A Review of Edwards's Part 4

Nor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist.

The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind, and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency, responsibility, and duty.

And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing external actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected with volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action is one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it, if we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this very moment there is no such correlation between the action and the will, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act of willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it would not be done; although at this very moment there is such a correlation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form the cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to exist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the correlation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the want of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and responsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its connexion with its consequents.

This does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions are to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect volitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation to the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in themselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force or power may have come in between the volition and its object, and changed the circ.u.mstances of the object, so as to bring about an event different from the will or intention; although being in connexion with the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act which appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an extended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is evil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must know what the man intends, before we p.r.o.nounce upon him; which is the same thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what his motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but the volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of these effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we can p.r.o.nounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really connected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable.

_Edwards and Locke._

Their systems are one: there is no difference in the principle. Edwards represents the will as necessarily determined so does Locke. Edwards places liberty in the unimpeded connexion of volition with its stated sequents--so does Locke.

They differ only in the mode of developing the necessary determination of will. According to Locke, desire is in itself a necessary modification of our being produced in its correlation with objects; and volition is a necessary consequent of desire when excited at any given moment to a degree which gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at that moment. "The greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that is constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in its choice of the next action." (book 2. ch. 21, -- 40.) According to Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, and the strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that moment.

Edwards's a.n.a.lysis is more nice than Locke's, and his whole developement more true to the great principle of the system--necessary determination.

Locke, in distinguishing the will from the desire, seems about to launch into a different psychology, and one destructive of the principle.

II.

THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.

These consequences must, I am aware, be deduced with the greatest care and clearness. The deduction must be influenced by no pa.s.sion or prejudice. It must be purely and severely logical--and such I shall endeavour to make it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has himself made.

I. There is no self-determining power of will, and of course no liberty consisting in a self-determining power.

A self-determining power of will is a supposed power, which will has to determine its own volitions.

Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of desire, emotion, or pa.s.sion.

Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable at any given moment.

Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of the will, or sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature and circ.u.mstances of the object.

Now, if the will determined itself, it would determine its own state, in relation to objects. But to determine is to act, and therefore, for the will to determine is for the will to act; and for the will to determine itself, is for the will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the will is a volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to create a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same way.

We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an indefinite series of volitions, without any first volition; consequently we shall have no self-determiner after all, because we can arrive at no first determiner, and thus the idea of self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again, we shall have effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of the case never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the negative of cause.

Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can question. If Edwards's psychology be right, and if self-determination implies a will to will, or choosing a choice, then a self-determining power is the greatest absurdity possible.

II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that G.o.d can exercise a perfect control over his intelligent creatures, or administer perfectly a moral government consisting in the influence of motives.

To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in reference to required determinations. And when an individual is removed from the motives adapted to his state of mind, the Almighty Providence can so order events as to bring him into contiguity with the motives.

If the state of mind should be such that no motives can be made available in reference to a particular determination, it is dearly supposable that he who made the soul of man, may exert a direct influence over this state of mind, and cause it to answer to the motives presented. Whether there are motives adapted to every state of mind, in reference to every possible determination required by the Almighty Lawgiver, so as to render it unnecessary to exert a direct influence over the will, is a question which I am not called upon here to answer.

But in either case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute, fore-determining and bringing to pa.s.s every event in the moral as well as the physical world; and the election of a certain number to eternal life, and the making of this election sure, are necessary and plain consequences of this system. And as G.o.d is a being all-wise and good, we may feel a.s.sured in connexion with this system, that, in the working out of his great plan, whatever evil may appear in the progress of its developement, the grand consummation will show that all things have been working together for good.

III. It is plainly deducible from this system that moral beings exert an influence over each other by the presentation of motives. And thus efforts may be made either to the injury or benefit of society.

IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of responsibility, the consciousness of guilt or of rect.i.tude, and consequently the expectation of punishment or reward, connect themselves simply with the nature of the mere fact of volition.--that is, if this is a true and complete representation of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon the mere fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go forth.

Thus we may view the system in relation both to G.o.d and to man.

