A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution Part 1

A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution.

by C. M. Williams.

PREFACE

Of the Ethics founded on the theory of Evolution, I have considered only the independent theories which have been elaborated to systems. I have omitted consideration of many works which bear on Evolutional Ethics as practical or exhortative treatises, or compilations of facts, but which involve no distinctly worked-out theory of morals. On the other hand, I have ventured to include Professor von Gizycki's "Moralphilosophie"

among the theoretical systems founded upon the theory of Evolution, since, although the popular form of the work renders the prominence of the latter theory impracticable, the warp of Evolution is clearly perceptible throughout it. In a.n.a.lyzing Hoffding's work, I have made use not of the Danish but the German edition of his "Ethics," which was translated with his cooperation.

It is generally customary for an author to acknowledge, in the preface of his book, his especial indebtedness to those who have most influenced the growth of his thought in the line of research treated in the book.

But I find this duty a difficult one to perform. Many of the authors whose work has aided me are cited in the text. But it is impossible, with regard to many points, to say to whom one is indebted, or most indebted, since much that one reads is so a.s.similated into one's organized thought, and changed in the process of a.s.similation, that its source and original form are no longer remembered. Besides this, much is always owed to personal influence and argument, and also to indefinite and minute forces whose workings it is impossible to trace. The growth of thought is, like any other growth, by imperceptible degrees and infinitesimal increments, and we breathe in ideas from our mental atmosphere as we breathe in perfumes or infections from our physical atmosphere. It is, of course, unnecessary to mention Mr. Spencer's name in this connection, since it goes without saying, that every one who writes on Ethics in their relation to the Theory of Evolution must owe much to him, even where he differs from him. But there is perhaps one name which it is fitting that I should mention here, since the influence of its bearer on my work, although one for which I have reason to feel peculiarly indebted, is not of a nature to determine its mention in connection with any particular theory. I refer to my first teacher of Philosophy, Professor M. Stuart Phelps, now deceased, whose life and labor all those who had the privilege of sharing his instruction and benefiting by his kindness must ever hold in grateful remembrance.

A REVIEW OF EVOLUTIONAL ETHICS

PART I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the preface to the latest edition of his "Naturliche Schopfungsgeschichte," Haeckel, writing of recent developments of thought on the subject of evolution, and the change of att.i.tude observable in our later literature, says: "The vast ma.s.s of literature, yearly increasing in astonishing measure, on the theory of evolution in its various branches, best ill.u.s.trates the remarkable change which public opinion has undergone. Twenty years ago, the greater part of this literature was in opposition to Darwin; to-day such opposition is not to be feared from well-informed students of science. On the other hand, almost the whole literature of biology now gives testimony in Darwin's favor, for almost all zoological, and botanical, anatomic, and ontogenetic works are founded upon the principles of the development of species, and derive from Darwin their best and most fruitful ideas."

No science is a better exponent of this radical and important change than that which has to do with the principles of morals; for by no science was the theory of evolution a.s.sailed, in the beginning, with more vehemence and indefatigability. Not only did the zealous adherents of Christian dogma fear to find, in the destruction of all distinct barriers between the different forms of animal life, a ground for the denial of G.o.d's especial favor to man, and the worshippers of emotional morals become indignant at the unveiling of the divine Mystic (as if only ignorance were reverence, and only the Unknown worthy of homage), but even the less conservative schools of philosophy often showed themselves unfavorable or hesitant towards the new ideas, dreading their implications. All this is changed. If England's most popular living philosopher was among the first to declare himself for Darwin, and to revise his whole system in accordance with the theory of evolution, so that this theory early began to find adherents among students of philosophy in all lands where English is spoken, it was not long before the newer schools of France and Germany began to follow in their wake.

Now every year, and almost every month, brings with it a fresh supply of books, pamphlets, and magazine articles on "The Evolution of Morality,"

"L'Evolution de la Morale," "Die Evolution der Sittlichkeit,"

"Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," etc. So many are the waters which now pour themselves into this common stream that the current threatens soon to become too deep and swift for any but the most expert swimmers.

In a short review of Evolutional Ethics, it will be impossible to consider all the literature that has added to our knowledge on this subject; we must confine ourselves to the few books that are most prominent. The first laborer in this line, not only indirectly through general theory, but also directly through particular theory, is, as usual, Charles Darwin; and though Darwin was himself no psychologist, and moreover advances his ideas on the origin and development of morals only in the tentative manner that necessarily attaches to a first attempt when made by so conscientious a thinker, he doubtless suggested to all other writers in this field a very large part of that which was best in their work. A Review of Evolutional Ethics must, therefore, in order to start with the proper origin of the science, begin with

CHARLES DARWIN

In the essay on "Instinct" appended to G. J. Romanes' "Mental Evolution in Animals,"[1] Darwin says: "The social instinct is indispensable to some animals, useful to still more, and apparently only pleasant to some few animals." The social tendency being thus cla.s.sed as an instinct, it belongs to our work to examine what are Darwin's theories as to the origin and nature of instinct.

