A Manual of Ancient History Part 29

Commencement of the wars against the Samnites, the Campanians having called the Romans to their a.s.sistance against that nation, 343. These wars, carried on with vigorous exertion and various success, lasted, with but short intermissions, till 290. This is the true heroic age of Rome, enn.o.bled by the patriotic valour of Decius Mus, (father and son, both voluntary victims,) Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, etc. The consequences of this struggle were: _a._ The Romans learnt the art of mountain warfare, and thereby for the first time acquired a peculiar system of military tactics; not, however, till they had been, 321, obliged to pa.s.s under the _furcas Caudinas_. _b._ Their relations were more firmly established with their neighbours the Latins and Etrurians, by the complete conquest of the former, 340, and by repeated victories over the latter, more especially in 308. _c._ Great national federations having arisen in Italy, particularly during the last period of the Samnite wars, the Romans entered into connection with the more distant nations of the country; with the Lucanians and Apulians, by the first league, 323, with the Umbri, from the year 308; and although the nature of this connection frequently varied, the different nations were perpetually struggling for independence, and were consequently at enmity with Rome. In this period, moreover, commenced the practical ill.u.s.tration of the leading ideas of Rome upon the political relations in which she placed the conquered with regard to herself.

14. After the subjection of the Samnites, Rome, wishing to confirm her dominion in Lower Italy, was thereby, for the first time, entangled in war with a foreign prince; the Tarentines, too feeble to maintain alone their footing against the Romans, called Pyrrhus of Epirus to their a.s.sistance. He came, indeed, but not so much to further the views of the Tarentines as to advance his own; but even in victory, he learnt by experience that the Macedonian tactics gave him but a slight preponderance, which the Romans soon transferred to their own side, exhibiting the truth of the principle, that a good civic militia, sooner or later, will always get the upper hand of mercenary troops.

The idea of calling upon Pyrrhus for a.s.sistance was the more natural, as the predecessor of that prince, Alexander I. (see above p. 275.) had endeavoured, but without success, to effect conquests in Lower Italy. In the first war with Pyrrhus, 280-278, two battles were fought, the first at Pandosia, 280, the other at Asculum, 279; in both of which Rome was unsuccessful. But Pyrrhus, after crossing over into Sicily, 278, (see above, p. 173, 174.) once more returned into Italy, 275, when he was defeated by the Romans at Beneventum, and compelled to evacuate Italy, leaving a garrison at Tarentum. That city, however, soon afterwards, 272, fell into the hands of the Romans, whose dominion was consequently extended to the extremity of Lower Italy.

15. The chief means to which, even from the earliest times, the Romans had recourse for the foundation of their dominion over the conquered, and at the same time for the prevention of the too great increase of the needy cla.s.ses at Rome, was the establishment of colonies of their own citizens, which, being settled in the captured cities, served likewise as garrisons. Each colony had its own distinct internal const.i.tution, modelled, for the most part, upon that of the mother city itself; hence to keep the colonies in perfect dependence naturally became an object of Roman policy. This colonial system of the Romans, necessarily and spontaneously arising out of the rude custom of bereaving the conquered of their lands and liberty, a.s.sumed its main features in the Samnite war, and gradually embraced the whole of Italy. Closely connected with this system was the construction of military highways, (_viae militares_,) one of which, the Appian Way, was constructed so early as 312, and to this day remains a lasting monument of the greatness of Rome at that period.

Even at the time of Hannibal's invasion, the number of Roman colonies amounted to 53: but several which had been settled returned to the mother city.

HEYNE, _De Romanorum prudentia in coloniis regendis_: inserted in _Opusc._ vol. iii. Cf. _Prolusiones de veterum coloniarum jure ejusque causis_, in his _Opusc._ vol. i.

