide for the defense of Spain and Africa during his absence. In the former country he placed his brother Hasdrubal, with a considerable army, great part of which was composed of Africans, while he sent over a large body of Spanish troops to contribute to the defense of Africa, and even of Carthage itself.

All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter quarters at New Carthage in the spring of B.C. 218, and crossed the Iberus with an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. The tribes between that river and the Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance, and, though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of 11,000 men under Hanno to maintain this newly-acquired province. His forces were farther thinned by desertion during the pa.s.sage of the Pyrenees, which obliged him to send home a large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, but one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition; for the Gaulish tribes through which he pa.s.sed were favorably disposed to him, or had been previously gained over by his enemies.

The Consul P. Cornelius Scipio had been ordered to proceed to Spain, but various causes had detained him in Italy, and upon landing at Ma.s.silia (Ma.r.s.eilles) he found that Hannibal was already advancing toward the Rhone. Meantime the Carthaginian general effected his pa.s.sage across the river, notwithstanding the opposition of the Gauls; and when Scipio marched up the left bank of the river he found that Hannibal had advanced into the interior of Gaul, and was already three days in advance of him. Despairing, therefore, of overtaking Hannibal, he determined to sail back to Italy and await him in Cisalpine Gaul; but as the Republic had already an army in that province, he sent the greater part of his own forces into Spain under the command of his brother Cn.

Scipio. This prudent step probably saved Rome; for if the Carthaginians had maintained the undisputed mastery of Spain, they might have concentrated all their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy, and have sent him such strong re-enforcements after the battle of Cannae as would have compelled Rome to submit.

Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, continued his march up the left bank of the river as far as its confluence with the Isere. Here he interposed in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and, by lending his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-operation of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther progress. But in his pa.s.sage across the Alps he was attacked by the barbarians, and as he struggled through the narrow and dangerous defiles the enemy destroyed numbers of his men. It was some days before he reached the summit of the pa.s.s. Thenceforth he suffered but little from hostile attacks, but the descent was difficult and dangerous. The natural difficulties of the road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the beginning of October, at which time the snows had already commenced in the high Alps), caused him almost as much loss as the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of the mountains. So heavy were his losses from these combined causes, that, when he at length emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po and encamped in the friendly country of the Insubres, he had with him no more than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse.[31] Such were the forces with which he descended into Italy to attempt the overthrow of a power that a few years before was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.

Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which the actual pa.s.sage of the Alps had occupied fifteen days. Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone.

After a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly reduced, and took their princ.i.p.al city (Turin). The news of the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn his attention toward a more formidable enemy. In the first action, which took place in the plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favor. The Romans were completely routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence of which he hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed the Po higher up, and, advancing to Placentia, offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by the other Consul, Ti. Semp.r.o.nius Longus, who had hastened from Ariminum to his support. Their combined armies were greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Semp.r.o.nius was eager to bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force. The result was decisive; the Romans were completely defeated, with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with the two Consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. The battles of the Ticinus and Trebia had been fought in December, and the winter had already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered severely from cold, and all his elephants perished except one. But his victory had caused all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his favor, and he was now able to take up his winter quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among the Gauls while he awaited the approach of spring.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Coasts of the Mediterranean, ill.u.s.trating the History of the Punic.]

As soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B.C.

217), Hannibal entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately declared in his favor, and descended by the valley of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this route in order to avoid the Roman armies, which guarded the more obvious pa.s.ses of the Apennines; but the hardships and difficulties which he encountered in struggling through the marshes were immense; great numbers of his horses and beasts of burden perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length, however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.

The Consuls for this year were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. The latter was the author of the celebrated Agrarian Law which occasioned the Gallic War, and in his first consulship he had gained a great victory over the Insubrian Gauls (see p. 79)(Sixth paragraph of Chapter XI.--Transcriber). He had been raised to his second consulship by popular favor, in spite of the opposition of the Senate; and he hurried from Rome before the Ides of March,[32] lest the Senate might throw any obstacle in the way of his entering upon his consulship. He was a man of great energy, but headstrong and reckless. When Hannibal arrived at Faesulae, Flaminius was with his army at Arretium. It was always the object of Hannibal to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, and therefore, in moving from Faesulae, he pa.s.sed by the Roman general, and advanced toward Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of march. Flaminius immediately broke up his camp, and, following the traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared for him. His army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circ.u.mstances, where it was hemmed in between rocky heights, previously occupied by the enemy, and the Lake of Trasimenus. Its destruction was almost complete.