In the chapter on "Instinct," in "The Origin of Species," Darwin premises: "I have nothing to do with the origin of the mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself."[2] Again: "Frederick Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have compared instinct with habit. This comparison gives, I think, an accurate notion of the frame of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but not necessarily of its origin.... If we suppose any habitual action to become inherited--and it can be shown that this does sometimes happen--then the resemblance between what originally was a habit and an instinct becomes so close as not to be distinguished.... But it would be a serious error to suppose that the greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to succeeding generations. It can be clearly shown that the most wonderful instincts with which we are acquainted, namely, those of the hive-bee and of many ants, could not possibly have been acquired by habit."[3] Of one of the habits of these last-named insects Darwin, however, writes: "I have not rarely felt that small and trifling instincts were a greater difficulty on our theory than those which have so justly excited the wonder of mankind; for an instinct, if really of no considerable importance in the struggle for life, could not be modified or formed through natural selection. Perhaps as striking an instance as can be given is that of the workers of the hive-bee arranged in files and ventilating, by a peculiar movement of their wings, the well-closed hive: this ventilation has been artificially imitated, and as it is carried on even during winter, there can be no doubt that it is to bring in free air and displace the carbonic acid gas; therefore _it is in truth indispensable, and we may imagine the stages_--a few bees first going to the orifice to fan themselves--_by which the instinct might have been arrived at_."[4] Again: "Glancing at instincts, marvellous as some are, they offer no greater difficulty than do corporeal structures on the theory of the natural selection of successive slight, but profitable modifications. We can thus understand why nature moves by graduated steps in endowing different animals of the same cla.s.s with their several instincts."[5] And again: "As I believe, the most wonderful of all known instincts, that of the hive-bee, can be explained by natural selection having taken advantage of numerous successive, slight modifications of simpler instincts, natural selection having, by slow degrees, more and more perfectly led the bees to sweep equal spheres at a given distance from each other in a double layer, and to build up and excavate the wax along the planes of intersection; the bees, of course, no more knowing that they swept their spheres at one particular distance from each other, than they know what are the several angles of the hexagonal prisms and of the basal rhombic plates; the motive power of the process of natural selection having been the construction of cells of due strength and of the proper size and shape for the larvae, this being effected with the greatest possible economy of labor and wax; that individual swarm which thus made the best cells with least labor, and least waste of honey in the secretion of wax, having succeeded best, and having transmitted their newly acquired economical instincts to new swarms, which in their turn will have had the best chance of succeeding in the struggle for existence."[6] And further, of instinct in general: "It will be universally admitted that instincts are as important as corporeal structures for the welfare of each species, under its present conditions of life. Under changed conditions of life, it is at least possible that slight modifications of instinct might be profitable to a species; and if it can be shown that instincts do vary ever so little, then I can see no difficulty in natural selection preserving and continually acc.u.mulating variations of instinct to any extent that was profitable. It is thus, as I believe, that all the most complex and wonderful instincts have originated. As modifications of corporeal structure arise from, and are increased by, use or habit, and are diminished or lost by disuse, so I do not doubt it has been with instincts"; though Darwin adds: "But I believe that the effects of habit are in many cases of subordinate importance to the effects of the natural selection of what may be called spontaneous variations of instincts; that is, of variations produced by the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure."

