A Political Diary, 1828-1830 Part 16

The joke is that Rothschild is to pay the money for the Turks, and to be made King of Jerusalem.

Aberdeen began by begging we would first settle the Greek question. He brought a paper the Russians were willing to deliver in containing a sort of apology for the 10th Article, and declaring that it by no means interfered with the powers of the Conference. We took a great deal of time in considering whether we should not suggest some alteration in this paper--some is to be proposed--not very essential.

We had a long discussion as to the name of the new State. At last it seemed to be thought 'Sovereign Prince of Greece' was the best. Aberdeen thinks he shall have little difficulty about the Prince. The Russians agree to the description given; but I dare say they imagine we mean to describe a different man. I suspect they think we want to give them Leopold.

Aberdeen read a letter he proposed sending to Lord Stuart, the purport of which was that we wanted to know what he meant to do towards redeeming France from the responsibility she had incurred and made us incur by giving instructions to Count Guilleminot, stating the terms of peace and the moderation of the Emperor--instructions which misled our Amba.s.sador, and induced the two Amba.s.sadors to give a.s.surances to the Porte which events proved to be unfounded.

The letter, I think, likewise desired him to enquire in what form our joint representations as to the amount of the indemnity were to be made. To these the Amba.s.sadors have pledged the two Cabinets.

There was a great deal more in the letter which is to be left out. It went into the details of the treaty, or rather of its effects.

The offer is to be made to the Turks of an independent Greece, from the Gulf of Volo to Missolonghi, or of a Greece under Suzerainete, with Negropont, and the line from Volo to the Gulf of Arta.

I think we are all agreed that at the commencement of the war it was our interest to take as little as possible from Turkey--that now it is our interest to make Greece a substantive State, which may hereafter receive the _debris_ of the Ottoman Empire. [Footnote: This may explain the apparently illiberal views of many of the Cabinet as to the Greek boundaries. They saw the difficulty of any halting place outside the Isthmus of Corinth, short of a wider boundary even than that ultimately adopted.]

As to the really important matter, the remonstrance to Russia, nothing was done. Nothing is, I conclude, written, and Aberdeen does not like Cabinet criticism, nor do I think the Cabinet at all agreed as to what should be said. Dudley's letters used to occupy us for days, and certainly they were the better for it--although we lost a good deal of time occasionally.

Aberdeen said he would send it to me. I think I shall write an _esquisse_ myself. We are to have no more Cabinets for some time. The Chancellor wishes to have the remaining fortnight of his holidays uninterrupted.

_October 12._

Went to town at quarter-past one. To the Foreign Office. The treaty arrived last night. Lord Aberdeen took it with him to Windsor. It differs materially from the _projet_. The Articles respecting indemnity are _relegues_ to a separate transaction. The payment of 100,000 ducats is to lead to the evacuation of Adrianople; 400,000 form the next payment, then 500,000, and 500,000, making the sum originally demanded for individual losses; but, as I understand Mr. Backhouse, eighteen months must elapse before Turkey can be evacuated to the Danube. I had much conversation with him as to other points. On looking into the Act of the Congress I find the Powers adhering to it may be considered as binding themselves not to _disturb_ the territorial arrangements that Act establishes; but they are not bound to _maintain_ them. Thus if France appropriated to herself Spain, she would violate the treaty, but no Power signing the treaty would be obliged, by virtue of that Act, to make war upon France for doing so.

That the general treaty contains no guarantee is evident from the specific guarantee of the cessions made by Saxony to Prussia, which would have been unnecessary if the spirit of the treaty had been that of existent guarantee.

_October 13._

Cabinet room. Found Lord Rosslyn there. Read the treaty.

The King was very well yesterday. The Recorder's Report was so long that half was deferred.

The last dispatches from Persia, which arrived on Friday, were opened at the Foreign Office, and read by everybody. Aberdeen sent them to the Duke, who has probably taken them to Walmer in his carriage. The Chairs sent for them, and could not get them. I must put a stop to this. I have written to Lord Heytesbury to beg he will in future forward letters to their address.

Wrote a 'proposed draft' to Lord Heytesbury, directing him, if he should have reason to think the Russians intend to exact further concession from Persia, to intimate that such an attempt will be considered by his Majesty as unfriendly to himself as an Asiatic Power. I doubt my getting the Duke to agree to the sending of this despatch; but I shall try.