16. But the relations existing between Rome and the Italian nations were extremely various in kind. 1. A few cities and nations enjoyed the full privileges of Roman citizenship; in some instances, however, without the right of voting in the _comitia_ (_municipia_). 2. The privileges of the colonies (_jus coloniarum_) were of a more restricted nature; the colonists were indeed in possession of their own civic government, but had no further share whatever either in the _comitia_ or magistracies of Rome. The other inhabitants of Italy were either federates (_socii, foedere juncti_) or subjects (_dedit.i.tii_). The first (_a_) preserved their internal form of government; but on the other hand (_b_) were obliged to furnish tribute and auxiliary troops (_tributis et armis juvare rempublicam_). Their further relation with Rome depended upon the terms of the league. The most advantageous of these terms were 3. in favour of the Latins, although each of their cities had its own separate league (_jus Latii_;) as 4. the rest of the Italian nations had their _jus Italic.u.m_. On the other hand, 5. the subjects, _dedit.i.tii_, were deprived of their internal const.i.tutions, and were governed by Roman magistrates, (_praefecti_,) annually renewed.

C. SIGONIUS, _De antiquo jure civium Romanorum_; and his treatise _De antiquo jure Italiae_, inserted both in his _Opera_ and in GRaeVII _Thes. Ant. Rom._ t. ii. contain the most learned researches on the details of these relations.

17. The internal const.i.tution of Rome itself, now completed, bore the character of a democracy, inasmuch as equality of rights existed both for n.o.bles and commons. Yet this democracy was modified by expedients so various and wonderful--the rights of the people, of the senate, of the magistrates, fitted so nicely into each other, and were so firmly supported by the national religion, connecting every thing with determinate forms--that there was no reason, at that time, to fear the evils either of anarchy, or, what is much more astonishing when we consider the warlike character of the people, those of military despotism.

The rights of the people consisted in the legislative power, so far as fundamental national principles were concerned, and in the election of the magistrates. The distinction between the _comitia tributa_ (as independent of the senate) and the _comitia centuriata_ (as dependent on the senate) still existed as to form, but had lost all its importance, the difference between patricians and plebeians being now merely nominal, and the establishment of the _tribus urbanae_, 303, excluding the too great influence of the people (_forensis factio_) upon the _comitia tributa_. The rights of the senate consisted in administering and debating all transitory national affairs, whether foreign relations, (war and peace only excepted, in which the consent of the people was requisite,) financial concerns, or matters regarding domestic peace and security. But the manner in which the senate was supplied must have made it the first political body at that time in the world. The rights and rank of magistrates were founded on their greater or lesser _auspicia_, no public affair being entered upon except _auspicato_. Consequently he only who was in possession of the former could hold the highest civic and military power; (_imperium civile et militare; suis auspiciis rem gerere_;) as dictator, consul, praetor; such was not the case with those who had only the lesser _auspicia_. The union of civil and military power in the person of the same individual was not without its inconveniences, but military despotism was in some measure guarded against by the prohibition of any magistrate possessing military command within Rome itself. We must not dismiss this subject without observing, that as the Roman const.i.tution arose merely out of practice, there never having been any completely written charter, we cannot expect that all the details should be clearly ascertained; to attempt, therefore, in default of such authority, to describe all the minutiae would be the surest way to fall into error.

Of the numerous works on the Roman const.i.tution and on Roman antiquities, we shall mention:

DE BEAUFORT, _La Republique Romaine, ou plan general de l'ancien gouvernement de Rome_. La Haye, 1766, 2 vols. 4to. A most copious work, and one of the most solid in regard to the matters discussed; although it does not embrace the whole of the subject.

_Histoire critique du gouvernement Romain_; Paris, 1765. Containing some acute observations.

_Du Gouvernement de la republique Romaine_, _par_ A. AD. DE TEXIER, 3 vols. 8vo. Hamburg, 1796. This contains many enquiries peculiar to the writer.

Some learned researches respecting the princ.i.p.al points of the Roman const.i.tution, as SIGONIUS and GRUCHIUS _de comitiis Romanorum_, ZAMOCIUS _de Senatu Romano_, etc. will be found collected in the first two vols, of GRaeVIUS, _Antiq. Roman._

For the popular a.s.semblies of the Romans, an antiquarian essay by Chr.

Ferd. Schulze, Gotha, 1815, chiefly according to Niebuhr, may be consulted.