However, "No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except by the slow and gradual acc.u.mulation of numerous slight, yet profitable, variations."[7] And of habit as connected with heredity, Darwin writes: "Changed habits produce an inherited effect, as in the period of the flowering of plants when transported from one climate to another. With animals the increased use or disuse of parts has had a more marked influence.... No breeder doubts how strong is the tendency to inheritance; that like produces like is his fundamental belief; doubts have been thrown on this principle only by theoretical writers.... If strange and rare deviations of structure are really inherited, less strange and commoner deviations may be freely admitted to be inheritable. Perhaps the correct way of viewing the whole subject would be to look at the inheritance of every character whatever as the rule, and non-inheritance as the anomaly.... If it could be shown that our domestic varieties manifested a strong tendency to reversion--that is, to lose their acquired characters whilst kept under the same conditions, and whilst kept in a considerable body, so that free intercrossing might check, by blending together, any slight deviations in their structure, in such case I grant that we could deduce nothing from domestic varieties in regard to species. But there is not a shadow of evidence in favor of this view; to a.s.sert that we could not breed our cart and race horses, long and short horned cattle, and poultry of various breeds, and esculent vegetables, for an unlimited number of generations, would be opposed to all experience."[8] Darwin recognizes, in instinct, the possibility for the play of a certain amount of imitation, as also of intelligence and experience,[9] though denying to these the range attributed to them by Wallace. And summing up his theory in the essay given by Romanes, he writes: "It may not be logical, but to my imagination it is far more satisfactory, to look at the young cuckoo ejecting his foster brothers, ants making slaves, the larvae of the ichneumidae feeding within the live bodies of their prey, cats playing with mice, otters and cormorants with living fish, not as instincts specially given by the Creator, but as very small parts of one general law leading to the advancement of all organic bodies--Multiply, Vary, let the strongest Live and the weakest Die."

It will thus be seen that Darwin, while confessing a disability to account for the origin of _Instinct_,--beginning with some form of instinct as already existent, just as he begins with life as already existent,--does advance some perfectly definite views as to the probable origins of _instincts_,--namely, preservation, in the struggle for existence, of numerous slight but profitable variations. The a.s.sertion of the inadequacy of habit to account for the origin of more complex instincts, as in the case of the hive-bees, when compared with the subsequent explanation, in the same connection, of the rise of these very instincts partly by habit acquired from experience and imitation, partly by accidental modifications of simpler instincts, both taken advantage of by natural selection,--would seem to limit the term "habit," as here used, to modes of action acquired during the life of the individual; this interpretation of the word being confirmed by the additional phrase "in one generation." But here, as everywhere in Darwin's work, an unknown quant.i.ty appears--namely, the cause of variation; _i.e._ of the differences, or tendency to differ, of offspring, from the parental type.

In "The Descent of Man," published twelve years later than "The Origin of Species," and "The Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication," which appeared yet three years later, Darwin's views on instinct and habit are still further elaborated, and a definition of the relation of these to reason, pleasure, pain, and the moral sense, attempted. In Vol. I. of the former work, Darwin devotes two chapters to these subjects. Instinct he calls, pages 116-122, "inherited habit"; and on page 168 he says: "But as love, sympathy, and self-command became strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer, so that man can value justly the judgments of his fellows, he will feel himself impelled, apart from any transitory pleasure or pain, to certain lines of conduct." Here, I take it, the word "habit" cannot be interpreted as referring to one generation of men, but to the race as a whole, a general continuity being thus ascribed to the inheritance of mental characteristics, and the important concept of progress as adaptation acquired. In contrasting reason with instinct, Darwin thinks that instinct and intelligence do not, as Cuvier maintained, stand in inverse ratio to each other, but that a high degree of intelligence is compatible with complex instincts--as in the case of the beaver; "yet it is not improbable that there is a certain amount of interference between the development of free intelligence and of instinct,--which latter implies some inherited modification of the brain. Little is known about the functions of the brain, but we can perceive that, as the intellectual powers become highly developed, the various parts of the brain must be connected by very intricate channels of the freest intercommunication; and as a consequence, each separate part would perhaps tend to be less well fitted to answer to particular sensations or a.s.sociations in a definite and inherited--that is, instinctive--manner. There seems even to exist some relation between a low degree of intelligence and a strong tendency to the formation of fixed, though not inherited habits; for, as a sagacious physician remarked to me, persons who are slightly imbecile tend to act in everything by routine or habit; and they are rendered much happier if this is encouraged."[10] Darwin thinks instinctive action and action from habit may not be connected with either pleasure or pain, though he would seem to contradict this view in the latter part of the pa.s.sage just quoted, and again where he says: "Although a habit may be blindly and implicitly followed, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, yet if it be forcibly and abruptly checked, a vague sense of dissatisfaction is generally experienced."[11]

