A Political and Social History of Modern Europe Part 9

At the very time when Charles V was encountering these grave troubles in administering his scattered hereditary possessions and in waging war now with the French and now with the Mohammedans, he likewise was saddled with problems peculiar to the government of his empire. Had he been able to devote all his talent and energy to the domestic affairs of the Holy Roman Empire, he might have contributed potently to the establishment of a compact German state. It should be borne in mind that when Charles V was elected emperor in 1519 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German-speaking peoples, and that the national unifications of England, France, and Spain, already far advanced, pointed the path to a similar political evolution for Germany. Why should not a modern German national state have been created coextensive with the medieval empire, a state which would have included not only the twentieth-century German Empire but Austria, Holland, and Belgium, and which, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the English Channel to the Vistula, would have dominated the continent of Europe throughout the whole modern era?

There were certainly grave difficulties in the way, but grave difficulties had also been encountered in consolidating France or Spain, and the difference was rather of degree than of kind. In every other case a strong monarch had overcome feudal princes and ambitious n.o.bles, had deprived cities of many of their liberties, had trampled upon, or tampered with, the privileges of representative a.s.semblies, and had enforced internal order and security. In every such case the monarch had commanded the support of important popular elements and had directed his major efforts to the realization of national aims.

National patriotism was not altogether lacking among Germans of the sixteenth century. They were conscious of a common language which was already becoming a vehicle of literary expression. They were conscious of a common tradition and of a common nationality. They recognized, in many cases, the absurdly antiquated character of their political inst.i.tutions and ardently longed for reforms. In fact, the trouble with the Germans was not so much the lack of thought about political reform as the actual conflicts between various groups concerning the method and goal of reform. Germans despised the Holy Roman Empire, much as Frenchmen abhorred the memory of feudal society; but Germans were not as unanimous as Frenchmen in advocating the establishment of a strong national monarchy. In Germany were princes, free cities, and knights,-- all nationalistic after a fashion, but all quarreling with each other and with their nominal sovereign.

[Sidenote: Charles V bent on Strengthening Monarchical Power though not on a National Basis]

The emperors themselves were the only sincere and consistent champions of centralized monarchical power, but the emperors were probably less patriotic than any one else in the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V would never abandon his pretensions to world power in order to become a strong monarch over a single nation. Early in his reign he declared that "no monarchy was comparable though not to the Roman Empire. This the whole world had once obeyed, and Christ Himself had paid it honor and obedience. Unfortunately it was now only a shadow of what it had been, but he hoped, with the help of those powerful countries and alliances which G.o.d had granted him, to raise it to its ancient glory."

Charles V labored for an increase of personal power not only in Germany but also in the Netherlands, in Spain, and in Italy; and with the vast imperial ambition of Charles the ideal of creating a national monarchy on a strictly German basis was in sharp conflict. Charles V could not, certainly would not, pose simply as a German king--a national leader.

[Sidenote: Nationalism among the German Princes]

Under these circ.u.mstances the powerful German princes, in defying the emperor's authority and in promoting disruptive tendencies in the Holy Roman Empire, were enabled to lay the blame at the feet of their unpatriotic sovereign and thereby arouse in their behalf a good deal of German national sentiment. In choosing Charles V to be their emperor, the princely electors in 1519 had demanded that German or Latin should be the official language of the Holy Roman Empire, that imperial offices should be open only to Germans, that the various princes should not be subject to any foreign political jurisdiction, that no foreign troops should serve in imperial wars without the approval of the Diet, and that Charles should confirm the sovereign rights of all the princes and appoint from their number a Council of Regency (_Reichsregiment_) to share in his government.