Among the numerous manuals of Roman antiquities, NIEUPORT, _explicatio rituum Romanorum, ed. Gesner_. Berol. 1743, promises at least as much as it performs. Of those which profess to treat of Roman antiquities in general, none have yet risen above mediocrity. Jurisprudence, however, has been much more successfully handled. We cite the two following excellent compendiums:

BACHII, _Historia Jurisprudentiae Romanae_. Lips. 1754. 1796.

# C. HUGO, _Elements of the Roman Law_; 7th edit. Berlin, 1820.

SECOND PERIOD.

_From the commencement of the war with Carthage to the rise of the civil broils under the Gracchi, B. C. 264-134. Year of Rome, 490-620._

SOURCES. The princ.i.p.al writer for this highly interesting period, in which was laid the foundation of the universal dominion of Rome, is Polybius as far as the year 146, not only in the complete books preserved to us, which come down to 216, but also in the fragments.

He is frequently followed by Livy, lib. xxi-xlv. 218-166. Appian, who comes next, does not confine himself merely to the history of the war; Florus gives us only an abridgement. The lives of Plutarch which relate to this portion of history, are FABIUS MAXIMUS, P.

aeMILIUS, MARCELLUS, M. CATO, and FLAMINIUS.

Of modern writers we dare only mention one:--and who is worthy to be ranked beside him?

MONTESQUIEU, _Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la decadence des Romains_.

1. The political division of Italy laid the foundation for the dominion of Rome in that country; the want of union and political relations in the world paved the way to her universal empire. The first step cost her much, the succeeding followed easily and rapidly; and the history of the struggle between Rome and Carthage only shows on a larger scale what the history of Greece exhibits on a smaller. The whole of the following history confirms the fact, that two republics cannot exist near each other, without one being destroyed or subjected: but the vast extent of this struggle, the important consequences which followed, together with the wonderful exertions made, and the great men engaged on both sides, gave it an interest which cannot be found in that of any other nations.

Though the power and resources of both states were nearly equal in appearance, they were widely different in quality and circ.u.mstances.

Carthage, besides her dominion over the seas, had also a better furnished treasury, by which she was enabled to enlist into her service as many _mercenaries_ as she pleased: Rome, on the contrary, _strong in herself_, had all the advantages possessed by a nation of warriors over one partly commercial, partly military.

2. The first war of twenty-three years between the two republics, arose from very slight causes: it soon, however, became a struggle for the possession of Sicily, which in the end naturally extended itself to the dominion of the sea. Rome, by the aid of her newly-built fleet, having obtained for some time this power, was enabled to attack Africa, and succeeded in driving the Carthaginians from Sicily.

The occupation of Messina by the Romans, 264, gave rise to this war. The defection of Hiero king of Syracuse from the side of Carthage, and his joining the Romans, first gave the latter the idea of expelling the Carthaginians from the island. The victory near Agrigentum, and capture of that city in 262, seemed to facilitate the execution of this project: it also convinced the Romans of the necessity of their having a naval power. We shall the less wonder at their forming a fleet in Italy, where wood was then plentiful, if we remember their previous experience in naval affairs; these were not the first vessels of war which they constructed, but only the first large ones which they built upon a Carthaginian model. The first naval victory of the Romans under Duilius, by the aid of grappling machines, 260. The project then conceived of carrying the war into Africa was one of the great ideas of the Romans, and from that time it became a ruling maxim of the state, to attack the enemy in his own territory. The second and very remarkable naval victory of the Romans, 257, opened the way for them to Africa, and shows their naval tactics in a very brilliant light: but the unfortunate issue of their expedition to Africa, restored the equilibrium; and the struggle for the dominion of the sea became the more obstinate, as success did not altogether favour one party. The result of the contest appears to have turned upon the possession of the eastern promontories of Sicily, Drepanum, and Lilybaeum, which were in a manner the bulwarks of the Carthaginians, and seemed impregnable since Hamilcar Barca had taken the command of them, 247. The last naval victory of the Romans, however, under the consul Lutatius, 241, having cut off the communication between Sicily and Carthage, and the finances of both parties being completely exhausted, a peace was concluded upon the conditions: 1. That the Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily and the small islands adjacent. 2. That they should pay to Rome, by instalments in ten years, for the expenses she had been at in carrying on the war, the sum of 2,200 talents. 3. That they should not make war against Hiero king of Syracuse.