_October 14._

Carried my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury to Aberdeen, who agrees to send it with a trifling alteration, at least one not very important. Read to him my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury on the Peace of Adrianople. He seemed to approve of great part of it. He has done nothing at his yet, and seems to think there is no hurry!

We shall stand very ill in Parliament if we have nothing to show. I think mine is a good _cadre_ of a letter, but that specific instructions should be given to Lord Heytesbury as to what he shall endeavour to obtain in a separate despatch.

Read my drafts to Lord Rosslyn after dinner. He seemed to think the view I took was the right, and that much of what I had written was very good, but that it might be shortened. So I think.

_October 15._

Henry copied the draft to Lord Heytesbury, for the Duke, to whom I sent it with a letter.

Showed the Chairs the draft to Lord Heytesbury on Persia. They were much pleased with it. So was old Jones. Sent it to the Duke. In little doubt his approving it.

Received from the Duke the Persian despatches which I gave to the Chairs.

The Duke had not read them.

Received from him a letter on the subject of half-Batta. He says as an officer he should have thought there was a compromise in 1801. That it should be looked into as a question of economy. That above all things in dealing with an army you must _be just_.

The Duke thinks the publication of the letter of Lord Combermere's secretary indiscreet and _wicked_, and is very angry with Lord Combermere.

A letter will be written to the Government on the subject, directing enquiry.

_October 19, Sunday._

Read McDonald's despatches from Persia, and sent them to the Duke, with a letter suggesting the heads of a letter to the Envoy.

The Russians have given up one of the two crores due, and allow five years for paying the other. They mean, therefore, to rule Persia _by influence_.

However, there is a good Mahometan and Anti-Russian feeling beyond the Euphrates, and if mischief happens, it is our fault.

Received a letter from Hardinge respecting half-Batta. He is for standing firm and giving some general boon, as an addition to marching money, to the whole army. That is my idea. I am sure it is the safest course.

Wrote to Loch, suggesting it, and at the same time advised him to answer the paragraphs respecting half-Batta, and not give misrepresentations too much head.

_October 20._

Two letters from the Duke, written very hastily. It is evident he did not like my making a sketch of a letter to Lord Heytesbury, and that he does not like any difference of opinion as to the Batta question.

On the first point I still think I was right. He mentions some ideas of Russia ordering Dieb.i.t.c.h across the Balkan, and even the Danube, of her giving up the Princ.i.p.alities, &c. In short he says all we know is that there is a peace--we do not know what it is--and it would be ridiculous to remonstrate against we know not what.

My draft was written before these reports were spread; and I only, from anxiety to have the despatch well written and soon, sketched what I thought would do.

As to the reports, I have told Aberdeen I cannot believe Russia has on a sudden ceased to be ambitious, or to use perfidy as a mode of accomplishing ambitious ends. She may give out she will make these changes--she may make some--but her object is to prevent all combination on the part of Austria, France, and England. If we do not remonstrate against what is signed, we shall lose all credit, if that which is executed should be comparatively favourable, and we shall incur great blame if no relaxation takes place. A remonstrance might be so worded as to do no harm to Turkey or to Europe, and to do good to us.

The Duke's other letter was on the Batta question, upon which he does not like contradiction, yet I think his course would lead to continued demands on the part of all the armies. I have told him I shall be in town to see the Chairs on Sat.u.r.day, and will try to see him on Friday, and, if he wishes, bring the Chairs to him on Sat.u.r.day.

_October 21._

Received a long confused letter from Fitzgerald upon my project of a draft to Lord Heytesbury. He was at Sudborn, [Footnote: Seat of Lord Hertford, in Suffolk] where the Duke was. The Duke was not so much inclined to think the Russians would make any considerable concessions as Aberdeen, but he thought, and had made Fitzgerald think, it would be premature to remonstrate. I have written to Fitzgerald and told him my opinion more at length than I told Aberdeen yesterday.

_October 23._

Cabinet room. Read the despatches from Petersburg and Paris. All the hints of the Emperor of Russia's intention of not retaining his army in Turkey come through Paris, Nesselrode having on September 29 spoken thus specifically to the Duke de Mortemart, and merely talked about taking less money and making some change in the guarantees to Lord Heytesbury. I did not see Aberdeen, who was engaged with the Spanish Minister.

I do not depart from my original idea that Russia does all this to gain time, and with as much perfidy as she has shown throughout.