A Political and Social History of Modern Europe Part 38

[Sidenote: Eastword Expansion into Asia]

Nor was the migration of the Russian race restricted to Europe. The division between Europe and Asia is largely imaginary, as another glance at the map will prove,--the low-lying Urals are a barrier only toward the north, while southward the plains of Russia stretch on interminably above the Caspian until they are merged in the steppes of Siberia. Across these plains moved a steady stream of Cossacks and peasants and adventurers, carrying with them the habits and traditions of their Russian homes. Ever eastward wended the emigrants. They founded Tobolsk in 1587 and Tomsk in 1604; they established Yakutsk on the Lena River in 1632, and Irkutsk on Lake Baikal in 1652; in 1638 they reached the Sea of Okhotsk, and, by the close of the seventeenth century, they occupied the peninsula of Kamchatka and looked upon the broad Pacific. Thus at the time when the Spaniards were extending their speech and laws throughout South America and the English were laying the foundations for the predominance of their inst.i.tutions in North America, the Russians were appropriating northern Asia and demonstrating that, with them at least, the course of empire takes its way eastward.

Ivan the Great had already been described in church service as "the ruler and autocrat of all Russia, the new Tsar Constantine [Footnote: The last Caesar of the Graeco-Roman Empire, Constantine XI, had perished in 1453 in vain defense of Constantinople against the Turks. It was a significant fact that the Russian rulers, who owed their Christianity and their nation's culture to the Greeks, should now revive the t.i.tle of Caesar (Russian form, tsar or czar).] in the new city of Constantine, Moscow." His successors invariably had themselves crowned as tsars and autocrats of all Russia. By military might they maintained their control over the ever-widening territories of the Russian people; with racial pride and religious fervor, the distant emigrants regarded their royal family at Moscow. The power of the tsars kept pace with the expansion of the state.

[Sidenote: Oriental Characteristics of Russia]

Yet this greater Russia remained essentially Oriental. Its form of Christianity was derived from the East rather than from the West. Its social customs savored more of Asia than of Europe. Its n.o.bles and even its tsars were rated by western Christendom as little better than barbarians. In fact, the Russian state was looked upon in the seventeenth century in much the same way as China was regarded in the nineteenth century.

The reasons for this relative backwardness are not hard to ascertain.

In the first place, the religion of the state was a direct heritage of the expiring Eastern Empire and was different from either the Catholicism or the Protestantism of western Europe. Secondly, long and close contact with the conquering Mongols or Tatars of Asia had saturated the Russian people with Oriental customs and habits.[Footnote: See above, pp. 21 f.] Thirdly, the nature of the country tended to exalt agriculture and to discourage industry and foreign commerce, and at the same time to turn emigration and expansion eastward rather than westward. Finally, so long as the neighboring western states of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey remained powerful and retained the entire coast of the Baltic and Black seas, Russia was deprived of seaports that would enable her to engage in traffic with western Europe and thus to partake of the common culture of Christendom.

Not until Russia was modernized and westernized, and had made considerable headway against one or all of her western neighbors, could she hope to become a European Power. Not until the accession of the Romanov dynasty did she enter seriously upon this twofold policy.

[Sidenote: The "Troublous Times"]

The direct line of Ivan the Great had died out at the close of the sixteenth century, and there ensued what in Russian history are known as "the troublous times." Disputes over the succession led to a series of civil wars, and the consequent anarchy invited foreign intervention.

For a time the Poles hara.s.sed the country and even occupied the Kremlin, or citadel, of Moscow. The Swedes, also, took advantage of the troublous times in Russia to enlarge their conquests on the eastern sh.o.r.e of the Baltic and to seize the important trading center of Novgorod. In the south, the Turks warred with the Cossacks and brought many of the Crimean princ.i.p.alities under their control.

[Sidenote: The Accession of the Romanovs, 1613]

Under these discouraging circ.u.mstances a great national a.s.sembly met at Moscow in 1613 to elect a tsar, and their choice fell upon one of their own number, a certain Michael Romanov, whose family had been connected by marriage ties with the ancient royal line. It is an interesting fact that the present autocrat of Russia is a lineal descendant of the Romanov who was thus popularly elected to supreme authority in 1613.

