A Political History of the State of New York Volume III Part 36

[Footnote 1554: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 84.

"Mr. Conkling felt that neither Mr. Tilden nor Mr. Hayes should be inaugurated."--Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 528.]

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONKLING AND CURTIS AT ROCHESTER

1877

Two State governments in Louisiana, one under Packard, a Republican, the other under Nicholls, a Democrat, confronted Hayes upon the day of his inauguration. The canva.s.sing boards which returned the Hayes electors also declared the election of Packard as governor, and it would impeach his own t.i.tle, it was said, if the President refused recognition to Packard, who had received the larger popular majority.

It was not unknown that the President contemplated adopting a new Southern policy. His letter of acceptance presupposed it, and before the completion of the Electoral Commission's work political and personal friends had given a.s.surance in a published letter that Hayes would not continue military intervention in the South.[1555] Moreover, the President's inaugural address plainly indicated such a purpose. To inform himself of the extent to which the troops intervened, therefore, and to harmonise if possible the opposing governments, he sent a commission to New Orleans,[1556] who reported (April 21) a returning board quorum in both branches of the Nicholls Legislature and recommended the withdrawal of the army from the immediate vicinity of the State House. This was done on April 24 and thenceforward the Nicholls government controlled in State affairs.[1557]

[Footnote 1555: Letter of Stanley Matthews and Charles Foster, dated February 17, 1877.--Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1877, p. 459.]

[Footnote 1556: This commission consisted of Charles B. Lawrence, Joseph B. Hawley, John M. Harlan, John C. Brown, and Wayne McVeigh.--_Ibid._, p. 465.]

[Footnote 1557: _Ibid._, pp. 456-465. Packard became consul to Liverpool.]

The President's policy quickly created discontent within the ranks of the Republican party. Many violently resented his action, declaring his refusal to sustain a governor whose election rested substantially upon the same foundation as his own as a cowardly surrender to the South in fulfillment of a bargain between his friends and some Southern leaders.[1558] Others disclaimed the President's obligation to continue the military, declaring that it fostered hate, drew the colour line more deeply, promoted monstrous local misgovernment, and protected venal adventurers whose system practically amounted to highway robbery. Furthermore, it did not keep the States under Republican control, while it identified the Republican name with vindictive as well as venal power, as ill.u.s.trated by the Louisiana Durrell affair in 1872,[1559] in the elections of 1874, and at the organisation of the Louisiana Legislature early in 1875.[1560]

Notwithstanding these potent reasons for the President's action the judgment of a majority of his party deemed it an unwise and unwarranted act, although Grant spoke approvingly of it.[1561]

[Footnote 1558: The commission reported the Packard government's insistence that the Legislature of 1870 had the power to create a Returning Board with all the authority with which the Act clothed it, and that the Supreme Court of the State had affirmed its const.i.tutionality. On the other hand, the Nichols government admitted the Legislature's right to confide to a Returning Board the appointment of electors for President and Vice-President, but denied its power to modify the const.i.tutional provision for counting the vote for governor without first amending the State Const.i.tution, declaring the Supreme Court's decision to the contrary not to be authoritative.--Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1877, pp. 403-404.]

[Footnote 1559: Durrell, a United States Circuit judge, sustained Kellogg in his contest with McEnery.]

[Footnote 1560: "The President directs me to say that he does not believe public opinion will longer support the maintenance of the State government in Louisiana by the use of the military, and he must concur in this manifest feeling." Grant's telegram to Packard, dated Mar. 1, 1877.]

[Footnote 1561: New York _Tribune_, July 10, 1877.]

Similar judgment was p.r.o.nounced upon the President's attempt to reform the civil service by directing compet.i.tive examinations for certain positions and by forbidding office-holders actively to partic.i.p.ate in political campaigns.[1562] "No officer should be required or permitted to take part in the management of political organisations, caucuses, conventions, or election campaigns," he wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury. "Their right to vote and to express their views on public questions, either orally or through the press, is not denied, provided it does not interfere with the discharge of their official duties. No a.s.sessments for political purposes should be allowed." In a public order dated June 22 he made this rule applicable to all departments of the civil service. "It should be understood by every officer of the government that he is expected to conform his conduct to its requirements."[1563] To show his sincerity the President also appointed a new Civil Service Commission, with Dorman B. Eaton at its head, who adopted the rules formulated under Curtis during the Grant administration, and which were applied with a measure of thoroughness, especially in the Interior Department under Carl Schurz, and in the New York post-office, then in charge of Thomas L.

James.