[Sidenote: The Council of Regency, 1521-1531]

[Sidenote: Its Failure to Unify Germany]

In accordance with an agreement reached by a Diet held at Worms in 1521, the Council of Regency was created. Most of its twenty-three members were named by, and represented the interests of, the German princes. Here might be the starting-point toward a closer political union of the German-speaking people, if only a certain amount of financial independence could be secured to the Council. The proposal on this score was a most promising one; it was to support the new imperial administration, not, as formerly, by levying more or less voluntary contributions on the various states, but by establishing a kind of customs-union (_Zollverein_) and imposing on foreign importations a tariff for revenue. This time, however, the German burghers raised angry protests; the merchants and traders of the Hanseatic towns insisted that the proposed financial burden would fall on them and destroy their business; and their protests were potent enough to bring to nought the princes' plan. Thus the government was forced again to resort to the levy of special financial contributions,--an expedient which usually put the emperor and the Council of Regency at the mercy of the most selfish and least patriotic of the German princes.

[Sidenote: Nationalism among the German Knights]

More truly patriotic as a cla.s.s than German princes or German burghers were the German knights--those gentlemen of the hill-top and of the road, who, usually poor in pocket though stout of heart, looked down from their high-perched castles with badly disguised contempt upon the vulgar tradesmen of the town or beheld with anger and jealousy the encroachments of neighboring princes, lay and ecclesiastical, more wealthy and powerful than themselves. Especially against the princes the knights contended, sometimes under the forms of law, more often by force and violence and all the barbarous accompaniments of private warfare and personal feud. Some of the knights were well educated and some had literary and scholarly abilities; hardly any one of them was a friend of public order. Yet practically all the knights were intensely proud of their German nationality. It was the knights, who, under the leadership of such fiery patriots as Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen, had forcefully contributed in 1519 to the imperial election of Charles V, a German Habsburg, in preference to non-German candidates such as Francis I of France or Henry VIII of England. For a brief period Charles V leaned heavily upon the German knights for support in his struggle with princes and burghers; and at one time it looked as if the knights in union with the emperor would succeed in curbing the power of the princes and in laying the foundations of a strongly centralized national German monarchy.

[Sidenote: Rise of Lutheranism Favored by the Knights and Opposed by Charles V]

But at the critical moment Protestantism arose in Germany, marking a cleavage between the knightly leaders and the emperor. To knights like Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen the final break in 1520 between Martin Luther and the pope seemed to a.s.sure a separation of Germany from Italy and the erection of a peculiar form of German Christianity about which a truly national state could be builded. As a cla.s.s the knights applauded Luther and rejoiced at the rapid spread of his teachings throughout Germany. On the other hand, Charles V remained a Roman Catholic. Not only was he loyally attached to the religion of his fathers through personal training and belief, but he felt that the maintenance of what political authority he possessed was dependent largely on the maintenance of the universal authority of the ancient Church, and practically he needed papal a.s.sistance for his many foreign projects. The same reasons that led many German princes to accept the Lutheran doctrines as a means of lessening imperial control caused Charles V to reject them. At the same Diet at Worms (1521), at which the Council of Regency had been created, Charles V prevailed upon the Germans present to condemn and outlaw Luther; and this action alienated the knights from the emperor.

[Sidenote: The Knights' War, 1522-1523]

Franz von Sickingen, a Rhenish knight and the ablest of his cla.s.s, speedily took advantage of the emperor's absence from Germany in 1522 to precipitate a Knights' War. In supreme command of a motley army of fellow-knights, Franz made an energetic attack upon the rich landed estates of the Catholic prince-bishop of Trier. At this point, the German princes, lay as well as ecclesiastical, forgetting their religious predilections and mindful only of their common hatred of the knights, rushed to the defense of the bishop of Trier and drove off Sickingen, who, in April, 1523, died fighting before his own castle of Ebernburg. Ulrich von Hutten fled to Switzerland and perished miserably shortly afterwards. The knights' cause collapsed, and princes and burghers remained triumphant. [Footnote: The Knights' War was soon followed by the Peasants' Revolt, a social rather than a political movement. For an account of the Peasants' Revolt see pp. 133 ff.] It was the end of serious efforts in the sixteenth century to create a national German state.