Michael Romanov proved an excellent choice. Accepted by all cla.s.ses, he reestablished order and security throughout the country and successfully resisted foreign encroachments. He founded several fortified towns in the south against the Tatars and the Turks. He recovered Novgorod from the Swedes. During the reign of his son, Polish depredations were stopped and the Dnieper River was fixed upon [Footnote: Treaty of Andrussovo (1667), in accordance with which Poland ceded to Russia Kiev, Smolensk, and eastern Ukraine.] as the general dividing line between Poland and Russia.

PETER THE GREAT

[Sidenote: His Accession and Early Travels]

The grandson of Michael Romanov was the celebrated Peter the Great, who may rightfully be designated as the father of modern Russia. His older brothers, with whom during his youth he was nominally a.s.sociated in the government, died in turn without leaving direct heirs, and Peter became sole ruler in 1696. From the outset he showed an insatiable curiosity about the arts and sciences of western Europe, the authority of its kings and the organization of its armies and fleets. To an intense curiosity, Peter added an indomitable will. He was resolved to satisfy his every curiosity and to utilize whatever he learned or found.

From childhood, Peter had displayed an apt.i.tude for mechanical tools and inventions and especially for boat-making. Shipbuilding and ship- sailing became his favorite pastimes. When he was barely twenty-one, he launched at Archangel, on the ice-bound White Sea, a ship which he had built with his own hands. Now in 1696, being sole tsar at the age of twenty-four, he fitted out a fleet which defeated the Turks on the Black Sea and allowed him to capture the valuable port of Azov. No other successes were gained, however, in this Turkish War; and the young tsar began to perceive that if he were to succeed in his cherished project he would have to obtain Western aid. In 1697, therefore, a special commission left Moscow for the purpose of soliciting the cooperation of the princ.i.p.al Powers against Turkey, and to this commission the young tsar attached himself as a volunteer sailor, "Peter Mikhailov," in order that he might incidentally learn much about ship-building and other technical sciences.

In its primary purpose, the Russian commission failed signally. Western Europe was on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, and all the European sovereigns seemed to be engrossed in the distractions of dynastic politics. No help against the Turks was forthcoming. But personally Peter learned many useful things. In Holland he studied ship-building as well as anatomy and engraving. In England he investigated industry and commerce. He closely scrutinized the military establishment of Prussia. In all places which he visited he collected artisans, sailors, engineers, or other workmen, whom he sent back to Russia to instruct his people.

[Sidenote: Suppression of the Streltsi]

While he was on his way from Vienna to Venice, news reached him that the royal bodyguard, called the _streltsi_, had taken advantage of his absence of a year and a half and had mutinied at Moscow. In hot haste he hurried home and wreaked dire vengeance upon the mutineers.

Two thousand were hung or broken on the wheel, five thousand were beheaded, and Peter for many days amused himself and edified his court by the wonderful dexterity he displayed in slicing off the heads of _streltsi_ with his own royal arm.

The severe punishment of the rebellious _streltsi_ and the immediate abolition of their military organization was clear evidence that Peter was fully determined both to break with the past traditions of his country and to compel all the Russian people to do likewise.

[Sidenote: Military Reform]

His first care was the reconstruction of the army on the Prussian model. Officered and disciplined by foreigners dependent entirely upon the tsar, the new army replaced the _streltsi_ and proved a potent factor in furthering the domestic and foreign policies of Peter the Great.

[Sidenote: Introduction of Occidental Customs]

The young reformer next turned his attention to the customs of his people--their clothing and manners--which he would transform from Oriental to Occidental. Edict followed edict with amazing rapidity. The chief potentates of the empire were solemnly a.s.sembled so that Peter with his own hand might deliberately clip off their long beards and flowing mustaches. A heavy tax was imposed on such as persisted in wearing beards. French or German clothes were to be subst.i.tuted, under penalty of large fines, for the traditional Russian costume. The use of tobacco was made compulsory. The Oriental semi-seclusion of women was prohibited. Both s.e.xes were to mingle freely in the festivities of the court. These innovations were largely superficial: they partially permeated the n.o.bility and clergy, but made little impression on the ma.s.s of the population. Peter had begun a work, however, which was certain of great results in the future.

[Sidenote: Development of Autocracy]

The reign of Peter the Great is notable for the removal of serious checks upon the power of the tsar and the definitive establishment of that form of absolutism which in Russia is called "autocracy." By sheer ability and will-power, the tsar was qualified to play the role of divine-right monarch, and his observation of the centralized government of Louis XIV, as well as the appreciation of his country's needs, convinced him that that kind of government was the most suitable for Russia.