In relation to G.o.d. It makes him supreme and absolute--foreseeing and fore-determining, and bringing everything to pa.s.s according to infinite wisdom, and by the energy of an infinite will.

In relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple fact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established antecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects, because he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear, because he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common judgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness, that an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which ought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a volition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong, because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition.

In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea of _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends the sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has all the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his effort.

In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground of moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_ necessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne to do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil, anything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under any responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to be tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of, could admit the plea--"I did not the good because I had not the will to do it," or "I did the evil because I had the will to do it." "This is your guilt," would be the reply of the judge, "that you had no will to do the good--that you had a will to do the evil."

We must now take up a different cla.s.s of deductions. They are such as those abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of morality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If however they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against them. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for himself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_.

I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional necessity, particular and general.

1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the individual.

It is granted in the system, that the connexion of motive and volition is necessary with an absolute necessity, because this precedes and therefore is not within the reach of the volition. So also, the state of mind, and the nature and circ.u.mstances of the object in relation to this state, forming a correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent upon a cause, beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make its motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive, and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first cause.

Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are related by an absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the effect of motive, being necessary also with an absolute necessity, the only place for freedom that remains, if freedom be possible, is the connexion of volition and effects, internal and external. And this is the only place of freedom which this system claims. But what new characteristic appears in this relation? Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and sequents? I will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will to sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established antecedent to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to think on a certain subject, I think on that subject. The volition of selecting a subject, and the volition of attending to it, are stated antecedents to that mental operation which we call thought. We have here only another instance of cause and effect; the relation being one as absolute and necessary as any other relation of cause and effect. The curious organism by which a choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces muscular movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause beyond the sphere of volition. The const.i.tution of mind which connects volition with thinking is also pre-established, and beyond the sphere of volition. As the volition itself appears by an absolute necessity in relation to the individual man, so also do the stated sequents or effects of volition appear by an absolute necessity in relation to him.

It is true, indeed, that the connexion between volition and its objects may be interrupted by forces coming between, or overcome by superior forces, but this is common to cause and effect, and forms no peculiar characteristic; it is a lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome by a greater. Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force does not prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still be necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the truth in respect of volition, according to this system. The volition could have no being without a motive, and when the motive is present it must have a being, and no sooner does it appear than its effects follow, unless impeded. If impeded, then we have two trains of causes coming into collision, and the same necessity which brought them together, gives the ascendency to the one or the other.

It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that necessity, absolute and unconditional, as far at least as the man himself is concerned, reigns in the relation of volition and its effect, if the volition itself be a necessary existence. All that precedes volition is necessary; volition itself is necessary. All that follows volition is necessary: Humanity is but a link of the inevitable chain.

2. General necessity--a necessity absolute, in relation to all being and causality, and applicable to all events.

An event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual--is this event likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? Let this event be a volition of a given individual; it is necessary in relation to that individual. Now it must be supposed to have a connexion by a chain of sequents and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take any particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that antecedent and sequent, in its particular place and relations, can be proved necessary in the same way that the volition is proved necessary in its particular place and relations; that is, the antecedent being given under the particular circ.u.mstances, the sequent must follow. But the antecedent is linked by like necessity to another antecedent, of which it is the sequent; and the sequent is linked by like necessity to another sequent, of which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole chain, from the given necessary volition up to the first cause, is necessary. We come therefore at last to consider the connexion between the first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is this a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded as a volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If G.o.d will the first sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that sequent should appear. But the volition itself cannot really be the first antecedent or cause, because volition or choice, from its very nature, must itself have a determiner or antecedent. What is this antecedent? The motive:--for self-determination, in the sense of the will determining itself, would involve the same absurdities on this system in relation to G.o.d as in relation to man; since it is represented as an absurdity in its own nature--it is determining a volition by a volition, in endless retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine volition, what is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition?

