A Manual of Ancient History Part 18

5. The glory of frustrating the second mighty Persian invasion of Greece under Xerxes I. belongs to Themistocles alone. Not only his great naval victory off Salamis, but still more the manner in which he contrived to work upon his countrymen, proves him to have been the greatest man of the age, and the deliverer of Greece, now united by one common bond of interest.--All national leagues are weak in themselves: yet how strong may even the weakest be made when held together by one great man, who knows how to animate it with his own spirit!

Themistocles' plan for the conduct of the war; first, a common union of all the h.e.l.lenic states; a measure which succeeds to a certain degree, the honour of the command being left to the Spartans; secondly, the sea made the theatre of war.--Gallant death of Leonidas with his three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians, July 6, 480. An example of heroism which contributes as much to the greatness of Greece as the victory of Salamis. About the same time naval engagements off Artemisium in Euboea, with two hundred and seventy-one sail. The leaders of the Greeks are kept to their posts merely by bribery; the means of purchasing their services being for the most part furnished by Themistocles himself.--Athens, deserted by its inhabitants, is taken and burnt by Xerxes, July 20. Retreat of the Grecian fleet into the bay of Salamis: revocation of all exiles, Aristides among the rest.--Politic measures adopted by Themistocles to hinder the dispirited Greeks from taking flight, and at the same time to secure to himself, in case of need, an asylum with the Persian monarch.--Naval engagement and victory off Salamis, Sept. 23, 480, with three hundred and eighty sail, (one hundred and eighty of which were Athenian,) against the Persian fleet, already much weakened: retreat of Xerxes.--Poets and historians have disfigured these events by fanciful exaggerations: still, however, they may show us how commonly human weakness is attended with human greatness!

6. The victory of Salamis did not conclude the war; but the negotiations entered into during the winter months with the Persian general, Mardonius, left in Thessaly, and with the Asiatic Greeks, to excite them to throw off the yoke, show how far the confidence of the nation in its own strength had increased. But by the battle fought on land at Plataeae, under the command of the Spartan, Pausanias, (guardian to Plistarchus, son of Leonidas,) and the Athenian, Aristides; together with the naval battle at Mycale on the same day, and the destruction of the Persian fleet, the Persians are for ever driven from the territory of Greece, though the war continues for some time longer.

7. The expulsion of the Persians wrought an entire change in the internal and external relations of Greece. From being the aggressed the Greeks became the aggressors; to free their Asiatic countrymen is now the chief object or pretext for the continuation of a war so profitable; the chief command of which abides with Sparta until B. C. 470.

Athens rebuilt and fortified by Themistocles despite of Spartan jealousy, 478: formation of the Piraeus, an event of still greater importance, 477.--Naval expedition under Pausanias, accompanied by Aristides and Cimon, undertaken against Cyprus and Byzantium, for the purpose of expelling the Persians, 470. Treachery and fall of Pausanias, 469. In consequence of the Spartans' haughtiness, the supreme command devolves upon the Athenians.

8. This transfer of the command to Athens had a decided effect on all the subsequent relations of Greece, not only because it augmented the jealousy between Sparta and Athens, but because Athens exercised her predominance for a purpose entirely different from that of Sparta.--Establishment of a permanent confederacy, comprising most of the Grecian states without Peloponnesus, especially the islands, and an adjustment of the contributions to be annually furnished by each, with the view of prosecuting the Persian war, and liberating the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. Although the common treasury was first established at Delos, the superintendence of it was confided to Athens; and such a manager as Aristides was not always to be found.--Natural consequence of this new establishment: 1. What had hitherto been mere military precedence, becomes in the hands of Athens a right of political prescription, and that, as usual, is soon converted into a sovereignty. Hence her idea of the supremacy of Greece, ([Greek: arche tes h.e.l.lados],) as connected with that of the sea, ([Greek: thala.s.sokratia].) 2. The oppression of the Athenians, sometimes real, at other times presumed, after a short time, rouses the spirit of discontent and contumacy among several of the confederates: hence, 3. The gradual formation of a counter league, headed by Sparta, who maintains her supremacy over the greatest part of the Peloponnesus.

