A Political History of the State of New York Volume III Part 27

[Footnote 1339: _Harper's Weekly_, November 4, 1871.]

[Footnote 1340: Paine, _Life of Nast_, p. 179.]

On October 26 all doubt as to the result of the election was dissipated. Until then belief in Tweed's direct profit in the Ring's overcharges was based upon presumption. No intelligent man having an accurate knowledge of the facts could doubt his guilt, since every circ.u.mstance plainly pointed to it, but judicial proof did not exist until furnished by the investigation of the Broadway Bank, which Tilden personally conducted. His a.n.a.lysis of this information disclosed the fact that two-thirds of the money paid under the sanction of the Board of Audit had pa.s.sed into the possession of public officials and their accomplices, some of it being actually traced into Tweed's pocket, and upon this evidence, verified by Tilden's affidavit, the Attorney-General based an action on which a warrant issued for Tweed's arrest. This announcement flashed over the State eleven days before the election. It was a powerful campaign doc.u.ment. People had not realised what an avenging hand pursued Tammany, but they now understood that Tweed was a common thief, and that Tilden, by reducing strong suspicion to a mathematical certainty, had closed the mouths of eulogists and apologists.

The result of the election carried dismay and confusion to Tammany.

Its register, its judges, its aldermen, a majority of its a.s.sistant aldermen, fourteen of its twenty-one a.s.semblymen, and four of its five senators were defeated, while Tweed's majority fell from 22,000 in 1869 to 10,000. As expected the Republicans reaped the benefit of the anti-Tammany vote, carrying the State by 18,000 majority and the Legislature by 79 on joint ballot.[1341] To obliterate Tweedism, Tilden had overthrown his party, but he had not fallen, Samson-like, under the ruin.

[Footnote 1341: Scribner, 387,107; Willers, 368,204. Legislature: Senate, 24 Republicans, 8 Democrats. a.s.sembly, 97 Republicans, 31 Democrats.--New York _Tribune_, November 27, 1871.

Compared with the returns for 1870, the Democratic vote, outside of New York and the six counties in its immediate vicinity, fell off 24,167, while the Republican vote fell off 9,235. In New York and adjoining counties the Republican vote increased 30,338.--_Ibid._

In New York City the majority for the Democratic candidate for secretary of state was 29,189, while the majority for the Republican or Union Reform candidate for register was 28,117.--_Ibid._]

CHAPTER XXII

GREELEY NOMINATED FOR PRESIDENT

1872

Although the Tammany exposure had absorbed public attention, the Republican party did not escape serious criticism. Reconstruction had disappointed many of its friends. By controlling the negro vote Republican administrations in several Southern States had wrought incalculable harm to the cause of free-government and equal suffrage.

The State debt of Alabama had increased from six millions in 1860 to forty millions, that of Florida from two hundred thousand to fifteen millions, and that of Georgia from three millions to forty-four millions. "I say to-day, in the face of heaven and before all mankind," declared Tilden, "that the carpet-bag governments are infinitely worse than Tweed's government of the city of New York."[1342]

[Footnote 1342: New York _Tribune_, September 5, 1872.]

Following such gross misgovernment the reactionary outbreaks influenced Congress to pa.s.s the so-called Ku-Klux Act of April 20, 1871, designed to suppress these outrages. This measure, although not dissimilar to others which protected the negro in his right of suffrage, met with stout Republican opposition, the spirited debate suddenly heralding a serious party division. Trumbull held it unconst.i.tutional, while Schurz, reviewing the wretched State governments of the South, the venal officials who misled the negro, and the riotous corruption of men in possession of great authority, attacked the policy of the law as unwise and unsound.