It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for there is nothing to render it otherwise, save the divine will. But the divine will cannot be supposed to do this, for the motive is already taken to be the ground and cause of the action of the divine will. The necessity which applies to volition, in the nature of the case must therefore apply to the divine volition. No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the divine will, except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This Edwards expressly affirms--"If G.o.d's will is steadily and surely determined in everything by _supreme_ wisdom, then it is in everything _necessarily determined_ to that which is _most_ wise." (p. 230.) That the universe is governed by infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought, and is abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most excellent government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be contended for. Let us not, however, wander from the question, and in representing it as the government of wisdom, forget that it is a government of necessity, and that absolute. The volition, therefore, with which we started, is at last traced up to a necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final cause; for here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.

What we have thus proved in relation to one volition, must be equally true in reference to every other volition and every other event, for the reasoning must apply to every possible case. Every volition, every event, must be traced up to a first and final cause, and this must be necessary and infinite wisdom.

II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that every volition or event is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place and relations.

The whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary wisdom. All volitions and events have their last and efficient cause in infinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that can be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great source. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change could make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute necessity,--and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has made it, and disposed of it.

III. If that which we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be both necessary evil and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is in vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptation of the word; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his.

These volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried back to the one great source of all being and events. Hence,

IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears in him, appears by an absolute necessity,--and it cannot be supposed to be otherwise than it is. Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only the perception of the difference between right and wrong, and the conviction that the right ought to be done, but the possession of a power to do the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition is fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all things considered, can it be supposed there could have been, at that precise moment and in that precise relation, any other volition. The volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite and necessary wisdom. We cannot escape from this difficulty by perpetually running the changes of--"He can if he will,"--"He could if he would,"--"There is nothing wanting but a will,"--"He has a natural ability," &c. &c. Let us not deceive ourselves, and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by these words, "he can if he will"! but he cannot if he don't will. The will is wanting,--and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? The man cannot change one volition for another. By supposition, he has not the moral or metaphysical ability,--and yet this is the only ability that can produce the new volition. It is pa.s.sing strange that the power upon which volition is absolutely dependent, should be set aside by calling it _metaphysical_,--and the man blamed for an act because the consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the necessary consequent of this power! The man is only in his volition. The volition is good or bad in itself. The cause of volition is none of his concern, because it transcends volition. He can if he will. That is enough for him! But it is not enough to make him blameable, when whether he will or not depends not only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the antecedent itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.

I am not now disputing the philosophy. The philosophy may be true; it may be very good: but then we must take its consequences along with it; and this is all that I now insist upon.

V. It is another consequence of this system, that there can be nothing evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of moral perfection, as indeed their very names imply, then all the necessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite wisdom and goodness, as principles, can only envelope parts of themselves. It would be the destruction of all logic to deny this. It would annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be said that infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what is essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do transgress this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation of the law was a necessary developement of infinite wisdom; and the volition which transgresses it is a developement of the same nature. If this seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system, and the system alone is responsible for its conclusions.

If it should be replied here, that every system must be subject to the same difficulty, because if evil had a beginning, it must have had a holy cause, inasmuch as it could not exist before it began to exist,--I answer, this would be true if evil is the _necessary_ developement of a holy cause. But more of this hereafter.

VI. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. Every volition being the sense of the most agreeable, and arising from the correlation of the object and the sensitivity; it follows that every motive and every action comes under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of gratification or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no collision between principle and pa.s.sion, because principle can have no power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most agreeable.

Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain sway only by uniting with desire, and thus coming under conditions of yielding the highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and benevolence, when obeyed, therefore, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable; and so also injustice, falsehood, and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as the quality of all motive and the universal principle of the determinations of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We may indeed _speculate_ respecting these distinctions,--we may say that justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in itself; but this judgement has practical efficiency only as one of the terms takes the form of the most agreeable. But we have seen that the most agreeable depends upon the state of the sensitivity in correlation with the object,--a state and a correlation antecedent to action; and that therefore it is a necessary law of our being, to be determined by the greatest apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can act.

VII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an effort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course cannot resist his pa.s.sions, or introduce any intellectual or moral discipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake any enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged, or not part or consequent of the same.