In writing of the social instinct, Darwin begins with it as already existent, and seems, moreover, to maintain concerning it a theory of purpose elsewhere denied in his works and, indeed, antagonistic to the whole principle of the struggle for existence. He says: "It has often been a.s.sumed that animals were in the first place rendered social, and that they feel, as a consequence, uncomfortable when separated from each other, and comfortable whilst together; but it is a more probable view that these sensations were first developed, _in order that_ those animals which would profit by living in society, _should be induced to live together_, in the same manner as the sense of hunger and the pleasure of eating were, no doubt, first acquired, in order to induce animals to eat."[12] If it were not for the expressions "should be induced" and "to induce," the words "in order that," taken in connection with what follows, might be interpreted as referring to mere sequence of time, as, on page 199, where Darwin refers to the "social faculties"

simply as antecedent to society, they evidently do. For he says: "In order that primeval man, or the ape-like progenitors of man, should become social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings which induce other animals to live in a body." The sentences referred to which follow the first quotation are as follows: "The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental or filial affections, since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents; and this extension may be attributed in part to habit, but chiefly to natural selection. With those animals which were benefited by living in close a.s.sociation, the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers, whilst those that cared least for their comrades, and lived solitary, would perish in greater numbers. With respect to the origin of the parental and filial affections, which apparently lie at the base of the social instincts, we know not the steps by which they have been gained; but we may infer that it has been to a large extent through natural selection." The pa.s.sage may possibly be consistently explained by the idea of the Survival of the Fittest, but it is at least very unclear in its wording. At the beginning of Chapter IV. of the same book, Darwin also gives a synopsis of the development of the moral sense from the social instincts, through the pleasure of a.s.sociation and service, remorse being a result of the power of representation, regard for the approbation and disapprobation of fellows arising from sympathy with them until resulting habit plays a very important part in guiding the conduct of the individual. Another pa.s.sage, however, again introduces an antagonism between habit, instinct, and reason, and natural selection: "It is impossible to decide in many cases whether certain social instincts have been acquired through natural selection, or are the indirect result of other instincts and faculties, such as sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation; or again, whether they are simply the result of long-continued habit." Darwin distinguishes between "the all-important emotion of sympathy," and that of love. "A mother may pa.s.sionately love her sleeping and pa.s.sive infant, but she can hardly at such times be said to feel sympathy for it"; but he includes both love and sympathy under the head of "sympathetic emotions"; and on page 163 he says: "With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation probably add, as Mr.

Bain has shown, to the power of sympathy; for we are led by the hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic kindness to others; and sympathy is much strengthened by habit." Again, on page 166, "instinctive love and sympathy" would seem to be contrasted with love and sympathy as habit, the increase of such feelings in the race through habit, elsewhere more or less distinctly a.s.serted, being here ignored: "Although man, as he now exists, has few special instincts, having lost any which his early progenitors may have possessed, this is no reason why he should not have retained, from an extremely remote period, some degree of instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows. We are, indeed, all conscious that we do possess such sympathetic feelings; but our consciousness does not tell us whether they are instinctive, having originated long ago in the same manner as with the lower animals, or whether they have been acquired by each of us during our early years."

But again, on page 220, sympathy is referred to as an element of the social instincts:[13] "It should, however, be borne in mind that the enforcement of public opinion depends on our appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of others; and this appreciation is founded on our sympathy, which it can hardly be doubted was originally developed through natural selection as one of the most important elements of the social instincts"; though, on pages 167, 168, the social instinct is again contrasted with sympathy, since according to Darwin the desire for the approbation of others and the consequent yielding to their wishes is the result of sympathy: "Thus the social instincts, which must have been acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably even by his early ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse to some of his best actions; but his actions are in a higher degree determined by the expressed wishes and judgments of his fellow-men." Again the social and the maternal instincts and sympathy are identified and cla.s.sed as under the dominion of the moral sense, pages 168-170: "It is evident, in the first place, that with mankind the instinctive impulses have different degrees of strength; a savage, will risk his own life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger; a young and timid mother urged by the maternal instinct will, without a moment's hesitation, run the greatest danger for her own infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature.

Nevertheless, many a civilized man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a torrent to save a drowning man, though a stranger.... Such actions as the above appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of the social or maternal instincts than that of any other instinct or motive; for they are performed too instantaneously for reflection, or for pleasure or pain to be felt at the time; though, if prevented by any cause, distress or even misery might be felt.... I am aware that some persons maintain that actions performed impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come under the dominion of the moral sense, and cannot be called moral.... On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be considered as perfect or as performed in the most n.o.ble manner, unless it be done impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are innate." Darwin defines the office of the moral sense as "telling us what to do,"[14] that of conscience,--which includes remorse, repentance, regret or shame, fear of the G.o.ds and of the disapprobation of men,--as reproving us if we disobey it;[15]