9. The changes introduced into the internal organization are not to be determined solely by the palpable alterations made in any of Lycurgus's or Solon's inst.i.tutions. In Sparta, the general frame-work of Lycurgus's const.i.tution subsisted; nevertheless the power was virtually in the hands of the ephori, whose dictatorial sway placed Sparta in the formidable posture she now a.s.sumed.--At Athens, in proportion as the importance of foreign relations increased, and amid the protracted struggles between the heads of the democratic and aristocratic parties, the real power, under the outward appearance of a democracy, gradually centered in the hands of the ten annually elected generals, ([Greek: strategoi],) who with more or less effect played the parts of demagogues.

Abrogation of the law that excluded the poorer citizens from official situations, B. C. 478.

Expulsion of Themistocles, implicated in the fall of Pausanias, princ.i.p.ally through the intrigues of Sparta: he is first banished by ostracism, 469, but in consequence of further persecution he flies over to the Persians, 466.

10. The following forty years, from 470-430, const.i.tute the flourishing period of Athens. A concurrence of fortunate circ.u.mstances happening among a people of the highest abilities and promoted by great men, produced here phenomena, such as have never since been witnessed.

Political greatness was the fundamental principle of the commonwealth; Athens had been the guardian, and the champion of Greece, and she wished to appear worthy of herself. Hence in Athens alone were men acquainted with public splendour, exhibited in buildings, in spectacles, and festivals, the acquisition of which was facilitated by private frugality. This public spirit animating every citizen, expanded the blossoms of genius; no broad line of distinction was anxiously drawn between private and public life; whatever great, whatever n.o.ble was produced by Athens, sprung up verdant and robust out of this harmony, this buxom vigour of the state. Far different was the case with Sparta; there rude customs and laws arrested the development of genius: there men were taught to die for the land of their forefathers: while at Athens they learnt to live for it.

11. Agriculture continued the princ.i.p.al occupation of the citizens of Attica; other employments were left to the care of slaves. Commerce and navigation were mainly directed towards the Thracian coast and the Black sea; the spirit of trade, however, was never the prevailing one. As affairs of state became more attractive, and men desired to partic.i.p.ate in them, the want of intellectual education began to be felt, and sophists and rhetoricians soon offered their instruction. Mental expertness was more coveted than mental knowledge; men wished to learn how to think and to speak. A poetical education had long preceded the rise of this national desire; poesy now lost nothing of its value: as heretofore Homer remained the cornerstone of intellectual improvement.

Could it be that such blossoms would produce other fruits than those which ripened in the school of Socrates, in the masterpieces of the tragedians and orators, and in the immortal works of Plato?

12. These flowers of national genius burst forth in spite of many evils, inseparable from such a const.i.tution established among such a people.

Great men were pushed aside; others took their places. The loss of Themistocles was supplied by Miltiades's son Cimon; who to purer politics united equal talents. He protracted the war against the Persians in order to maintain the union of the Greeks; and favoured the aristocratic party at the same time that he affected popularity. Even his enemies learnt by experience, that the state could not dispense with a leader who seemed to have entered into a compact for life with victory.

Another expedition under Cimon; and victory by sea and land near the Eurymedon, B. C. 469. He takes possession of the h.e.l.lespontine Chersonesus, 468. Some of the Athenian confederates already endeavour to secede. Hence, 467, the conquest of Caristus in Euboea; subjection of Naxos, 466, and from 465-463, siege and capture of Thasos, under Cimon. The Athenians endeavour to obtain a firmer footing on the sh.o.r.e of Macedonia; and for that purpose send out a colony to Amphipolis, 465.