[Sidenote: Subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Russian State]

[Sidenote: The Holy Synod]

We have already observed how Peter replaced the independent, turbulent _streltsi_ with a thoroughly devoted and orderly standing army.

That was one important step in the direction of autocracy. The next was the subordination of the Church to the state. The tsar understood the very great influence which the Holy Orthodox Church exerted over the Russian people and the danger to his policies that ecclesiastical opposition might create. He was naturally anxious that the Church should become the ally, not the enemy, of autocracy. He, therefore, took such steps as would exalt the Church in the opinion of his countrymen and at the same time would render it a serviceable agent of the government. Professing the warmest faith in its religious tenets, he deprived the patriarch [Footnote: Until late in the sixteenth century, the metropolitan of Moscow was in theory under the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople; thereafter, through Boris G.o.dunov, he became independent with full consent and approval of the whole Greek Orthodox Church and was styled the patriarch of Moscow.] of Moscow of his privilege of controlling the ecclesiastical organization and vested all powers of church government in a body, called the Holy Synod, whose members were bishops and whose chief was a layman, all chosen by the tsar himself. No appointment to ecclesiastical office could henceforth be made without the approval of the Holy Synod; no sermon could be preached and no book could be published unless it had received the sanction of that august body. The authority which the tsar thereby obtained over the Russian Church was as complete and far-reaching as that which Henry VIII had acquired, two centuries earlier, over the Anglican Church. The results have been in keeping with Peter's fondest expectations, for the Orthodox Church in Russia has been from his time to the present the right-hand support of absolutism. The tsars have exalted the Church as the fountain of order and holiness; as a veritable ark of the covenant have the clergy magnified and extolled the autocracy.

[Sidenote: Secular Power of the Tsar]

A remodeling of the secular government of Russia along autocratic lines was another achievement of Peter the Great which long endured. At the head of the state was the tsar or emperor, possessing absolute, unlimited powers. An ancient a.s.sembly, or Duma, of n.o.bles, which had formerly exercised vague legislative rights, was practically abolished, its place being taken by an advisory Council of State whose members, usually n.o.blemen, were selected by the tsar. All traces of local self- government were similarly swept away, and the country was henceforth administered by the tsar's personal agents. To enforce his autocratic will, a system of police was organized on a militia basis, its chiefs being made dependent on the central authority. In these, as in all his other reforms, the tsar encountered a good deal of opposition, and for a while was obliged to rely largely on foreigners to carry them out. As soon as possible, however, Peter employed natives, for it was a cardinal point in his policy that the Russians themselves must manage their own state without foreign interference or help.

[Sidenote: Attempted Social Reforms of Peter the Great]

Like his contemporaries in western Europe, Peter gave considerable attention to the economic condition of the monarchy. He strove, though often in a bungling manner, to promote agriculture and to improve the lot of the peasantry, who still const.i.tuted the overwhelming bulk of forms of the population. He certainly deprived the n.o.bles of many of their former privileges and sought to rest political power and social position on ability rather than on birth. He understood that Russia grievously lacked a numerous and prosperous middle cla.s.s, and he aimed to create one by encouraging trade and industries. His almost constant partic.i.p.ation in wars, however, prevented him from bringing many of his economic and social plans to fruition.

[Sidenote: Ambitious Foreign Policy of Peter the Great]

Internal reforms were but one-half of Peter's ambitious program. To him Russia owes not only the abolition of the _streltsi_, the loss of the independence of the Church, the Europeanization of manners and customs, and the firm establishment of autocracy, but also the p.r.o.nouncement and enforcement of an elaborate scheme of foreign aggrandizement. On one hand, the tsar showed a lively interest in the exploration and colonization of Siberia and in the extension of Russian dominion around the Caspian Sea and towards the Persian Empire. On the other hand,--and this, for our purposes, is far more important,--he was resolved to make the cultural and commercial connection between Russia and Europe strong and intimate, to open a way to the west by gaining outlets on both the Black and Baltic seas--"windows" to the west, as he termed them.

On the Baltic Sea, Sweden blocked him; toward the Black Sea, the Ottoman power hemmed him in. It was, therefore, against Sweden and Turkey that Peter the Great waged war. It seemed to him a matter of dire necessity for the preservation of European civilization in Russia that he should defeat one or both of these states. Against the Turks, as events proved, he made little headway; against the Swedes he fared better.

In order that we may understand the nature of the momentous conflict between Russia and Sweden in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, it will be necessary at this point to notice the parallel development of Sweden.