[Footnote 1562: The first step towards a change in the manner of appointments and removals was a bill introduced in Congress on December 20, 1865, by Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island "to regulate the civil service of the United States." A few months later Senator B.

Gratz Brown of Missouri submitted a resolution for "such change in the civil service as shall secure appointments to the same after previous examinations by proper Boards, and as shall provide for promotions on the score of merit or seniority." On March 3, 1871, Congress appended a section to an appropriation bill, authorising the President to "prescribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service as may best promote efficiency therein and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge and ability for the branch of service in which he seeks to enter; and for this purpose he may employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, prescribe their duties, and establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appointments." Under this authority President Grant organised a commission composed of George William Curtis, Joseph Medill, Alexander C. Cattell, Davidson A.

Walker, E.B. Ellicott, Joseph H. Blackfan, and David C. c.o.x. This commission soon found that Congress was indisposed to clothe them with the requisite power, and although in the three years from 1872 to 1875, they had established the entire soundness of the reform, an appropriation to continue the work was refused and the labours of the commission came to an end.]

[Footnote 1563: New York _Tribune_, June 25, 1877.]

This firm and aggressive stand against the so-called spoils system very naturally aroused the fears of many veteran Republicans of sincere and unselfish motives, who had used offices to build up and maintain party organisation, while the order restricting freedom of political action provoked bitter antagonism, especially among members of the New York Republican State Committee, several of whom held important Federal positions. To add to the resentment an official investigation of the New York custom-house was ordered, which disclosed "irregularities," said the report, "that indicate the peril to which government and merchants are exposed by a system of appointments in which political influence dispenses with fitness for the work."[1564] The President concurred. "Party leaders should have no more influence in appointments than other equally respectable citizens," he said. "It is my wish that the collection of the revenue should be organised on a strictly business basis, with the same guarantees for efficiency and fidelity in the selection of the chief and subordinate officers that would be required by a prudent merchant."[1565]

[Footnote 1564: New York _Tribune_, July 28, 1877.]

[Footnote 1565: _Ibid._]

The Republican press, in large part, deplored the President's action, and while managing politicians smothered their real grievance under attacks upon the Southern policy, they generally a.s.sumed an att.i.tude of armed neutrality and observation.[1566] No doubt the President was much to blame for this discontent. He tolerated the abuses disclosed by the investigation in New York, continued a disreputable regime in Boston, and installed a faction in Baltimore no better than the one turned out. Besides, the appointment to lucrative offices of the Republican politicians who took active part in the Louisiana Returning Board had closely a.s.sociated him with the spoils system.[1567]

Moreover, his failure to remove offending officials discredited his own rule and created an unfavourable sentiment, because after provoking the animosity of office-holders and arousing the public he left the order to execute itself. Yet the people plainly believed in the President's policy of conciliation, sympathised with his desire to reform abuses in the civil service, and honoured him for his frankness, his patriotism, and his integrity. During the months of August and September several Republican State conventions, notably those in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ma.s.sachusetts, and New Jersey commended him, while Maine, under the leadership of Blaine, although refusing to indorse unqualifiedly the policy and acts of the Administration, refrained from giving any expression of disapproval.[1568]

[Footnote 1566: In his speech at Woodstock, Conn., on July 4, Blaine disapproved the President's action; a gathering of Republicans in New Jersey, celebrating the return of Robeson from a foreign tour, indicated an unfriendly disposition; the Camerons of Pennsylvania, father and son, exhibited dissent; one branch of the New Hampshire Legislature tabled a resolution approving the President's course; and an early Republican State convention in Iowa indirectly condemned it.]

[Footnote 1567: In H.R. 45th Cong., 3d Sess., No. 140, p. 48 (Potter report) is a list of those connected with the Louisiana count "subsequently appointed to or retained in office."]

[Footnote 1568: These conventions occurred as follows: Ohio, August 2; Maine, August 9; Pennsylvania, September 6; Wisconsin, September 12; Ma.s.sachusetts, September 20; New Jersey, September 25. See New York papers on the day following each.]

New York's Republican convention a.s.sembled at Rochester on September 26. The notable absence of Federal office-holders who had resigned committeeships and declined political preferment attracted attention, otherwise the membership of the a.s.sembly, composed largely of the usual array of politicians, provoked no comment. Conkling and Cornell arrived early and took possession. In 1874 and in 1875 the Senator's friends fought vigorously for control, but in 1877 the divided sentiment as to the President's policies and the usual indifference that follows a Presidential struggle inured to their benefit, giving them a sufficient majority to do as they pleased.