Not less disturbing was the failure of Congress to grant universal amnesty. To this more than to all other causes did the critics of the Republican party ascribe the continuance of the animosities of the war, since it deprived the South of the a.s.sistance of its former leading men, and turned it over to inexperienced, and, in some instances, to corrupt men who used political disabilities as so much capital upon which to trade. The shocking brazenness of these methods had been disclosed in Georgia under the administration of Governor Bullock, who secured from Congress amnesty for his legislative friends while others were excluded. Schurz declared "When universal suffrage was granted to secure the equal rights of all, universal amnesty ought to have been granted to make all the resources of political intelligence and experience available for the promotion of the welfare of all."[1343]

[Footnote 1343: _Congressional Globe_, January 30, 1872, p. 699.]

The South had expected the President to develop a liberal policy. The spirit displayed at Appomattox, his "Let us have peace" letter of acceptance, and his intervention in Virginia and Mississippi soon after his inauguration, encouraged the belief that he would conciliate rather than hara.s.s it. His approval of the Ku-Klux law, therefore, intensified a feeling already strained to bitterness, and although he administered the law with prudence, a physical contest occurred in the South and a political rupture in the North. The hostility of the American people to the use of troops at elections had once before proved a source of angry contention, and the criticism which now rained upon the Republican party afforded new evidence of the public's animosity.

These strictures would have awakened no unusual solicitude in the minds of Republicans had their inspiration been confined to political opponents, but suddenly there came to the aid of the Democrats a formidable array of Republicans. Although the entering wedge was a difference of policy growing out of conditions in the Southern States, other reasons contributed to the rupture. The removal of Motley as minister to England, coming so soon after Sumner's successful resistance to the San Domingo scheme, was treated as an attempt to punish a senator for the just exercise of his right and the honest performance of his duty. Nine months later Sumner was discontinued as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If doubt existed as to the ground of Motley's removal, not a shadow clouded the reason for Sumner's deposition. The cause a.s.signed was that he no longer maintained personal and social relations with the President and Secretary of State, but when Schurz stigmatised it as "a flimsy pretext" he voiced the opinion of a part of the press which accepted it as a display of pure vindictiveness. "The indignation over your removal," telegraphed John W. Forney, "extends to men of all parties.

I have not heard one Republican approve it."[1344] Among Sumner's correspondents Ira Harris noted the popular disapproval and indignation in New York. "Another term of such arrogant a.s.sumption of power and wanton acquiescence," said Schurz, "may furnish the flunkies with a store of precedents until people cease to look for ordinary means of relief."[1345]

[Footnote 1344: Pierce, _Life of Sumner_, Vol. 4, p. 477.]

[Footnote 1345: New York _Tribune_, April 13, 1872.]

More disturbing because more irritating in its effects was the Administration's disposition to permit the control of its patronage by a coterie of senators, who preferred to strengthen faction regardless of its influence. Under this policy something had occurred in nearly every Northern State to make leading men and newspapers bitter, and as the years of the Administration multiplied censure became more drastic. Perhaps the influence of Conkling presented a normal phase of this practice. The Senator stood for much that had brought criticism upon the party. He approved the Southern policy and the acquisition of San Domingo. He indulged in a personal attack on Sumner, advised his deposition from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, commended the removal of Motley, and voted against the confirmation of E. Rockwood h.o.a.r for a.s.sociate justice of the Supreme Court.[1346] He also opposed civil service reform.

[Footnote 1346: George F. h.o.a.r, _Autobiography_, Vol. 1, p. 306; Vol.

2, p. 77.]

A statesman so p.r.o.nounced in his views and in control of abundant patronage was not likely to change a contest for personal advantage into a choice of public policies. Such an one appointed men because of their influence in controlling political caucuses and conventions.