Great earthquake at Sparta; gives rise to a ten years' war, viz.

the third Messenian war or revolt of the Helots, who fortify themselves in Ithome, 465-455: in this war the Athenians, at the instigation of Cimon, send a.s.sistance to the Spartans, 461, who refuse the proffered aid. The democratic party seize the opportunity of casting on Cimon the suspicion of being in the interest of Sparta; he is banished by ostracism, 461.

13. The death of Aristides, and the banishment of Cimon, concur in elevating Pericles to the head of affairs; a statesman whose influence had begun to operate as early as 469. Less a general than a demagogue, he supported himself in authority during forty years, until the day of his death, and swayed Athens without being either archon or member of the areopagus. That under him the const.i.tution must have a.s.sumed a more democratic character, is demonstrated by the fact of his exaltation as leader of the democratic party. The aristocrats, however, contrive until 444 to set up rivals against him in the persons of the military leaders, Myronides, Tolmidas, and more particularly the elder Thucydides.

Change in the spirit of administration under Pericles, both in reference to internal and external relations. A brilliant management succeeds to the parsimonious economy of Aristides; and yet, after the lapse of thirty years, the state treasury was full.--Limitation of the power of the areopagus by Ephialtes, B.

C. 461. The withdrawal of various causes which formerly came under the jurisdiction of that tribunal must have diminished its right of moral censorship.--Introduction of the practice of paying persons who attended the courts of justice.

With regard to external relations, the precedence of the Athenians gradually advanced toward supremacy; although their relations with all the confederates were not precisely the same. Some were mere confederates; others were subjects.--Augmentation in the imposts on the confederates, and transfer of the treasury from Delos to Athens, 461. The jealousy of Sparta and the discontent of the confederates keep pace with the greatness of Athens.

Unsuccessful attempt to support by the help of an Athenian fleet and troops, Inarus of Egypt in his insurrection against the Persians, 462-458.

Wars in Greece: the Spartans instigate Corinth and Epidaurus against Athens. The Athenians, at first defeated near Haliae, in their turn rout the enemy, 458, and then carry the war against aegina, which is subdued, 457. In the new quarrel between Corinth and Megara respecting their boundaries, the Athenians side with Megara; Myronides conquers at Cimolia, 457. Expedition of the Spartans to the support of the Dorians against Phocis; and hence arises the first rupture between Athens, Sparta, and Boeotia.

First battle of Tanagra, in which the Spartans are victorious in the same year, 457. The Boeotians, incited by the Spartans, are in the second battle of Tanagra worsted by Myronides, 456. The recall of Cimon, at the suggestion of Pericles himself, in consequence of the first defeat.

14. Cimon recalled from exile, endeavours to reestablish the domestic tranquillity of Greece, and at the same time to renew the war against the Persians. He succeeds in his attempt after the lapse of five years; and the consequence is a victorious expedition against the Persians. He defeats their fleet off Cyprus, and routs their army on the Asiatic coast. The fruit of this victory is the celebrated peace with Artaxerxes I. (see above, p. 104.) Ere that peace is concluded Cimon dies, too soon for his country, while occupied with the siege of Citium.

Termination of the third Messenian war in favour of Sparta, by the cession of Ithome, B. C. 455. Meantime Athens continues the war with Peloponnesus; Tolmidas and Pericles making an incursion by sea on the enemy's territory, 455-454. At the same time Pericles, by sending out colonies to the h.e.l.lespont, endeavours to secure more firmly the Athenian power in that quarter: a colony is likewise sent out to Naxos, 453.--Cimon negotiates a truce, which is adopted first (451) tacitly, afterwards formally, (450,) for five years. The result of this truce is his victorious expedition against the Persians, and the consequent peace with that nation.

Although the conditions of the peace prescribed by Cimon were sometimes infringed, they appear to have been ratified by all parties.