[Sidenote: Failure of German Nationalism in the Sixteenth Century]

The Council of Regency lasted until 1531, though its inability to preserve domestic peace discredited it, and in its later years it enjoyed little authority. Left to themselves, many of the princes espoused Protestantism. In vain Charles V combated the new religious movement. In vain he proscribed it in several Diets after that of Worms. In vain he a.s.sailed its upholders in several military campaigns, such as those against the Schmalkaldic League, which will be treated more fully in another connection. But the long absences of Charles V from Germany and his absorption in a mult.i.tude of cares and worries, to say nothing of the spasmodic aid which Francis, the Catholic king of France, gave to the Protestants in Germany, contributed indirectly to the spread of Lutheranism. In the last year of Charles's rule (1555) the profession of the Lutheran faith on the part of German princes was placed by the peace of Augsburg [Footnote: See below, p. 136.] on an equal footing with that of the Catholic religion. Protestantism among the German princes proved a disintegrating, rather than a unifying, factor of national life. The rise of Protestantism was the last straw which broke German nationalism.

[Sidenote: Charles V and England]

With England the relations of Charles V were interesting but not so important as those already noted with the Germans, the Turks, and the French. At first in practical alliance with the impetuous self-willed Henry VIII (1509-1547), whose wife--Catherine of Aragon--was the emperor's aunt, Charles subsequently broke off friendly relations when the English sovereign asked the pope to declare his marriage null and void. Charles prevailed upon the pope to deny Henry's request, and the schism which Henry then created between the Catholic Church in England and the Roman See increased the emperor's bitterness. Towards the close of Henry's reign relations improved again, but it was not until the accession of Charles's cousin, Mary (1553-1558), to the English throne that really cordial friendship was restored. To this Queen Mary, Charles V married his son and successor Philip.

[Sidenote: Abdication of Charles V]

At length exhausted by his manifold labors, Charles V resolved to divide his dominions between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip and to retire from government. In the hall of the Golden Fleece at Brussels on 25 October, 1555, he formally abdicated the sovereignty of his beloved Netherlands. Turning to the representatives, he said: "Gentlemen, you must not be astonished if, old and feeble as I am in all my members, and also from the love I bear you, I shed some tears."

At least in the Netherlands the love was reciprocal. In 1556 he resigned the Spanish and Italian crowns, [Footnote: He made over to his brother all his imperial authority, though he nominally retained the crown of the Holy Roman Empire until 1558] and spent his last years in preparation for a future world. He died in 1558. Personally, Charles V had a prominent lower jaw and a thin, pale face, relieved by a wide forehead and bright, flashing eyes. He was well formed and dignified in appearance. In character he was slow and at times both irresolute and obstinate, but he had a high sense of duty, honest intentions, good soldierly qualities, and a large amount of cold common sense. Though not highly educated, he was well read and genuinely appreciative of music and painting.

PHILIP II AND THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN

For a century and a half after the retirement of Charles V in 1556, we hear of two branches of the Habsburg family--the Spanish Habsburgs and the Austrian Habsburgs, descended respectively from Philip II and Ferdinand. By the terms of the division, Ferdinand, the brother of Charles, received the compact family possessions in the East--Austria and its dependencies, Bohemia, that portion of Hungary not occupied by the Turks, and the t.i.tle of Holy Roman Emperor,--while the remainder went to Charles's son, Philip II,--Spain, the Netherlands, Franche Comte (the eastern part of Burgundy), the Two Sicilies, Milan, and the American colonies.

Over the history of Ferdinand and his immediate successors, we need not tarry, because, aside from efforts to preserve religious peace and the family's political predominance within the empire and to recover Hungary from the Turks, it is hardly essential. But in western Europe Philip II for a variety of reasons became a figure of world-wide importance: we must examine his career.