conscience seems elsewhere to be defined as concerned with resolve to better future action; and in still another pa.s.sage, the moral sense and conscience are identified. But again, in another paragraph, Darwin seems to ascribe remorse or regret, not to the baulking of an instinct, but to a _judgment_ of having been baulked: "A man cannot prevent past impressions often repa.s.sing through his mind; he will thus be driven to make a comparison between the impressions of past hunger, vengeance satisfied, or danger shunned at other men's cost, with the almost ever-present instinct of sympathy, and with his early knowledge of what others consider as praiseworthy or blamable. This knowledge cannot be banished from his mind, and from instinctive sympathy is esteemed of great moment. He will then feel as if he had been baulked in following a present instinct or habit, and this with all animals causes dissatisfaction, or even misery."[16] But, in spite of all indefiniteness in the use of terms and uncertainty as to the interrelations of "the social instincts," sympathy, reason, pleasure, and the moral sense, it is, after all, comparatively easy to gather, after a little deeper study, the general and more important features of Darwin's theory as to the origin of morality. We may state these as follows: The social instinct led men or their ape-like progenitors to society,[17] this instinct growing out of the parental or filial affections through habit and natural selection. Virtue is, at first, only tribal.[18] The social qualities of sympathy, fidelity, and courage implied in mutual aid and defence, were no doubt acquired by man through the same means. "When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into compet.i.tion, if (other circ.u.mstances being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other.... Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes; but in the course of time it would, judging from all past history, be in its turn overcome by some other tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the world." Though in a warlike state, where courage is especially necessary to tribal existence, the bravest men would perish in larger numbers than other men, and the survival of the unfittest would seem thus to be secured, the influence of their bravery on others might excite the latter to imitation and do far more good than the begetting of offspring who would inherit their bravery. So, also, pity, though inciting modern society to the preservation of the weak, yet is useful in that it cultivates sympathy; and so, too, wealth, affording leisure for intellectual pursuits and a wider choice in marriage, tends, in the end, to the preservation of the fittest morally, by direct or indirect means.[19] Altruistic action, followed from selfish motives, may become habit; habits of benevolence certainly strengthen the feeling of sympathy; and "habits followed during many generations probably tend to be inherited." Furthermore, melancholy tends often to suicide, as violence, and quarrelsomeness to a b.l.o.o.d.y end, intemperance to the destruction of individual life, and profligacy to disease and sterility; so that some elimination of the worst dispositions takes place. These are some of the probable steps of advancement, though the process is too complex to be clearly followed out. The approbation of others--the strengthening of sympathies by habit--example and imitation--reason--experience and even self-interest--instruction during youth, and religious feelings--are the causes which lead to the advancement of morality.[20] In the paragraph just quoted, Darwin says: "With civilized nations, as far as an advanced standard of morality and an increased number of fairly good men are concerned, natural selection apparently effects but little, though the fundamental social instincts were originally thus gained"; but he later writes: "Judging from all that we know of man and the lower animals, there has always been sufficient variability in their intellectual and moral faculties for a steady advance through natural selection"; and he further says: "No doubt such advance demands many favorable concurrent circ.u.mstances; but it may well be doubted whether the most favorable would have sufficed, had not the rate of increase been rapid, and the consequent struggle for existence extremely severe."[21] The end or aim of morality is the general good, rather than the general happiness, though "no doubt the welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that is discontented and unhappy.... As all wish for happiness, the 'greatest happiness principle' will have become a most important secondary guide and object; the social instinct, however, together with sympathy (which leads to our regarding the approbation and disapprobation of others), having served as the primary impulse and guide."[22] And with regard to the future, Darwin says: "Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant."[23]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] P. 381. This essay originally formed part of the chapter on "Instinct" in "The Origin of Species," but was omitted for the sake of condensation.

[2] Vol. I. p. 319.

[3] Pp. 320, 321.

[4] Appendix to "Mental Evolution in Animals," pp. 378, 379. The italics are my own.

[5] "The Origin of Species," II. p. 286.

[6] Ibid. I. pp. 353, 354.

[7] "The Origin of Species," I. pp. 321, 322.

[8] Ibid. I. pp. 12-17.

[9] Appendix to "Mental Evolution in Animals," pp. 370, 383; see also "The Descent of Man," I. p. 102 _et seq._; and "Nature" for Feb. 13, 1873, introduction to a letter to the editor from William Higginson.

[10] P. 103.

[11] Pp. 160, 161.

[12] P. 161.

[13] See also p. 171. And, p. 172, sympathy is designated as "a fundamental element of the social instincts."

[14] P. 178.

[15] Pp. 174, 178.

[16] P. 173.

[17] "Descent of Man," I. p. 199, etc.

[18] Ibid. p. 179.

[19] Ibid. pp. 199-209.

[20] Ibid. p. 212.