15. The conclusion of peace with Persia, glorious as it was, and the death of the man whose grand political object was to preserve union among the Greeks, again aroused the spirit of internal strife. For notwithstanding nearly twenty years intervened before the tempest burst with all its fury, this period was so turbulent during its course, that Greece seldom enjoyed universal peace. While Athens by her naval strength was maintaining her ascendancy over the confederates, and while some of those confederates were raising the standard of rebellion and pa.s.sing over to Sparta, every thing was gradually combining towards the formation of a counter league, the necessary consequence of which must have been a war, such as the Peloponnesian. Up to this time Athens was at the height of her power; she was governed by Pericles, who, in every thing but the name, was sole ruler during this period, and for that reason she experienced few of the evils resulting from a democratic const.i.tution. Who, indeed, could overthrow a demagogue whose presence of mind, even in the greatest good fortune, never once deserted him; who knew how to keep alive among his fellow-citizens the conviction that, however exalted they might be, it was to him alone they were indebted for it?

During the five years' truce the sacred war for the possession of the Delphian oracle took place, and it is given by the Spartans to the city of Delphi; but after their return is given back again by the Athenians to the Phocians, B. C. 448. The Athenians commanded by Tolmidas, are defeated by the Boeotians, 447. This expedition, undertaken in opposition to the advice of Pericles, contributes to increase his influence; particularly as he reduces to obedience the revolted Euboea and Megara, 446. End of the five years' truce with Sparta; and renewal of hostilities, 445; further warlike proceedings are repressed by a new thirty years' peace, which lasts, however, only fourteen years.--Complete suppression of the aristocratic party, by the banishment of the elder Thucydides, 444; the whole administration of the state consequently centres in the hands of Pericles.--Democracy in the confederate states favoured; forcibly introduced in Samos, which, after a nine months' siege, is obliged to submit to Pericles, 440.--Commencement of the war between Corinth and Corcyra, on the subject of Epid.a.m.nus, 436, which the Corcyraeans take possession of after winning a naval victory, 435. The Athenians take part in the quarrel, and side with the Corcyraeans, 432. The rupture with Corinth, and the policy of Perdiccas II. king of Macedonia, lead to the secession of the Corinthian colony of Potidaea, which previously belonged to the Athenian confederacy: the war thereby is extended to the Macedonian coast. Engagement near Potidaea, and siege of that town, 432. The Corinthians direct their steps to Sparta, and excite the Spartans to war; which is further accelerated by the attack of the Thebans upon Plataeae, the confederate of Athens, 431.

16. The history of the twenty-seven years' war, known by the name of the Peloponnesian, or great Grecian war, which swept away the fairest flowers of Greece, is the more deserving attention from its being not merely a struggle between nations, but likewise against certain forms of government. The policy of Athens, which to establish or preserve her influence in foreign states, excited the mult.i.tude against the higher orders, had on all sides given rise to two factions, the democrat or Athenian, and the aristocrat or Spartan; and the mutual bitterness of party spirit produced the most violent disorders.

17. The respective relations of the two head states of Greece to their confederates, were at this time of a very opposite nature. Athens, as a naval power, was mistress of most of the islands and maritime cities, which, as tributary confederates, rendered for the most part a forced obedience. Sparta, as a land power, was allied with most of the states on the continent, which had joined her side of their own accord, and were not subject to tribute. Sparta therefore presented herself as the deliverer of Greece from the Athenian yoke.

Confederates of the Athenians: the islands Chios, Samos, Lesbos, all those of the Archipelago, (Thera and Melos excepted, which stood neutral,) Corcyra, Zacynthus; the Grecian colonies in Asia Minor, and on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia; in Greece itself, the cities of Naupactus, Plataeae, and those of Acarnania.--Confederates of the Spartans: all the Peloponnesians, (Argos and Achaia excepted, which stood neutral,) Megara, Locris, Phocis, Boeotia, the cities of Ambracia and Anactorium, and the island of Leucas.