[Sidenote: Character and policies of Philip II]

Few characters in history have elicited more widely contradictory estimates than Philip II. Represented by many Protestant writers as a villain, despot, and bigot, he has been extolled by patriotic Spaniards as Philip the Great, champion of religion and right. These conflicting opinions are derived from different views which may be taken of the value and inherent worth of Philip's policies and methods, but what those policies and methods were there can be no doubt. In the first place, Philip II prized Spain as his native country and his main possession--in marked contrast to his father, for he himself had been born in Spain and had resided there during almost all of his life--and he was determined to make Spain the greatest country in the world. In the second place, Philip II was sincerely and piously attached to Catholicism; he abhorred Protestantism as a blasphemous rending of the seamless garment of the Church; and he set his heart upon the universal triumph of his faith. If, by any chance, a question should arise between the advantage of Spain and the best interests of the Church, the former must be sacrificed relentlessly to the latter. Such was the sovereign's stern ideal. No seeming failure of his policies could shake his belief in their fundamental excellence. That whatever he did was done for the greater glory of G.o.d, that success or failure depended upon the inscrutable will of the Almighty and not upon himself, were his guiding convictions, which he transmitted to his Spanish successors. Not only was Philip a man of principles and ideals, but he was possessed of a boundless capacity for work and an indomitable will.

He preferred tact and diplomacy to war and prowess of arms, though he was quite willing to order his troops to battle if the object, in his opinion, was right. He was personally less accustomed to the sword than to the pen, and no clerk ever toiled more industriously at his papers than did this king. From early morning until far into the night he bent over minutes and reports and other business of kingcraft. Naturally cautious and reserved, he was dignified and princely in public. In his private life, he was orderly and extremely affectionate to his family and servants. Loyalty was Philip's best attribute.

There was a less happy side to the character of Philip II. His free use of the Inquisition in order to extirpate heresy throughout his dominions has rendered him in modern eyes an embodiment of bigotry and intolerance, but it must be remembered that he lived in an essentially intolerant age, when religious persecution was stock in trade of Protestants no less than of Catholics. It is likewise true that he constantly employed craft and deceit and was ready to make use of a.s.sa.s.sination for political purposes, but this too was in accordance with the temper of the times: lawyers then taught, following the precepts of the famous historian and political philosopher, Machiavelli, that Christian morality is a guide for private conduct rather than for public business, and that "the Prince" may act above the laws in order to promote the public good, and even such famous Protestant leaders as Coligny and William the Silent entered into murder plots. But when all due allowances have been made, the student cannot help feeling that the purpose of Philip II would have been served better by the employment of means other than persecution and murder.

The reign of Philip II covered approximately the second half of the sixteenth century (1556-1598). In his efforts to make Spain the greatest power in the world and to restore the unity problems of Christendom, he was doomed to failure. The chief Confronting reason for the failure is simple--the number and [side note Problems Confronting Philip II] variety of the problems and projects with which Philip II was concerned. It was a case of the king putting a finger in too many pies--he was cruelly burned. Could Philip II have devoted all his energies to one thing at a time, he might conceivably have had greater success, but as it was, he must divide his attention between supervising the complex administration of his already wide dominions and annexing in addition the monarchy and empire of Portugal, between promoting a vigorous commercial and colonial policy and suppressing a stubborn revolt in the Netherlands, between championing Catholicism in both England and France and protecting Christendom against the victorious Mohammedans. It was this multiplicity of interests that paralyzed the might of the Spanish monarch, yet each one of his foreign activities was epochal in the history of the country affected. We shall therefore briefly review Philip's activities in order.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Political]