Thousands fell by the sword, among whom was the Consul himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost only 1500 men. Hannibal's treatment of the captives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which he afterward uniformly acted; the Roman citizens alone were retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the nations of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in the position of the leader of a national movement rather than that of a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give time for this feeling to display itself that he did not, after so decisive a victory, push on toward Rome itself; but, after an unsuccessful attempt upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great part of the summer, and was able effectually to refresh his troops, who had suffered much from the hardships of their previous marches; but no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he had looked for among the Italians.

Meantime the Romans had collected a fresh army, which they placed under the command of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been elected Dictator by the Comitia of the Centuries. Fabius formed a different plan for the campaign. He determined to keep the heights, and not to risk a battle, but at the same time to watch the Carthaginian army, cut off its supplies, and hara.s.s and annoy it in every possible way. From pursuing this policy he received the surname of _Cunctator_, or the _Lingerer_.

Hannibal now recrossed the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, without opposition, that fertile territory.

But he was unable either to make himself master of any of the towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general contented himself with occupying the mountain pa.s.ses leading from Samnium into Campania, by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had caught him, as it were, in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by an ingenious stratagem, pa.s.sed the defiles of the Apennines without loss, and established himself in the plains of Apulia, where he collected supplies from all sides, in order to prepare for the winter.

Meantime the Romans, having become impatient at the inactivity of Fabius, raised Minucius, the Master of the Horse, to an equality in command with Fabius. His rashness very nearly gave Hannibal the opportunity, for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army by a decisive blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from destruction; and Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage, took up his winter quarters at the small town of Geronium. Minucius acknowledged his error, and resumed his post of Master of the Horse.

During the winter the Romans made preparations for bringing an unusually large force into the field. The people thought that it needed only a man of energy and decision at the head of an overwhelming force to bring the war to a close. They therefore raised to the consulship C.

Terentius Varro, said to have been the son of a butcher, who had been for some time regarded as the champion of the popular party. The Senate regarded this election with dismay, as Varro possessed no military experience; and they therefore persuaded the people to appoint as his colleague L. aemilius Paullus, who had distinguished himself by the way in which he had conducted the Illyrian war during his consulship.

Hannibal remained at Geronium until late in the spring (B.C. 216), when, compelled to move by the want of provisions, he surprised the Roman magazines at Cannae, a small town of Apulia, and established his head-quarters there until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile the two Roman Consuls arrived at the head of an army of little less than 90,000 men. To this mighty host Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of Cannae. We have no statement of the numbers of his army, but it is certain that it must have been greatly inferior to that of the enemy; notwithstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry, and the disciplined valor of his African and Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive victory. The immense army of the Romans was not only defeated, but annihilated, and between forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, among whom was the Consul aemilius Paullus, both the Consuls of the preceding year, the late Master of the Horse, Minucius, above eighty senators, and a mult.i.tude of the wealthy knights who composed the Roman cavalry. The other Consul, Varro, escaped with a few hors.e.m.e.n to Venusia, and a small band of resolute men forced their way from the Roman camp to Ca.n.u.sium; all the rest were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. Hannibal has been generally blamed for not following up his advantage at once, after so decisive a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome itself--a measure which was strongly urged upon him by Maharbal. "Only send me on with the cavalry," said this officer, "and within five days thou shalt sup in the Capitol." Whatever may be the motives that deterred Hannibal from marching upon Rome, we can not but be surprised at his apparent inactivity after the battle. He probably expected that so brilliant a success would immediately produce a general rising among the nations of Italy, and remained for a time quietly in Apulia, until they should have had time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes disappointed; the Hirpinians, all the Samnites (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, declared in favor of Carthage.

But, though the whole of the south of Italy was thus apparently lost to the Romans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so decisive as it would at first appear; for the Latin colonies, which still, without exception, remained faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the revolted provinces; and the Greek cities on the coast, though mostly disposed to join the Carthaginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with a Carthaginian force. Hannibal marched first into Samnium, and from thence into Campania, where he obtained possession of the important city of Capua, the gates of which were opened to him by the popular party. Here he established his army in winter quarters. Thus ends the first period of the war, in which Hannibal had met with uninterrupted success. Three great victories in three years, followed by the revolt of a city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance, seemed to promise a speedy termination of the war.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Route of Hannibal. (See p. 90.) (After footnote 32--Transcriber)]

[Footnote 31: The pa.s.s of the Alps which Hannibal crossed was probably the Graian Alps, or _Little St. Bernard_. See note "On the Pa.s.sage of Hannibal across the Alps" at the end of this chapter.]