Thus far Conkling had not betrayed his att.i.tude toward the Administration. At the time of his departure for Europe in search of health, when surrounded by the chief Federal officials of the city, he significantly omitted words of approbation or criticism, and with equal dexterity avoided the expression of an opinion in the many welcoming and serenade speeches amidst which his vacation ended in August. No doubt existed, however, as to his personal feeling. The selection of Evarts for secretary of state in place of Thomas C. Platt for postmaster general did not make him happy.[1569] George William Curtis's ardent support of the President likewise aided in separating him from the White House. Nevertheless, Conkling's att.i.tude remained a profound secret until Thomas C. Platt, as temporary chairman, began the delivery of a carefully prepared speech.

[Footnote 1569: New York _Tribune_, February 28, 1877.]

Platt was then forty-four years old. He was born in Owego, educated at Yale, and as a man of affairs had already laid the foundation for the success and deserved prominence that crowned his subsequent business career. Ambition also took him early into the activities of public political life, his party having elected him county clerk at the age of twenty-six and a member of Congress while yet in his thirties. His friends, attracted by his promise-keeping and truth-telling, included most of the people of the vicinage. He was not an orator, but he possessed the resources of tact, simplicity, and bonhomie, which are serviceable in the management of men.[1570] Moreover, as an organiser he developed in politics the same capacity for control that he exhibited in business. He had quickness of decision and flexibility of mind. There was no vacillation of will, no suspension of judgment, no procrastination that led to hara.s.sing controversy over minor details.

He seemed also as systematic in his political purposes as he was orderly in his business methods. These characteristic traits, well marked in 1877, were destined to be magnified in the next two decades when local leaders recognised that his judgment, his capacity, and his skill largely contributed to extricate the party from the chaotic conditions into which continued defeat had plunged it.

[Footnote 1570: "Platt and I imbibed politics with our earliest nutriment. I was on the stump the year I became a voter, and so was he. I was doing the part of a campaign orator and he was chief of the campaign glee club. The speech amounted to little in those days unless it was a.s.sisted by the glee club. In fact the glee club largely drew the audience and held it. The favorite song of that day was 'John Brown's Body,' and the very heights of ecstatic applause were reached when Brother Platt's fine tenor voice rang through the arches of the building or the trees of the woodland, carrying the refrain, 'We'll hang Jeff Davis on a sour apple tree, while John Brown's soul goes marching on.'"--Chauncey M. Depew, _Speeches_, 1896 to 1902, p. 237.]

Conkling early recognised Platt's executive ability, and their friendship, cemented by likeness of views and an absence of rivalry, kept them sympathetically together in clearly defined fields of activity. In a way each supplemented the other. Platt was neither self-opinionated nor overbearing. He dealt with matters political with the light touch of a man of affairs, and although without sentiment or ideals, he worked incessantly, listened attentively, and was anxious to be useful, without taking the centre of the stage, or repelling support by affectations of manner. But like Conkling he relied upon the use of patronage and the iron rule of organisation, and too little upon the betterment of existing political conditions.

This became apparent when, as temporary chairman, he began to address the convention. He startled the delegates by calling the distinguished Secretary of State a "demagogue," and other Republicans who differed with him "Pecksniffs and tricksters." As he proceeded dissent blended with applause, and at the conclusion of his speech prudent friends regretted its questionable taste. In declining to become permanent president Conkling moved that "the gentleman who has occupied the chair thus far with the acceptance of us all" be continued. This aroused the Administration's backers, of whom a roll-call disclosed 110 present.[1571]

[Footnote 1571: The vote stood 311 to 110 in favour of the motion.]

The platform neither approved nor criticised the President's Southern policy, but expressed the hope that the exercise of his const.i.tutional discretion to protect a State government against domestic violence would result in peace, tranquillity, and justice. Civil service reform was more artfully presented. It favoured fit men, fixed tenure, fair compensation, faithful performance of duty, frugality in the number of employes, freedom of political action, and no political a.s.sessments.

Moreover, it commended Hayes's declaration in his letter of acceptance that "the officer should be secure in his tenure so long as his personal character remained untarnished and the performance of his duty satisfactory," and recommended "as worthy of consideration, legislation making officers secure in a limited fixed tenure and subject to removal only as officers under State laws are removed in this State on charges to be openly preferred and adjudged."[1572] This paralleled the President's reform except as to freedom of political action, and in support of that provision it arrayed a profoundly impressive statement, showing by statistics that Hayes's order, if applied to all State, county, and town officials in New York, would exclude from political action one voter out of every eight and one-half. If this practical ill.u.s.tration exhibited the weakness of the President's order it also antic.i.p.ated what the country afterwards recognised, that true reform must rest upon compet.i.tive examination for which the Act of March 3, 1871 opened the way, and which President Hayes had directed for certain positions.