As we have seen, Philip II inherited a number of states which had separate political inst.i.tutions and customs. He believed in national unification, at least of Spain. National unification implied uniformity, and uniformity implied greater power of the crown. So Philip sought to further the work of his great-grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella,--absolutism and uniformity became his watchwords in internal administration. Politically Philip made no pretense of consulting the Cortes on legislation, and, although he convoked them to vote new taxes, he established the rule that the old taxes were to be considered as granted in perpetuity and as const.i.tuting the ordinary revenue of the crown. He treated the n.o.bles as ornamental rather than useful, retiring them from royal offices in favor of lawyers and other subservient members of the middle cla.s.s. All business was conducted by correspondence and with a final reference to the king, and the natural result was endless delay.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Economic]

Financially and economically the period was unfortunate for Spain. The burden of the host of foreign enterprises fell with crushing weight upon the Spanish kingdom and particularly upon Castile. Aragon, which was poor and jealous of its own rights, would give little. The income from the Netherlands, at first large, was stopped by the revolt. The Italian states barely paid expenses. The revenue from the American mines, which has been greatly exaggerated, enriched the pockets of individuals rather than the treasury of the state. In Spain itself, the greater part of the land was owned by the ecclesiastical corporations and the n.o.bles, who were exempt from taxation but were intermittently fleeced. Moreover, the 10 per cent tax on all sales--the alcabala [Footnote: See above, p. 57.]--gradually paralyzed all native industrial enterprise. And the persecution of wealthy and industrious Jews and Moors diminished the resources of the kingdom. Spain, at the close of the century, was on the verge of bankruptcy.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Religious]

In religious matters Philip II aimed at uniform adherence to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. He felt, like so many of his contemporaries, that disparity of belief among subjects would imperil a state. Both from political motives and from religious zeal Philip was a Catholic. He therefore advised the pope, watched with interest the proceedings of the great Council of Trent which was engaged with the reformation of the Church, [Footnote: See below, pp. 158 ff.] and labored for the triumph of his religion not only in his own dominions and in France, but also in Poland, in England, and even in Scandinavia.

In Spain he strengthened the Inquisition and used it as a tool of royal despotism.

[Sidenote: Temporary Union of Spain and Portugal]

Territorially Philip II desired to complete political unity in the peninsula by combining the crown of Portugal with those of Castile and Aragon. He himself was closely related to the Portuguese royal family, and in 1580 he laid formal claim to that kingdom. The duke of Braganza, whose claim was better than Philip's, was bought off by immense grants and the country was overrun by Spanish troops. Philip endeavored to placate the Portuguese by full recognition of their const.i.tutional rights and in particular by favoring the lesser n.o.bility or country gentry. Although the monarchies and vast colonial possessions of Spain and Portugal were thus joined for sixty years under a common king, the arrangement never commanded any affection in Portugal, with the result that at the first opportunity, in 1640, Portuguese independence was restored under the leadership of the Braganza family.

[Sidenote: Rebellions Against Philip II in Spain]

The most serious domestic difficulty which Philip had to face was the revolt of the rich and populous Netherlands, which we shall discuss presently. But with other revolts the king had to contend. In his efforts to stamp out heresy and peculiar customs among the descendants of the Moors who still lived in the southern part of Spain, Philip aroused armed opposition. The Moriscos, as they were called, struggled desperately from 1568 to 1570 to reestablish the independence of Granada. This rebellion was suppressed with great cruelty, and the surviving Moriscos were forced to find new homes in less favored parts of Spain until their final expulsion from the country in 1609. A revolt of Aragon in 1591 was put down by a Castilian army; the const.i.tutional rights of Aragon were diminished and the kingdom was reduced to a greater measure of submission.

[Sidenote: Revolt of the Netherlands: The Causes]

The causes that led to the revolt of the Netherlands may be stated as fourfold. (1) Financial. The burdensome taxes which Charles V had laid upon the country were increased by Philip II and often applied to defray the expenses of other parts of the Spanish possessions.

Furthermore, the restrictions which Philip imposed upon Dutch commerce in the interest of that of Spain threatened to interfere seriously with the wonted economic prosperity of the Netherlands. (2) Political.