[Footnote 32: At this time the Consuls entered upon their office on the Ides of March. It was not till B.C. 153 that the consulship commenced on the Kalends of January.]

NOTE ON HANNIBAL'S Pa.s.sAGE ACROSS THE ALPS.

(See p. 84.)(Fourth paragraph of Chapter XII.--Transcriber)

The narrative in the text is taken from that of the Greek historian Polybius, which is certainly by far the most trustworthy that has descended to us; but that author has nowhere clearly stated by which of the pa.s.ses across the Alps Hannibal effected his march; and this question has given rise to much controversy both in ancient and modern times. Into this discussion our limits will not allow us to enter, but the following may be briefly stated as the general results: 1. That after a careful examination of the text of Polybius, and comparison of the different localities, his narrative will be found, on the whole, to agree best with the supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps, or _Little St. Bernard_; though it can not be denied that there are some difficulties attending this line, especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2. That Caelius Antipater certainly represented him as taking this route (Liv., xxi., 38); and as he is known to have followed the Greek history of Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the greatest weight. 3. That Livy and Strabo, on the contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the Cottian Alps, or _Mont Genevre_. But the main argument that appears to have weighed with Livy, as it has done with several modern writers on the subject, is the a.s.sumption that Hannibal descended in the first instance into the country of the Taurinians, which is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, who says expressly that he descended among the Insubrians, and _subsequently_ mentions his attack on the Taurinians. 4. That, as according to Livy himself (xxi., 29), the Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's guides were Boians, it was natural that these should conduct him by the pa.s.sage that led directly into the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the Insubrians, rather than into that of the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. And this remark will serve to explain why Hannibal chose apparently a longer route, instead of the more direct one of Mont Genevre. Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he censures the exaggerations and absurdities with which earlier writers had enc.u.mbered their narrative, does not intimate that any doubt was entertained as to the line of march; and Pompey, in a letter to the Senate, written in 73 B.C., alludes to the route of Hannibal across the Alps as something well known. Hence it appears clear that the pa.s.sage by which he crossed them must have been one of those frequented in subsequent times by the Romans. This argument seems decisive against the claims of _Mont Cenis_, which have been advocated by some modern writers, that pa.s.s having apparently never been used till the Middle Ages--See _Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography_, vol. ii., p. 334, 335.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Plain of Cannae.]

CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND PUNIC WAR: SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE REVOLT OF CAPUA TO THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS. B.C. 215-207.

Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, and the enervating effect which these produced upon the army of Hannibal became a favorite theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. The futility of such declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the superiority of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may be truly said that the winter spent at Capua (B.C. 216-215) was in great measure the turning-point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war a.s.sumed an altered character. The experiment of what he could effect with his single army had now been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his victories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now found himself, apparently at least, in a condition to commence the execution of his long-cherished plan--that of arming Italy itself against the Romans, and crushing the ruling power by means of her own subjects. It was to this object that his attention was henceforth mainly directed. From this time, also, the Romans changed their plan of operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great army in the field, they hemmed in his movements on all sides, guarded all the most important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every province of Italy to thwart the operations of his lieutenants and check the rising disposition to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in detail the complicated operations of the subsequent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appearing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, and astonishing and often baffling the enemy by the rapidity of his marches. All that we can do is to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished each successive campaign.

The campaign of B.C. 215 was not marked by any decisive events. The Consuls were Q. Fabius Maximus (whose plan of conducting the war had been fully vindicated by the terrible defeat of Cannae) and Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius Gracchus. With the advance of spring Hannibal took up his camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements from Carthage, he was at hand to support his partisans in Campania and oppose the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts on c.u.mae and Neapolis were foiled, and even after he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior, however, to what he had expected), he sustained a repulse before Nola, which was magnified by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter approached he withdrew into Apulia, and took up his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other prospects were already opening before him. In his camp on Tifata he had received emba.s.sies from Philip, king of Macedon, and Hieronymus of Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed, and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and raised up two formidable enemies against the Roman power.

These two collateral wars in some degree drew off the attention of both parties from that in Italy itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Carthaginian general a chain of armies which fettered all his operations; and though Hannibal was ever on the watch for the opportunity of striking a blow, the campaign of B.C. 214 was still less decisive than that of the preceding year. Fabius was again elected Consul, and Marcellus was appointed his colleague. Early in the summer Hannibal advanced from Apulia to his former station on Mount Tifata to watch over the safety of Capua; from thence he had descended to the Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of surprising the important city of Tarentum.