"The last two State conventions were mockeries," declared Greeley, "some of the delegates having been bought out of our hands and others driven out of the convention.... I saw numbers, under threats of losing federal office, dragooned into doing the bidding of one man."[1347] The removal of officials whose names stood high in the roll of those who had greatly honoured their State deeply wounded many ardent Republicans, but not until the appointment and retention of Thomas Murphy did criticism scorn the veil of hint and innuendo. This act created a corps of journalistic critics whose unflagging satire and unswerving severity entertained the President's opponents and amazed his friends. They spoke for the popular side at the moment of a great crisis. Almost daily during the eighteen months of Murphy's administration the press of the whole country, under the lead of the _Tribune_, pictured the collector as a crafty army contractor and the partner of Tweed. "I think the warmest friends of Grant," wrote Curtis, "feel that he has failed terribly as President, not from want of honesty but from want of tact and great ignorance. It is a political position and he knew nothing of politics."[1348] The sacrifice of the best men among his cabinet advisers added greatly to this unrest. In one of his letters, Lowell, unintentionally overlooking Hamilton Fish, declared that E. Rockwood h.o.a.r and Jacob D.

c.o.x were "the only really strong men in the Cabinet."[1349] After the latter's forced resignation and the former's sudden exit to make room for a Southern Republican in order to placate carpet-bag senators for the removal of Sumner, the great critics of the Administration again cut loose. "How long," asked Bowles, "does the President suppose the people will patiently endure this dealing with high office as if it were a presidential perquisite, to be given away upon his mere whim, without regard to the claims of the office? It was bad enough when he only dealt so with consulates and small post-offices; but now that he has come to foreign ministers and cabinet officers it is intolerable."[1350]

[Footnote 1347: New York _Tribune_, April 13, 1872.]

[Footnote 1348: Cary, _Life of Curtis_, p. 213.]

[Footnote 1349: _Letters of_, Vol. 2, p. 57.

"There was undoubtedly great corruption and maladministration in the country in the time of President Grant. Selfish men and ambitious men got the ear of that simple man and confiding President. They studied Grant, some of them, as the shoemaker measures the foot of his customer."--h.o.a.r, _Autobiography_, Vol. 1, p. 197.]

[Footnote 1350: Springfield (Ma.s.s.) _Republican_, November 12, 1870.]

Under these conditions Republicans had been losing strength. In the election of 1870 their numbers, for the first time since 1864, had fallen below a two-thirds majority in the national House, while the Democrats gained four United States senators. In the same year Carl Schurz, with the a.s.sistance of the Democrats, had carried Missouri on the issue of universal amnesty. As the disaffection with the Administration became more p.r.o.nounced, this faction, a.s.suming the name of Liberal Republicans, met in convention at Jefferson City on January 24, 1872, and invited all Republicans who favoured reform to meet in national ma.s.s convention at Cincinnati on May 1. This call acted like a lighted match in a pile of shavings, prominent Republicans in every State, including many leading newspapers, giving it instant and hearty response. Among other journals in New York the _Nation_ and the _Evening Post_ guardedly approved the movement, and the _World_, although a Democratic organ, offered conditional support. The _Tribune_ also encouraged the hope that it would eventually swing into line.

Horace Greeley's principles were in substantial accord with those of his party. He had little liking for civil service reform; the integrity of the national debt invoked his unflagging support; and the suppression of the Ku-Klux, although favouring a liberal Southern policy, had received his encouragement.[1351] Nor had he said anything in speech or writing disrespectful of the President. He did not favour his renomination, but he had faith in the essential honesty and soundness of Republican voters. Moreover, the demand for "a genuine reform of the tariff" made it impossible to reconcile his policy with that of the Liberal Republicans of Missouri.

[Footnote 1351: New York _Tribune_, May 31, 1870; February 27, 1871; May 1, 1872.]

Nevertheless, Greeley's position in the Republican party had become intolerable. Conkling controlled the city and State machines, Fenton belonged in a hopeless minority, and Grant resented the _Tribune's_ opposition to his succession. Besides, the editor's friends had been deeply humiliated. The appointment of Murphy was accepted as "a plain declaration of war."[1352] The treatment of the Greeley committee, overthrown by the power of patronage, also festered in his heart. "For more than a year," he said, "to be an avowed friend of Governor Fenton was to be marked for proscription at the White House."[1353] Thus, with the past unforgiven and the future without hope, the great journalist declared that "We propose to endure this for one term only."[1354]

[Footnote 1352: _Ibid._, April 25, 1872.]