3. The issue of this war placed the political connections of Rome in a new situation, and necessarily extended her influence abroad. The length of the war and the manner of its conclusion had, moreover, inspired a national hatred, such as is only found in republics; the conviction also that they could not remain independent of one another, must have become much more striking, as the points of contact had greatly increased since the beginning of the war. Who does not know the arrogance of a republic after the first essay of her power has been crowned with success! Rome gave a striking example of this by her invasion of Sardinia in the midst of peace. These successes had also a sensible effect on the Roman const.i.tution. For although in appearance its form was not in the least changed, yet the power of the senate now acquired that preponderance which the ruling authority of a republic never fails to do after long and successful wars.

Origin and nature of the governments of the first Roman provinces, in part of Sicily and in Sardinia.

4. An opportunity was soon afforded the Romans, in the Adriatic sea, of making use of their superior naval power, in chastising the pirates of Illyria under their queen Teuta. By effecting this, they not only secured their authority over that sea, but at the same time formed their first political relations with the Grecian states; relations which soon afterwards became of great importance.

Commencement of the first Illyrian war, 230, which ended with the subjugation of Teuta, 226. The war, however, again broke out, 222, against Demetrius of Pharus, who conceived himself inadequately rewarded by Rome for the services he had rendered her in the preceding war. The Romans found him a much more dangerous adversary than had been expected, even after his expulsion and flight to Philip, 220, (see above, p. 282.) Throughout this war, Rome appeared as the deliverer of the Grecian states, which had suffered extremely from the plunder of these freebooters; Corcyra, Apollonia, and other cities placed themselves formally under her protection, while the Achaeans, aetolians, and Athenians vied with each other in showing their grat.i.tude.

5. In the mean time, while Carthage endeavoured to make up for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia by extending her Spanish dominions, which the jealousy of Rome restrained her from carrying beyond the Ebro (p. 84.), Rome herself had a new war to maintain against her northern neighbours the Gauls, which ended after a violent contest with the establishment of her authority over the north of Italy.

From the first Gallic war to the burning of Rome, 390, the Gauls had repeated their attacks in 360 and 348, even to the conclusion of the peace in 336. But in the latter part of the Samnite war, a formidable confederacy having taken place among the Italian tribes, some of the Gauls enlisted as mercenaries in the service of the Etruscans, while others allied themselves to the Samnites.

This led them to take part in these wars in 306, 302, and 292, until they were obliged, together with the Etruscans, to sue for peace in 284, before which time the Romans had sent a colony into their country, near Sena. This peace lasted till 238, when it was disturbed by the incursion of the transalpine Gauls; without, however, their coming to any war with Rome. But in 232, the proposition of Flaminius the tribune, (_lex Flaminia_), to divide the lands conquered from the Senones, became the cause of new disturbances. Upon this occasion, the Gauls entered into an alliance with their transalpine countrymen, the Gaesates on the Rhone, who had been accustomed to engage as mercenaries. These having crossed the Alps, the dreadful war of six years (226-220) began, in which, after defeating the Gauls near Clusium, 225, the Romans pursued them into their own territory, and encamped upon the Po, 223. The Gauls having been again completely overthrown by Marcellus, were obliged to sue for peace; when the Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona were established. The number of men capable of bearing arms in all Italy subject to the Romans during this war amounted to 800,000.

6. Before this storm was totally appeased, in which it is probable that Carthaginian policy was not altogether inactive, Hannibal had obtained the chief command in Spain. From the reproach of having first begun the war, he and his party cannot be cleared; Rome, in the situation she then was, could hardly desire it; he however who strikes the first blow is not always the real aggressor. The plan of Hannibal was the destruction of Rome; and by making Italy the princ.i.p.al seat of the war, he necessarily turned the scale in his favour; because Rome, obliged to defend herself, left to him all the advantages of attack. The preparations she made for defence, show that it was not believed possible he could execute his enterprise by the route which he took.