Thither he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too late; Tarentum had been secured by a Roman force. After this his operations were of little importance, until he again took up his winter quarters in Apulia.

During the following summer (B.C. 213), while all eyes were turned toward the war in Sicily, Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the neighborhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still entertained of making himself master of that important city rendering him unwilling to quit that quarter of Italy. Before the close of the ensuing winter he was rewarded with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum was betrayed into his hands by two of its citizens. The advantage, however, was incomplete, for a Roman garrison still held possession of the citadel, from which he was unable to dislodge them. The next year (B.C. 212) was marked by important events in Sicily and Spain, to which we must now direct our attention.

Hiero, so long the faithful ally of Rome, died shortly after the battle of Cannae (B.C. 216), and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a vain youth, who abandoned the alliance of Rome for that of Carthage. But he was a.s.sa.s.sinated after a reign of fifteen months, and a republican form of government was established in Syracuse. A contest ensued between the Roman and Carthaginian parties in Syracuse, but the former ultimately prevailed, and Epicydes and Hippocrates, two brothers whom Hannibal had sent to Syracuse to espouse his interests, had to quit the city, and took refuge at Leontini. Such was the state of affairs when the Consul Marcellus arrived in Sicily (B.C. 214). He forthwith marched against Leontini, which Epicydes and Hippocrates defended with a considerable force. He took the city by storm, and, though he spared the inhabitants, executed in cold blood 2000 Roman deserters whom he found among the troops that had formed the garrison. This sanguinary act at once alienated the minds of the Sicilians, and alarmed the mercenary troops in the service of Syracuse. The latter immediately joined Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had made their escape to Herbessus; the gates of Syracuse were opened to them by their partisans within the walls, and the party hostile to Rome was thus established in the undisputed command of that city. Marcellus now appeared before Syracuse at the head of his army, and, after a fruitless summons to the inhabitants, proceeded to lay siege to the city both by sea and land.

His attacks were vigorous and unremitting, and were directed especially against the quarter of Achradina[33] from the side of the sea; but, though he brought many powerful military engines against the walls, these were rendered wholly unavailing by the superior skill and science of Archimedes, which were employed on the side of the besieged. All the efforts of the a.s.sailants were baffled; and the Roman soldiers were inspired with so great a dread of Archimedes and his engines,[34] that Marcellus was compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the city by open force, and to turn the siege into a blockade. The siege was prolonged far on into the summer of B.C. 212, nor did there appear any prospect of its termination, as the communications of the besieged by sea were almost entirely open. In this state of things Marcellus fortunately discovered a part of the walls more accessible than the rest; and, having prepared scaling ladders, effected an entrance at this point during the night which followed a great festival, and thus made himself master of Epipolae. The two quarters called Tyche and Neapolis were now at his mercy, and were given up to plunder; but Epicydes still held the island-citadel and the important quarter of Achradina, which formed two separate and strong fortresses. Marcellus, however, made himself master of the fort of Euryalus, and had closely invested Achradina, when the Carthaginian army under Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to the relief of the city. Their efforts were, however, in vain; all their attacks on the camp of Marcellus were repulsed, and they were unable to effect a junction with Epicydes and the Syracusan garrison. The unhealthiness of the country soon gave rise to a pestilence which carried off both the Carthaginian generals and led to the entire break-up of the army. Shortly afterward the treachery of a leader of Spanish mercenaries in the Syracusan service opened to Marcellus the gates of Achradina, and in the general attack that ensued he made himself master of the island of Ortygia also. The city was given up to plunder, and Archimedes was slain by a Roman soldier, being so intent upon a mathematical problem at the time that he did not answer a question that was asked him. He was deeply regretted by Marcellus, who gave orders for his burial, and befriended his surviving relatives.[35]

The booty found in the captured city was immense: besides the money in the royal treasury, which was set apart for the coffers of the state, Marcellus carried off many of the works of art with which the city had been adorned, to grace his own triumph and the temples at Rome. This was the first instance of a practice which afterward became so general; and it gave great offense not only to the Greeks of Sicily, but to a large party at Rome itself.