Philip II sought to centralize authority in the Netherlands and despotically deprived the cities and n.o.bles of many of their traditional privileges. Philip never visited the country in person after 1559, and he intrusted his arbitrary government to regents and to Spaniards rather than to native leaders. The scions of the old and proud n.o.ble families of the Netherlands naturally resented being supplanted in lucrative and honorable public offices by persons whom they could regard only as upstarts. (3) Religious. Despite the rapid and universal spread of Calvinistic Protestantism throughout the northern provinces, Philip was resolved to force Catholicism upon all of his subjects. He increased the number of bishoprics, decreed acts of uniformity, and in a vigorous way utilized the Inquisition to carry his policy into effect. (4) Personal. The Dutch and Flemish loved Charles V because he had been born and reared among them and always considered their country as his native land. Philip II was born and brought up in Spain. He spoke a language foreign to the Netherlands, and by their inhabitants he was thought of as an alien.

[Sidenote: Margaret of Parma and the "Beggars"]

At first the opposition in the Netherlands was directed chiefly against the Inquisition and the presence of Spanish garrisons in the towns. The regent, Margaret of Parma, Philip's half-sister, endeavored to banish public discontent by a few concessions. The Spanish troops were withdrawn and certain unpopular officials were dismissed. But influential n.o.blemen and burghers banded themselves together early in 1566 and presented to the regent Margaret a pet.i.tion, in which, while protesting their loyalty, they expressed fear of a general revolt and begged that a special emba.s.sy be sent to Philip to urge upon him the necessity of abolishing the Inquisition and of redressing their other grievances. The regent, at first disquieted by the pet.i.tioners, was rea.s.sured by one of her advisers, who exclaimed, "What, Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars (_ces gueux_)?" Henceforth the chief opponents of Philip's policies in the Netherlands humorously labeled themselves "Beggars" and a.s.sumed the emblems of common begging, the wallet and the bowl. The fashion spread quickly, and the "Beggars'"

insignia were everywhere to be seen, worn as trinkets, especially in the large towns. In accordance with the "Beggars'" pet.i.tion, an emba.s.sy was dispatched to Spain to lay the grievances before Philip II.

[Sidenote: Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, 1567-1573]

Philip II at first promised to abolish the Inquisition in the Netherlands, but soon repented of his promise. For meanwhile mobs of fanatical Protestants, far more radical than the respectable "Beggars,"

were rushing to arms, breaking into Catholic churches, wrecking the altars, smashing the images to pieces, profaning monasteries, and showing in their retaliation as much violence--as their enemies had shown cruelty in persecution. In August, 1566, this sacrilegious iconoclasm reached its climax in the irreparable ruin of the magnificent cathedral at Antwerp. Philip replied to these acts, which he interpreted as disloyalty, by sending (1567) his most famous general, the duke of Alva, into the Netherlands with a large army and with instructions to cow the people into submission. Alva proved himself quite capable of understanding and executing his master's wishes: one of his first acts was the creation of a "Council of Troubles," an arbitrary tribunal which tried cases of treason and which operated so notoriously as to merit its popular appellation of the "Council of Blood." During the duke's stay of six years, it has been estimated that eight thousand persons were executed, including the counts of Egmont and Horn, thirty thousand were despoiled of their property, and one hundred thousand quitted the country. Alva, moreover, levied an enormous tax of one-tenth upon the price of merchandise sold.

As the tax was collected on several distinct processes, it absorbed at least seven-tenths of the value of certain goods--of cloth, for instance. The tax, together with the lawless confusion throughout the country, meant the destruction of Flemish manufactures and trade. It was, therefore, quite natural that the burgesses of the southern Netherlands, Catholic though most of them were, should unite with the n.o.bles and with the Protestants of the North in opposing Spanish tyranny. The whole country was now called to arms.

[Sidenote: William the Silent, Prince of Orange]