The history of this war, 218-201, of which no later transaction has been able to destroy the interest, is divided into three parts: the history of the war in Italy; the contemporary war in Spain; and from 203, the war in Africa. Hannibal's invasion of Italy in the autumn, 218--engagement near the river Ticinus and the battle of Trebia, in the same year. Battle near the lake Thrasymenus in the spring, 217. Seat of the war transferred to Lower Italy, and the defensive system of the dictator Fabius until the end of the year. Battle of Cannae, 216, followed by the conquest of Capua and the subjection of the greater part of Lower Italy. The defensive mode of warfare afterwards adopted by the Carthaginian, arose partly from his desire to form a junction with his brother Asdrubal and the Spanish army, and partly from his expectation of foreign support by means of alliances, with Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, 215, and with Philip of Macedon, 216. These hopes, however, were frustrated by the Romans.--Syracuse was besieged and taken, 214-212, (see above, p.

174.) and Philip kept employed in Greece, (see above, p. 282.) In addition to this, the Romans retook Capua, notwithstanding the audacious march of Hannibal towards Rome, 211, and he had now no succour left except the reinforcement which Asdrubal was bringing from Spain. The latter, however, was attacked immediately upon his arrival in Italy, near Sena, by the consuls Nero and Livius, and left dead on the field, 207. From this time the war in Italy became only of secondary importance, as Hannibal was obliged to act on the defensive in Bruttium.

_The Course of Hannibal over the Alps ascertained_, by J.

WHITTAKER. London, 1794, 2 vols. 8vo. The author endeavours to prove that the pa.s.sage of Hannibal was over the great St. Bernard, and criticises the opinions of other writers.

[We may likewise mention the learned treatise:--

_A Dissertation on the Pa.s.sage of Hannibal over the Alps._ By H.

L. WICKHAM, M. A. and the Rev. J. A. CRAMER, M. A. second edition, Oxon.]

The war in Spain began nearly about the same time between Asdrubal and the two brothers, Cn. and P. Cornelius Scipio, and was continued, with various success, till the year 216, the issue depending much upon the disposition of the Spaniards themselves.

The plan of Carthage after the year 216, was to send Asdrubal with the Spanish army into Italy, and to supply its place by an army from Africa; two victories, however, gained by the Scipios near the Ebro, 216, and the Illiberis, 215, prevented this from being effected, till at last both fell under the superior power and cunning of the Carthaginians, 212. But the arrival of the youthful P. Cornelius Scipio, who did not appear merely to his own nation as an extraordinary genius, entirely changed the face of affairs, and the fortunes of Rome soon became attached to his name, which alone seemed to promise victory. During his command in Spain, 210-206, he won over the inhabitants while he defeated the Carthaginians, and for the furtherance of his great design, contracted an alliance with Syphax in Africa, 206. He was unable, however, to prevent the march of Asdrubal into Italy, 208, which nevertheless rendered it an easy task for him to subdue all Carthaginian Spain as far as Gades, 206, and thus procured him the consular dignity at his return, 205.

The carrying of the war into Africa by Scipio, notwithstanding the opposition of the old Roman generals, and the desertion of Syphax, who at the persuasion of Sophonisba again went over to the Carthaginians (whose loss however was well repaid by Masinissa, whom Scipio had won over to his side in Spain), was followed by an important consequence; for after he had gained two victories over Asdrubal and Syphax, 203, and taken the latter prisoner, the Carthaginians found it necessary to recall Hannibal from Italy, 202; and the battle of Zama terminated the war, 201. The following were the conditions of peace: 1. That the Carthaginians should only retain the territory in Africa annexed to their government.