18. Sketch of the internal state of Athens and Sparta at this period.

The power of Athens depended mainly on the state of her finances; without which she could not support a fleet, and without a fleet her ascendancy over the confederates would of course fall to ground. And although Pericles, notwithstanding his lavish public expenditure, was able to enter upon the war with 6,000 talents in the treasury, experience could not fail to show that, in such a democratic state as Athens was now become under Pericles, the squandering of the public money was an unavoidable evil. This evil was produced, however, at Athens much less by the peculations of individual state officers than by the demands of the mult.i.tude, who for the most part lived at the expense of the state treasury. On the other hand, Sparta as yet had no finance; and only began to feel the want of it as she began to acquire a naval power, and entered upon undertakings more vast than mere incursions.

Financial system of the Athenians. Revenue: 1. The tribute paid by the confederates ([Greek: phoroi]) increased by Pericles from four hundred and sixty to six hundred talents. 2. Income from the customs, (which were farmed,) and from the mines at Laurium. 3.

The caution money of the non-citizens: ([Greek: metoikoi].) 4. The taxes on the citizens, ([Greek: eisphorai],) which fell almost entirely on the rich, more particularly on the first cla.s.s, the members of which were not only to bear the burthen of fitting out the fleet, ([Greek: trierarchiai],) but were likewise to furnish means for the public festivals and spectacles, ([Greek: ch.o.r.egiai].) The whole income of the republic at this time was estimated at 2,000 talents. But the disburs.e.m.e.nts made to the numerous a.s.sistants at the courts of justice (the princ.i.p.al means of existence with the poorer citizens, and which, more than any thing else, contributed to the licentiousness of the democracy and the oppression of the confederates, whose causes were all brought to Athens for adjudication,) together with the expenditure for festivals and spectacles, even at this time, absorbed the greatest part of the revenue.

# F. BOEKH, _Public Economy of the Athenians_, 2 parts, Berlin, 1816. The chief work on the subject. [Ably translated by J. C.

LEWIS, esq. of Christ Church in this university.]

_Athenian Letters, or the Epistolary Correspondence of an Agent of the King of Persia, residing at Athens during the Peloponnesian war._ London, 1798, 2 vols. 4to. The production of several young authors; first printed, but not published, in 1741. This sketch comprises, not only Greece, but likewise Persia and Egypt.

19. First period of the war until the fifty years' peace. Beginning of the war unsuccessful to Athens during the first three years, under the conduct of Pericles, in whose defensive plan we may perhaps discern the infirmities of age. The Athenians, however, suffered less from the annual inroads of the Spartans than from the plague, to which Pericles himself at last fell a victim. The alliance of the Athenians with the kings of Thrace and Macedonia extended the theatre of war; on the other hand, Sparta had already conceived the idea of an alliance with Persia.

20. The death of Pericles was, for the next seven years, during which the place of that great man was supplied by Cleon a currier, followed by all the evils of an uncurbed democracy. The atrocious decrees with respect to Mitylene, which after seceding, had been recaptured, and the insurrection of the Corcyraean populace against the rich, characterized the party spirit then dominant in Greece better than the few insignificant events of a war conducted without any plan. Sparta, however, found in young Brasidas a general, such as are wont to arise in revolutionary times. His prosecution of the war on the Macedonian coast might have brought great danger to Athens, had he so early not fallen a victim to his own gallantry.

Capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas, and exile of Thucydides, 424.

Engagement near Amphipolis between Brasidas and Cleon; and death of those two generals, 422.

21. The peace now concluded for fifty years could not be of long duration, as many of the confederates on either side were discontented with its terms. All hope of tranquillity must have been at an end when the management of Athenian affairs fell into the hands of a youth like Alcibiades, in whom vanity and artifice held the place of patriotism and talent, and who thought war the only field in which he could gain credit. Against him what availed the prudence of Nicias?--Happy was it for Athens that during the whole of this period Sparta never produced one man who could match even with Alcibiades!

Attempt of some states, Corinth especially, to set Argos at the head of a new confederacy; this measure Athens likewise favours, 421.--Violation of the peace, 419; the war indirect until 415, and limited to a.s.sisting the confederates on either side.--Alcibiades's plan of giving Athens the preponderance in Peloponnesus, by an alliance with Argos, is defeated by the battle of Mantinea, 417.--Exterminating war of the Athenians waged against the Melians, who wish to preserve their neutrality, whereas neutrality in the weaker party now becomes a crime, 416.