[Footnote 1353: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1354: _Ibid._]

From the first it was apparent that the Republican schism, to be successful, needed the support of the _Tribune_. Although its influence had materially suffered during and since the war, it still controlled a great const.i.tuency throughout the North, and the longer its chief hesitated to join the new party the more earnest and eloquent did the appeals of the Liberals become. At last, relying upon a compromise of their economic differences, Greeley accepted the invitation to meet the Missouri reformers in convention.[1355] His action was the occasion for much rejoicing, and on April 13 the Liberals of New York City began their campaign amidst the cheers of an enthusiastic mult.i.tude a.s.sembled at Cooper Inst.i.tute.[1356] The Fenton leaders, conspicuously posted on the platform, indicated neither a real love of reform nor an absence of office-seekers, but the presence among the vice-presidents of E.L. G.o.dkin of the _Nation_ and Parke G.o.dwin of the _Post_ removed all doubt as to the sincere desire of some of those present to replace Grant with a President who would discourage the use of patronage by enforcing civil service reform, and encourage good government in the South by enacting universal amnesty.

To Schurz's charge that the national Republican convention would be made up of office-holders, Oliver P. Morton declared, three days later in the same hall, that there would be more office-seekers at Cincinnati than office-holders at Philadelphia.[1357]

[Footnote 1355: _Ibid._, March 30, 1872.]

[Footnote 1356: New York _Tribune_, April 14, 1872.]

[Footnote 1357: Dudley Foulke, _Life of Morton_, Vol. 2, p. 255.]

The managers of the Liberal Republican movement preferred Charles Francis Adams for President. Adams' public life encouraged the belief that he would practise his professed principles, and although isolated from all political a.s.sociations it was thought his brilliant championship of the North during the temporising of the English government would make his nomination welcome. David Davis and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois were likewise acceptable, and Salmon P. Chase had his admirers. Greeley's availability was also talked of. His signature to the bail-bond of Jefferson Davis, releasing the ex-president of the Confederacy from prison, attracted attention to his presidential ambition, while his loud declaration for universal amnesty opened the way for a tour of the South. At a brilliant reception in Union Square, given after his return, he described the carpet-bagger as "a worthless adventurer whom the Southern States hate and ought to hate," likening him to the New York legislator "who goes to Albany nominally to legislate, but really to plunder and steal."[1358] His excessive zeal for Democratic support led to the intimation that he had economised his epithets in criticising the Tweed ring.[1359] As early as February, Nast, with his usual foresight, pictured "H.G., the editor" offering the nomination to "H.G., the farmer," who, rejoicing in the name of Cincinnatus, had turned from the plough toward the dome of the Capitol in the distance.[1360] To the charge that he was a candidate for President, Greeley frankly admitted that while he was not an aspirant for office, he should never decline any duty which his political friends saw fit to devolve upon him.[1361]

[Footnote 1358: New York _Tribune_, June 13, 1871.]

[Footnote 1359: Paine, _Life of Nast_, p. 162.]

[Footnote 1360: _Ibid._, p. 223.]

[Footnote 1361: New York _Tribune_, May 30, 1871.]

Nevertheless, the men whose earnest efforts had prepared the way for the Liberal movement did not encourage Greeley's ambition. Especially were his great newspaper a.s.sociates dumb. A week before the convention Bowles of the Springfield _Republican_ mentioned him with Sumner and Trumbull as a proper person for the nomination, but G.o.dkin of the _Nation_, Halstead of the Cincinnati _Commercial_, and Horace White of the Chicago _Tribune_ remained silent. The _Evening Post_ spoke of him as "the simple-minded philanthropist, with his various sc.r.a.ps of so-called principles."[1362] Jacob D. c.o.x, Stanley Matthews, and George Hoadley, the conspicuous Liberal triumvirate of Ohio, repudiated his candidacy, and Schurz, in his opening speech as president of the convention, without mentioning names, plainly designated Adams as the most suitable candidate and Greeley as the weakest.[1363]

[Footnote 1362: New York _Post_, May 2, 1872.]