SWEDEN AND THE CAREER OF CHARLES XII

[Sidenote: Sweden a Great Power in the Seventeenth Century]

It will be recalled that a century before Peter the Great, the remarkable Gustavus Adolphus had aimed to make the Baltic a Swedish lake. To his own kingdom, lying along the western sh.o.r.e of that sea, and to the dependency of Finland, he had added by conquest the eastern provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia [Footnote: Livonia, occupied by Gustavus Adolphus during the Polish War of 1621-1629, was not formally relinquished by Poland until 1660. Esthonia had been conquered by the Swedes in 1561, but Russia did not renounce her pretensions to this province until 1617.], and his successful interference in the Thirty Years' War had given Sweden possession of western Pomerania and the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, and Weser rivers and a considerable influence in German affairs. For many years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden was the recognized leader of continental Protestantism, and her trade on the Baltic grew and thrived. The exports of Russia and Poland found a convenient outlet through the Swedish port of Riga, and those of the northern Germanics were frequently dispatched on Swedish vessels from Stettin or Stralsund.

Repeated efforts were made by Denmark, Poland, and Brandenburg to break the commercial monopoly which Sweden enjoyed upon the Baltic and to deprive her of her conquests, but for a long time in vain. Victory continued to attend Swedish arms and a general treaty in 1660 confirmed her dominion. At that time Sweden was not only a military power of the first magnitude but also one of the largest states of Europe, possessing about twice as much area as present-day Sweden. Her area embraced a land-surface 7000 square miles larger than the modern German Empire. All the islands and the greater part of the coast of the Baltic belonged to her. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very center of the empire, whose second city was Riga, on the other side of the sea. In politics, in religion, and in trade, Sweden was feared and respected.

[Sidenote: Elements of Weakness in Sweden's Position]

Yet the greatness of Sweden in the seventeenth century was more apparent than real. Her commerce provoked the jealousy of all her neighbors. Her dependencies across the Baltic were difficult to hold: peopled by Finns, Russians, Poles, Germans, and Danes, their bond with Sweden was essentially artificial, and they usually sympathized, naturally enough, with their sovereign's enemies. They, therefore, imposed on the mother country the duty of remaining a military monarchy, armed from head to foot for every possible emergency. For such a tremendous destiny Sweden was quite unfitted. Her wide territory was very spa.r.s.ely populated, and her peasantry were very poor. Only the French alliance gave her solid backing in the Germanies, and, with the decline of the fortunes of Louis XIV and the rise of Prussia and Russia, she was bound to lose her leadership in the North.

To the fate of Sweden, her rulers in the seventeenth century contributed no small share. Nearly all of them were born fighters and nearly all of them were neglectful of home interests and of the works of peace. The military instincts of the Swedish kings not only sacrificed thousands of lives that were urgently needed in building up their country and cost the kingdom enormous sums of money but likewise impaired commerce, surrounded the empire with a broad belt of desolated territory, and implanted an ineradicable hatred in every adjacent state. Then, too, the extravagance and negligence of the sovereigns led to chaos in domestic government. Taxes were heavy and badly apportioned. The n.o.bles recovered many of their political privileges.

The royal power steadily dwindled away at the very time when it was most needed; and a selfish, grasping aristocracy hastened their country's ruin. [Footnote: A reaction appeared under the capable Charles XI (1660-1697), but its fruits were completely lost by his son and successor, Charles XII.]

[Sidenote: Coalition against Charles XII]

At length, in 1697, when Charles XII, a boy of fifteen years, ascended the throne of Sweden, the neighboring Powers thought the time had arrived to part.i.tion his territories among themselves. Tsar Peter, while returning home the following year from his travels abroad, had discussed with Augustus II, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, a plan which the latter had formed for the dismemberment of the Swedish Empire: Poland was to recover Livonia and annex Esthonia; Russia was to obtain Ingria and Karelia and thereby a port on the Baltic; Brandenburg was to occupy western Pomerania; and Denmark was to take possession of Holstein and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Charles XII was to retain only his kingdom in the Scandinavian peninsula and the grand duchy of Finland. At the last moment Brandenburg balked, but Saxony, Denmark, and Russia signed the nefarious alliance in 1699. The allies expected quick and decisive victory. All western and southern Europe was on the verge of a great struggle for the Spanish inheritance and would clearly be unable to prevent them from despoiling Sweden.

[Sidenote: Military Exploits of Charles XII]