22. Alcibiades's party brings forward at Athens the project of conquering Sicily, under the pretence of succouring the Segestani against the Syracusans. This rash expedition, in which the hopes both of the Athenians and of its instigator Alcibiades were blighted, gave to Athens the first great blow, from which she never after, even with the utmost exertion of her strength, recovered; especially as Sparta also was now become a naval power.

Early interference of the Athenians with the concerns of the Sicilian Greeks.--A fleet and army under the command of Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades, sent against Sicily, 415.--Accusation, recall, and flight of Alcibiades to Sparta: formal rupture of the peace by an inroad of the Spartans into Attica, where they fortify Decelea, 414. Unsuccessful siege of Syracuse, 414; and total annihilation of the Athenian fleet and army by the a.s.sistance of the Spartans under Gylippus, 413.

23. Fatal as in the present circ.u.mstances the blow struck in Sicily must appear to have been to Athens, yet the calamity was surmounted by Athenian enthusiasm, never greater than in times of misfortune. They maintained their supremacy over the confederates; but the part which Alcibiades, in consequence of the new posture his own personal interest had a.s.sumed at Sparta, took in their affairs, brought about a twofold domestic revolution, which checked the licentious democracy.

Alliance of the Spartans with the Persians, and indecisive engagement off Miletus--Flight of Alcibiades from Sparta to Tissaphernes; his negotiations to gain the satrap over to the interests of Athens, 411.--Equivocal policy of Tissaphernes.--Negotiations of Alcibiades with the chiefs of the Athenian army at Samos, and the consequent revolution at Athens, and overthrow of the democracy by the appointment of the supreme council of four hundred in place of the [Greek: boule], and of a committee of five thousand citizens in place of the popular a.s.sembly, 411.--The army a.s.sumes the right of debate; names Alcibiades to be its leader; but declares again for democracy.--Great commotions at Athens in consequence of the discomfiture of the fleet at Eretria, and the secession of Euboea.

Deposition of the college of four hundred, after a despotic rule of four months;--Reformation of the government;--Transfer of the highest power to the hands of the five thousand;--Recall of Alcibiades, and reconciliation with the army.

24. Brilliant period of Alcibiades's command. The reiterated naval victories won by the Athenians over the Spartans under Mindarus, who, mistrusting Tissaphernes, now forms an alliance with Pharnabazus, satrap of the north of Asia Minor, oblige the Spartans to propose peace, which haughty Athens, unluckily for herself, rejects.

Two naval engagements on the h.e.l.lespont, 411.--Great victory by sea and land won near Cyzicus, 410.--Confirmation of the Athenian dominion over Ionia and Thrace by the capture of Byzantium, 480.

Alcibiades returns covered with glory; but in the same year is deposed, and submits to a voluntary exile, 407.

25. Arrival of the younger Cyrus in Asia Minor; the shrewdness of Lysander wins him over to the Spartan interest. The republican haughtiness of Lysander's successor, Callicratidas, shown to Cyrus, was a serious error in policy; for, una.s.sisted by Persian money, Sparta was not in a condition to pay her mariners, nor consequently to support her naval establishment. After the defeat and death of Callicratidas, the command is restored to Lysander, who terminates the twenty seven years'

war triumphantly for Sparta.

Naval victory of Lysander over the Athenians at Notium, 407; in consequence of which Alcibiades is deprived of the command.--Appointment of ten new leaders at Athens; Conon among the number.--Naval victory of Callicratidas at Mitylene; Conon is shut up in the harbour of that place, 406.--Great naval victory of the Athenians; defeat and death of Callicratidas at the aeginussae islands, near Lesbos, 406.--Unjust condemnation of the Athenian generals.--Second command of Lysander, and last _decisive_ victory by sea over the Athenians at aegospotamos on the h.e.l.lespont, Dec.