2. That they should give up all their ships of war, except ten triremes, and all their elephants. 3. That they should pay, at times specified, 10,000 talents. 4. That they should commence no war without the consent of Rome. 5. That they should restore to Masinissa all the houses, cities, and lands that had ever been possessed by himself or his ancestors.--The reproach usually cast upon the Carthaginians, of having left Hannibal unsupported in Italy, in a great measure vanishes, if we remember the plan formed in 216, to send the Spanish army into Italy, and to replace it by an African one: a plan formed with much ability, and followed with as much constancy. We may add to this, that the Barcine faction maintained its influence in the government even to the end of the war. But why they, who by the treaty of peace gave up five hundred vessels of war, suffered Scipio to cross over from Sicily, without sending one to oppose him, is difficult to explain.

7. Notwithstanding her great loss of men, and the devastation of Italy, Rome felt herself much more powerful at the end of this war than at the beginning. Her dominion was not only established over Italy, but extensive foreign countries had been brought under it; her authority over the seas was rendered secure by the destruction of the naval power of the Carthaginians. The Roman _form_ of government, it is true, underwent no change, but its _spirit_ much, as the power of the senate became almost unlimited; and although the dawn of civilization had broken over Rome, since her intercourse with more civilized foreigners, the state still remained altogether a nation of warriors. And now, for the first time, appears in the page of history the fearful phenomenon of a great military republic; and the history of the next ten years, in which Rome overthrew so many thrones and free states, gives a striking proof, that such a power is the natural enemy to the independence of all the states within the reach of her arms. The causes which led Rome from this time to aspire after the dominion of the world are to be found neither in her geographical situation, which for a conquering power by land seemed rather unfavourable; nor in the inclination of the people, who were opposed to the first war against Philip; but singly and entirely in the spirit of her government. The means, however, whereby she obtained her end, must not be sought for merely in the excellence of her armies and generals, but rather in that uniform, sharp-sighted, and dexterous policy, by which she was enabled to frustrate the powerful alliances formed against her, notwithstanding the many adversaries who at that time sought to form new ones. But where could be found such another council of state, embodying such a ma.s.s of practical political wisdom, as the Roman senate must have been from the very nature of its organization? All this, however, would not have been sufficient to have subjugated the world, if the want of good government, the degeneracy of the military art, and an extremely corrupt state of morals among both rulers and people, in foreign states, had not seconded the efforts of Rome.

View of the political state of the world at this period. In the west, Sicily (the whole island after 212), Sardinia, and Corsica, from the year 237, and Spain, divided into citerior and ulterior (the latter rather in name than in fact), had become Roman provinces 206; the independence of Carthage had been destroyed by the last peace, and her subordination secured by the alliance of Rome with Masinissa; Cisalpine Gaul, formed into a province, served as a barrier against the inroads of the more northern barbarians. On the other side, in the east, the kingdom of Macedonia, and the free states of Greece, forming together a very complicated system, had opened a connection with Rome since the Illyrian war, 230, and Philip's alliance with Hannibal, 214. Of the three powers of the first rank, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, the two former were allied against the latter, who, on her part, maintained a good understanding with Rome. The states of secondary rank were, those of the aetolian league, the kings of Pergamus, and the republic of Rhodes, with some smaller, such as Athens: these had allied themselves to Rome since the confederacy against Philip, 211. The Achaean league, on the contrary, was in the interests of Macedonia, which Rome always endeavoured to attach to herself, in order to make head against those of the first rank.

8. A declaration of war against Philip, notwithstanding the opposition of the tribunes of the people, and an attack upon Macedonia itself, according to the constant maxim of carrying the war into the enemy's country, immediately followed. They could not, however, drive Philip so soon from the fastnesses of Epirus and Thessaly, which were his bulwarks. But Rome possessed in T. Quintius Flaminius, who marched against Philip as the deliverer of Greece, a statesman and general exactly fitted for a period of great revolutions. By the permanency of his political influence he became indeed the true founder of the Roman power in the east. Who could better cajole men and nations, while they were erecting altars to him, than T. Quintius? So artfully indeed did he a.s.sume the character of a great genius, such as had been given by nature to Scipio, that he has almost deceived history itself. The struggle between him and Philip consisted rather in a display of talents in political stratagem and finesse than in feats of arms: even before the battle of Cynoscephalae had given the finishing stroke, the Romans had already turned the balance in their favour, by gaining over the Achaean league.