[Footnote 1572: Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1877, pp. 562-563.]

But despite the platform's good points, George William Curtis, construing its failure to endorse the Administration into censure of the President, quickly offered a resolution declaring Hayes's t.i.tle to the presidency as clear and perfect as that of George Washington, and commending his efforts in the permanent pacification of the South and for the correction of abuses in the civil service.[1573] Curtis had never sought political advantage for personal purposes. The day he drifted away from a clerkship in a business firm and landed among the philosophers of Brook Farm he became an idealist, whom a German university and years of leisure travel easily strengthened. So fixed was his belief of moral responsibility that he preferred, after his unfortunate connection with _Putnam's Magazine_, to lose his whole fortune and drudge patiently for sixteen years to pay a debt of $60,000 rather than invoke the law and escape legal liability. He was an Abolitionist when abolitionism meant martyrdom; he became a Republican when others continued Whigs; and he stood for Lincoln and emanc.i.p.ation in the months of dreadful discouragement preceding Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah. He was likewise a civil service reformer long in advance of a public belief, or any belief at all, that the custom of changing non-political officers on merely political grounds impaired the efficiency of the public service, lowered the standard of political contests, and brought reproach upon the government and the people. It is not surprising, therefore, that he stood for a President who sought to re-establish a reform that had broken down under Grant, and although the effort rested upon an Executive order, without the permanency of law, he believed that any attempt to inaugurate a new system should have the undivided support of the party which had demanded it in convention and had elected a President pledged to establish it. Moreover, the President had offered Curtis his choice of the chief missions, expecting him to choose the English. Remembering Irving in Spain, Bancroft in Germany, Motley in England, and Marsh in Italy, it was a great temptation. But Curtis, appreciating his "civic duty," remained at home, and now took this occasion to voice his support of the Executive who had honoured him.[1574]

[Footnote 1573: New York _Tribune_, September 27.]

[Footnote 1574: Curtis declined chiefly from the motive ascribed in Lowell's lines:

"At courts, in senates, who so fit to serve?

And both invited, but you would not swerve, All meaner prizes waiving that you might In civic duty spend your heat and light, Unpaid, untrammelled, with a sweet disdain.

Refusing posts men grovel to attain."

--_Lowell's Poems_, Vol. 4, pp. 138-139.]

His speech, pitched in an exalted key, sparkled with patriotic utterances and eloquent periods, with an occasional keen allusion to Conkling. He skilfully contrasted the majority's demand for harmony with Platt's reference to Evarts as a "demagogue" and to civil service reform as a "nauseating shibboleth." He declared it would shake the confidence of the country in the party if, after announcing its principles, it failed to commend the agent who was carrying them out.

Approval of details was unnecessary. Republicans did not endorse Lincoln's methods, but they upheld him until the great work of the martyr was done. In the same spirit they ought to support President Hayes, who, in obedience to many State and two or three National conventions, had taken up the war against abuses of the civil service.

If the convention did not concur in all his acts, it should show the Democratic party that Republicans know what they want and the man by whom to secure such results.

In speaking of abuses in the civil service he told the story of Lincoln looking under the bed before retiring to see if a distinguished senator was waiting to get an office,[1575] referred to the efforts of Federal officials to defeat his own election to the convention, and declared that the President, by his order, intended that a delegate like himself, having only one vote, should not meet another with one hundred votes in his pocket obtained by means of political patronage. Instead of the order invading one's rights it was intended to restore them to the great body of the Republicans of New York, who now "refuse to enter a convention to be met--not by brains, not always by mere intelligence, not always by convictions, or by representative men, but by the forms of power which federal patriots a.s.sume." He did "not believe any eminent Republican, however high his ambition, however sore his discontent, hoped to carry the Republican party of the United States against Rutherford B. Hayes. Aye, sir, no such Republican, unless intoxicated with the flattery of parasites, or blinded by his own ambition." He spoke of Conkling's interest in public affairs as beginning contemporaneously with his own, of their work side by side in 1867, and of their sustaining a Republican President without agreement in the details of his policy, and he closed with the prayer that they might yet see the Republican party fulfilling the hope of true men everywhere, who look to it for honesty, for reform, and for pacification.[1576]

[Footnote 1575: See Chapter XII., p. 166.]