The fall of Syracuse was followed, though not immediately, by the subjugation of the whole island by the Romans; but these successes were counterbalanced by the defeat and death of the two Scipios in Spain. We have already seen that P. Scipio, when he landed at Ma.s.silia and found himself unable to overtake Hannibal in Gaul, sent his brother Cneius with the army into Spain, while he himself returned to Italy. In the following year (B.C. 217) Publius himself crossed over into Spain, where he found that his brother had already obtained a firm footing. They continued in Spain for several years, during which they gained many victories, and prevented Hasdrubal from marching into Italy to support his victorious brother. When Hasdrubal was recalled to Africa to oppose Syphax, one of the Numidian kings, who was carrying on war against Carthage, the Scipios availed themselves of his absence to strengthen their power still farther. They gained over new tribes to the Roman cause, took 20,000 Celtiberians into their pay, and felt themselves so strong in B.C. 212 that they resolved to cross the Iberus and to make a vigorous effort to drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. They accordingly divided their forces; but the result was fatal. Publius was destroyed, with the greater part of his troops; and Cneius was also defeated, and fell in battle, twenty-nine days after the death of his brother. These victories seemed to establish the superiority of Carthage in Spain, and open the way for Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy.

In Italy (B.C. 212) the two Consuls Appius Claudius and Q. Fulvius began to draw together their forces for the purpose of besieging Capua.

Hannibal advanced to relieve it, and compelled the Consuls to withdraw; but he was unable to force either of them to fight. Shortly afterward he returned again to the south to urge on the siege of the citadel of Tarentum, which still held out; and he spent the winter and the whole of the ensuing spring (B.C. 211) in its immediate neighborhood. But during his absence the Consuls had renewed the siege of Capua, and prosecuted it with such activity, that they had succeeded in surrounding the city with a double line of intrenchments. The pressing danger once more summoned Hannibal to its relief. He accordingly presented himself before the Roman camp, and attacked their lines from without, while the garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous sally from the walls. Both attacks were however repulsed, and Hannibal, foiled in his attempt to raise the siege by direct means, determined on the bold manoeuvre of marching directly upon Rome itself, in hopes of thus compelling the Consuls to abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to provide for the defense of the city. But this daring scheme was again frustrated; the appearance of Hannibal before the gates of Rome for a moment struck terror through the city; but a considerable body of troops was at the time within the walls; and the Consul Fulvius, as soon as he heard of Hannibal's march, hastened, with a portion of the besieging army, from Capua, while he still left with the other Consul a force amply sufficient to carry on the siege. Hannibal was thus disappointed in the main object of his advance, and he had no means of effecting any thing against Rome itself, where Fulvius and Fabius confined themselves strictly to the defensive, allowing him to ravage the whole country without opposition, up to the very walls of Rome. Nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly recrossed the Anio, and marched slowly and sullenly through the land of the Sabines and Samnites, ravaging the country which he traversed. From thence he retired to the Bruttii, leaving Capua to its fate. The city soon after surrendered to the Romans. Its punishment was terrible. All the leaders of the insurrection were beheaded; the chief men were imprisoned; and the rest of the people were sold. The city and its territory were confiscated, and became part of the Roman domain.

The commencement of the next season (B.C. 210) was marked by the fall of Salapia, which was betrayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruction of the army of the Proconsul Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea. The Consul Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided an action for the rest of the campaign, while he hara.s.sed his opponent by every possible means. Thus the rest of that summer too wore away without any important results. But this state of comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to the cause of Hannibal; the nations of Italy that had espoused that cause when triumphant now began to waver in their attachment; and in the course of the following summer (B.C. 209) the Samnites and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were admitted to favorable terms. A still more disastrous blow to the Carthaginian cause was the loss of Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal. In vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman general into a snare; the wary Fabius eluded his toils. The recovery of Tarentum was the last exploit in the military life of the aged Fabius, and was a n.o.ble completion to his long list of achievements. From the time of the battle of Cannae he had directed almost exclusively the councils of his country, and his policy had been pre-eminently successful; but the times now demanded bolder measures, and something else was necessary than the caution of the Lingerer to bring the war to a close.

After the fall of Tarentum Hannibal still traversed the open country unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his enemies. Yet we can not suppose that he any longer looked for ultimate success from any efforts of his own; his object was doubtless now only to maintain his ground in the south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear in the north of Italy, an event to which he had long anxiously looked forward. Yet the following summer (B.C. 208) was marked by some brilliant achievements.

The two Consuls, Crispinus and Marcellus, who were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, allowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally wounded. Marcellus was one of the ablest of the Roman generals. Hannibal displayed a generous sympathy for his fate, and caused due honors to be paid to his remains.